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Abstract	  How	   do	   infants	   grow	   in	   and	   into	   culture?	   How	   do	   they	   become	   competent	  participants	   in	   networks	   of	   meaning-­‐making	   including	   people	   and	   artefacts?	  Typically	  research	  addressing	  these	  questions	  starts	  looking	  from	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	   year,	   when	   infants’	   early	   dyadic	   social	   interactions	   are	   supposed	   to	   turn	  “triadic”,	   that	   is,	   are	  extended	   to	   include	  objects	  and	  aspects	  of	   the	  world,	  only	  then	   giving	   rise	   to	   cultural	   learning,	   symbol	   use,	   co-­‐operative	   participation.	   In	  the	   face	   of	   mismatches	   with	   everyday	   experience	   and	   counter-­‐evidence	   from	  recent	  empirical	  studies,	  we	  revisit	  several	  research	  programs	  dealing	  explicitly	  with	  the	  development	  of	  infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  interactions	  to	  arrive	  at	  a	  critical	  appreciation	   of	   how	   the	   concept	   of	   triadic	   interaction	   and	   the	   core	   narrative	  developed.	   On	   this	   basis,	   and	   drawing	   from	   embodiment,	   situatedness,	   and	  dynamical	   systems,	   we	   construct	   our	   own	   approach	   for	   exploring	   the	  development	   of	   jointly	   practicing	   social	   object	   activities,	   which	   we	   frame	   in	  terms	  of	  attention-­‐	  and	  action-­‐coordination.	  We	  conducted	  a	  naturalistic	  longitudinal	  study	  visiting	  16	  infants	  in	  their	  homes	  once	   a	   month	   from	   3-­‐12	   months	   and	   documenting	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  interactions.	   Adapting	   techniques	   from	   interaction	   and	   conversation	   analysis,	  and	   using	   macro-­‐	   and	   micro-­‐analysis	   of	   video	   recordings,	   we	   1)	   explore	   and	  analyse	  the	  development	  of	  book	  sharing	  as	  a	  model	  activity	  over	  the	  first	  year	  of	  life,	  we	  2)	  develop	   concepts	  and	  methods	   to	   characterize	  and	  analyse	  different	  modes	   of	   engagement,	   and	   patterns	   of	   coordination,	   infants	   and	   caregivers	  employ	   in	   a	  wide	  variety	  of	   ecological	   contexts,	   and	  3)	   introduce	   the	  notion	  of	  jointly	  moving	  through	  affect-­‐imbued	  action	  arcs	  together.	  Finally,	  we	  4)	  sketch	  a	  tentative	   developmental	   trajectory	   of	   participation	   in	   social	   object	   activities,	  reconceptualising	   the	   shift	   from	   “dyadic”	   to	   “triadic”	   interactions	   as	   “jointly	  structuring	   shared	   spaces	   of	   meaning-­‐and-­‐action”	   of	   increasing	   complexity.	   In	  particular,	   we	   propose	   the	   mapping	   of	   complex	   action	   structures	   on	   familiar	  affect-­‐imbued	   action	   arcs	   as	   a	   bridge	   towards	   activities	   such	   as	   collaborative	  participation,	   symbol	   and	   conventional	   object	   use,	   cultural	   learning	   and	   co-­‐creation.	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1 General	   Introduction:	   The	   development	   of	   triadic	   infant-­‐
caregiver-­‐object	  interactions	  –	  encountering	  a	  narrative.	  
For the psychological theoretician this […] triangle will be as interesting and 
cause as many difficulties as the three-body-problem [is and does] for the 
physicist. 
Karl Bühler (1927) about 3-pole interaction. 
1.1 Investigating	  growing	  in	  and	  into	  culture	  How	  do	  we	  arrive	  at	  a	  shared	  world?	  People	   jointly	  act	   in,	  communicate	  about,	   transform	  and	  co-­‐create	   their	  world.	  They	  do	  so	  by	  smoothly	  navigating	  and	   building	   complex	   networks	   of	  meaning-­‐making	   involving	   persons,	   objects,	  and	  symbols.	  How	  do	  we	  do	  this?	  	  How,	  in	  particular,	  do	  children	  grow	  in	  and	  into	  culture?	  How	  do	  they	  become	  competent	   participants	   in	   cultural	   practices,	   in	   networks	   of	   meaning-­‐making	  including	  people	  and	  artefacts?	  Language	  and	  tool	  use,	  as	  well	  as	  more	  recently	  co-­‐operation	   as	   well	   as	   teaching	   and	   social	   learning	   are	   regarded	   as	   essential	  characteristics	  of	  human	  culture,	  as	  means	  to	  jointly	  create	  as	  well	  as	  to	  transmit	  and	   further	   develop	   them	   across	   many	   generations,	   thus	   giving	   rise	   to	   a	  cumulative	  cultural	  process	  (Tomasello,	  Kruger,	  &	  Ratner,	  1993).	  	  Researchers	   interested	   in	   the	   development	   of	   cultural	   and	   social	   learning	  typically	  focus	  on	  a	  time	  period	  starting	  from	  the	  end	  of	  the	  infant's	  first	  year	  of	  life:	   at	   this	   point	   the	   eyes	   of	   parents	   as	   well	   as	   psychologists	   are	   caught	   by	   a	  range	  of	  behaviours	  becoming	  abundant	  all	  at	   the	  same	  time:	   infants	  engage	   in	  giving	   and	   taking	   objects	   together	   with	   their	   caregivers,	   waving	   hello	   and	  goodbye,	   imitating	  acts	  on	  objects,	   following	   instructions,	   labelling	  objects,	   and	  often	   seeking	   visual	   contact	   and	   checking	   back	  with	   their	   parents	  while	   doing	  something.	   Those	   activities	   appear	   to	   make	   such	   a	   powerful	   impression	   on	  observers	   and	   are	   experienced	   as	   such	   a	   striking	   change	  by	  people	   interacting	  with	   infants	   that	   this	   period	   is	   regarded	   as	   a	   major	   shift	   in	   development,	   a	  “transition”	  from	  one	  phase	  into	  another,	  e.g.	  into	  intersubjectivity	  (Stern,	  1985)	  or	  from	  “primary”	  to	  “secondary	  intersubjectivity”	  (Trevarthen	  &	  Hubley,	  1978)	  and	  is	  sometimes	  even	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  “revolution”	  as	   in	  Tomasello's	  “9	  month	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(social-­‐cognitive)	   revolution”	   (Tomasello,	   1995)	   or	   a	   “quantum	   leap”	   (Stern,	  1985).	  What	  is	  going	  on	  here?	  What	  exactly	  is	  changing?	  How	  is	  this	  change	  coming	  about?	   Looking	   for	   something	   that	   those	   activities	   have	   in	   common,	   their	  “greatest	   common	   factor”,	   that	  which	  connects	   those	  activities	  and	  at	   the	  same	  time	  lets	  them	  stand	  apart	  from	  previous	  interactions,	  what	  is	  often	  put	  forth	  is	  the	   “triadic	   character”	   of	   these	   interactions,	   sometimes	   also	   referred	   to	   as	   a	  “referential	  triangle”	  (e.g.	  Tomasello,	  1999;	  Bates,	  Benigni,	  Bretherton,	  Camaioni,	  &	  Volterra,	  1979).	  This	  triangle	  is	  supposed	  to	  connect	  the	  activities	  of	  infant	  and	  caregiver	   to	   each	   other	   and	   to	  material	   culture	   such	   as	   objects,	   activities,	   and	  ideas.	   It	   is	   striking	   that	  otherwise	  very	  different	  accounts	  of	  child	  development	  share	   this	   emphasis	   on	   triadic	   interaction.	   Taking	   a	   closer	   look,	   “triadic	  interaction”	   is	   often	   part	   of	   a	   larger	   developmental	   narrative,	   which	   can	   be	  loosely	   summarized	   as	   follows	   (see	   Figure	   1.1	   for	   an	   illustration):	  at	   around	   9	  months,	  two	  lines	  of	  development,	  considered	  to	  be	  separate	  before	  that	  time	  –	  viz.	   dyadic	   infant-­‐caregiver	   communication	   (predominant	   in	   the	   first	   months)	  and	   infant-­‐object	   interaction	   (gaining	   predominance	   from	   6	   months)	   –	   come	  together	   in	   the	   emergence	  of	   triadic	   interactions	   as	   the	   infant	  becomes	  able	   to	  co-­‐ordinate	  engagement	  with	  people	  and	  engagement	  with	  objects	  (Bakeman	  &	  Adamson,	   1984).	  And	  only	   this	   ability	   in	   turn	   gives	   rise	   to	   conventional	   object	  understanding	  and	  use,	  language	  use	  and	  symbolic	  activities	  in	  general,	  as	  well	  as	  boosts	   forms	   of	   cultural	   learning	   such	   as	   learning	   by	   imitation	   or	   learning	   by	  instruction	  (Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  1993;	  Trevarthen	  &	  Hubley,	  1978).	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Figure	  1.1:	  Illustration	  of	  the	  developmental	  narrative	  sketching	  a	  sudden	  onset	  of	  triadic	  interactions	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  year	  around	  9	  months,	  when	  two	   lines	   of	   development	   considered	   separate	   until	   this	   point	   –	   dyadic	   infant-­‐caregiver	   communication	   and	   dyadic	   infant-­‐object	   interaction	   come	  together,	  as	   the	   infant	   is	   for	   the	   first	   time	  credited	  with	  being	  able	   to	  co-­‐ordinate	  engagement	  with	  people	  and	  objects	   (supposedly	  based	  on	  a	  newly	  emerging	  capacity	  of	  joint	  attention).	  And	  only	  this	  in	  turn	  gives	  rise	  to	  conventional	  object	  meaning	  and	  use,	  labelling,	  language	  use,	  symbol	  play,	  as	  well	  as	  cultural	  learning	  and	  co-­‐operation.	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1.2 Encountering	  the	  narrative:	  A	  first	  approximation.	  Short	  versions	  of	  this	  narrative	  can	  readily	  be	  found	  in	  introductions	  and	   opening	   sections,	   interdisciplinary	   or	   popular	   accounts	   as	   well	   as	  textbooks,	  in	  short,	  places	  where	  –	  as	  pointed	  out	  by	  Ludwik	  Fleck	  (1936)	  –	  (probably	   simplified	  but)	   securely	   established	  parts	  of	   a	   field’s	  knowledge	  can	  be	  found:	  
Six-month-old infants interact dyadically with objects, grasping and 
manipulating them [...]. If people are around when they are manipulating 
objects, they mostly ignore them and they interact dyadically with other 
people, expressing emotions back-and-forth in a turn-taking sequence [...]. 
If objects are around when they are interacting with people, they mostly 
ignore them [...]. But at around 9-12 months of age a new set of behaviors 
begins to emerge that are not dyadic, like these early behaviors, but are 
triadic in the sense that they involve a coordination of their interactions 
with objects and people, resulting in a referential triangle of child, adult, 
and the object or event to which they share attention.  (Tomasello, 1999) Does	   this	  mean	   that	   infants	   before	   the	   age	   of	   nine	  months	   literally	  live	  in,	  or	  perhaps	  rather	  enact,	  two	  different	  realms	  –	  a	  lonely	  object	  world	  and	  an	  object-­‐less	  social	  realm?	  Do	  objects	  only	  start	  to	  play	  a	  role	  in	  social	  interactions	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   first	   year	   as	   seems	   to	   be	   implied	   in	   this	  perhaps	  overly	  stringent	  version	  of	  the	  narrative?	  	  Graphical	   illustrations	   often	   give	   a	   similar	   impression:	   while	  capturing	   aspects	   of	   proto-­‐conversations	   (see	   section	   2.3.1)	   depictions	   of	  early	   dyadic	   social	   interactions	   often	   suggest	   that	   early	   interactions	   are	  exclusively	   dyadic	   (see	   Figure	   1.2),	   abstracting	   away	   the	   material	   and	  cultural	  context	  from	  the	  interaction.	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Figure	  1.2:	  Schematic	  depiction	  of	  dyadic	  interactions,	  often	  held	  to	  be	  representative	  for	  social	  interactions	  in	  general	  in	  early	  infancy	  (figure	  5.1	  in	  Moore,	  2006,	  whose	  account	  of	  early	  infancy	  is,	  however,	  much	  more	  nuanced)	  
Figure	   1.3:	   Momentary	   snapshot	   showing	   a	   4	   month	   old	   immersed	   in	   a	   rich	   cultural	  context	  involving	  people	  and	  objects,	  and	  following	  the	  motions	  of	  complex	  interchanges,	  as	  the	   mother,	   while	   holding	   and	   engaging	   with	   her	   infant	   at	   the	   end	   of	   nappy	   change,	  manages	  two	  more	  interaction	  tasks	  as	  they	  arise:	  answering	  her	  mobile	  phone	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  tending	  to	  her	  older	  daughter’s	  runny	  nose,	  with	  a	  doll	  and	  a	  nappy	  waste	  bag	  nearby	  telling	  of	  the	  ongoing	  background	  activities.	  oore	  (Moore,	  2006)	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In	   everyday	   life,	   however,	   they	   rather	   look	   like	   figure	   1.3,	   showing	   a	   4	  month-­‐old	   infant	   immersed	   in	   a	   rich	   and	   complex	   culture-­‐suffused	  everyday-­‐life	  situation	  including	  other	  people	  as	  well	  as	  objects.	  Clearly,	  infants	  are	  from	  the	  beginning	  immersed	  in	  a	  world	  of	  people	  and	  objects	  embedded	  in	  culturally	  shaped	  everyday	  life	  practices	  and	  routines,	  at	   least	   potentially	   giving	   infants	   plenty	   of	   opportunity	   for	   learning	   about	  culture,	  raising	  the	  questions	  of,	  first,	  how	  these	  routines	  are	  organised	  and	  practiced	  together,	  second,	  what	  infants	  take	  away	  from	  this	  immersion	  and	  joint	   practice,	   and,	   third,	   what	   enables	   infants	   to	   participate	   and	   take	  advantage	  of	  being	  immersed	  in	  and	  part	  of	  culture	  from	  early	  on.	  	  
1.3 “Triadic	  interaction”	  as	  “joint	  attention”	  	  A	   central	   characteristic	   of	   triadic	   interaction	   is	   a	   shared	   focus	   of	  engagement.	   This	   is	   often	   operationalized	   in	   terms	   of	   (visual)	   “joint	  attention”,	  defined	  as	  two	  people,	   typically	  mother	  and	  infant,	  attending	  to	  the	  same	  object	  and	  knowing	  that	  they	  are	  both	  attending	  to	  the	  same	  object	  (e.g.	   Tomasello,	   1995).	   This	   position	   takes	   its	   starting	   point	   mainly	   from	  research	  on	  gaze	  checking	  and	  gaze	  following	  (Carpenter,	  Nagell,	  Tomasello,	  Butterworth,	   &	   Moore,	   1998;	   Scaife	   &	   Bruner,	   1975)	   and	   accordingly	  narrows	   down	   the	   focus	   from	   Bakeman	   and	   Adamson's	   (1984)	   relatively	  general	   phrasing	   “joint	   engagement”	   with	   people	   and	   objects	   to	   (visual)	  “attention”	   as	   the	   relevant	   aspect	   to	   look	   at	   (Moore	   &	   Dunham,	   1995;	   or	  further	  differentiated	  variants	  thereof	  such	  as	  “joint	  perception”:	  Tomasello,	  Carpenter,	  Call,	  Behne,	  &	  Moll,	  2005).	  	  Moreover,	  it	  introduces	  the	  notion	  of	  “knowledge”.	  Behaviours	  that	  were	  repeatedly	  evoked	  in	  experimental	  studies,	  such	  as	  acts	  of	  gaze	  following	  are	  condensed	   to	   a	   “capacity”	   based	   on	   specific	   “knowledge”.	   By	   making	   this	  move,	   the	   approach	  leaves	   Adamson	   and	   Bakeman's	   more	   descriptive	  stance	   and	   enters	   the	   space	   of	   theoretical	   claims,	   making	   the	   researcher	  turn	  away	  from	  looking	  at	  the	  process	  and	  instead	  letting	  him/her	  engage	  in	  the	  activity	  of	  asking	  for	  and	  giving	  explanations:	  What	  kind	  of	  “knowledge”	  is	  the	  capacity	  of	  joint	  attention	  based	  on?	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At	  some	  point	  the	  tentatively	  constructed	  hypothetical	  bridge	  suggesting	  to	   explain	   joint	   attention	   by	   “understanding	   someone	   as	   an	   intentional	  agent”	  is	  crossed	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction	  turning	  “joint	  attention”	  itself	  into	  a	  criterion	  for	  “social	  understanding”	  (Tomasello,	  1995),	  which	  is	  then	  used	  to	  evaluate	  the	  (“lack	  of”)	  social	  cognition	  abilities	  in	  autism	  (e.g.	  Mundy	  &	  Newell,	   2007)	   and	   even	   rule	   out	   social	   cognition	   abilities	   in	   other	   species	  (e.g.	   Shepherd	   &	   Cappuccio,	   2011),	   thereby	   implicitly	   declaring	   the	  hypothetical	  bridge	  for	  solid	  ground.	  	  Conceptualized	   as	   a	   capacity	   “joint	   attention”	   then	   also	   makes	   its	  appearance	  as	  a	  pre-­‐requisite	  for	  more	  complex	   forms	  of	   social	   interaction	  and	   cultural	   learning	   –	   including	   social	   referencing,	   learning	   by	   imitation,	  learning	  by	  instruction,	  symbol	  play,	  joint	  labelling,	  etc.	  -­‐	  which	  therefore	  by	  definition	  become	  possible	  only	  after	  9	  months.	  	  
1.4 Counter-­‐evidence	  However,	   in	  addition	  to	  countervailing	  common-­‐sense	  impressions	  from	  everyday	   life	   experience	   (see	   above	   figure	   1.2),	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	  naturalistic	   studies	   describing	   a	   gradual	   development	   of	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	   interactions	   of	   incrementally	   increasing	   complexity	   over	   the	   first	  year,	  starting	  with	  the	  seminal	  studies	  of	  Hubley	  and	  Trevarthen	  (Hubley	  &	  Trevarthen,	  1979;	  Trevarthen	  &	  Hubley,	  1978)	  and	  Adamson	  and	  Bakeman	  (Adamson	  &	  Bakeman,	  1984,	  1985;	  Bakeman	  &	  Adamson,	  1986,	  see	  section	  2.3.2),	   as	   well	   as	   qualitative	   studies	   from	   cultural	   psychology	   (Moro	   &	  Rodríguez,	  2004;	  Zukow-­‐Goldring,	  1997,	  2012),	  and	  more	  recent	  ones	  (e.g.	  De	  Barbaro,	  Johnson,	  &	  Deák,	  2013;	  Nomikou	  &	  Rohlfing,	  2011).	  	  Moreover,	   there	   is	   growing	  evidence	   from	  experimental	   studies	   that	  1)	  infants	   show	   behaviours	   associated	  with	   cultural	   learning	  well	   before	   the	  “nine	   months	   revolution”:	   at	   six	   months,	   for	   example,	   infants	   are	   able	   to	  recognize	  everyday	  objects	  by	  their	  word	  labels	  above	  chance	  (Bergelson	  &	  Swingley,	   2012).	   They	   can	   also	   be	   credited	   with	   some	   understanding	   of	  conventional	  object	  use,	  as	  they	  show	  predictive	  gaze	  to	  the	  goal	  positions	  of	  objects	  as	  they	  are	  used	  in	  everyday	  life,	  such	  as	  a	  cup	  put	  to	  the	  mouth	  or	  a	  cell	  phone	  put	  to	  the	  ear	  (Hunnius	  &	  Bekkering,	  2010).	  2)	  Moreover,	  aspects	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of	  joint	  attention	  such	  as	  gaze	  following,	  capacities	  regarded	  as	  catalysts	  of	  cognitive	   development	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   first	   year,	   are	   present	   already	   as	  early	  as	  three	  months	  (Striano	  &	  Reid,	  2006,	  2009).	  	  	  
1.5 Aims	  of	  the	  thesis	  and	  chapter	  overview	  This	  thesis	  seeks	  to	  take	  a	   fresh	   look	  at	  early	  –	  yet	   largely	  overlooked	  –everyday	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	   interactions,	   both	   theoretically	   exploring	  how	   they	   are	   conceived	   of	   by	   different	   approaches	   in	   developmental	  psychology,	   and	   empirically	   looking	   into	   how	   they	   are	   organized	   and	   co-­‐ordinated	  by	  caregivers	  and	  infants	  in	  daily	  praxis.	  Investigating	  how	  these	  processes	  of	  co-­‐ordination	  change	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  first	  year	  we	  seek	  to	  capture	  and	  make	  tractable	  “culture	  in	  the	  making”.	  Chapter	  overview:	  
Part	  I:	  A	  critical	  theoretical	  analysis	  of	  approaches	  investigating	  infant-­‐
caregiver-­‐object	  interactions	  (chapter	  2)	  
Chapter	   2	   “The	   development	   of	   triadic	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  
interactions	  revisited”	  constitutes	  the	  first,	  theoretical	  part	  of	  the	  thesis,	  and	   engages	   in	   conceptual	   and	   historical	   analysis,	   critically	   assessing	  previous	   and	   current	   research	   programmes	   explicitly	   dealing	   with	   the	  development	   of	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	   interactions.	   I	   compare	   and	   relate	  these	   diverse	   approaches	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   backgrounds,	   aims,	   conceptual	  
frameworks,	   methods	   of	   data	   collection,	   analysis,	   as	   well	   as	   modes	   of	  
explanation,	   and	   seek	   to	   analyse	   how	   these	   shape	   the	   key	   concepts	   and	  accounts	  advocated	  by	   the	  respective	  approach.	  The	   following	  approaches,	  grouped	  together	  into	  distinct	  types	  of	  accounts,	  are	  discussed:	  
I)	  “cognitive	  complexity”	  (Piaget,	  Bates,	  and	  Sugarman-­‐Bell,	  followed	  by	  
II)	   “coordination	   of	   separate	   object	   and	   person	   realms”	   (Hubley	   and	  Trevarthen,	   and	   Adamsom	   and	   Bakeman),	   III)	   cognitive,	   individual	  
knowledge	   and	   capacity	   based	   accounts	   (exemplified	   by	   Tomasello	   &	  colleagues),	   IV)	   cultural	   accounts	   (Vygotsky,	   Rodríguez,	   and	   Zukow-­‐Goldring	   as	   different	   examples),	   and	   V)	   other	   recent	   and	   interactive	  
accounts	  .	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Such	  an	  approach-­‐analysis	  not	  only	  adresses	  1)	  the	  current	  narrative	  about	  the	  beginnings	  of	  cultural	   learning	   in	   the	  emergence	  of	   triadic	   interactions	  around	  9-­‐12	  months,	  its	  conceptual	  and	  empirical	  foundations,	  its	  different	  versions	   and	   historical	   development,	   but	   also,	  more	   generally,	   by	   locating	  this	   narrative	   within	   2)	   a	   variety	   of	   different	   accounts	   of	   infant	  development,	  it	  directs	  our	  attention	  to	  their	  scope	  and	  limits,	  and	  to	  what	  they	   each	   have	   to	   offer	   for	   developing	   an	   approach	   suitable	   to	   address,	  investigate,	  and	  better	  understand	  the	  development	  of	  increasingly	  complex	  ways	  of	  co-­‐ordinating	  social	  object	  interactions	  resulting	  in	  the	  co-­‐creation	  of	  culture.	  
Part	   II,	   An	   Empirical	   investigation	   into	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  
interactions	  over	  the	  first	  year	  of	  life:	  a	  naturalistic,	  longitudinal	  study	  
and	   examples	   of	   analysis	   of	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	   interactions	   and	  
activity	  contexts	  (chapters	  3-­‐4).	  For	  the	  second,	  empirical	  part,	  informed	  by	  and	  based	  on	  the	  theoretical	  part,	  a	  naturalistic	   longitudinal	  study	  was	  conducted,	   following	  infants	  and	  their	  caregivers	  through	  their	  everyday	   interactions	  over	  the	  course	  of	   the	  first	  year	  of	   life	  (from	  3-­‐12	  months),	   focusing	  in	  particular	  on	  –	  yet	  under-­‐researched	  -­‐	  infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  interactions	  and	  everyday	  (conventional)	  
routines.	  	  
Chapters	  3	  and	  4	  represent	  examples	  of	  different	  forms	  of	  analysis:	  first	  looking	  at	  co-­‐ordination	  in	  one	  model-­‐activity	  “book	  sharing”	  in	  detail,	  and	  then	  extending	  the	  analysis	  to	  and	  comparing	  co-­‐ordination	  across	  different	  activity	  contexts.	  
Material	   and	   methods:	   Chapter	   3,	   since	   published	   as	   a	   stand-­‐alone	  paper	   (see	   below),	   provides	   a	   self-­‐contained	   account	   of	   our	  methodology	  including	  study	  design,	  data	  collection,	  exploration,	  and	  analysis	  (qualitative	  micro-­‐analysis	  of	  multiple	  action	  strands	  combining	  ELAN	  and	  PRAAT)	  for	  a	  detailed	   investigation	   of	   one	   particular	   activity	   routine	   (see	   section	   3.2).	  Building	  on	   this,	  chapter	   4	   further	  develops	  key	  concepts	  and	  generalizes	  the	  methodology	  to	  a	  wider	  set	  of	  activities	  and	  activity	  contexts,	  including	  developing	   novel	   macro-­‐measures	   to	   distinguish	   the	   structural	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characteristics	  of	  different	  ecological	  activity	  contexts	  and	  to	  compare	  forms	  of	  co-­‐ordination	  across	  these	  (see	  section	  4.2).	  
Chapter	  3	  	  “Jointly	  structuring	  triadic	  spaces	  of	  meaning	  and	  action:	  
book	   sharing	   from	   3	   months	   on.”	   –	   published	   as	   a	   stand-­‐alone	   paper	  (Rossmanith,	  Costall,	  Reichelt,	  López,	  &	  Reddy,	  2014).	  From	   the	  300+	  hours	  of	   video	  material	  of	  diverse	  everyday	  activities	   -­‐	  we	  here	   select	   book	   sharing,	   due	   to	   its	   prototypically	   cultural	   characteristics	  and	   its	   surprisingly	   early	   and	   widespread	   occurrence,	   as	   a	   first	   model	  activity	   for	   culturally	   shaped	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	   interactions	   to	  investigate	  and	  gain	  first	   insights	   into	  how	  they	  are	  organized.	  Drawing	  on	  enactive	   cognitive	   science,	   conversation	   and	   interaction	   analysis,	   we	   use	  detailed	   qualitative	   micro-­‐analyses	   and	   investigate	   how	   the	   interaction	   is	  co-­‐ordinated	   as	   it	   unfolds,	   what	   the	   three	   poles	   –	   infant,	   caregiver,	   and	  object	   –	   each	   contribute	   to	   the	  multi-­‐modal,	  multi-­‐strand	   interaction,	   and	  how	  action-­‐and-­‐attention	  coordination	  develops	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  first	  year,	  as	  it	  becomes	  increasingly	  triadic.	  In	  chapter	  4	  “Varieties	  of	   joint	  attention-­‐and-­‐action	  coordination	  in	  
early	  everyday	  infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  activities”	  we	  then	  seek	  to	  extend	  the	   analysis	   from	   the	   example	   of	   book	   sharing	   -­‐	   testing,	   generalizing,	  adapting	   the	   concepts	   and	  methods	  developed	   there	   -­‐	   to	   a	  wider	   range	  of	  infants’	  everyday	  social	  object	  interactions.	  	  Whereas	  the	  standard	  narrative	  of	  the	  development	  of	  triadic	  interaction	  rests	   on	   only	   a	   small	   number	   of	   research	   settings	   –	   mostly	   proto-­‐conversation	   for	   early	   interactions	   and	   (staged)	   object	   play,	   labelling	   for	  later	   ones	   –	   and	   largely	   focuses	   on	   (visual)	   joint	   attention	   as	   the	   single	  crucial	   form	  of	  co-­‐ordination,	  we	  here	  seek	  to	   investigate	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object-­‐interactions	  across	  different	  ecological	  activity	  contexts,	   such	  as	  e.g.	  
feeding,	   nappy	   change,	   “witnessing”	   caregiver’s	   chores,	   peekaboo,	   object	  
exploration	   in	   baby	   gym	   etc.	   These	   differ	   in	   terms	   of	   their	   settings	   and	  activity	   structures	   and	   hence	  may	   afford,	   different	   forms	   of	   (multi-­‐modal,	  multi-­‐strand)	  attention-­‐and-­‐action-­‐co-­‐ordination.	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As	  this	  constitutes	  a	  larger	  ongoing	  research	  project	  exceeding	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  current	  thesis	  chapter	  4	  focuses	  on:	  	  -­‐ Developing	   concepts	   and	   a	   tentative	   method,	   in	   particular	   marco-­‐analytic	  measures,	  allowing	  us	  to	  distinctively	  capture	  the	  structural	  characteristics	  of	  different	  ecological	  contexts	  and	  compare	  forms	  of	  co-­‐ordination	  across	  these	  contexts.	  -­‐ Documenting	   the	   process	   and	   results	   of	   macro-­‐analysis	   in	   more	  detail	   for	   one	   examplar	   ecological	   activity	   context:	   infant-­‐directed	  caregiving	  tasks	  involving	  objects.	  -­‐ Conducting	   a	   detailed	   micro-­‐analysis	   for	   nappy	   change	   as	   an	  example	  of	  a	  particularly	  rich	  type	  of	  infant-­‐directed	  caregiving	  task,	  analysing	  and	  illustrating	  the	  complex	  temporal	  dynamic	  patterns	  of	  multi-­‐modal,	   multi-­‐strand	   co-­‐ordination	   with	   distinctive	   functional	  infant	   participation,	   which	   is	   already	   seen	   in	   specific	   joint	   object	  routines	  from	  3	  months.	  	  
Part	  III:	  	  Integration	  of	  empirical	  and	  theoretical	  parts	  	  The	   final	   part	   of	   the	   thesis	   seeks	   to	   integrate	  what	   has	   been	   gained	   from	  conceptual	  analysis	   in	   the	   theoretical	  part	  and	  what	  has	  been	  gained	   from	  empirical	   observational	   analysis	   and	   to	   reframe	   and	   reconceptualize	   the	  problems	  and	  challenges	  of	  the	  development	  of	  triadic	  interaction.	  Chapters	  
5	  and	  6	  explore	  through	  two	  examples	  –	  the	  development	  of	  understanding	  “self	   and	   other”	   and	   the	   development	   of	   participation,	   respectively	   –	   how	  this	  approach	  can	  be	  applied	  longitudinally	  and	  what	  it	  then	  can	  contribute	  to	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  development.	  	  
Chapter	   5	   “Structure	   and	   Openness	   in	   the	   Development	   of	   Self	   in	  
Infancy”	   is	   a	   spin-­‐off	   paper,	   which	   takes	   the	   reader	   on	   an	   excursion	   to	  explore	   how	   a	   second-­‐person	   approach	   in	   combination	   with	   the	   view	   of	  infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	   interaction	   developed	   in	   this	   thesis	   may	   open	   up	  new	   perspectives	   on	   the	   development	   of	   “self”	   and	   “other”.	   It	   has	   been	  published	  as	  a	   stand-­‐alone	  paper	   in	   the	   Journal	  of	  Consciousness	  Studies	   as	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part	  of	  a	  dialogue	  about	  the	  “self”	  between	  psychological	  and	  philosophical	  approaches	  and	  spiritual	  traditions	  (Rossmanith	  &	  Reddy,	  2016).	  	  Triadic	   interaction,	   seen	   as	   related	   to	   the	   ability	   to	   co-­‐ordinate	   people	  and	   objects,	   implying,	  more	   generally,	   the	   ability	   to	   take	   into	   account	   the	  relation	   between	   two	   things,	   has	   been	   ascribed	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	  development	   of	   the	   self,	   either	   as	   opening	   the	   door	   to	   intersubjectivity	  proper,	   understanding	   self	   and	   other	   as	   “minds”	   with	   a	   hidden	   (albeit	  shareable)	   inner	   life	   (Stern	   1984),	   or	   emphasising	   how	   over	   time	   the	  triangulation	  with	  caregiver	  and	  objects	  allows	  to	  reflectively	  see	  the	  self	  in	  relation	   to	  other	  people	   from	  the	  perspective	  of	  other	  people,	   leading	   to	  a	  more	  distanced,	  objectified	  understanding	  of	  self	  (e.g.	  Davidson,	  Fuchs).	  	  Here,	   however	   –	   applying	   and	   testing	   the	   approach	   developed	   in	   this	  thesis:	   that	   triadic	   interaction	   is	   grounded	   in	   and	   constituted	   by	   a	  (developing)	  network	  of	   jointly	  created	  shared	  action	  structures	  –	  we	   look	  at	   self-­‐and-­‐other	   development	   in	   a	   novel	   way:	   and	   ask:	   what	   role	   do	   1)	  participating	   in	   joint	   object	   routines,	   2)	   jointly	   creating	   action	   structures	  and	   3)	   these	   created	   action	   structures	   themselves	   –	   over	   time	   forming	  shared	   sense-­‐and-­‐action-­‐scapes	   –	   play	   in	   the	   development	   of	   infants’	  experience	  and	  understanding	  of	  “self”,	  “other”,	  and	  “together-­‐	  or	  we-­‐ness”?	  
In	  chapter	  6	  “The	  development	  of	  participation	  in	  infant-­‐caregiver-­‐
object	   practices:	   changes	   in	   attention-­‐and-­‐action	   co-­‐ordination”,	   we	  take	  up	  concepts	  and	  methods	  developed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapters	  and	  show	  how	   they	   can	   be	   used	   longitudinally	   to	   investigate	   and	   understand	   the	  development	  of	  triadic	  infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  interactions,	  here	  focusing	  on	  the	  example	  of	  how	  participation	  in	  social	  object	  routines	  develops.	  We	   first	   revisit	   common	   rational	   and	   knowledge-­‐based	   notions	   of	  participation,	   joint	  action,	  and	  co-­‐operation	  and	  reframe	   them	   into	  a	  more	  embodied	   and	   situated	   version,	   emphasising	   co-­‐ordination	   and	   jointly	  orienting	  in	  shared	  spaces	  of	  meaning	  and	  action.	  	  Using	  examples	  from	  our	  data	  and	  building	  on	  and	  extending	  the	  results	  of	  our	  analyses	  in	  part	  II,	  we	  then	   sketch	   a	   tentative	   trajectory	   of	   how	   participation	   in	   social	   object	  activities	   develops	   in	   terms	   of	   attention-­‐action-­‐coordination	   over	   the	   first	  year	  of	   life.	  We	  discuss	   the	  potential	   role	  of	   “jointly	  enacted	  affect-­‐imbued	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action	   arcs”	   later	   turning	   into	   “systemically	   structured	   shared	   sense-­‐and-­‐action-­‐scapes”	  as	  key	  factors	  enabling	  infants	  to	  understand	  and	  participate	  in	  complex	  activities.	  
Finally	   in	  7	  Conclusions,	   general	  discussion	  and	  outlook,	  we	  briefly	  revisit	  and	  summarize	  the	  conclusions	  of	  the	  respective	  chapters	  and	  relate	  them	  to	  the	  literature,	  and	  compare	  and	  contrast	  them	  with	  the	  accounts	  of	  the	  development	  of	  triadic	  interaction	  revisited	  in	  chapter	  2.	  We	  discuss	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  current	  study	  and	  –	  giving	  a	  brief	  outlook	  –	  sketch	  possible	  next	  steps	  to	  further	  develop	  research	  beyond	  those	  limits.	  	  	  As	  we	  conceive	  of	  “thinking”	  as	  embodied	  and	  situated	  engaging	  with	  the	  world,	  affecting	  and	  being	  affected	  by	  it,	  and	  conceive	  of	  “research”	  as	  also	  including	   “conversation	   with	   materials”	   (Schön,	   1983)	   –	   we	   consider	   this	  thesis	   as	   a	   collection	   of	   “thinking	   and	  working	  materials”,	   having	   resulted	  from	   engagement	   with	   empirical	   research	   and	   its	   products	   (such	   as	  literature	  and	  video	  data).	  They	  provide	  a	  palpable	  target	  for	  engagement	  in	  the	  process	  of	  developing	  an	  approach	  which	  allows	  to	  address,	  investigate,	  and	   better	   understand	   the	   development	   of	   joint	   co-­‐ordination	   of	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  interactions.	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Part	   I:	  A	  critical	   theoretical	  analysis	  of	  approaches	   investigating	   infant-­‐
caregiver-­‐object	  interactions	  	  
2 The	   development	   of	   triadic	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  
interactions	  revisited	  
2.1 Aims	  of	  this	  chapter	  In	   the	   introduction	   (see	   section	   1.2-­‐3)	   we	   carved	   out	   a	   core	   narrative	  about	  the	  development	  of	  triadic	  interactions	  common	  to	  many	  accounts	  in	  developmental	   psychology:	   two	   separate	   lines	   of	   development	   –	   dyadic	  infant-­‐caregiver	  communication	  and	  dyadic	  infant-­‐object	  interaction	  –	  come	  together	   around	   9	   months	   in	   triadic	   interactions	   only	   then	   giving	   rise	   to	  cultural	   learning,	   symbol	   use,	   and	   co-­‐operative	   participation.	   On	   closer	  inspection	   this	   framework	   of	   separate	   lines	   of	   development	   is	   based	   on	   a	  narrow	  and	  selective	  reading	  of	  the	  evidence	  from	  the	  literature,	  is	  at	  odds	  with	   some	   of	   the	   evidence	   from	   everyday	   life	   as	   well	   as	   naturalistic	   and	  experimental	  studies,	  and	  in	  particular	  when	  it	  posits	  a	  sudden	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  “capacity”,	  actually	  prevents	  researchers	  from	  even	  taking	  a	  closer	  look	   at	   earlier	   periods	   and	   blocks	   the	   generation	   of	   new	   hypotheses	   or	  insights	   that	   would	   allow	   us	   to	   better	   understand	   the	   processes	   of	  development	  (see	  sections	  1.4).	  Therefore	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  chapter	  is	  to	  revisit	  accounts	  explicitly	  dealing	  with	   the	   early	   development	   of	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	   interaction,	   the	  emergence	   of	   sharing	   a	   world,	   growing	   in	   and	   into	   culture,	   and,	   in	  particular,	   the	  narrative	  about	   the	  emergence	  of	   triadic	   interactions	  out	  of	  previously	   separated	   social	   and	   object	   domains,	   and	   investigate	   this	  narrative’s	  conceptual	  and	  empirical	  background.	  To	  do	  so,	  we	  will	  discuss	  in	   the	   following	   section	   a	   set	   of	   research	  programs	  dealing	   explicitly	  with	  the	  development	  of	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	   interactions.	  As	   the	  approaches	  are	  very	  diverse,	  coming	  from	  different	  traditions,	  fields	  and	  eras,	  and	  as	  we	  seek	   to	   understand	   how	   the	   approach	   and	   methods	   used	   influence	   the	  results	  and	  accounts	  given	  (compare	  Bühler,	  1927;	  Fleck,	  1936),	  we	  will	  give	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each	  approach	  more	  space	  than	  in	  the	  usual	  review	  section	  of	  a	  paper.	  We	  will	   give	   a	   short	   summary	   (mostly	   letting	   the	   approaches	   speak	   for	  themselves)	   and	   analysis	   concerning	   their	   backgrounds,	   aims,	   conceptual	  frameworks,	   methods	   of	   data	   collection	   and	   analysis,	   and	   modes	   of	  explanation	   for	   each	   approach	   to	   stand	   and	   to	   be	   understood	   in	   its	   own	  right.	   	  As	  we	  conceive	  of	   thinking	  as	  embodied	  and	  situated	  engaging	  with	  the	  world,	   and	  of	   research	  as	   also	   including	   “conversation	  with	  materials”	  (Schön,	   1983)	   –	   we	   consider	   these	   condensed	   sketches	   as	   “thinking	   and	  working	  material”,	   for	  ourselves	  and	  perhaps	  also	  useful	  for	  others	  as	  they	  allow	   to	   literally	   put	   all	   accounts	   next	   to	   each	   other	   on	   a	   workspace	   to	  compare	   and	  work	  with.	   In	   this	   comparison	  we	   try	   not	   to	   (mis-­‐)construe	  them	  merely	   as	   strawmen	   to	   set	   our	   own	   approach	   apart,	   nor	   to	   pretend	  that	  they	  all	  fit	  into	  one	  framework	  right	  away,	  contributing	  different	  “facts”	  in	  favour	  of	  or	  “falsifying”	  certain	  claims	  in	  one	  single	  framework.	  Rather	  we	  seek	  to	  let	  them	  stand	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  compare	  and	  relate	  them	  to	  each	  other	   to	   organize	   them,	   and	   then	   understand	   them	   through,	   their	  similarities	   and	   differences,	   and	   explore	   their	   respective	   scope	   and	   limits.	  We	   do	   so	   to	   explore	  what	   they	   can	   contribute	   to	   developing	   an	   approach	  suitable	   for	   investigating	   the	   development	   of	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  practices	  with	  regard	  to	  attention	  and	  action	  co-­‐ordination.	  	  
	  
A	   comparison	   of	   different	   accounts	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   triadic	  
interactions	  
2.2 Accounts	   I:	   General	   cognitive	   complexity	   and	   differentiation	  
(Piaget,	  Bates,	  Sugarman-­‐Bell)	  In	   this	   section	   we	   discuss	   approaches	   which	   set	   out	   to	   explain	   the	  developments	  over	  the	  first	  year	  and,	  in	  particular,	  the	  changes	  toward	  the	  end	  of	  it,	  in	  terms	  of	  and	  by	  linking	  them	  to	  processes	  of	  general	  intelligence	  becoming	   increasingly	   complex	   and	   differentiated	   (including	   in	   particular	  the	  development	  and	  understanding	  of	  instrumental	  means-­‐end	  actions).	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1)	  The	  starting	  point	  for	  our	  exploration	  of	  different	  accounts	  will	  be	  Jean	  Piaget.	  Even	   though	   Jean	  Piaget	  was	  not	  himself	  explicitly	   concerned	  with,	  nor	   explicitly	   addressed	   the	   development	   of	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  interactions,	   his	   approach	   was	   largely	   formative	   for	   developmental	  psychology,	   and	  his	   infamous	   “neglect”	  of	   early	   social	   interactions	  actually	  prompted	   several	   generations	   of	   researchers	   to	   explore	   the	   field	   of	   early	  infant	  social	  interaction.	  Piaget’s	  approach	  has	  explicitly	  or	  implicitly	  shaped	  their	   research	   frameworks	   (even	   as	   they	   sought	   to	   set	   themselves	   apart	  from	  it),	  so	  an	  appreciation	  of	  Piaget’s	  approach	  seems	  a	  necessary	  starting	  point	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   the	   development	   of	   research	   on	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  interactions.	  	  We	   then	   move	   on	   to	   two	   examples	   among	   the	   pioneering	   language	  researchers	   who	   sought	   to	   investigate	   preverbal	   communication	   in	   the	  1970s,	  and,	  in	  order	  to	  do	  so,	  drew	  on	  and	  extended	  Piaget’s	  framework	  into	  the	  social	  realm:	  2)	  Elisabeth	  Bates	  and	  colleagues,	  combining	  the	  frameworks	  of	  Austin’s	  speech	   act	   theory	   and	   Piaget’s	   sensorimotor	   intelligence	   model	   to	  investigate	   the	   onset	   of	   “intentional	   communication”	   in	   form	   of	   proto-­‐imperatives	  and	  proto-­‐declaratives.	  And	  3)	   Susan	   Sugarman-­‐Bell,	   analysing	   the	   development	   of	   infants’	   co-­‐ordination	   of	   person	   and	   object-­‐directed	   actions	  within	   social	   contexts	   in	  terms	  of	  action	  complexity.	  	  
2.2.1 Jean	  Piaget	  (1936,	  1945):	  Co-­‐ordinating	  secondary	  circular	  reactions	  in	  
novel	   contexts	   as	   the	   first	   truly	   intentional	   actions	   marking	   the	  
beginnings	  of	  intelligence.	  
2.2.1.1 Background,	  interest,	  and	  theoretical	  framework	  Coming	   from	   Biology	   and	   inclined	   towards	   philosophical	   questions,	  Piaget	   was	   interested	   in	   the	   continuity	   between	   1)	   the	   development	   of	  	  biological	   form	   in	   interaction	  with	  and	  adaptation	   to	   the	  environment	  and	  2)	  the	  development	  of	  structures	  of	  “mind”,	  in	  particular	  complex	  systems	  of	  thought	  such	  as	  logic	  and	  mathematics.	  For	  our	  current	  context	  we	  can	  just	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briefly	  note,	  that	  these	  are	  frequently	  seen	  both	  as	  “proto-­‐typical”	  forms	  as	  well	  as	  pinnacles	  of	  thought,	  often	  closely	  linked	  to	  human	  culture,	  both	  as	  hallmarks	  and	  motors.	  Given	   the	  difficulties	   in	   getting	   at	   the	   evolution	   of	  mind	   (which	  doesn’t	  fossilize),	   Piaget	   turned	   to	   ontogeny	   engaging	   in	   a	   kind	   of	   [behavioural]	  “embryology	  of	  intelligence”	  (Piaget,	  1971,	  1976;	  Newson	  &	  Newson,	  1975)	  
2.2.1.2 Empirical	  investigation	  After	   investigating	   the	   logical	   thinking	   of	   school	   children	   through	  conversation,	  Piaget	   in	   the	  1920s	  and	  1930s	  turned	  to	  explore	   the	  earliest	  forms	   of	   intelligence	   by	   observing	   and	   testing	   his	   own	   three	   children,	  seeking	   to	   demonstrate	   how	   these	   early	   forms	   of	   intelligence	   grow	  out	   of	  infants’	   interactions	   with	   their	   (object)	   world	   (even	   before	   the	   onset	   of	  language)	  from	  which	  the	  infant	  constructs	  increasingly	  complex	  structures	  of	  mind.	  	  	  
2.2.1.3 Resulting	   account	   of	   intelligence	   emerging	   from	   sensorimotor	  
interaction	  In	  his	  resulting	  account	  of	  early	  sensorimotor	  development,	  The	  origin	  of	  
intelligence	   in	   the	   child	   (Piaget,	   1936),	   he	   distinguishes	   a	   sequence	   of	  cumulative,	  increasingly	  complex	  phases	  and/or	  levels	  of	  engaging	  with	  the	  world,	  resulting	  in	  increasingly	  complex	  mental	  structures:	  As	  infants	  exercise	  basic	   reflex	  actions	  such	  as	  sucking	  (sensorimotor	  
stage	   I),	   they	   soon	   seek	   to	   sustain	   the	   experience	   and	   extend	   the	   reflex	  activity	  beyond	  its	  primary	  function	  and	  immediate	  context	  for	  its	  own	  sake,	  e.g.	   from	  drinking	   to	   sucking	   the	   thumb	   (assimilating	   new	   contexts	   to	   the	  action),	  thus	  engaging	  in	  self-­‐reinforcing	  activity	  dubbed	  “primary	  circular	  
reactions”	   (sensorimotor	   stage	   II)	   by	   Piaget	   (following	   Baldwin	   and	  Wallon),	   leading	   to	   the	   development	   of	   their	   first	   acquired	   adaptations:	  
habits.	   Through	   variation	   inherent	   in	   these	   extended	   actions	   they	   make	  new	  experiences	  and	  through	  seeking	   to	  sustain	  or	  recreate	  some	  of	   these	  experiences	   their	   action	   varieties	   differentiate	   (accommodating	   to	   these	  new	  experiences	  and	  contexts)	  into	  new	  distinct	  habits.	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For	   Piaget	   the	   next	   qualitative	   change	   (and	   hence	   the	   beginning	   of	  
sensorimotor	   stage	   III)	   occurs	   as	   infants	   from	   around	   3	  months	   extend	  these	   self-­‐reinforcing	   circular	   reactions	   from	   sustaining	   and	   recreating	  interesting	   bodily	   experiences	   to	   sustaining	   and	   recreating	   interesting	  effects	   on	   objects	   (thus	   even	   further	   removed	   from	   basic	   bodily	   need	  satisfaction)	  –	  hence	  called	  secondary	  circular	  reactions.	  Even	  though	  the	  secondary	   circular	   reactions	  may	   already	   provide	   the	   infant	  with	   a	   broad	  repertoire	  of	  actions,	  they	  still	  are	  habits,	  accidentally	  discovered	  and	  then	  sustained,	  and	  are	  only	  adaptively	  used	   in	  specific	   familiar	  contexts	  where	  they	  are	  applied	  repetitively	  –	  thus	  still	  distinct	  from	  intelligence	  considered	  as	  an	  “adaptation	  to	  a	  novel	  situation”.	  	  In	  contrast,	  consider	  the	  following	  situation:	  an	  infant,	  who	  is	  confronted	  with	   a	   pillow	   blocking	   his	   reach	   to	   a	   desired	   object	   –	   rather	   than	  unsuccessfully	   repeating	   his	   reaching	   schemes	   toward	   the	   object	   –	   first	  pushes	  down	  the	  pillow,	  and	  then	  reaches	  for	  the	  object.	  Seeking	  to	  trace	  the	  emergence	  of	  intelligence,	  these	  first	  instrumental	  means-­‐end	  actions,	  which	  he	  observed	  in	  his	  children	  around	  8-­‐9	  months,	  are	  of	  major	  importance	  to	  Piaget	   and	   for	   him	   constitute	   a	   major	   developmental	   milestone	   (labelled	  
sensorimotor	   stage	   IV),	   as	   they	   mark	   the	   first	   forms	   of	   a)	   intentional	  
action	  and	  b)	   intelligence	  proper	  and	  are	  closely	  linked	  to	  the	  first	  forms	  of	  “representation”	  and	  the	  central	  concept	  of	  “object	  permanence”,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  processes	  of	  “objectification”	  and	  “spatialization”	  of	  causality	  (Piaget,	  1955)	  Thus	   already	  Piaget	   speaks	   of	   a	  major	   qualitative	   shift	   occurring	   in	   the	  period	   around	   8-­‐9	   months	   of	   age	   –	   at	   the	   same	   point	   in	   time	   and	   hence	  equivalent	   to	   what	   the	  modern	   developmental	   narratives	   refer	   to	   as	   “the	  quantum	  leap”,	  “the	  socio-­‐cognitive	  revolution”,	  etc.	  However,	  as	  Piaget	  was	  not	  concerned	  with	  triadic	  infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  interaction	  –	  indeed	  was	  at	   this	  point	  not	   concerned	  with	   social	   interactions	  at	   all,	   he	   framed	   these	  changes	   in	  a	  different	  way	   than	  “dyadic	   interaction	  converging	   into	   triadic	  ones”	   and	   valued	   them,	   as	   mentioned	   above,	   for	   different	   reasons:	   he	  conceived	  of	  them	  as	  a)	  the	  first	  truly	  intentional	  actions	  and	  valued	  them	  as	  b)	  the	  first	  manifestations	  of	  intelligence	  proper.	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Let	   us	   take	   a	   closer	   look:	   The	   action	   described	   above	   counts	   as	   a	  demonstration	  of	  true	  intelligence,	  insofar	  as	  it	  constitutes	  an	  “adaptation	  
to	   a	   novel	   situation”	   (the	   object	   of	   desire	   is	   suddenly	   blocked),	   newly	  combining	   two	   familiar	   actions	   (pushing	   down	   pillow	   and	   reaching	   for	  object)	  in	  a	  novel	  way	  and	  subjecting	  them	  to	  an	  overarching	  new	  goal.	  	  Conversely,	   as	   Piaget	   was	   struggling	   with	   existing	   definitions	   of	  
“intention”	  which	  were	  either	  too	  narrow	  (considered	  as	  actions	  controlled	  by	   language	   related	   representations)	   or	   too	   vague	   (considered	   as	   actions	  controlled	  by	  any	  conscious	  awareness	  or	  expectation),	  he	  sought	  to	  define	  the	  notion	  of	  intentionality	  from	  the	  organism’s	  perspective:	  he	  speaks	  of	  an	  
organism	   having	   an	   intention	  when	   it	   is	   able	   to	   separate	   out	   a	   goal	  
from	  the	  action	  and	  keep	   it	   in	  mind,	  persistently	  pursuing	  it	  even	  in	  the	  face	  of	  obstacles.	  For	  Piaget,	  this	  ability	  develops	  out	  of	  secondary	  circular	  reactions	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  As	  a	  specific	  goal	  arises	  for	  the	  organism,	  e.g.	  the	  tendency	  to	  grasp	   or	   move	   a	   specific	   object,	   but	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   new,	   unfamiliar	  situation	   (e.g.	   the	   object	   is	   blocked	  by	   an	   obstacle),	   the	   holistic	   secondary	  circular	   reaction	   –	   containing	   as	   an	   undifferentiated	   unit	   the	   arising	   goal	  and	  the	  grasping	  action	  realizing	  it	  –	  cannot	  proceed	  as	  usual,	  but	  is	  broken	  up.	  Only	  now,	  as	  the	  goal	  cannot	  be	  reached	  immediately,	  an	  organism	  can	  begin	  to	  distinguish	  and	  hence	  perceive	  desires	  or	  goals	  (as)	  separate	  from	  the	  means	  to	  realize	  them.	  As	  much	  as	  Piaget	  stresses	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  organism	  and	  proposes	  a	   story	   about	   how	   the	   organism	   may	   learn	   to	   distinguish	   and	   hold	   an	  intention,	  taking	  a	  closer	  look,	  this	  specific	  definition	  of	  intentionality	  seems	  above	  all	  a	  definition	  that	  allows	  the	  investigating	  observer	  to	  attribute	  
the	  existence	  of	  a	  separate	  goal	  to	  another	  organism	  without	  doubt.	  As	  for	   an	   observer	   an	   action	   unit	   is	   here	   made	   visible	   and	   defined	   through	  behaviour	  directed	  at	  an	  object	  as	  its	  visible	  goal,	  two	  objects	  are	  needed	  –	  	  with	  one	  serving	  as	  an	  obstacle	  –	  to	  make	  an	   intention	  visible,	  resulting	   in	  the	  setup	  described	  above:	  the	  infant,	  instead	  of	  directly	  attempting	  to	  grasp	  the	  desired	  object,	  acts	  on	  the	  second	  object	  as	  she	  would	  usually	  do,	  but	  not	  for	  its	  own	  sake	  as	  she	  removes	  rather	  than	  attains	  the	  object	  and	  does	  not	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confine	  herself	  to	  the	  first	  action,	  but	  continues	  to	  combine	  it	  with	  a	  second	  one,	   now	   grasping	   for	   the	   first	   –	   apparently	   desired	   –	   object,	   allowing	   to	  infer	   that	   grasping	   the	   first	   object	   had	   been	   the	   intention	   singled	   out	   and	  kept	  in	  mind	  all	  along.	  	  	  However,	   in	   these	   first	   instrumental	  means-­‐end	   actions	   the	   infant	   only	  
uses	   familiar	  action	  schemas	  and	  directly	  acts	  on	   the	  objects	  as	  he/she	  
usually	   does:	   first	   pushing	   down	   the	   pillow,	   then	   grasping	   the	   object.	   It	  takes	  another	  2-­‐3	  months	  until	  the	  infant	  from	  around	  12	  months	  on,	  starts	  
systematically	   varying	   object	   schemas	   for	   experimentation	   (stage	   V:	  
tertiary	   circular	   reactions),	   and	   through	   such	   experimentation	   finds	  
novel	   means	   to	   specific	   goals,	   e.g.	   using	   a	   stick	   not	   for	   banging	   on	   an	  object,	  but	  as	  a	  means	  for	  fetching	  an	  out	  of	  reach	  object.	  	  Piaget’s	   characterization	   of	   the	   changes	   occurring	   at	   8-­‐9	  months	   as	   the	  onset	  of	  intentionality	  in	  the	  form	  of	  instrumental	  means-­‐end	  actions	  (stage	  IV),	   as	   well	   as	   his	   characterization	   of	   more	   complex	   tool-­‐mediated	  instrumental	   actions	   (stage	   V)	   had	   great	   impact	   on	   what	   came	   to	   be	   the	  modern	   developmental	   narrative	   about	   the	   development	   of	   triadicity.	   It	  provided	   the	   frame	   for	   generations	   of	   researchers	   to	   work	   from,	   either	  building	   on	   Piaget	   explicitly,	   such	   as	   Bates	   and	   Sugarman	   (see	   below)	   as	  well	  as	  Tomasello	  (section	  2.4),	  or	  seeking	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  his	  framework	  (e.g.	  Trevarthen,	  see	  section	  2.3.1).	  To	  arrive	  at	  modern	  versions	  of	  the	  narrative,	  much	  has	  been	  added	  to	  this	  frame,	  both	  methodologically	  as	  well	  as	  theoretically,	   including	  –	  crucially	  –	  sociality,	  as	  will	  be	  explored	  in	  the	  next	  sections.	  However,	   for	   Piaget	   this	   was	   not	   the	   end	   of	   an	   infant’s	   journey	   from	  sensorimotor	  interactions	  to	  thinking.	  According	  to	  him,	  it	  takes	  yet	  another	  couple	  of	  months	  until	  (from	  around	  16	  months)	  the	  infant	  can	  effectively	  solve	   problems	   using	   tools	   in	   a	   novel	   situation	  without	   engaging	   in	   overt	  experimentation	   but	   by	   thought	   and	   insight	   alone	   (e.g.	   using	   a	   nearby	  stick	   to	   fetch	   an	   out	   of	   reach	   object	  without	   ever	   having	   done	   so	   before).	  Thus,	   with	   this	   invention	   via	   imagination	   the	   infant	   now	   not	   only	   has	  exercised	   the	   earliest	   forms	   of	   true	   internal	   thinking	   (and	   has	   thus	  achieved	   Stage	   VI:	   The	   invention	   of	   new	   means	   through	   mental	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combination),	  but	  also	  the	  ground	  has	  been	  laid,	  in	  principle,	  to	  contribute	  –	  in	  combination	  with	  language	  –	  to	  culture	  creation.	  More	  about	  the	  development	  of	  the	  foundations	  of	  language	  –	  symbol	  use	  –	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Piaget’s	  “Play,	  Dreams	  and	  Imitation	  in	  Childhood”	  (1962),	  where	   he	   lays	   out	   the	   development	   of	   symbol	   play	   –	   along	   with	   the	  
development	  of	   imitation,	  another	  ability	  considered	  crucial	  for	  culture	  –	  again	  both	  seen	  as	  more	  or	  less	  solitary	  processes	  rooted	  exclusively	  in	  the	  individual,	   emerging	   out	   of	   the	   individual	   children’s	   interaction	  with	   their	  world.	  	  According	  to	  Piaget,	  symbol	  or	  pretend	  play	  develops	  when	  infants	  –	  exercising	   their	   repertoire	   –	   begin	   to	   perform	   various	   actions	   on	  inappropriate	  objects	  repeatedly	  and	   in	   increasingly	  ritualised	   form	  –	  thus	  not	   serving	   any	   functional	   adaptation	   but	   apparently	   done	  merely	   for	   joy	  (e.g.	  pretending	  to	  sleep	  by	  using	  a	  cloth,	  piece	  of	  coat,	  or	  tail	  of	  a	  donkey	  as	  a	  pillow	  and	  laughing)	  and	  by	  doing	  so	  start	  to	  separate	  actions	  from	  their	  
context	  and	  using	  objects	  as	  “symbols”	  standing	  for	  something	  else.	  
2.2.1.4 Piaget’s	  individualist	  account	  and	  “neglect”	  of	  the	  social	  	  Thus	  Piaget	  has	  accounted	  for	  several	  abilities	  often	  taken	  to	  be	  “pillars”	  of	   culture,	   such	   as	   instrumental	   reasoning,	   imitation,	   and	   symbol	   use,	  exclusively	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  active	  individual’s	  cognitive	  or	  mental	  structures	  developing	   from	   autonomous	   interactions	   with	   the	   object-­‐world,	   without	  ascribing	  any	  major	  role	  to	  –	  or	  even	  taking	  into	  account	  –	  the	  infant’s	  social	  world	  and	  interactions.	  “The	   social”	   for	   Piaget	   only	   seems	   to	   play	   a	   role	   for	   acquiring	   certain	  cultural-­‐specific	   content	   (such	  as	   specific	   language	   signs,	  words,	  which	   for	  Piaget	  are	  based	  on	  arbitrary	  social	  conventions	  not	  discoverable	  for	  infants	  on	  their	  own,	  as	  well	  as	  morals),	  rather	  than	  for	  developing	  most	  of	  the	  basic	  mental	  structures	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  some	  aspects	  of	  logic,	  Lourenço	  &	  Machado,	   1996).	   He	   even	   at	   times	   seems	   to	   consider	   social	   interaction	   as	  potentially	  harmful:	  for	  research,	  as	  it	  might	  conceal	  what	  an	  infant	  is	  “truly”	  able	   to	   do	   on	   his/her	   own,	   and	   for	   development	   in	   general,	   distorting,	   or	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interfering	  with	  natural	   development	   (see	   e.g.	   his	   comments	  when	   setting	  apart	  true	  imitation	  from	  pseudo-­‐imitation	  in	  Piaget,	  1945,	  1962)1.	  Piaget’s	   “neglect	   of	   the	   social”	   has	   famously	   prompted	   much	   criticism:	  Bruner’s	   comments	   from	  his	   autobiography,	   neatly	   compiled	  by	  Adamson,	  paint	   the	  world	   of	   the	   Piagetian	   infant	   under	   the	   exclusion	   of	   sociality	   in	  gloomy	  colours:	  	  
To Bruner, Piaget’s child appeared to be “a calm and a lone one” (p. 139). 
Bruner also saw the world as “a quiet place” where “he is virtually alone” 
in "a world of objects that he must array in space, time and causal 
relationships. He begins his journey egocentrically and must impose 
properties on the world that will eventually be shared with others. But 
others give him little help. The social reciprocity of infant and mother plays 
a very small role in Piaget’s account of development. And language gives 
neither hints nor even a means of unraveling the puzzles of the world to 
which language applies. (J. S. Bruner, 1983, p. 138; Adamson, 1995) Trevarthen	   and	   Hubley	   criticise	   Piaget	   for	   reducing	   infants	   to	   their	  “object	  motive”	  and	  denying	  them	  the	  “social	  motive”	  altogether:	  
Indeed, Piaget presents himself as a responsive but invisible examiner of the 
developing imagination and reason of the child. Even studying imitation and 
play, he makes his analysis in terms of a “thinking” that allows the infant no 
special awareness of humans as persons having a unique potentiality for 
shared awareness and shared intention. (Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 […]	   nous	   avons	   précisément	   pris	   grand	   soin,	   dès	   le	   début	   de	   nos	  
observations,	  d’éliminer	  dans	  la	  mesure	  du	  possible	  l’intervention	  du	  dressage.	  
C’est	  pourquoi,	   soustraits	  à	   certain	   influences	  adultes	   (jeux	   suggérés,	   etc.)	   et	  
en	  particulier	  à	  la	  manie	  pédagogique	  des	  nurses,	  nos	  trois	  sujets	  ont	  présenté	  
un	  progrès	  dans	  l’imitation	  beaucoup	  plus	  lent	  et	  plus	  régulier	  que	  se	  n’est	  le	  
cas	  chez	  les	  bébé	  sans	  cesse	  déformés	  par	  leur	  entourage.	  (Piaget,	  1945,	  p.	  25,	  quoting	  the	  French	  original	  here,	  since	  the	  English	  1962	  translation	  seems	  to	  gloss	  over	  this	  point.)	  	  
	   36	  
Reddy	  (2008)	  describes	  and	  analyses	  how	  Piaget	  –	  even	  when	  describing	  affect-­‐laden	   social	   interaction	   –	   astonishingly	   manages	   to	   describe	   the	  situation	  individually	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  infant’s	  sensory	  interests,	  blinding	  out	  the	   caregiver,	   her	   affective	   response,	   and	   any	   relationality,	   and	   himself	  remains	  unengaged	  as	  an	  observer:	  
Although his observations are beautiful and reveal a powerful empathy for 
children's intentions in relation to the physical world, he was strangely 
unengaged with their relations to their social world. Take the following 
powerful description of Jacqueline at 10 months: OBS 63. At O;10(3) J. put 
her nose close to her mother’s cheek and then pressed against it, which 
forced her to breathe much more loudly. This phenomenon at once 
interested her, but instead of merely repeating it or varying it so as to 
investigate it, she quickly complicated it for the fun of it; she drew back an 
inch or two, screwed up her nose, sniffed and breathed out alternately very 
hard (as if she were blowing her nose), then again thrust her nose against 
her mother’s cheek, laughing heartily. These actions were repeated at least 
once a day for more than a month, as a ritual. (Piaget, 1951/1972, p. 94) 
Piaget’s observation focuses on the individual actions and sensory interests. 
They do not include reactions from others or from himself (even if they had 
occurred they may have been seen as irrelevant to this phenomenon). In this 
particular instance, however, it is hard to believe that the mother, whose 
cheek was being rubbed and breathed into, and whose ears were filled with 
a 10-month-old daughter’s hearty laughter, did not react at all. […] His 
observation of Jacqueline, although containing some acute perceptions of 
her intentionality, curiosity and playfulness, nonetheless portrays her as 
separated from and unengaged with himself (Reddy, 2008, p. 37) Analogously	  to	  the	  example	  Reddy	  picked	  for	  social	  interactions	  there	  are	  similar	   description	   of	   social	   object	   interactions,	   which	   might	   well	   be	  considered	   as	   social	   object	   games	   as	   described	  by	  Trevarthen	   and	  Hubley	  (1978).	  	  
OBS 61. At 0 ; 7 (13), after learning to remove an obstacle to gain his 
objective, T. began to enjoy this kind of exercise. When several times in 
succession I put my hand or a piece of cardboard between him and the toy 
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he desired, he reached the stage of momentarily forgetting the toy and 
pushed aside the obstacle, bursting into laughter (Piaget, 1962, p. 92). Here	  one	  cannot	  but	  wonder	  whether	  the	  funny	  effect	  is	  simply	  due	  to	  the	  object,	   or	   whether	   the	   interaction	   is	   experienced	   as	   sharing	   something	  funny,	  playing	  with	  intentions	  and	  expectations	  in	  a	  social	  game	  where	  both	  self	  and	  other	  may	  be	  felt	  vividly	  as	  the	  other’s	  actions	  are	  highly	  attuned	  to,	  and	   hence	   can	   be	   experienced	   as	   responses	   to	   and	   anticipations	   of,	   the	  infant’s	  action	  and	  indeed	  her	  intention.	  Seeking	   to	   put	   Piaget’s	   apparent	   neglect	   of	   the	   social	   into	   context,	  Lorenço	  and	  Machado	  point	  out	  in	  their	  “Defense	  of	  Piaget”,	  that	  Piaget	  did	  not	  simply	  neglect	  the	  social	  but	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  importance	  he	  ascribed	  to	   it	  with	  regard	  to	  his	  respective	  questions	  changed	  in	  different	  phases	  of	  his	  work:	  
During the initial and functionalist phase of his studies, Piaget (1923, 1932) 
considered social interaction the main factor responsible for the transition 
from egocentric to socialized thinking and gave a purely social explanation 
of cognitive structures. Later, when he found a sensorimotor intelligence 
and logic before the emergence of verbal language (Piaget, 1936, 1937), 
Piaget (1976a) confessed that in his initial phase he had overestimated the 
role of language and social interaction in the construction of knowledge. He 
then moved to a strongly structuralist phase and pursued the idea that 
cognitive structures and operations come from the subject's own 
coordination and self-regulation of his or her actions (Lourenço & 
Machado, 1996)2 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 	  Another	   factor	   pointed	   out	   by	   Lourenço	   &	   Machado	   as	   a	   probably	  
contributing	  to	  Piaget’s	  neglect	  of	  the	  social	  is	  that	  Piaget	  wanted	  to	  trace	  the	  
origins	   of	   necessary	   knowledge	  and	  got	  particularly	   interested	   in	   the	  role	  
played	   by	   reflective	   abstraction	   as	   the	   main	   source	   for	   mathematical	  
knowledge	   and	   accounting	   for	   the	   construction	   of	   new	   knowledge.	   And	  
reflective	  abstraction	   for	  Piaget	  does	  not	  originate	   from	  interaction	  with	  the	  
world	   but	   from	   the	   co-­‐ordination	   of	   actions	   themselves	   –	   hence	   it	   is	  
something	   the	   infant	   supposedly	   can	   only	   construct	   from	  within	   him/herself	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Thus	  (striking	  a	  similar	  chord)	  Chapman,	  rather	  than	  criticising	  a	  neglect	  of	  social	  interaction	  instead	  points	  out	  a	  lack	  of	  integration:	  	  
Although Piaget recognized for both operative [object directed] and 
communicative [people directed] forms of interaction in various phases of 
his work, he never integrated those components in a single model. In 
particular, communicative interaction was addressed in some detail in the 
1920s and was relatively neglected in his work on operational thought after 
1940 (Chapman, 1991). In	   other	   words,	   Chapman	   criticises	   that	   Piaget	   only	   looks	   at	   dyadic	  interaction	  and	  not	  at	  triadic	  interaction,	  whereas	  according	  to	  Chapman	  it	  would	  be	  crucial	  to	   look	  at	  the	  “epistemic	  triangle”	  of	  triadic	   interaction	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  any	  form	  of	  knowledge	  construction.	  
2.2.1.5 The	  productive	  impact	  of	  Piaget’s	  “neglect	  of	  the	  social”	  on	  following	  
research	  Besides	  wide	  criticism	  Piaget’s	  “neglect	  of	  the	  social”	  above	  all	  sparked	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  research	  responses:	  a)	   One	   line	   of	   researchers	   sought	   to	   “complement”	   Piaget	   by	   simply	  adding	  “social	  interaction”	  as	  one	  more,	  yet	  overlooked	  research	  area.	  	  They	  basically	   maintained	   Piaget’s	   theory	   and	   as	   their	   main	   task	   engaged	   in	  exploring	  how	  Piaget’s	  theory	  could	  be	  slightly	  modified	  and	  applied	  to	  this	  new	   area,	   spelling	   out	   how	   infants	   exercise	   their	   developing	   general	  intelligence	  skills	  and	  cognitive	  structures	  in	  social	  interactions,	  this	  specific	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and	  making	  it	  futile	  to	  look	  at	  anything	  (any	  “content”)	  coming	  from	  the	  outer	  
world	  including	  social	  partners.	  However	  it	  might	  well	  be	  the	  establishment	  
of	   joint	   action	   routines,	   carefully	   structured	  and	  held	   stable	  by	   caregivers,	  
and	  the	   joint	  modification	  of	   these	   jointly	  created	  structures,	   that	  provides	  a	  
space	  for	  the	  first	  reflective	  abstraction	  to	  occur.	  This	  possibility	  will	  be	  taken	  
up	  again	  and	  further	  developed	  based	  on	  evidence	  from	  our	  own	  naturalistic	  
longitudinal	  study	  on	  everyday	  infant-­‐caregiver	  routines	  in	  chapters	  5	  and	  6.	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not	  yet	  investigated	  part	  of	  their	  lives	  (Rivière	  &	  Coll,	  1987;	  Chapman,	  1991,	  Bates	  and	  Sugarman	  see	  sections	  2.2.2.	  &	  2.2.3).	  b)	   Other	   researchers	   however	   insisted	   that	   social	   interactions	   with	  people	  provided	  such	  a	  different	  context	  for	  infants,	  and	  that	  indeed	  infants	  showed	  such	  different	  actions	  in	  social	  contexts	  than	  in	  object	  contexts	  that	  any	   account	   of	   infants’	   minds	   based	   on	   object	   interactions	   remains	  fundamentally	  insufficient	  and	  we	  need	  to	  assume,	  investigate	  and	  describe	  multiple	   different	   systems	   through	   which	   infants	   fuel	   and	   guide	   their	  interactions	  with	  different	  aspects	  of	  the	  world.	  (e.g.	  Trevarthen,	  see	  section	  2.3.1)	  c)	  While	  yet	  another,	   third	  group	  goes	  even	   further,	   suggesting	   that	   the	  general	   focus,	   unit	   of	   analysis,	   and	   direction	   of	   explanation	   need	   to	   be	  fundamentally	   changed	   and	   extended	   beyond	   the	   infant,	   as	   the	   processes	  and	  abilities	  in	  question	  do	  not	  exclusively	  originate	  in	  nor	  are	  restricted	  to	  the	   infant(‘s	  mind),	  but	  only	  emerge	  collaboratively	   in	   interaction	  with	  the	  partners	   affecting	   each	   other	   in	   a	   process	   of	   mutual	   transformation	   (e.g.	  Newson	  &	  Newson,	  1975)	  	  In	   the	   further	   course	  of	   this	   chapter	  we	  will	   again	   and	  again	   encounter	  researchers	   whose	   approach	   to	   triadic	   interaction	   can	   at	   least	   partly	   be	  traced	  back	  to	  these	  different	  ways	  of	  responding	  to	  Piaget,	  which	  can	  hence	  serve	  as	  a	  rough	  map	  to	  what	  we	  are	  going	  to	  encounter	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  chapter	  ahead.	  We	  will	  meet	  representatives	  of	  the	  first	  strategy	  a)	  extend	  Piaget	  to	  the	  
social	   in	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  section:	  first	  Elizabeth	  Bates	  and	  colleagues	  (2.2.2)	   and	   Sugarman-­‐Bell	   (2.2.3),	   who	   applied	   Piaget’s	   framework	   to	   the	  social	  realm	  developing	  the	  concept	  of	  “social	  tool	  use”	  and	  –	  when	  running	  into	  the	  limits	  of	  Piaget’s	  framework	  –	  started	  to	  move	  beyond	  it.	  Second,	  we	  will	   meet	   its	   later	   modified	   echoes	   in	   the	   section	   about	   the	   cognitivist	  approach	  of	  Tomasello	  and	  colleagues	  (2.4),	  an	  account	   in	  which	  Piagetian	  “intention	   understanding”	   plays	   a	   crucial	   role	   and	   is	   complemented	   by	   a	  specific	  form	  of	  “social	  knowledge”.	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  We	   will	   encounter	   the	   second	   strategy	   b)	   distinguish	   2	   separate	  
systems/domains	  in	  the	  following	  section	  when	  discussing	  Trevarthen	  and	  Hubley	   (2.3.1),	  who	   endow	   the	   infant	   from	   the	   beginning	  with	   the	   special	  social	   ability	   of	   “(primary)	   intersubjectivity”,	   over	   time	   integrated	   with	  object	   skills	   resulting	   in	   “secondary	   intersubjectivity”,	   as	  well	   as	  Adamson	  and	   Bakeman	   (2.3.2)	   for	   whom	   bridging	   what	   they	   consider	   separate	  domains	  of	  people	  and	  object	  engagement	  constitutes	  a	  major	  challenge	  of	  development	   to	   be	   slowly	   overcome	   and	   finally	  mastered	   in	   “coordinated	  joint	  engagement”	  before	  infants	  can	  start	  on	  language	  learning.	  And	   we	   will	   recognize	   the	   third	   strategy	   c)	   “zoom	   out	   and	  
reconceptualise	   social	   interactions	   as	   a	   systemic	   process	   of	   mutual	  
affecting	   and	   transformation”	   pursued	   in	   various	   different	   forms	   in	  Section	  2.5	  on	  cultural	  psychology,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  Section	  2.6	  discussing	  more	  recent	  embodiment,	  situatedness	  and	  2nd	  person	  approaches.	  	  	  
2.2.2 Bates	  and	  colleagues	  (1975-­‐79):	  Communicative	  intentionality	  as	  social	  
tool	  use:	  proto-­‐imperatives	  and	  proto-­‐declaratives	  
2.2.2.1 Background,	  interest,	  and	  theoretical	  framework	  The	   collaborating	   researchers	   Elizabeth	   Bates,	   Laura	   Benigni,	   Inge	  Bretherton,	  Luigia	  Camaioni,	  and	  Virginia	  Volterra	  were	  among	  the	  pioneers	  of	  language	  researchers	  who,	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1970s,	  got	  increasingly	  aware	  of	  and	  interested	  in	  communication	  processes	  prior	  to	  language,	  their	  development,	   and	   –	  with	   an	   eye	   on	   identifying	   potential	   pre-­‐requisites	   of	  language	  –	   their	   interdependence	  with	  other	  aspects	  of	  development,	   such	  as	  general	  cognition	  and	  sociality,	  considered	  as	  separate	  systems	  (or	  in	  the	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then	   emerging	   Cognitive	   Science	   vernacular	   “software	   packages”3).	   They	  chose	   to	  explore	   the	  onset	  of	   “intentional	  communication”,	   later	  defined	  as	  
"signalling	  behaviour	  in	  which	  the	  sender	  is	  aware	  a	  priori	  of	  the	  effect	  that	  a	  
signal	   will	   have	   on	   his	   listener,	   and	   he	   persists	   in	   that	   behaviour	   until	   the	  
effect	  is	  obtained	  or	  failure	  is	  clearly	  indicated."	  (Bates	  et	  al.,	  1979)	  Starting	   from	   this	   concept	   created	   a	   point	   of	   entry	   into	   the	   then	  (theoretically	   and	   methodologically)	   mostly	   uncharted	   territory	   of	   pre-­‐verbal	   communication,	   as	   the	   concept	   lies	   at	   an	   intersection	  of,	   and	  hence	  can	   bridge	   two	   hitherto	   separate	   research	   frameworks:	   Jean	   Piaget’s	  account	  of	  sensorimotor	  development	  and	  James	  Austin’s	  speech	  act	  theory.	  	  Piaget’s	   theory	   (sketched	   above)	   presents	   the	   earliest	   forms	   of	   general	  intelligence	   as	   developing	   out	   of	   pre-­‐verbal	   infants’	   sensorimotor	  interactions	  with	  the	  object-­‐world,	  and	  the	  occurrence	  of	  means-­‐end	  actions	  around	   9	   months	   serves	   as	   a	   visible	   indicator	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	  “intentional”	  actions	  marking	  the	  onset	  of	  intelligence	  proper.	  	  Austin,	   after	   struggling	   with	   verbal	   utterances	   whose	   meaning	   largely	  eludes	   classic	   semantic	   analysis	   (like	   the	   “I	   do”	   in	   a	  marriage	   ceremony),	  proposed	   that	   their	  meaning	  was	   better	   captured	   by	   considering	   them	   as	  performing	  a	  specific	  action	  (hence	  dubbed	  “performatives”)	  and	  went	  on	  to	  generally	   addressing	   language	   in	   terms	   of	   action,	   as	   “performing	   speech	  acts”	  (Austin,	  1962).	  This	  shift	  to	  action	  had	  made	  his	  theory	  interesting	  to	  a	  number	   of	   infant	   researchers	   (J.	   S.	   Bruner,	   1975;	   Dore,	   1978;	   Halliday,	  1975)	  as	   it	  made	  pre-­‐verbal,	  action	  based	  communication	  addressable	  –	   in	  analogy	  to	  verbal	  utterances	  –	  as	  non-­‐verbal	  speech	  acts,	  more	  particularly,	  performatives.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  “some	   sort	   of	   software	   package,	   a	   ‘program’	   that	   an	   individual	   child	   or	  
adult	   ‘has’,	   which	   permits	   generation	   of	   behaviors	   that	   are	   externally	  
identifiable	  as	   ’linguistic’,	   ‘cognitive’	   or	   ‘social’”	   	   (Bates,	  Benigni,	  Bretherton,	  
Camaioni,	  &	  Volterra,	  1979)	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Thus,	   both	   theories	   blended	   together	   opened	   up	   a	   new	   research	  framework,	   where	   early	   pre-­‐verbal	   communication	   could	   be	   addressed	  together	   with	   early	   general	   intelligence	   and	   later	   emerging	   language	   to	  elucidate	  development.	  Additionally	   Bates	   et	   al.	   adapted	   Austin’s	   distinction	   between	   multiple	  aspects	   or	   types	   of	   speech	   acts,	   which	   an	   utterance	   could	   embody	   (often	  (all)	  at	   the	  same	   time):	   locutions	   (verbal	  utterances,	   strings	  of	  words	  with	  specific	   references),	   illocutions	   (fulfilling	   specific	   conventional	   actions	  recognized	  by	  participants),	  and	  perlocutions	  (effects	  on	  the	  listener).	  Bates	  and	   colleagues	   sequentialized	   the	   different	   kinds	   of	   speech	   acts	   and	  projected	   them	  onto	  development,	  suggesting	   the	   following	  developmental	  trajectory	  for	  the	  development	  of	  communication:	  	  	  1) “a	  perlocutionary	  stage,	  in	  which	  the	  child	  has	  a	  systematic	  effect	  on	  his	  listener	  without	  having	  an	  intentional,	  aware	  control	  over	  that	  effect”;	  	  2) “an	  illocutionary	  stage,	  in	  which	  the	  child	  intentionally	  uses	  non-­‐verbal	  signals	  to	  convey	  requests	  and	  to	  direct	  adult	  attention	  to	  objects	  and	  events”;	  and	  3) “a	  locutionary	  stage,	  in	  which	  the	  child	  constructs	  propositions	  and	  utters	  speech	  sounds	  within	  the	  same	  performative	  sequences	  that	  he	  previously	  expressed	  nonverbally”	  (Bates,	  Camaioni,	  &	  Volterra,	  1975)	  This	   framework	   now	   a)	   allows	   stating	   that	   there	   is	   meaningful	  communication	  from	  birth,	  though	  still	  unintentional,	  and	  b)	  offers	  a	  direct	  point	   of	   attack	   to	   investigate	   the	   onset	   of	   “intentional	   communication”:	  Bates	   et	   al.	   simply	   look	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   what	   they	   call	   non-­‐verbal	  
performatives	  as	  markers	  for	  intentional	  communication,	   in	  particular	  for	  the	  early	  pre-­‐verbal	  forms	  of	  the	  “two	  most	  general	  forms	  of	  performatives”:	  1)	   proto-­‐imperatives:	   using	   a	   person	   as	   a	   means	   to	   reach	   some	   goal	   –	  which	   they	   quickly	   narrow	   down	   to:	   “a	   desired	   object”,	   arguably	   for	  pragmatic	   reasons	   of	   observability	   –	   and	   2)	  proto-­‐declaratives:	   using	   an	  object	  to	  attain	  a	  person’s	  attention	  (e.g.	  showing,	  pointing).	  These	  they	  then	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sought	   to	   relate	   to	   the	   occurrence	   of	   markers	   of	   social	   and	   cognitive	  development	  (Bates	  et	  al.,	  1975).	  
2.2.2.2 Empirical	  study	  (Bates	  et	  al.,	  1975)	  For	  a	  pilot	  they	  visited	  3	  children	  at	  home	  once	  or	  twice	  a	  month	  during	  different	   yet	   overlapping	   age	   periods	   (starting	   from	   2,	   6,	   and	   12	  months)	  and	  observed	  (but	  only	  partly	  videotaped	  due	  to	  high	  costs)	  the	  infants	  for	  approximately	  2	  hours	  in	  spontaneous	  communicative	  interaction	  as	  well	  as	  planned	   interventions	   for	   a)	   communicative	   behaviour	   (using	   their	   own	  categories,	   see	   below),	   b)	   cognitive	   development	   (object	   permanence	   and	  means-­‐end	   tests	   following	   Piaget),	   and	   c)	   social	   development	   (attachment	  tests	  following	  Bowlby	  and	  Spitz).	  	  For	   their	   qualitative	   analysis	   they	   transcribed	   the	   videos	   into	   written	  text	  and	  subsequently	  analysed	  the	  text	  for	  the	  occurrence	  of	  predefined	  key	  behaviours,	   which	   were	   then	   sorted	   into	   the	   respective	   columns:	  communicative	   (proto-­‐imperative,	   proto-­‐declarative),	   social	   (smiling,	  following	   mother,	   crying	   at	   stranger)	   and	   cognitive	   (object	   permanence,	  spatial	  displacements,	  causality,	  and	  imitation	  [note:	  not	  listed	  under	  social,	  probably	   following	   Piaget]).	   They	   then	   compared	   the	   onsets	   of	   these	   key	  behaviours	  across	  columns.	  	  
2.2.2.3 Results	  and	  Interpretation	  Only	   at	   around	   10	   months	   they	   find	   the	   first	   proto-­‐imperatives	   and	  proto-­‐declaratives.	   For	   the	   first	  months	   they	   report	   infants	   smiling,	   crying	  and	  parents	  “responding	  to	  satisfy	  their	  needs”	  but	  state	  to	  “find	  no	  evidence	  
for	   intentional	   communication	   before	   9	   months”.	   Rather	   –	   following	  psychoanalytic	  theory	  –	  they	  interpret	  infants’	  early	  communicative	  acts	  as	  
“merely	  a	  built-­‐in	  reaction	  to	  a	  particular	  internal	  state“.	  “Prior	  to	  that	  time	  [9	  
months],	   communication	   certainly	   takes	   place.	   The	   infant	   cries,	   or	   reaches	  
toward	  his	  goal,	  and	  the	  adult	  interprets	  the	  child’s	  desires	  and	  intervenes	  to	  
meet	  them	  (1979,	  p.	  34).	  This	  adult	  response	  to	  the	  infant’s	  signals	  establishes	  
a	  circular	  means-­‐end	  relationship	  which	  is	  the	  first	  step	  in	  the	  development	  of	  
communicative	   intentions.	   But	   there	   is	   no	   evidence	   that	   the	   child	   himself	   is	  
aware	   a	   priori	   of	   the	   signal	   value	   of	   his	   smiles	   and	   cries.”	  When	   Bates	   and	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colleagues	   make	   the	   claim	   that	   communication	   prior	   to	   9	   months	   is	  automatic	   and	   inner-­‐state-­‐induced	   –	   probably	   in	   order	   to	   further	  conceptually	   carve	  out	   the	  difference	   to	   later	   intentional	   communication	  –	  this	  dichotomous	  conception	  is	  apparently	  shaped	  by	  another	  classic	  figure	  of	  thought	  dealing	  with	  “intentionality”	  of	  “goal	  directedness”	  in	  a	  different	  context:	  Aristotle’s	  distinction	  between	  “efficient	  cause/causality”	  vs.	   “final	  cause/teleology”,	   which	   constitute	   two	   of	   his	   “four	   causes”.	   But	   while	   for	  Aristotle	  these	  were	  two	  out	  of	  four	  different	  causes	  for	  one	  phenomenon,	  in	  other	   words,	   two	   different	   kinds	   or	   aspects	   of	   explanation,	   here	   they	  become	  reified	  into	  two	  different	  kinds	  of	  causation,	  supposed	  to	  distinguish	  two	  different	  phenomena:	  pre-­‐intentional	  from	  intentional	  communication:	  “Prior	  to	  9	  months	  communication	  is	  efficiently	  caused	  but	  not	  finally	  caused”	  (Bates	  et	  al.,	  1975).	  Even	  though	  they	  acknowledge	  that	  parents	  do	  indeed	  “treat	  the	  infant’s	  
expressions	   from	   early	   on	   as	   deliberate	   products	   of	   a	   conscious	   agent”,	   and	  even	   though	   they	   consider	   many	   of	   already	   early	   observed	   behaviours	  towards	  objects	  as	  well	  as	  towards	  people	  as	  showing	  signs	  of	  intentionality	  before	   9	   months,	   e.g.	   persistently	   using	   a	   variety	   of	   actions	   to	   grasp	   the	  mother’s	   face	  (suggesting	  a	   less	  strict	  use	  of	  the	  term	  than	  Piaget’s)	  –	  they	  still	   decidedly	   rule	   out	   any	   “communicative	   intentionality”	   before	   9	  months.	  Why	  is	  that	  and	  what	  makes	  them	  so	  certain?	  A	  possible	  answer	  is	  offered	   by	   a	   sentence	   found	   in	   their	   earlier	   paper,	   which	   gives	   valuable	  insight	  into	  the	  scientific	  process,	  frankly	  expressing	  the	  struggle	  to	  shape	  a	  new	  phenomenon	  into	  something	  accountable	  for	  (in	  familiar	  terms):	  
 However if they [infants < 9m] were indeed capable of intentional 
communication at this stage, we would be unable to explain their apparent 
inability to look toward adults and invoke their help in later attempts to 
reach objects (Bates et al., 1975). One	  puzzling	  situation	  reported	  by	  Bates	  and	  colleagues	  can	  serve	  as	  an	  example	   for	   the	   kind	   of	   interactions	   referred	   to	   in	   the	   above	   sentence:	   a	  roughly	   9	  month	   old	   infant	   “in	   an	   effort	   to	   attain	   a	   box	   from	  her	  mother’s	  
arms”	   is	   “pulling	  at	   the	  arms,	  pushing	  her	  whole	  body	  against	   the	   floor,	  and	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approaching	  the	  box	  from	  several	  angles”,	  without	  however	  ever	   looking	  up	  at	  her	  mother’s	  face.	  	  Whereas	   the	   (lack	   of)	   communicative	   actions	   exhibited	   by	   the	   infant	   in	  the	  example	  above	  will	  clearly	  seem	  striking	  to	  an	  adult	  observer,	   the	  way	  the	   above	   argument	   is	   posed	   takes	   the	   form	   of	   an	   argument	   from	   the	  impossibility	   to	   think	   otherwise	   or	   to	   imagine	   alternative	   explanations,	  implicitly	  making	   and	   holding	   on	   to	   a	   number	   of	   tacit	   assumptions	   about	  what	  actually	  might	  be	  framed	  as	  a	  different	  problem,	  than	  the	  one	  assumed.	  	  Bates	  and	  colleagues	  go	  on	  to	  account	  for	  this	  situation	  and	  the	  assumed	  inability	   to	   communicate	   intentionally	   by	   concluding	   (in	   retrospect)	   that	  roughly	   for	   the	   first	   9	  months	   “schemes	   for	   interacting	  with	   adults	   and	  
schemes	   for	   interacting	   with	   non-­‐social	   objects	   are	   apparently	   kept	  
separate.”	   (Bates	  et	  al.,	  1979,	  p.	  212).	  Thus	   they	  propose	  a	  separation	   of	  
people	  and	  object	   interactions	   for	   the	   first	  9	  months	  as	   it	   is	   found	   in	  
today’s	  narrative.	  	  However,	   different	   from	   today’s	   version	   of	   the	   separation,	   Bates	   and	  colleagues	   made	   this	   statement	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   Piagetian	  
instrumental	   action	   framework	   which	   they	   take	   as	   a	   model	   for	  communication:	  under	  its	  terms	  it	  is	  the	  more	  general	  challenge	  for	  infants	  in	   all	   instrumental	   thinking	   to	   combine	   two	   hitherto	   separate	   action	  schemas.	  And	  this	  problem	  seems	  indeed	  to	  be	  the	  same	  in	  principle	  as	  well	  for	  both	  proto-­‐imperatives	  and	  proto-­‐declaratives	  to	  occur.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  Bates	  and	  colleagues’	  specific	  setup	  and	  their	  research	  question	  concerning	  “communication	  with	  people	  about	  objects”	  the	  two	  actions	  to	  be	  combined	  just	   coincidentally	   happen	   to	   be	   actions	   towards	   objects	   and	   people,	  respectively.	  	  Thus,	   having	   framed	   (intentional)	   communication	   in	   terms	   of	   Piagetian	  (compositional)	  instrumental	  action,	  the	  occurrence	  of	  proto-­‐performatives	  only	  after	  9	  months	   is	  exactly	   in	   line	  with	  what	  would	  be	  predicted	  by	  the	  Piagetian	   framework,	   stating	   that	   9	   months	   is	   the	   time	   any	   two	   motor	  schemes	  start	  being	  combined	  into	  compositional	  instrumental	  actions.	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And	  more	   than	   that,	   taking	   a	   closer	   look	   at	   proto-­‐imperatives	   and	   proto-­‐declaratives	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  Piagetian	   framework,	   they	  actually	  seem	  to	  go	  well	  beyond	  the	  above	  described	  stage	  IV	  instrumental	  acts,	  combining	  two	  familiar	  motor	  schemes	  (where	  infants	  still	  directly	  engage	  in	  familiar	  motor	  schemes	  as	  they	  normally	  would,	  only	  chaining	  them	  together	  sequentially	  in	  novel	  ways).	  Rather,	  proto-­‐performatives	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  constitute	  a	  
more	   indirect,	   truly	   tool-­‐mediated	   instrumental	   act,	   analogous	   to	   Piaget’s	  example	   of	   fetching	   an	   object	  with	   a	   stick,	   characterizing	   stage	  V	   “tertiary	  
circular	  reactions”,	  where	  action	  targets	  are	  not	  acted	  on	  in	  the	  familiar	  way	  anymore,	   but	   in	   novel	   and	   sometimes	   indirect	   ways,	  which,	   according	   to	  Piaget,	   only	   become	   possible	   through	   new	   stage-­‐V-­‐type	   co-­‐ordinations:	  employing	   novel	   means	   discovered	   through	   systematic	   experimentation,	  (compare	  section	  2.2.1:	  Piaget).	  And	   indeed,	   it	   was	   around	   the	   (same)	   time,	   10	   months,	   (when)	   infants	  tested	  positively	  for	  pulling	  a	  cloth	  to	  attain	  a	  desired	  object	  standing	  on	  the	  cloth	   (qualifying	   for	   Piaget’s	   stage	   V),	   that	   Bates	   and	   colleagues	   reported	  observations	   of	   proto-­‐imperatives	   and	   proto-­‐declaratives,	   and	   at	   11	  months,	   in	   a	   situation	   similar	   to	   the	   one	   described	   above,	   the	   infant	   now	  
“looked	   the	   adult	   intently	   in	   the	   face”	   before	   again	   taking	   up	   her	   efforts	  towards	  the	  object.	  	  Thus	   the	   Piagetian	   framework	   seems	   sufficient	   to	   account	   for	   the	  development	   of	   proto-­‐performatives,	   of	   “social	   tool	   use”	   along	  with	   “tool-­‐	  use”	   in	  general.	  And	  while	  Bates	  and	  colleagues	  go	  along	  with	   this	   in	   their	  later	  book,	  in	  the	  earlier	  paper	  they	  seem	  to	  go	  one	  step	  further	  and	  stress	  the	  differences	  between	  people	  and	  object	   interaction	  schemes	  making	  the	  gulf	  between	  them	  larger	  and	  harder	  to	  be	  bridged.	  	  
The difference between the use of a simple instrument as an intermediate 
means, and the use of an adult, is that the child himself is not longer the 
agent. In appealing to the other as agent, the child must pass through an 
indirect causality, a means that is not under his direct control, and whose 
results may be delayed and unpredictable. The adult-tool is hence quite 
different from such malleable instruments as cloth-supports or sticks and 
handles. (Bates et al., 1975). 
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This	  gulf	  between	  people	  and	  objects	  will	  grow	  still	  larger	  later	  on,	  either	  or	   implicitly	   assumed	   from	   the	   start	   as	   e.g.	   in	   Adamson	   and	   Bakeman	  (section	   2.3.2),	   or	   explicitly	   with	   Trevarthen’s	   notion	   of	   two	   entirely	  separate	  “physiological	  action	  systems”	  or	  “motives”	  for	  people	  and	  objects	  (see	  2.3.1).	  	  Also	   in	   other	   cases	   regarding	   social	   aspects	   of	   interaction,	   Bates	   and	  colleagues	  feel	  they	  have	  to	  move	  beyond	  Piaget:	  First,	  they	  newly	  describe	  
proto-­‐declaratives,	  which	   they	   first	   tried	   to	  model	   after	   a	  Piagetian	   stage	  framework	  but	  eventually	  found	  hard	  to	  account	  for	  exclusively	  in	  Piagetian	  terms.	  They	  see	  the	  pre-­‐stages	  of	  proto-­‐declaratives	  in	  showing	  off,	  which	  they	  interpret	  as	  Piagetian	  circular	  reactions,	  as	  the	  infant	  seeks	  to	  prolong	  and	  re-­‐create	  the	  adult’s	  affective	  response	  (e.g.	   laughter)	  by	  repeating	  the	  behaviour.	   When	   infants	   begin	   to	   hold	   up	   (“show”)	   objects,	   Bates	   and	  colleagues	   consider	   this	   to	   be	   the	   onset	   of	   proto-­‐declaratives	   proper,	  interpreted	   as	   deliberately	   using	   novel	   means	   (showing	   the	   object)	   to	  achieve	   a	   familiar	   end	   (amusing	   the	   adult	   and	   receiving	   attention).	   With	  time,	  infants	  begin	  to	  give	  the	  object	  to	  the	  adult,	  and	  later	  still	  they	  begin	  to	  
point,	   i.e.	   engage	   in	   the	   prototypical	   proto-­‐declarative.	   As	   they	   cannot	  account	   for	   this	   development	   in	   Piagetian	   terms,	   they	   turn	   to	   Werner	   &	  Kaplan’s	   concept	   of	   “distancing”	   where	   infants	   beginning	   from	   an	  undifferentiated	   primordial	   sharing	   situation	   increasingly	   differentiate	  between	   self,	   other,	   and	   object	   (see	   Werner	   &	   Kaplan	   1963).	   While	  “distancing”	   is	   also	   seen	   as	   a	   general	   development,	   it	   is	   here	   understood	  quite	   “literally”,	   as	   showing	   off,	   showing	   an	   object	   at	   arms	   length,	   etc.,	   to	  finally	   pointing	   at	   distal	   objects	   “carry	   the	   inclusion	   and	   progressive	  distancing”	  of	  objects	  “beyond	  the	  length	  of	  the	  child’s	  arm”.	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2.2.3 Sugarman-­‐Bell	  (1978):	  A	  succession	  of	  overlapping	  waves	  moving	  from	  
simple	   to	   complex	   single	   person	   or	   object	   acts	   (and)	   finally	   to	   co-­‐
ordinated	  person	  and	  object	  acts.	  
2.2.3.1 Background,	  interest,	  and	  theoretical	  framework	  Sugarman-­‐Bell’s	  pre-­‐doctoral	  research	  conducted	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1970s	   is	   	   -­‐	   similar	   to	   the	   research	  of	  Bates	   and	   colleagues	  –	   rooted	   in	   the	  growing	  awareness	  of	  the	  time	  that	  infants	  express	  meaning	  prior	  to	  speech	  and	   language	   through	   non-­‐verbal	   action.	   In	   order	   to	   investigate	   the	  development	   of	   preverbal	   communication	   the	   classic	   referential	   language	  acquisition	  scenario	  of	  “labelling	  or	  communicating	  to	  people	  about	  objects”	  is	   again	   translated	   into	   a	   preverbal,	   behavioural	   analogue	   of	   infants	  conveying	   their	   mothers	   their	   intentions	   towards	   objects,	   which	   provide	  visible	  targets	  of	  behaviour	  to	  the	  observer.	  However,	   rather	   than	   looking	   for	   specific	   communicative	   acts	   as	   Bates	  and	   colleagues	   do,	   Sugarman	   puts	   the	   question	   in	   slightly	   more	   general	  terms:	  
How do infants organize and co-ordinate their actions and vocalisations 
towards people and towards objects within social contexts and how does 
this change over time”? (Sugarman-Bell, 1978, adapted, merging two 
paragraphs) She	  adopts	  a	  slightly	  more	  general	  analytic	  stance,	  devising	  quantitative	  measures	  for	  investigating	  the	  general	  “complexity”	  of	  the	  actions	  and	  how	  it	  changes	  over	  time,	  albeit	  restricted	  to	  small	  pilot	  study.	  Sugarman	   takes	   as	   an	   impetus	   the	   same	   situation	  Bates	   and	   colleagues	  were	  wondering	  about:	  as	  an	  object	  was	  held	  on	  the	  mother’s	  lap,	  younger	  infant	   A	   kept	   trying	   to	   pull	   the	   object	   off	   the	   mother’s	   lap	   without	   ever	  looking	   at	   her	   face,	   whereas	   older	   infant	   B	   first	   touched	   and	   made	   eye	  contact	   with	   the	   mother	   and	   only	   then	   grasped	   for	   the	   object.	   Sugarman	  isolates	  two	  aspects,	  along	  which	  A’s	  actions	  (only	  directly	  pursuing	  his/her	  object	   intention)	  and	  B’s	  actions	  (making	  B’s	   intentions	  towards	  the	  object	  clear	  to	  the	  adult	  and	  then	  reaching	  for	  the	  object)	  can	  be	  differentiated:	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1) The	  complexity	  of	  actions	  in	  terms	  of	  number	  of	  different	  sub-­‐actions	  employed,	  and	  	  2) the	  orientations	  towards,	  or	  “targets”	  of,	  the	  action:	  object	  and/or	  mother.	  	  (This	   for	   our	   purposes	   could	   also	   be	   called:	   “dimensionality	   of	  action”,	  see	  chapter	  3)	  As	   she	   built	   her	   study	   around	   these	   two	   aspects,	   complexity	   and	  orientation,	  these	  in	  turn	  became	  the	  relevant	  aspects	  in	  terms	  of	  which	  the	  development	  of	  pre-­‐verbal	  communication	  was	  accounted	  for.	  Extending	   Piaget’s	   and	   Duncker’s	   findings	   about	   physical	   object	  interactions,	   that	   simple	   actions	   directly	   affecting	   an	   object	   (secondary	  circular	   reactions)	   precede	   more	   complex	   ones	   (means-­‐end	   actions),	  Sugarman	  predicts	  the	  following	  sequence	  for	  social	  object	   interactions:	  1)	  Simple	   actions	   within	   each	   of	   the	   two	   orientations	   (towards	   people	   and	  objects,	   respectively)	   –	   which	   hence	   remain	   mutually	   exclusive.	   2)	  Increasingly	  complex,	  differentiated	  actions	  within	  each	  of	  the	  orientations	  –	   still	   kept	   separate.	   3)	   Action	   sequences	   integrating	   both	   orientations	  (Sugarman-­‐Bell,	  1978,	  p.	  50).	  
2.2.3.2 Empirical	  study	  In	   an	   exploratory	   study	   8	   infants	   were	   visited	   at	   their	   homes	   once	   a	  month	   for	   5	  months	   (4	   from	  4/5	   –	   9/10	  m	   and	  4	   from	  8/9.5	   –	   12/13	  m)	  following	  mother	  and	  infants	  through	  their	  everyday	  routines	  and	  recording	  social	  interactions	  with	  a	  pen	  and	  paper	  coding	  system	  for	  about	  1	  hour	  at	  each	  visit.	  Social	  interactions	  were	  defined	  as:	  a)	  2	  people	  being	  active	  and	  b)	   at	   least	   one	   participant	   at	   least	   partially	   orienting	   toward	   the	   other.	  Finally,	   the	  Uzgiris	  and	  Hunt	  (1966)	  “Means	   for	  Achieving	  Desired	  Events”	  and	   “The	  Development	  of	  Causality”	   scales	  were	  administered	   (Sugarman-­‐Bell,	  1978).	  
2.2.3.3 Analysis	  The	  mother-­‐infant	   social	   interactions	   were	   coded	   in	   terms	   of	   1)	   single	  orientations	   toward	   object	   or	   person,	   which	   were	   further	   divided	   into	  simple	   vs.	   complex	   single	   orientations	   (paralleling	   Piaget’s	   distinction	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between	   unitary	   secondary	   circular	   reactions	   (stage	   III)	   and	   means-­‐end	  actions	  (stage	  IV),	  and	  2)	  co-­‐ordinated	  people-­‐object	  orientations,	  resulting	  in	  the	  following	  coding	  scheme:	  	   	  Single	  simple	  orientation	  (1,	  2):	  
1)	   Simple	   person-­‐oriented	   acts:	  one	  or	   two	  types	  of	  behaviour	  directed	  at	  person	   (e.g.	   adult	   looks	   at	   and	  vocalizes	   to	   child	  –	   child	  smiles	  at	  adult).	  	  
2)	   Simple	   object	   oriented	   acts:	   child	   manipulates	   or	   turns	  attention	  to	  object,	  person	  only	  involved	  incidentally	  (e.g.	  adult	  holds	  object	  over	  child’s	   cot	  –	   child	  beats	  at	  object	  without	  making	  direct	  social	  contact	  …)	  Complex	  single	  orientation	  (3,	  4):	  
3)	  Complex	  person-­‐oriented	  acts:	  approaches	  or	  responses	  to	  a	  person	   involving	   a	   combination	   of	   different	   behaviours,	   e.g.	   child	  looks,	  smiles	  at	  adult,	  touches,	  tugs	  at	  adult	  clothing	  –	  adult	  lifts	  child,	  reciprocal	  imitation	  
4)	   Complex	   object-­‐oriented	   acts:	   different	   discrete	   behaviours	  are	   combined	   and	   directed	   at	   external	   object,	   e.g.	   adult	   gives	   child	  box	  and	  lid	  –	  child	  takes	  object	  without	  acknowledging	  adult	  –	  child	  puts	  lid	  on	  box.	  
Co-­‐ordinated	  person-­‐object	  orientation	  (5):	  	  
5)	   the	   child	   marks	   his	   objective	   regarding	   the	   object,	   and	  approaches	   the	  person	   involved	  socially	   (e.g.	   child	  holds	   jar	   toward	  adult,	   looks	   at	   adult	   and	   vocalizes	   –	   adult	   takes	   jar	   from	   child,	  vocalizes	   to	   child;	   Child	   vocalizes	   to	   adult,	   reaches	   toward	   chair,	  adult	  places	  child	  in	  chair.	  
2.2.3.4 Results	  Results	   showed	  a	  3	   step	  or	   rather	  wave	   like	   succession	  of	   action	   types,	  where	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   new	   type	   of	   engagement	   co-­‐occurred	   with	   or	  immediately	  followed	  a	  sharp	  rise	  of	  the	  previous	  one.	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1)	   simple	   single	   orientation	   sequences	   towards	   people	   or	   objects	   each	  present	  since	  beginning	  of	  the	  study	  and	  peaking	  between	  4.5	  and	  7	  months,	  	  2)	   complex	   single	   orientation	   sequences	   towards	   people	   or	   objects	  emerging	  between	  4	  and	  7	  months	  and	  peaking	  around	  10	  months,	  and	  	  3)	   co-­‐ordinated	   orientation	   interaction	   emerging	   between	   8	   and	   10	  months.	  	  While	   remaining	   separate,	   single	   person	   acts	   and	   single	   object	   acts	  developed	  in	  parallel	  through	  the	  first	  months	  with	  changes	  occurring	  in	  the	  same	  order	  and	  the	  same	  time:	  simple	  single	  person	  acts	  peaked	  at	  the	  same	  time	   as	   secondary	   circular	   reactions	  with	   objects	   (sensorimotor	   stage	   III),	  later	   means-­‐end	   actions	   on	   objects	   (sensorimotor	   stage	   IV:	   combining	  familiar	  means),	   e.g.	   pushing	   away	   a	   cushion	   to	   get	   to	   object	   (but	   not	   yet	  using	  an	  object	  to	  get	  to	  another	  object)	  co-­‐occurred	  with	  a	  peak	  in	  complex	  single	   person	   acts,	   combining	   multiple	   distinct	   actions	   (e.g.	   tugging	   at	  clothing	  and	  reaching	  up	  towards	  adult’s	   face)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  emergence	  of	  multi-­‐step	   play	   routines.	   Despite	   the	   complexity	   of	   complex	   single	   object	  acts	   occurring	   in	   social	   context	   social	   bids	   for	   objects	   were	   not	   observed	  until	   later,	   when	   subjects	   began	   to	   subordinate	   the	   use	   of	   one	   (physical)	  object	   to	   actually	   manoeuvring	   a	   second	   (e.g.	   using	   a	   stick	   to	   retrieve	   an	  object,	   sensorimotor	   stage	   V)	   suggesting	   that	   they	   first	   had	   to	   learn	   to	   –	  rather	   than	   directly	   acting	   on	   the	   desired	   object	   –	   to	   set	   in	  motion	   either	  instruments	  or	  agents	  as	  a	  means	  to	  indirectly	  attain	  the	  object.	  	  In	  addition	   to	   the	   increasing	  hierarchical	  differentiation	  of	   instrumental	  thinking	   and	   acting	   structures	   in	   general	   Sugarman,	   similar	   to	   Bates	   and	  colleagues,	  notes	  another	  development	  within	  instrumental	  actions:	  infants	  increasingly	   differentiated	   the	   way	   they	   approached	   objects	   (through	  manual	  manipulation)	  and	  the	  way	  they	  approached	  people	  (through	  social	  cueing)	   in	   instrumental	   acts,	   with	   Sugarman	   reporting	   transitory	   in-­‐between	  states	  where	  infants	  were	  directly	  acting	  on	  parts	  of	  the	  adult	  (e.g.	  hands)	   to	   make	   them	   work	   as	   instruments	   –	   a	   phenomenon	   already	  discussed	  by	  Piaget	  and	  later	  often	  restricted	  to	  discussions	  of	  children	  with	  autism	  and	  great	  apes,	  as	  an	  argument	  for	  	  illustrating	  their	  supposed	  lack	  of	  social	  understanding	  (but	  see	  Gomez,	  2004).	  Sugarman	  notes	  that:	  “Subjects’	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social-­‐interactive	  manoeuvres	   developed	   not	   only	   toward	   the	   elaboration	   of	  
instrumental	   relationships	   but	   also	   toward	   the	   differentiation	   of	   another	  
person	  as	  an	  agent	  in	  those	  relationships”	  (Sugarman-­‐Bell,	  1978,	  p.	  61).	  Here	   the	   object-­‐person	   dichotomy	   already	   built	   into	   the	   framing	   of	  research	  on	  preverbal	  communication	  in	  analogy	  to	  language4	  –	  now	  makes	  visible	   the	   infants’	   different	   responses	   to	   people	   and	   objects.	   	   Here	   we	  already	   see	   the	   seeds	   for	   postulating	   a	   priori	   a	   gulf	   between	   people	   and	  objects	   needing	   to	   be	   bridged	   as	   done	   in	   later	   accounts.	   Though	   here,	   in	  contrast	   to	   more	   recent	   research,	   the	   general	   differentiation	   between	  communication	   and	   manipulation	   seems	   to	   be	   considered	   a	   rather	   late	  development:	  
[I]t seems reasonable to speculate that while an instrumental basis evolves 
for social transactions, the child eventually distinguishes communication 
from manipulations, certainly by the time he begins to talk (Sugarman-Bell, 
1978) Interestingly,	   the	   formulation	  “the	  differentiation	  of	  another	  person	  as	  an	  
agent”	   already	   foreshadows	   Tomasello’s	   account	   (first	   take,	   see	   section	  2.4.1),	   where	   the	   development	   of	   specifically	   social	   person-­‐knowledge:	  
“understanding	   people	   as	   intentional	   agents”,	   rather	   that	   an	   increasing	  general	   ability	   to	   deal	   with	   (and	   enact)	   increasing	   complexity,	   will	   be	  considered	  the	  crucial	  factor	  (to	  account	  for)	  for	  the	  ability	  to	  share	  a	  world	  in	  triadic	  interactions	  to	  develop.	  Of	  particular	  interest	  for	  our	  purpose	  of	  understanding	  the	  development	  of	  triadic	  interaction	  are	  in	  this	  study	  1)	  the	  efforts	  to	  systematically	  capture	  
the	   complexity	   of	   actions,	   2)	   the	   suggestion	   of	   a	   wavelike	   succession	   of	  increasingly	  complex	  action	  forms,	  but	  also	  3)	  which	  aspects	  were	  explicitly	  
excluded	   as	   “unscorable”	   with	   the	   coding	   scheme	   applied:	   “Additional	  
unscorable	  sequences	  include	  sequences	  in	  which	  both	  the	  person-­‐	  and	  object-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  language	  and	  reference	  framed	  as:	  people	  communicating	  about	  objects;	  preverbal	   communication	   framed	   as:	   infants	   nonverbally	   conveying	   their	  object-­‐intentions	  to	  adults.	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orientations	  were	  present,	  but	  in	  which	   [...]	   the	  adult	   clearly	  elicited	  each	  
focus	  in	  succession	  [...]	  A	  final	  unscored	  group	  of	  sequences	  comprises	  rituals	  
(for	  example	  'peekaboo'),	  i.e.	  reciprocal	  exchanges	  built	  up	  over	  time	  by	  adult	  
and	  child	  in	  which	  there	  was	  a	  fixed	  set	  and	  order	  of	  actions.	  These	  sequences	  
involved	  a	  training	  element	  and/or	  a	  reliance	  on	  the	  mother's	  stereotyped	  
behaviors.	   For	   a	   variety	   of	   reasons,	   it	   was	   decided	   that	   these	   sequences	  
ultimately	  require	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  analysis.”	  (Sugarman-­‐Bell,	  1978,	  p.	  56)	  This	  note	  of	  exclusion	  of	  adult-­‐elicited	  shared	  orientations	  and	  trained	  
routines	   highlights	   challenges	   and	   limits	   of	   this	   particular	   kind	   of	  behavioural	   coding;	   at	   the	   same	   time	   we	   only	   here	   are	   informed	   of	   the	  existence	   of	   particular	   classes	   of	   observed	   interactions	  which	  might	   be	   of	  particular	  interest	  for	  the	  development	  of	  attention	  and	  action	  co-­‐ordination	  but	   are	   not	   described	   further,	   inviting	   us	   to	   have	   a	  more	   detailed	   look	   at	  these	  classes	  of	  interactions	  in	  our	  naturalistic	  longitudinal	  study.	  
2.2.4 Cognitive	  complexity	  accounts:	  a	  comparison	  What	  these	  three	  approaches	  have	  in	  common	  is	  that	  they	  all	  address	  and	  account	   for	   the	   developmental	   changes	   over	   the	   first	   year,	   in	   particular	  towards	   the	   end	   of	   the	   first	   year,	   concerning	   the	   phenomena	   they	   are	  interested	   in	   (emergence	  of	   intelligence	  and	   instrumental	  actions,	  onset	  of	  intentional	  communication,	  respectively)	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  differentiation	  and	  increasing	  complexity	  of	  the	  infant’s	  actions	  and	  cognitive	  structures	  (in	  particular	   an	   increasing	   means-­‐end	   differentiation	   and	   causal	  understanding).	   Additionally	   Bates	   as	   well	   as	   Sugarman	   suggest	   an	  increasing	   differentiation	   between	   the	   way	   infants	   used	   objects	   as	  instruments	  and	  the	  way	  they	  used	  people	  as	   instrumental	  agents,	  already	  foreshadowing	   later	   categorical	   distinctions	   between	   object	   and	   people	  engagement,	   but	   let	   us	   for	   now	   stay	  with	   the	   general	   point	   and	   unpack	   it	  into	  its	  parts.	  
2.2.4.1 The	  infant	  as	  the	  unit	  of	  analysis:	  The	  focus	  and	  unit	  of	  analysis	  of	  all	  
three	  approaches	  is	  the	  infant	  as	  an	  active,	  autonomous	  individual.	  	  Piaget	   went	   so	   far	   as	   to	   focus	   and	   restrict	   his	   observations	   almost	  exclusively	  on	  infant-­‐object	  interactions,	  neglecting	  any	  social	  context	  (only	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acknowledging	   social	   influence	   for	   culture	   specific	   “content”	   such	   as	  arbitrary	   symbols	   or	   morals,	   as	   well	   as	   some	   more	   complex	   logic	  operations).	   This	   overemphasis	  might	   be	   understood	   in	   the	   context	   of	   his	  efforts	   to	   carve	  out	   the	   infant	   as	   an	   active	   individual	   developing	   cognitive	  structures	   out	   of	   him-­‐/herself	   through	   autonomous	   sensorimotor	  interactions	  with	  the	  (object)	  world	  from	  early	  on.	  Piaget	  thus	  separated	  the	  infant’s	  intelligence	  out	  of	  the	  “logos	  complex”	  (see	  section	  2.7),	  that	  is,	  freed	  it	   from	   language	   and	   hence	   sociality,	   seeking	   to	   counter	   approaches	  rendering	   the	   infant’s	   intelligence	   completely	   dependent	   on	   sociality	  (including	  his	  own	  previous	  overemphasis	  on	  socialisation	  to	  overcome	  the	  child’s	   assumed	   egocentricism),	   or	   even	   denigrating	   it	   to	   being	   passively	  shaped	  by	  “drill”	  and	  social	  reinforcement.	  	  Bates	   and	   colleagues,	   as	  well	   as	   Sugarman,	  were	  part	   of	   the	  pioneering	  language	   researchers	   interested	   in	   preverbal	   communication,	   who	  separated	   certain	   not-­‐exclusively-­‐verbal	   aspects	   of	   language	   (e.g.	  “reference”)	   out	   of	   the	   “logos-­‐complex”	   pulling	   them	   downwards	   and	  looking	  for	  them	  at	  earlier	  ages	  within	  early	  social	  interactions.	  Looking	  for	  a	   framework	   for	   early	   development	   they	   drew	  on	  Piaget	   and	   –	   seeking	   to	  understand	   aspects	   of	   language	   –	   extended	   and	   applied	   his	   framework	   to	  the	   social	   realm.	   Thus,	   while	   (in	   contrast	   to	   Piaget)	   explicitly	   focusing	   on	  infants’	  social	   interactions,	   their	   level	  of	  analysis	  still	   remained	  exclusively	  the	  infant,	  only	  analysing	  the	  infant’s	  actions,	  or	  even	  infant	  initiated	  actions	  (Sugarman’s	  study	  explicitly	  excluded	  actions	  where	  the	  mother	  established	  the	   shared	   focus,	   as	   well	   as	   familiar	   “rituals”)	   to	   check	   for	   specific	  characteristics	   (non-­‐verbal	   performatives,	   simple/complex	  single/integrated	  person	  or	  object	  actions)	  and	  from	  this	  determine	  infants’	  abilities,	  and	  potentially	  infer	  capacities	  and	  cognitive	  structures.	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2.2.4.2 Actions	  and	  cognitive	  structures:	  All	  three	  approaches	  share	  a	  rather	  
abstract	   logic-­‐	   and	   language-­‐oriented	   conception	   of	   action	   and	  
thinking,	  which	  are	  partitioned	   into	  units	  defined	  by	  their	   functional	  
roles,	   in	   particular	   in	   terms	   of	   specific	   effects	   on	   objects	   or	   people,	  
observable	  for	  a	  researcher,	  supposedly	  in	  the	  service	  of	  instrumental	  
reason.	  	  While	   pointing	   out	   the	   continuity	   between	   sensorimotor	   action	   and	  intelligence	  and	   cognition	   (see	  below),	  Piaget	   –	  being	  mainly	   interested	   in	  logic	  and	  mathematics	  –	  tended	  to	  look	  at	  early	  psychological	  development	  as	   leading	   towards	   reversible	   logic	   operations	   (state-­‐based,	   atemporal)	   as	  their	   end	   point.	   Due	   to	   this	   orientation	   and	   reflecting	   his	   observational	  method,	  he	  considered	  processes	  of	   thinking	  and	  acting	  primarily	   in	  terms	  of	   acts	   of	   instrumental	   intelligence,	   partitioned	   into	   units	   defined	  by	   their	  functional	   roles,	   i.e.	   their	   specific	   observable	   effects	   on	   objects	   or	   people	  performed	  step	  by	  step	  in	  the	  service	  of	  instrumental	  reason.	  While	  he	  seeks	  to	  ground	  intelligence	  in	  sensorimotor	  interactions,	  even	  basic	  sensorimotor	  schemas5	  are	  –	  due	  to	  the	  constraints	  of	  his	  method	  (and	  era)	  –	  conceived	  of	  in	   quite	   abstract	   form,	   removed	   from	   physiological	   processes	   of	   motor	  planning	   and	   control	   (though	   less	   so	   than	   later	   cognitivist	   sense-­‐think-­‐act	  approaches)	  (Piaget,	  1962).	  Likewise,	   Bates	   and	   Sugarman	   interested	   in	   (the	   cognitive	   aspects	   of)	  language	  (i.e.	  reference)	  look	  at	  early	  development	  already	  with	  these	  later	  emerging	   complex	   language	   structures	   in	   mind.	   Looking	   for	   analogies	   in	  pre-­‐verbal	   actions	   and	   hence	   selectively	   paying	   attention	   to	   the	   cognitive	  aspects	   they	  are	   interested	   in,	   they	   find	  a	  good	  match	   in	  Piaget’s	  model	  of	  instrumental	   actions.	   Again	   due	   to	   this	   orientation	   and	   apparently	   having	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Schemas	  of	  action	  are	  defined	  as	  coordinated	  systems	  of	  movement	  and	  perceptions,	  which	   constitute	   any	   elementary	  behaviours	   capable	  of	   being	  repeated	   and	   applied	   to	   new	   situations,	   e.g.,	   grasping,	  moving,	   shaking	   an	  object	  (Piaget,	  1962,	  p.	  273).	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not	  yet	  been	  able	   to	   integrate	   the	   then	  new	  research	  on	  early	   interactions	  and	   proto-­‐conversation,	   they	   see	   infant’s	   early	   communication	   as	   merely	  automatically	   caused	   reactions	   to	   inner	   states,	   and	   conceive	  of	   later	   social	  interactions	   such	   as	   showing	   objects	   exclusively	   as	   deliberate	   intentional,	  indeed	   rational	   instrumental	   acts	   –	   with	   “getting	   attention”	   as	   a	   rather	  abstract	  and	  late	  acquired	  goal	  –	  rather	  than	  e.g.	  as	  affect	  imbued	  exchanges	  and	  acts	  of	  sharing	  between	  interaction	  partners,	  	  co-­‐creating	  and	  regulating	  the	  interaction	  and	  affecting	  each	  other.	  	  Conceiving	   communicative	   intentions,	   and	   intentionality	   in	   general,	  exclusively	  in	  terms	  of	  instrumental	  means-­‐end	  thinking	  in	  which	  “the	  goal”	  and	  the	  “means”	  of	  an	  action	  are	  clearly	  distinguished	  as	  separate	  discrete	  units,	  paves	  the	  way	  towards	  a	  rational	  conception	  of	  thinking	  and	  acting	  as	  a	   series	   of	   discrete	   steps:	   1)	   forming	   a	   goal	   or	   intention,	   2)	   ahead-­‐of-­‐time	  planning,	  and	  3)	  executing	  the	  plan.	  This	  idealized	  conception	  may	  to	  some	  extent	   capture	   (aspects	   of)	   conscious	   rational	   thinking,	   but	   may	   be	  misleading	   as	   a	   generalized	   frame	   for	   understanding	   complex	   multi-­‐dimensional	   processes	   of	   control	   and	   coordination,	   artificially	   separating	  planning	  and	  control	  of	  action	  (a	  tendency	  we	  will	  find	  exacerbated	  in	  later	  cognitive	  approaches,	  see	  e.g.	  Tomasello	  section	  2.4).	  In	   addition,	   their	   research	   methodology	   based	   on	   verbal	   transcription	  may	   further	   reinforce	   this	   one-­‐dimensional,	   serialised	   conception	   of	   (in	  particular	  communicative)	  action	  and	  cognition:	  by	  recording	  behaviour	  by	  taking	  notes	  and	  transcribing	  video	  recordings	  into	  linear	  text	  as	  their	  first	  step,	  and	  exclusively	  relying	  on	  this	  text-­‐based	  version	  for	  further	  analysis,	  they	   inadvertently	   collapse	  a	   complex	  multi-­‐modal	  and	  multi-­‐strand	  social	  interaction	   into	   a	   serial,	   single	   channel,	   and	   one	   dimensional	   sequence	   of	  selected	   discrete	   steps,	   reflecting	   the	   selective	   interest	   and	   attention	  (Tomasello’s	   “intentional	   perception”)	   of	   the	   researcher.	   In	   general,	  managing,	   enacting,	   and	   coordinating	   activities	   of	   increasing	   complexity	  here	  is	  reduced	  to	  singling	  out	  and	  selecting	  the	  correct	  action	  unit	  from	  an	  ever	   larger	   repertoire	  and	  sequentially	   chaining	   them	  together	   into	   longer	  and	   longer	  stacks,	   thus	  missing	  some	  of	   the	  ongoing	  continuous,	  analogue,	  aspects	  (including	  affect)	  of	  the	  multi-­‐modal	  multi-­‐stream	  co-­‐ordination.	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2.2.4.3 The	  focus	  on	  (inter-­‐)action	  and	  its	  complexities:	  Though	   rendered	   common	   place	   by	   countless	   quotations	   and	   textbook	  descriptions/renditions,	  Piaget’s	  considerations	  on	  sensorimotor	  processes	  –	  held	   in	  high	   regard	   in	   the	  embodied	  action	   currents	   in	   cognitive	   science	  (Bickhard,	   1992;	   Di	   Paolo,	   Barandiaran,	   Beaton,	   &	   Buhrmann,	   2014)	   –	   as	  well	   as	   his	   biological	   process	   model	   of	   assimilation	   and	   accommodation	  merit	  another	   fresh	   look	  as	   they	  –	   rather	   than	   later	  abstract	   “information-­‐processing	   models”	   –	   offer	   a	   rich	   source	   for	   building	   a	   framework	  considering	   “developing	   in	   interaction”	   as	   a	  process,	  where	  all	   poles	   in	   an	  interaction,	   people	   and	   objects,	   actually	   affect	   and	   change	   each	   other	   on	  many	  levels	  and	  at	  many	  timescales	  in	  a	  process	  of	  ongoing	  transformation.	  And	  yet,	  these	  processes	  seem	  to	  remain	  rather	  abstract	  in	  Piaget’s	  account	  –	  giving	  rise	  to	  Vygotsky’s	  criticism	  that	  what	  Piaget’s	  infants	  lack	  is	  “reality,	  and	  the	  [..]	  relationship	  to	  that	  reality.	  What	  is	  missing	  is	  the	  child’s	  practical	  activity”	   (Vygotsky,	   1987,	   p.	   87).	   This	   peculiar	   dissonance	   in	   Piaget’s	  thinking	   might	   be	   caused	   by	   a	   clash	   between	   conceptualizing	   the	  irreversibly	   transformative	   historic	   change	   processes	   of	   evolution	   on	   the	  one	   side	   and	   reversible	   logic	   operations	   performed	   offline	   and	   thus	   not	  affecting	  the	  “real	  world”.	  All	   three	   accounts	   address	   development	   over	   the	   first	   year	   of	   life,	  including	  the	  challenges	  and	  major	  changes	  in	  the	  development	  of	  triadicity,	  in	   terms	   of	   complexity	   of	   action,	   which	   later	   tends	   to	   fade	   into	   the	  background	   in	   favour	   of	   accounts	   in	   terms	  of	   specific	   abstract	   knowledge.	  While	  these	  three	  accounts	  are	  all	  characterized	  by	  a	  somewhat	  abstracted	  and	   sequential	   conception,	   they	   place	   a	   major	   focus	   on	   the	   challenges	   of	  coordination	   of	   actions,	   which	   gains	   a	   new	   relevance	   when	   considering	  actions	  as	  multi-­‐modal	  and	  multi-­‐strand	  processes	  of	  joint	  praxis.	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2.3 Accounts	   II:	   Social	   relating	  and	   co-­‐ordination	  of	   social	   and	  object	  
realms	  (Trevarthen	  &	  Hubley,	  Adamson	  &	  Bakeman)	  The	  research	  programs	  discussed	  in	  this	  section	  are	  examples	  of	  research	  pursued	  in	  the	  generations	  after	  Piaget,	  countering	  Piaget	  by	  emphasizing	  in	  particular	   social	   relating	   and	   interacting.	   For	   these	   approaches,	   the	  challenge	   and	   achievement	   of	   infants’	   development	   over	   and	   towards	   the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  year	  primarily	  comes	  to	  mean	  coordinating	  and	  integrating	  engagement	  with	  the	  two	  domains,	  now	  considered	  separate,	  of	  people	  and	  objects.	   We	   discuss	   1)	   Trevarthen	   and	   Hubley’s	   account	   of	   infants’	  developing	   intersubjectivity	   from	   “primary”	   to	   “secondary	  intersubjectivity”,	   and	   2)	   Adamson	   and	   Bakeman’s	   account	   of	   the	   gradual	  emergence	  of	  “coordinated	  joint	  engagement”	  between	  people	  and	  objects.	  
2.3.1 Trevarthen	   and	   Hubley:	   from	   primary	   to	   secondary	   intersubjectivity	  
(Trevarthen	  &	  Hubley	  1978,	  Hubley	  and	  Tevarthern	  1979s)	  
2.3.1.1 Infants’	  early	  intersubjectivity	  Trevarthen's	  early	  research	  conducted	  together	  with	  Martin	  Richards	  and	  Barry	  Brazelton	  at	  Jerome	  Bruner’s	  Center	  for	  Cognitive	  Studies	  in	  Harvard	  in	  the	  late	  1960s,	  where	  they	  observed	  infants	  from	  birth	  to	  their	  6	  month	  of	  life,	  convinced	  him	  of	  two	  things:	  First:	  the	  behavior	  newborns	  showed	  was	  not	  reflex	   like	  but	  purposeful,	   integrating	  the	  whole	  body,	   including	  highly	  co-­‐ordinated	   eye-­‐head	   or	   hand-­‐to-­‐	   mouth	   movements,	   which	   he	   also	  experienced	  as	  being	  “aware”	  and	  “conscious.”	  And	  secondly	  they	  seemed	  to	  behave	   in	   two	   distinctively	   different	   ways	   depending	   on	   whether	   they	  engaged	  with	  objects	  or	  with	  people:	  
“They seek physical objects as sources of perceptual information or interest, 
and also as potentially graspable, chewable, kickable, step-on-able or 
otherwise usable. But persons are communicated with.”(Trevarthen, 1979, 
p. 323) Trevarthen	   describes	   these	   –	   coming	   from	   a	   biological	   systems,	  physiological,	  and	  motor	  control	  background	  –	  as	  two	  different	  “regulatory	  states”,	  “inner	  contexts	  of	  action”	  and	  later	  simply	  “motives	  of	  behavior”.	  In	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“The	   self	   born	   in	   intersubjectivity”	   (1993)	   he	  writes	   about	   the	  motivation	  for	  this	  concept:	  
[T]he word schema suggest a static pattern or plan that can keep a record 
in its shape. It has no efficiency of its own. It brings to mind something seen 
from outside and described, or “schematized”. We need a term to designate 
an active process or system more closely identified with the life of the 
subject. Program is the term used in cognitive science and artificial 
intelligence, but this is a set of logical or mathematical instructions that 
determines how information is processed through the system defining its 
input-output relations. Again we have a word that does not convey the inner 
generative and developmental aspect of psychological activities. A program, 
even one called generative, has to be written and then put into effect by 
some agency that delivers the right input language of energy and 
information to the programmable system. It is a rational, symbolic insertion. 
Psychological activities, with other life activities, have their own agency: 
They are autopoietic, or self-creating, like a growing organism, and they 
generate both awareness and the action in it. The word motive seems more 
appropriate to describe psychological functions that develop in the subject’s 
mind in readiness for perceiving the information needed for acting. The 
innate releasing mechanisms of von Uexküll and Lorenz […] is a motive, 
but it is defined as triggered or released by a “sign stimulus.” We need a 
term that indicates, more directly, the psychological function that explores 
and orients towards the consummatory response or goal. (Trevarthen, 1993, 
p. 123) 
“Motive” in the sense used here, designates a mental function that is a 
cause and director of movement and, at the same time, a seeker of 
information to direct and confirm movement – to make it work for a 
purpose […]. A motive causes a subject to be curious and exploratory, as 
well as purposeful and effective, to be prepared to react selectively to the 
information that will be taken up in perception and to seek immediate 
influences that are appropriate for direct, ongoing control of acts and their 
effects. The motive regulates what will be chosen for uptake in perception 
and for retention in memory. Motives originate in largely inaccessible 
cerebral activity, but because they generate a wealth of movements for 
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aiming and focusing perception as well as for acting on the world, they are 
as real and readily observable as any regulatory principle in behavior. The 
central energy and self-regulating quality of motives are expressed in 
emotions. (Trevarthen, 1993, pp. 123–124, emphasis ours) 
 For	   Trevarthen,	   the	   remarkable	   thing	   about	   infants’	   different	  modes	   of	  acting	   towards	   people	   and	   towards	   objects	   is	   -­‐	   especially	   with	   regard	   to	  various	  theoretical	  positions	  within	  developmental	  psychology,	  in	  particular	  Piaget’s	   exclusive	   focus	   on	   object	   interactions	   and	   neglect	   of	   the	   social	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  -­‐	  that	  there	  indeed	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  distinct	  
social	   motive	   active	   in	   the	   infant	   from	   the	   beginning,	  which	   becomes	  manifest	   in	   neonatal	   imitation	   and	   proto-­‐conversation	   (Bateson,	   1975,	  1979;	   Brazelton,	   Berry,	   Koslowski,	   &	   Main,	   1974;	   Bullowa,	   1979;	   Lock,	  1978;	  Snow,	  1977;	  Stern,	  1971;	  Tronick,	  1982)	  To	   account	   for	   these	   intricately	   coordinated	   behaviours	   Trevarthen	  formulates	   his	   “Theory	   of	   Innate	   Intersubjectivity”:	   “a	   child	   is	   born	   with	  
motives	   to	   find	   and	   use	   the	   motives	   of	   other	   persons	   in	   "conversational"	  
negotiation	   of	   purposes,	   emotions,	   experiences	   and	  meaning.	   [...]	   the	   idea	   of	  
infant	  intersubjectivity	  is	  no	  less	  than	  a	  theory	  of	  how	  human	  minds,	  in	  human	  
bodies,	   can	   recognize	   one	   another's	   impulses,	   intuitively,	   with	   or	   without	  
cognitive	  or	  symbolic	  elaborations”	  (Trevarthen,	  1998).	  	  Thereby	   Trevarthen	   also	   clearly	   positions	   himself	   within	   the	   field	   of	  various	   theoretical	   approaches:	   he	   sets	   himself	   apart	   from	   Piaget	   and	  cognitivist	   theories	   in	   claiming	   that	   there	   is	   an	   active	   social	   motive,	   an	  understanding	   of	   and	   meaningfully	   interacting	   with	   others	   from	   the	  beginning,	   not	   necessarily	   depending	   on	   cognitive	   or	   symbolic	  mediation.	  He	  distinguishes	  himself	   from	  cultural	  psychology	  approaches	  by	  stressing	  the	  active	   role	  of	   the	   infant,	   and	   from	  clinical	  approaches	  by	   insisting	   that	  this	   active	   role	   goes	   beyond	   responding	   for	   being-­‐cared-­‐for	   or	   being	  regulated	   but	   rather	   is	   a	   genuine	   seeking	   for	   engagement	   and	   sharing	  experiences	  with	  others	  and	  engaging	  in	  joint	  regulation	  and	  also	  implying	  a	  genuine	   intersubjective	   understanding.	   What	   exactly	   does	   he	   mean	   by	  “intersubjective	  understanding”?	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The	   term	   “intersubjectivity”	   is	   drawn	   from	   Habermas'	   theory	   of	  communicative	   action.	   Trevarthen	   repeatedly	   stresses	   the	   impact	  Habermas'	  work	  had	  –	  along	  with	  Austin’s	  speech	  act	  theory	  –	  on	  the	  field	  of	  early	   infant	   communication:	   how	   his	   efforts	   to	   put	   language	   in	   a	   broader	  pragmatic	  context	  of	  communication	  and	  to	  develop	  a	  framework	  describing	  more	   general	   characteristics	   and	   preconditions	   for	   mutual	   understanding	  were	   readily	   taken	   up	   for	   example	   by	   Ryan,	   as	   they	   could	   fruitfully	   be	  applied	  to	  investigating	  the	  development	  of	  communication	  before	  language	  (compare	   last	   section).	   In	   Bullowa's	   “Before	   Speech”	   Trevarthen	   explains	  what	  work	  the	  term	  "intersubjectivity"	  does	  for	  him:	  
It is not a graceful word, but it does specify the linking of subjects who are 
active in transmitting their understanding to each other. The relating is 
"interpersonal" but we need to penetrate the psychological process by which 
conscious intending subjects relate their mental and emotional processes 
together. I feel that the "intersubjective" emphasizes this. (Trevarthen, 1979; 
note Trevarthen’s emphasis on consciousness and awareness) For	   Trevarthen	   following	   Habermas	   the	   concept	   “intersubjectivity”	  defines	   the	   very	   requirements	   people	   need	   in	   order	   to	   participate	   in	  communication:	  
First they must be able to exhibit to others at least the rudiments of 
individual consciousness and intentionality. This attribute of acting agents I 
call subjectivity. [...] By subjectivity I mean the ability to show by 
coordinated acts that purposes are being consciously regulated. [examples 
given: focusing attention on things, handling and exploring objects with 
interest in the consequences, orientating or avoiding while anticipating the 
course of events and meeting or evading them.] 
In order to communicate, infants must also be able to adapt or fit this 
subjective control to the subjectivity of others: they must also demonstrate 
intersubjectivity. (Trevarthen, 1979 emphasis ours) How	   intersubjectivity	   changes	   over	   time	  was	   investigated	   by	  Hubley	   in	  her	   dissertation	   research	   (Hubley,	   1983;	   Hubley	   &	   Trevarthen,	   1979;	  Trevarthen	  &	  Hubley,	  1978)	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2.3.2 From	  primary	  to	  secondary	  intersubjectivity	  Penelope	  Hubley	  began	  data	  collection	  for	  what	  was	  initially	  intended	  to	  form	   the	   basis	   for	   two	   distinct	   studies	   on	   the	   development	   of	   1)	   mother	  infant	   social	   interaction	   and	   2)	   early	   object	   reaching	   and	   manipulation,	  however,	   it	  soon	  “became	  apparent	   that	  social	  and	  object	  related	  activities	  did	  not	  remain	  separate	  after	  4	  to	  5	  months”	  (Hubley,	  1983,	  pp.	  6–7).	  Hence	  the	   focus	  of	  attention	  moved	  to	   look	   into	  how	  this	   joint	  activity	  developed	  and	  changed	  over	  time.	  
2.3.2.1 Descriptive	   Qualitative	   Longitudinal	   Case	   Study:	   Trevarthen	   and	  
Hubley	  (1978)	  For	  their	  study,	  Trevarthen	  and	  Hubley	  followed	  free	  play	  interactions	  of	  a	  young	  girl	  (Tracey)	  with	  her	  mother	  across	  32	  lab	  visits	  from	  3	  weeks	  to	  12	  months	  of	  age.	  The	  pair	  brought	   their	  own	   toys	   from	  home	   including	  a	  wooden	  pull-­‐doll,	  a	  multi-­‐part	  globe	  rattle,	  and	  a	  wooden	  truck	  on	  a	  string	  with	   2	   wooden	   figures.	   Tracey	   was	   placed	   in	   a	   specially	   designed	   seat,	  supporting	   her	   trunk	   in	   a	   near	   vertical	   position	   and	   allowing	   free	   limb	  movement.	   Tracey’s	   and	   her	  mother’s	   actions	   and	   facial	   expressions	  were	  recorded	  on	  16	  mm	  film	  projected	  side-­‐by-­‐side	  using	  a	  mirror.	  	  In	   the	   first	   month	   Tracy	   –	   in	   her	   brief	   periods	   of	   alertness	   -­‐	   showed	  tracking	  and	  pre-­‐reaching	  movements	  towards	  a	  ball	  suspended	  in	  front	  of	  her	   face	   as	   well	   as	   communicative	   actions	   (eye-­‐contact,	   cooing,	   and	   body	  and	   arm	   movements)	   towards	   her	   mother,	   which	   flourished	   into	   proto-­‐conversations	  over	   the	  next	   two	  months,	   though	  being	  slightly	  weary	  with	  people,	  paralleling	  her	  mother’s	  slight	  insecurity,	  which	  also	  led	  to	  a	  longer	  break	   of	   several	   weeks	   in	   recording.	   Data	   collection	   was	   resumed	   with	   a	  happier	   dyad	   at	   4	  months,	   and	   by	   5	  months	   the	   infant’s	   interest	   in	   -­‐	   and	  grasping	  movements	  towards	  -­‐	  objects	  had	  increased,	  as	  well	  as	  towards	  her	  mother’s	   hands	   and	   mouth.	   By	   6	   months	   she	   manipulated	   objects	   under	  close	   visual	   attention	   with	   an	   expression	   of	   serious	   intent	   with	   hardly	  paying	   attention	   to	   her	   mother.	   She	   accepted	   or	   pushed	   away	   offered	  objects,	   in	   the	   first	   case	   without	   any	   motion	   towards	   giving	   them	   back,	  though	  dropping	  them	  became	  a	  game	  for	  which	  she	  and	  her	  mother	  shared	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amusement.	  Tracey	  also	  expressed	  joy	  when	  successfully	  setting	  a	  jumping-­‐jack	  doll	  in	  motion	  pulling	  on	  its	  chord,	  without	  however	  directly	  looking	  at	  the	   mother	   or	   her	   reaction.	  While	   during	   these	   months	   interest	   in	   direct	  social	   face	   to	   face	   communication	   had	   decreased,	   out	   of	   the	   mother’s	  touching	   her	   and	   animating	   objects	   two	  mediated	   forms	   of	   social	   play	  emerged:	   1)	   games	   of	   the	   person	   from	   around	   4-­‐5	   months,	   where	   the	  bodies’	   palpable,	   object-­‐like	   characteristics	   as	   an	   object	   to	   be	   physically	  engaged	   with	   or	   a	   means	   for	   displaying	   exaggerated	   actions	   came	   to	   the	  fore,	   and	   2)	   games	   with	   objects	   from	   around	   5-­‐6	   months,	   where	   the	  mother	  animated	  objects	  (analogously	  to	  moving	  body	  parts	  in	  games	  of	  the	  person),	   and	   rhythmically	   moved,	   loomed,	   or	   made	   them	   emit	   noises,	  following	   and	   adapting	   to	   Tracey’s	   interests	   in	   the	   effects	   of	   her	   own	   and	  her	  mother’s	  actions	  on	  the	  objects.	  
As with games of the person, Tracey co-operated closely with her mother, 
but she did so without giving more than an occasional glance to her 
mother’s eyes and without looking at her mother’s expressions to observe 
feelings or interests concerning herself. She appeared unable to attend to 
the other’s purpose directly, or else resistant to it. (Trevarthen & Hubley, 
1978) Around	   7-­‐8	   months,	   within	   games	   with	   objects,	   a	   reversal	   occurred:	   as	  Tracey	  shook	  and	  banged	  objects,	  and	  her	  mother	  replied	  with	  “bang-­‐bang-­‐bang”	  she	  realized	  the	  effect	  her	  object	  actions	  had	  on	  her	  mother	  and	  the	  effect	   became	   the	   goal	   of	   a	   new	   game	   leading	   to	   smiling	   and	   laughter.	  However,	  Tracey	  still	  failed	  to	  act	  reciprocally	  in	  giving	  objects	  back	  to	  her	  mother’s	  open	  hand	  and	  was	  not	  truly	  co-­‐operative,	  failing	  to	  attend	  directly	  to	  the	  intentions	  of	  her	  mother.	  From	  around	  9-­‐10	  months	  on,	  Tracey	  interrupted	  her	  actions	  to	  make	  eye-­‐contact	  and	  exchange	  affect	  and	  paid	  attention	  to	  demonstrations	  of	  object	  acts,	  showing	  willingness	  to	  share	  her	  experiences.	  She	   followed	  when	  her	  mother	  pointed	  to	  an	  object	  and	  at	  the	  command	  “pull	  it!”	  made	  a	  move	  to	  pull	   the	   toy	   trolley	   towards	   her.	   A	   little	   later	   she	   engaged	   in	   giving	   and	  taking	   and	   around	  11-­‐12	  months	  was	   able	   to	   select	   objects	  named	  by	  her	  mother	  in	  a	  naming	  game.	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“With babies in the second and third month, most mothers we have filmed 
played games that involved touching the infant's body, like pat-a-cake with 
the hands, bouncing the legs, shaking the cheeks, prodding the nose or 
stomach. Gradually, it would seem the mother herself is accepted as a game 
object as she mirrors the infant's acts of expression. After this the play 
incorporates objects that the infant has accepted as foci for interest. We 
found that by 6 months these games via objects, or with parts of the mother's 
body treated as objects, became the infants' preferred form of play. Then, at 
9 or 10 months, they started the deliberately co-operative form of interest in 
objects which transforms play into exchange of acts of meaning.” 
(Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978, pp. 211–212) 
2.3.2.2 Quantitative	  Longitudinal	  Study:	  Sharing	  a	  Task	  in	  Infancy	  (Hubley	  &	  
Trevarthen,	  1979)	  For	  a	  follow-­‐up	  study	  aiming	  to	  investigate	  the	  emergence	  of	  cooperation,	  5	   mother-­‐daughter	   pairs	   were	   videotaped	   at	   the	   lab	   for	   6	   play	   sessions	  when	  the	  infants	  each	  were	  34,	  38,	  42,	  46,	  50,	  54	  weeks	  (~8-­‐12	  months)	  of	  age.	   The	  mothers	  were	   instructed	   to	   engage	   in	   4	   conditions,	   of	   4	  minutes	  duration	  each:	  1)	  play	  without	  toys,	  2)	  join	  in	  play	  with	  toys	  (a	  similar	  set	  of	  toys	  as	  in	  the	  pilot)	  3)	  refrain	  from	  initiating	  play,	  just	  watch	  the	  infant	  play,	  but	   respond	  with	   gaze	   or	   smile	  when	   addressed,	   and	   4)	   teach	   the	   baby	   a	  simple	   manipulation	   task:	   putting	   3	   wooden	   figures	   into	   a	   toy	   truck.	  Analysis	  was	  restricted	  exclusively	  to	  this	  forth	  condition.	  All	   behaviours	   coded	   were	   considered	   as	   “acts	   of	   communication”,	   as	  they	  “regulate	  communication	  between	  partners	  because	  they	  are	  directed	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  manifest	   interest	  or	  activity	  of	  the	  partner,	  or	  because	  they	  respond	   to	   acts	   of	   communication.“	   Two	   types	   of	   communicative	   acts	   are	  distinguished:	   1)	   interpersonal	   acts:	   acts	   directed	   to	   the	   other	   person	  making	  no	  reference	  to	  objects,	  including	  looks,	  smiles,	  laughs	  towards	  each	  other,	   vocal	   imitation,	  movements	   towards	  or	   touching	  each	  other;	   and	  2)	  
acts	  of	  joint	  praxis:	  acts	  on	  objects	  that	  are	  oriented	  to	  the	  attention	  or	  action	  of	   the	  other	  person.	  Thus,	   interestingly,	  Hubley’s	  and	  Trevarthen’s	   “acts	  of	  
joint	   praxis”	   by	   themselves	   already	   include	   coordination	   between	   people	  and	  objects,	  that	  is,	  already	  show	  some	  aspects	  of	  triadicity.	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Hubley	   and	   Trevarthen	   reported	   a	   stable	   number	   and	   duration	   of	  communicative	   episodes	   across	   infants	   and	   ages,	   with	   a	   quite	   stable	  composition	   of	   such	   episodes,	   around	   2/3	   of	   which	   were	   categorized	   as	  “joint	  praxis	  only”,	  10-­‐20%	  “interpersonal	  acts	  only”,	  with	  the	  combination	  of	  “joint	  praxis	  and	  interpersonal	  acts”	  in	  the	  same	  episode	  increasing	  from	  15%	   in	  week	  34	   to	   around	  30%	   in	  week	  54.	  Only	   infants	   in	   the	  older	   age	  groups	   began	   to	   (sometimes)	   imitate	   demonstrations	   and	   comply	   with	  instructions,	  which	  became	  more	  frequent	  and	  more	  elaborate	  with	  age.	  
[O]ur results show that between thirty-four and fifty-four weeks infant 
subjects began to engage with their mothers in communication about using 
objects. […] As the infants grew older they began to integrate interpersonal 
acts and acts of joint praxis together, they complied with the mothers 
instructions, and the imitated her acts on objects. […] Mothers and infants 
together started communicating, using objects in a way that transmitted 
messages and invoking people as agents to help in a task. (Hubley & 
Trevarthen, 1979; emphasis ours) For	  our	  current	  purposes,	  the	  results	  	  -­‐	  even	  if	  restricted	  to	  condition	  4	  –	  are	   highly	   suggestive	   in	   that	   infants	   from	   the	   first	   session	   (at	   8	   months)	  already	   abundantly	   engaged	   in	  acts	  of	   joint	  praxis,	   i.e.	   coordinate	   between	  persons	   and	   objects.	   However,	   the	   authors	   unfortunately	   do	   not	   further	  describe	   or	   analyse	   joint	   praxis,	   nor	   look	   at	   its	   development	   (before	   8	  months)	  in	  this	  study.	  To	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  development	  of	  joint	  praxis	  itself,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  interesting	  to	  learn	  about	  how	  joint	  praxis	  is	  organized,	  expanding	  on	  their	  qualitative	  observations	  from	  the	  case	  study	  (see	  above).	  
2.3.2.3 Accounting	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  secondary	  intersubjectivity	  Apart	   from	   the	   behavioural	   description	   of	   the	   emergence	   of	   secondary	  intersubjectivity	  as	  the	  integration	  of	  joint	  praxis	  and	  interpersonal	  acts,	  Trevarthen	   and	   Hubley	   account	   for	   these	   developments	   in	   terms	   of	   3	  different	   systems,	   the	   seeds	   of	   which	   are	   already	   in	   place	   from	   birth	   and	  which	   develop	   in	   alternating	   waves	   and	   reach	   a	   new	   level	   of	   integration	  between	  9	  and	  12	  months:	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These modes are probably three real systems of the brain that achieve 
functional differentiation by interaction with each other and with the 
environment. Forms of action and perceptual processing appropriate for 1) 
knowing and using objects (praxic mode), for 2) communicating with the 
human world (communicative mode), and for 3) acting in self-directed or 
thoughtful manner (reflective mode) appear as distinct rudiments in the 
new-born. […] Once free interaction between communicative and praxic 
modes of action is achieved, the infant suddenly shows behavior that is 
unique to man in its complexity, and full of potential for the development 
of knowledge, joint enterprise, and language. (Hubley & Trevarthen, 1979; 
emphasis ours) While	  distancing	  themselves	  from	  Piaget,	  Trevarthen	  and	  Hubley	  indeed	  consider	  the	  infant	  as	  more	  or	  less	  the	  sole	  source	  of	  agency	  in	  development,	  not	  unlike	  Piaget;	  only	  with	  infants	  not	  developing	  exclusively	  in	  interaction	  with	  objects	  but	  also	  through	  interaction	  with	  social	  partners	  who	  adapt	  to	  them,	   thus	   providing	   an	   even	   better	   source	   of	   interaction.	   And,	   crucially,	  adult	  social	  partners	  engage	  with	  infants	  as	  companions.	  With	  regard	  to	  the	  concrete	   course	   of	   development	   however,	   Trevarthen	   and	   Hubley	   do	   not	  credit	   adult	   social	   partners	   much	   influence	   beyond	   what	   the	   infant’s	  development	  and	  actions	  dictate:	  
Even though the mother’s adaptations were undoubtedly influenced by 
knowledge and ideas imported from her cultural experience away from 
Tracey, the strong regulation of the play by Tracey’s acts makes it unlikely 
that the games were invented by the mother. The games appear to follow 
development in the object-seeking and person-recognizing functions Tracey 
has exhibited since her first month, and to depend on the mother being 
interested and sufficiently aware to adapt to these functions. (Trevarthen & 
Hubley, 1978) 
Changes are initiated, not by the adult rule bearers, but by the infant and 
child. [...] The vocabulary of language, games, toys and all other cultural 
artefacts enrich the possibilities of life of an infant because they meet the 
infant’s habits of intersubjectivity. Changes at certain ages, such as the 
change at 9 months, caused the rules of interaction to change. People in the 
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social world react by becoming affectionate, co-operative, interested and 
talkative, adapting to the forms of social action that seem most natural to an 
infant at each age. (Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978) In	   addition	   to	   their	   general	   account	   in	   terms	   of	   3	   developing	   and	  increasingly	  integrating	  action	  systems,	  they	  repeatedly	  mention	  a	  change	  in	  understanding	   or	   knowledge	   as	   a	   key	   factor	   the	   qualitative	   changes	   in	  interaction,	  namely	   “the	  infant’s	  changing	  understanding	  of	  her	  mother	  as	  a	  
person”:	  
At the beginning of the study [34 weeks] the infants did not understand or 
have clear expectations of the mothers’ behavior with objects, hence the 
mother was not able to communicate about objects to them. […] We believe 
that the meaning of the mother’s activity changed because the babies started 
somewhere in the 20 weeks over which the study extended to conceive their 
mothers as praxic agents doing particular things. […] Perceiving someone 
as an agent implies seeing that person as having plans and goals in 
action; it implies a degree of subjectivity. Cooperating with someone in 
joint action on objects involves taking up at least some part of the other 
person’s plans and goals. In cooperative actions on objects the partners 
combine communicative intention and praxic agency having effect both 
on each other and on the physical world. (Hubley & Trevarthen, 1979; 
emphasis ours) This	  focus	  on	  understanding	  or	  knowledge	  about	  someone,	  her	  plans	  and	  goals,	   using	   cognitive	   terms	   now,	   we	   will	   later	   find	   again	   in	   Tomasello’s	  account	   as	   the	   crucial	   aspect	   suddenly	   leading	   to	   the	   different	   ways	   of	  relating	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  “9	  months	  revolution”	  (see	  section	  2.4.).	  	  	  
2.3.3 Adamson	   and	   Bakeman:	   passive	   and	   coordinated	   joint	   engagement	  
(Bakeman	  &	  Adamson,	  1984)	  
2.3.3.1 Background,	  interests,	  and	  theoretical	  framework	  In	  a	  seminal	  study	  and	  a	  series	  of	  resulting	  papers	  appearing	  throughout	  the	  early	  1980s	  Adamson	  and	  Bakeman	  set	  out	  to	  explore	  “the	  emergence	  of	  the	  ability	  to	  coordinate	  attention	  toward	  a	  social	  partner	  and	  an	  object	  of	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mutual	   interest”,	   here	   already	   dubbed	   “a	   developmental	   milestone”	  (Bakeman	  &	  Adamson,	  1984).	  In	   their	  1982	   reflective	   “research-­‐in-­‐progress-­‐chapter”	   they	   share	   some	  of	  the	  background:	  Interested	  in	  the	  development	  of	   infant	  communication	  they	  found	  themselves	  facing	  a	  gap	  between	  2	  different	  research	  traditions	  interested	   in	   different	   aspects	   and	   age	   groups:	   early	   communication	  researchers	  looking	  at	  arousal	  and	  affect	  regulation	  in	  0-­‐5	  month	  olds,	  and	  language	  researchers	  looking	  for	  the	  first	  cases	  of	  reference	  from	  around	  9	  months	  on.	  This	  gap	  with	  regard	  to	  age	  as	  well	  as	  concepts	  made	  it	  hard	  to	  compare	  and	  relate	  the	  approaches	  and	  hence	  made	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  process	   of	   development	   of	   communication	  difficult	   (Adamson	  &	  Bakeman,	  1982).	  Adamson	   and	   Bakeman	   became	   convinced	   that	   to	   understand	   the	  development	   of	   communication	   it	   was	   necessary	   I)	   to	   look	   at	   the	   same	  parameters	   across	   the	   whole	   age	   span,	   II)	   to	   take	   into	   account	   the	  interaction	  of	  all	  participants,	  and	  that	  III)	  sharing	  and	  guiding	  attention	  (in	  a	   situation	  where	   people	   and	   objects	   come	   together,	  which	  Adamson	   also	  dubs	   “triadic”)	   was	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   language	   and	   communication	   –	   as	  Adamson	  elaborates	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  a	  later	  textbook	  (Adamson,	  1995)	  6.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  In	  her	  1995	  textbook	  Adamson	  reminds	  the	  reader	  that	  this	  idea	  should	  not	  be	  taken	  for	  granted,	  as	  it	  e.g.	  is	  not	  found	  in	  Piaget’s	  account,	  and	  traces	  aspects	  of	  it	  back	  through	  history:	  1)	   The	   idea	   that	   a	   sharing	   situation,	   where	   people	   and	   objects	   come	  together	   in	   close	  vicinity	   so	   (attention	   to)	  objects	   can	  be	  shared,	   is	   crucial	  for	   language	   development,	   is	   common	   to	   both	   Werner	   and	   Kaplan’s	  	  	  (“primordial	   sharing	   situations”),	   as	   well	   as	   Jakobson’s	   language	  model,	   a	  similarity	  Bakeman	  traces	  back	  to	  their	  common	  teacher	  Karl	  Bühler	  and	  his	  organon	  model	  of	  language.	  2)	   Turning	   to	   the	   process	   of	   sharing	   and	   directing	   attention	   itself	   and	  underscoring	   its	   role	   for	   language	   (development),	   Adamson	   appeals	   to	  Bruner:	   “The	   problem	   of	   how	   reference	   develops	   “	   can	   be	   restated	   as	   “the	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2.3.3.2 Empirical	  Study	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
problem	   of	   how	   people	   manage	   and	   direct	   each	   other’s	   attention”,	   quoting	  from	  his	   book	  Child’s	  Talk.	   This	   book	   is	   dedicated	   -­‐	   and	   hence	   again	   links	  these	  thoughts	  -­‐	  to	  Bruner’s	  “teacher	  and	  friend”	  Jacobson	  [and	  thus	  in	  turn,	  indirectly,	  to	  Bühler].	  3)	   Interestingly,	   the	   discussions	   in	   her	   1995	   textbook	   strongly	   suggest	  that,	   for	  Adamson,	   the	   role	  of	   sharing	  and	  directing	  attention	   for	   language	  goes	  well	  beyond	  being	  an	  expression	  of	  a	  general	  prerequisite-­‐capacity	  of	  “joint	  attention”	   reflecting	   specific	   social	  knowledge	  necessary	   for	   sharing,	  as	   it	   is	   conceived	   of	   by	   knowledge-­‐based	   cognitivist	   approaches.	   Rather,	  following	   Jacobson,	   she	  points	  out	   the	  concrete	   functional	   role	   of	   jointly	  shifting	   attention	   for	   ongoing	   communication:	  each	   concrete	   attentional	  
shift	  towards	  a	  particular	  aspect	  within	  an	  ongoing	  communication	  matters,	  as	   it	   effectively	   changes	  and	  newly	  determines	   the	   joint	   topic,	   and	  with	   it	  also	   the	   function	   of	   communication	   –	   being	   emotive	   with	   focus	   on	   the	  speaker;	   conative	   with	   focus	   on	   the	   addressee;	   referential	   with	   focus	   on	  objects;	  phatic,	  metalinguistic,	  and	  poetic	  with	  focus	  on	  the	  connection,	  the	  linguistic	   mode	   of	   communication,	   or	   its	   concrete	   form,	   respectively.	   She	  also	   adapts	   this	  model	   to	   capture	   crucial	   characteristics	  of	   communicative	  development	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   shared	   topic	   of	   communication:	   the	  
connection	   is	   shared	   in	   the	   first	   “two	  months	   of	   shared	   attentiveness”,	  
each	  other	  and	  the	  lines	  and	  messages	  of	  communication	  are	  shared	  in	  in	   “interpersonal	   communication”	   (2-­‐6m),	   objects	   in	   “joint	   object	  
involvement”	  (notably	  here	  starting	  already	  from	  6m),	  and,	  finally,	  around	  13	   months	   –	   with	   increasing	   ritualization	   –	   the	   code	   comes	   into	   shared	  awareness	   going	   hand	   in	   hand	   with	   the	   emergence	   of	   symbolic	  
communication.	  	  Note	   one	   difference	   between	   the	   model	   presented	   here	   and	   Bühler’s	  
model:	  what	  is	  not	  explicitly	  emphasised	  here,	  while	  it	  lies	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  Bühler’s	  model	  appears	  to	  be	  jointly	  acting	  together.	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Thus	   they	   devised	   a	   study	   to	   investigate	   I)	   the	   development	   of	   various	  parameters	  across	  an	  age	  range	  from	  6-­‐18	  months,	  and	  used	  II)	  a	  relational	  coding	   scheme	   taking	   into	   account	   both	   interaction	   partners	   and	   their	  relation	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   III)	   focussing	   in	   particular	   on	   the	   development	   of	  attention	   coordination	   (and	   relate	   it	   to	   multiple	   other	   parameters,	   see	  below).	  In	  their	  longitudinal	  study	  two	  cohorts	  of	  14	  infants	  each	  were	  visited	  in	  their	  homes	  at	  3	  months	  intervals,	  from	  6-­‐15	  and	  from	  9-­‐18	  months	  of	  age,	  respectively.	   At	   every	   visit	   infants	   were	   videotaped	   in	   three	   different	  contexts	   of	   10	  minutes	   duration	   each,	   in	   order	   to	   investigate	   the	   role	   and	  contributions	  of	  different	  interaction	  partners:	  a)	  in	  free	  play	  with	  mothers	  using	   toys	   provided	   by	   researchers	   (toy	   telephone,	   picture	   book,	   wooden	  puzzle,	  nesting	  cups,	  doll,	   rattle,	   soft	   toy	  with	  wheels),	  b)	  with	  peers	  using	  the	   same	   toys,	   and	   c)	   placed	   alone	   and	   provided	   with	   toys	   (with	   their	  mother	  in	  the	  room).	  1)	   In	   their	   first	   report	  on	   this	  study,	   they	  particularly	   focused	  on	  a)	   the	  appearance	  of	  attention	  coordination	  (its	  first	  emergence	  as	  well	  as	  routine	  use)	   as	  well	   as	   b)	   the	   role	   of	   the	   adult	   partners	   (as	   opposed	   to	  peers	   and	  solitary	   engagement)	   potentially	   fostering	   coordination	   (Bakeman	   &	  Adamson,	  1984).	  In	  subsequent	  reports	  they	  2)	  analysed	  whether	  and	  how	  the	  mothers’	  communicative	  acts	  changed	  over	  time	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  infant’s	   development	   (Adamson	  &	  Bakeman,	   1985),	   as	  well	   as	   3)	   how	   the	  display	   of	   affect	   changed	   when	   infants’	   “involvement	   in	   social	   interaction	  
shifted	   from	   participation	   in	   predominantly	   ‘expressive’	   face-­‐to-­‐face	  
exchanges	   of	   early	   infancy	   to	   participation	   in	   the	   preverbal	   ‘referential’	  
dialogues	  	  of	  late	  infancy”	  (Adamson	  &	  Bakeman,	  1984).	  	  For	   analysis	   the	   infant’s	   attention	   was	   coded	   using	   a	   state-­‐based	  
(relational)	   coding	   scheme	   with	   6	   distinct	   mutually	   exclusive	  
“engagement	  states”	  which	  allows	  –	  with	  respect	  to	  report	  1)	  –	  to	  directly	  address	  and	  measure	  attention	  coordination,	  and	  provides	  –	  with	  respect	  to	  reports	   2)	   and	   3)	   contextual	   parameters	   to	   relate	   the	   measures	   used	   in	  reports	   2	   and	   3	   to.	   The	   6	   engagement	   states	   were:	   a)	   unengaged:	  uninvolved	   with	   any	   specific	   person,	   object,	   or	   activity	   b)	   onlooking:	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observing	  another's	  activity,	  but	  not	  taking	  part	  in	  it	  c)	  person	  engagement	  (e.g.	   face-­‐to-­‐face,	   person	   play,	   cooing	   at	   tickling,	   vocalizing	   and	   reaching	  towards	   person),	  d)	   object	   engagement	   involved	   in	   playing	  with	   objects	  alone,	   attending	   just	   to	   the	   toys	   at	   hand,	   e)	   passive	   joint	   engagement:	  infant	   and	   caregiver	  actively	   involved	   in	   the	   same	   object,	   but	   the	   infant	  
evidences	   little	   awareness	   of	   other's	   involvement	   or	   even	   presence 
(Mothers	   often	   attempt	   to	   induce	   this	   state	   in	   their	   babies.	   They	   will	  manipulate	  objects	  (e.g.,	  shake	  rattles,	  ring	  toy	  telephones,	  etc.)	  in	  ways	  that	  seem	   designed	   to	   capture	   their	   infants'	   attention	   by	   making	   the	   objects	  "come	  alive"	   for	   them),	   f)	   coordinated	   joint	  engagement:	   “infant	  actively	  involved	  with	  and	  coordinates	  his/her	  attention	  to	  both	  another	  person	  and	  an	  object	  that	  person	  is	  involved”	  (Bakeman	  &	  Adamson,	  1984).	  
The	  results	  Bakeman	  and	  Adamson	  reported	  with	  regard	  to	  question	  1)	  
the	  development	   of	   attention	   coordination,	   included:	  a)	   age	   effects,	  as	  well	   as	   b)	   partner	   effects.	   A)	   Age	   effects:	   the	   relative	   percentage	   of	  
person	   engagement	   (dyadic)	   steadily	   decreased	   between	   6	   and	   18	  months	   (roughly	   from	   12%	   to	   5%	   with	   mothers,	   from	   12%	   to	   3%	   with	  peers),	  while	   the	   relative	   percentage	   of	  coordinated	   joint	   engagement	  (triadic)	  increased	  with	  age	  (with	  mothers	  starting	  from	  2%	  (at	  6m),	  then	  jumping	  from	  4%	  at	  12	  months	  to	  11%	  at	  15	  months	  and	  27%	  at	  18	  months,	  with	   peers	   it	   grew	   from	   0.3%	   to	   7%.	   The	   duration	   of	   coordinated	  
episodes	  also	  increased	  with	  age,	  on	  average	  from	  7	  seconds	  to	  34	  seconds	  with	  mothers	  and	  from	  2	  seconds	  to	  9	  seconds	  with	  peers,	  respectively.	  The	  percentage	  of	  the	  other	  engagement	  states	  remained	  stable	  over	  time	  (with	  onlooking	   between	   8-­‐11%,	   object	   engagement	   between	   37-­‐43%,	   and	  passive	  joint	  engagement	  between	  17-­‐24%	  with	  mothers,	  whereas	  between	  2-­‐4%	  with	  peers).	  b)	  Partner	  effects:	  as	  shown	  above,	  both	  passive	  as	  well	  
as	  coordinated	  joint	  engagement	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  occur	  when	  infants	  played	  with	  their	  mothers	  than	  with	  peers.	  In	   addition,	   a	   sequence	   analysis	   of	   the	   respective	   engagement	   states	  showed	  that	  object	  engagement	  was	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  followed	  by,	  and	  to	  
follow,	  both	   passive	   and	   coordinated	   joint	   attention.	   Moreover	   in	   the	  condition	  with	  mothers,	  passive	   joint	  engagement	  following	  a	  period	  of	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onlooking	  was	  also	  a	  likely	  sequence.	  Person	  engagement,	  in	  contrast,	  was	  
not	   a	   likely	   precursor	   of	   either	   passive	   of	   coordinated	   joint	  
engagement.	  With	   regard	   to	   question	   2),	   how	   mothers’	   communicative	   acts	  
changed	  over	  time,	  they	  reported	  a	  change	  from	  self-­‐	  to	  object-­‐marking	  and	   within	   object-­‐marking	   from	   literal	   marking	   (e.g.	   animating	   an	  object)	   to	   conventionalized	   object	   marking	   (words,	   gestures	   and	  ritualized	   games,	   i.e.	   give	   and	   take,	   book	   sharing),	   with	   these	   ritualized	  games	   greatly	   increasing	   after	  12	  months	   and	  with	  over	  20%	  constituting	  the	  by	   far	   largest	  share	  of	  activities	  at	  15	  and	  18	  months).	  Note	  how	  their	  results	  come	  alive	  in	  their	  vivid	  verbal	  description:	  
The mothers we observed gradually altered their actions in a way that 
reflected their infants’ emergence as increasingly able users of 
conventional, object-focused acts. They seemed therefore to be dynamic, 
developing partners who tailored their actions to suit their infants’ 
developmental path. 
The age effects observed were striking. Although mothers always tended to 
act and to chat about half the time during a play period, they were not 
always enacting the same plot. To a 6-month-old partner, they presented an 
animate, literal world [… and] were most likely to highlight themselves and 
their social link to the infant. If objects were acted upon, it was often to 
make them “come alive” with sound and movement as if extending their 
own perceptual qualities outward beyond the boundaries of their social 
interchange. Rarely were acts that gained meaning only through social 
convention used, and when they were they were as likely as not to occur in 
concert with literal actions which, by their actual force, might draw the 
infant’s attention. Mothers of older infants, in contrast, seemed less like 
stars in a social relationship and more like narrators of the world 
surrounding them and their infants. They rarely marked only themselves. Yet 
their many object-markers were now often socially mediated. Conventional 
acts, performed without literal support, were both numerous and patterned 
to enact shared rituals such as “bookreading” and “give-and-take.” Thus 
while the attentional focus of the mothers’ actions was primarily away from 
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the immediate social interchange, the way it was marked was fundamentally 
shared and social. (Adamson & Bakeman, 1985)	  A	   systematic	   analysis	   of	   question	   3):	   infants’	   frequency	   of	   affective	  
displays,	   found	   that	   affective	   displays	   generally	   increased	   with	   age,	   but	  mean	  duration	   of	   displays	   decreased	   (from	  over	   3	   to	   under	   2	   seconds)	  and	   shifted	   relatively	   to	   the	   vocal	   modality	   with	   age,	   and	   was	   most	  frequent	   in	   person	   play	   (with	   mothers	   and	   peers)	   and	   in	   object	   play,	  especially	  with	  mothers	  when	  affect	  sharing	  was	  sustained	  throughout	   the	  activity.	  Generally,	   Bakeman	   and	   Adamson	   conclude	   that	   coordinated	   joint	  
engagement	   emerges	   around	   9	   months,	   but	   becomes	   routinely	   used	  
only	  from	  around	  15	  months,	  and	  –	  as	  suggested	  by	  the	  sequence	  analyses	  –	  that	  infants	  only	  begin	  to	  coordinate	  engagement	  after	  they	  begun	  to	  
focus	   on	   objects	   on	   their	   own.	  Bakeman	  and	  Adamson	  align	   themselves	  with	   Nelson	   (1979)	   in	   that	   this	   surprisingly	   late	   mastery	   of	   attention-­‐coordination	   might	   be	   the	   reason	   for	   language	   developing	   only	   relatively	  late	   –	   well	   after	   its	   prerequisites	   already	   seem	   to	   be	   in	   place,	   and	   they	  affirmatively	  take	  up	  her	  suggestion	  that	  infants	  indeed	  seem	  to	  need	  that	  
time	   to	   meet	   the	   challenge	   to	   –	   in	   Nelson’s	   and	   Adamson	   &	   Bakeman’s	  words	  –	  	  “co-­‐ordinate	  social	  and	  object	  realms”.	  In	  the	  spirit	  of	  Mead,	  Vygotsky,	  and	  proponents	  of	  a	  social	  interactionist	  perspective,	   such	   as	   Bruner,	   the	   Newsons,	   and	   Trevarthen,	  who	   Bakeman	  and	   Adamson	   refer	   to,	   they	   interpret	   their	   results	   as	   affirming	   their	  perspective	   that	   “new	   communicative	   forms	   occur	   first	   embedded	   in	   and	  supported	  by	  social	  context”.	   In	  particular,	   they	  see	   the	  results	  as	  strongly	  suggestive	   of	   mothers	   playing	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   the	   development	   of	  
communication:	  engagement	  states	  that	  offer	  some	  potential	  for	  referential	  communication,	   namely	   passive	   joint	   engagement	   and	   coordinated	   joint	  engagement,	  were	  observed	  much	  more	  frequently	  when	  infants	  were	  with	  mothers	   than	   with	   peers.	   The	   biggest	   differences	   were	   found	   for	   passive	  joint	   attention,	   where	   infants	   spend	   around	   20%	   of	   time	   in	   when	   with	  mothers	  (none	  with	  peers)	  irrespective	  of	  age,	  that	  is,	  it	  was	  observed	  even	  in	  the	  youngest	  infants	  of	  the	  study.	  Mothers	  seemed	  to	  deliberately	  induce	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passive	   joint	   engagement	   (accounting	   for	   the	   difference	   with	   peers,	   as	  mothers	   “were	  more	  willing	  and	  able	   to	  complement	  the	   infant’s	  attention”)	  to	   some	   extent	   freeing	   infants	   of	   the	   need	   to	   establish	   co-­‐ordinated	  attention	  to	  objects	  and	  people.	  
2.3.3.3 Accounting	   for	   the	  development	  of	   coordinating	  attention	   to	  people	  
and	  objects	  Seeking	  to	  find	  in	  the	  process	  of	  observing	  real	  life	  data	  that	  coordination	  ability,	   which	   later	   gives	   rise	   to	   referential	   communication,	   and	   trying	   to	  operationalize	   it	   for	   coding,	   the	   concept	   “attending	   to	   the	   same	   object”	  apparently	   turned	   out	   not	   to	   be	   a	   sufficient	   coding	   category:	   neither	   to	  appropriately	   capture	   this	   ability	   nor	   to	   differentiate	   interactions	   at	  different	  ages,	  as	  “attending	  to	  the	  same	  object”	  was	  already	  observed	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  data	  collection	  (6	  months).	  This	   seems	   to	  be	   the	   reason	   that	   they	   split	   up	   this	   class	   of	   interactions	  into	   two	   categories,	   singling	   out	   joint	   (=	   triadic)	   engagement	   “proper”	   –	  what	  they	  now	  called	  “co-­‐ordinated	  joint	  engagement”	  defined	  as	  “the	  infant	  is	   actively	   involved	   with	   and	   coordinates	   his	   attention	   to	   both	   another	  person	  and	  the	  object	  that	  person	  is	  involved	  with”	  –	  separating	  it	  from	  all	  other	   cases	   of	   “not-­‐yet-­‐proper-­‐joint-­‐engagement”	   –	   dubbed	   “passive	   joint	  engagement”,	  defined	  as:	  infant	  and	  caregiver	  being	  actively	  involved	  in	  the	  same	   object,	   but	   the	   infant	   “evidences	   little	   awareness	   of	   other's	  involvement	  or	  even	  presence”.	  What	   is	   striking	   is	   that,	   rather	   than	   relying	  on	   gaze	  measures	   to	   assess	  “visual	   joint	  attention”	  as	  has	  become	  the	  default	  strategy	  pursued	  in	  most	  later	   studies,	   Bakeman	   and	   Adamson	   deliberately	   chose	   the	   broad,	  
inclusive	  notion	  of	   “joint	  engagement”	   to	  capture	  the	  ability	  in	  question	  and	   accordingly	   constructed	   a	   coding	   scheme	   based	   on	   broadly	   defined	  relational	   states,	   importantly	   giving	   room	   to	   include	   a	   variety	   of	  
different	   forms	   of	   joint	   engagement,	   including	   but	   not	   restricted	   to	  
gaze-­‐based	  coordination.	  In	  Adamson	  and	  Bakeman	  (1985)	  they	  explicitly	  reflect	  on	  these	  methodological	  considerations:	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A major advantage of such state-based schemes is that they provide 
descriptions of attention that are not based solely on patterns of visual gaze. 
Of course, there is a high degree of correspondence between the direction of 
gaze and engagement state. For example, by definition, infants do not gaze 
repeatedly toward a person in either object engagement or passive joint 
engagement, while visual regard is expected during onlooking, person 
engagement, and, to a lesser degree, coordinated joint engagement. But 
gaze alone may not provide a fully adequate index of the intensity of 
interest-a quality that often differentiates states such as onlooking from 
others such as person engagement or passive joint engagement. Moreover, 
by the end of the first year, infants appear to continue to attend to some 
portion of the surroundings while momentarily looking elsewhere, as when 
in "coordinated joint engagement" they gaze at an object but seem aware of 
their partner as well. (Adamson & Bakeman, 1985) And	  indeed	  their	  definition	  of	  coordinated	  engagement	  stressing	  “active	  involvement”	   does	   not	   only	   seem	   to	   allow,	   but	   to	   actually	   call	   for,	  engagement	   beyond	   mere	   looking,	   e.g.	   physically-­‐effective	   manual	  engagement.	   While	   the	   inclusive,	   holistic	   relational	   coding	   categories	   of	  “passive	   and	   coordinated	   joint	   engagement”	   seem	   vague,	   they	   apparently	  are	   strikingly	   robust	   to	   implement,	   as	   human	   observers	   seem	   to	   reliably	  recognize	  “joint	  engagement”	  when	  they	  see	  it.	  	  While	   relationally	   defined,	   that	   is,	   taking	   into	   account	   both	   partners’	  actions,	   the	   main	   drawback	   of	   the	   coding	   methodology	   in	   terms	   of	   these	  categories	   is	   that	   they	   actually	   cover	   up	   how	   the	   participants	   interact	   in	  detail.	  It	  would	  be	  very	  interesting	  to	  learn	  more	  about	  the	  actual	  range	  and	  modes	  of	  joint	  engagements	  as	  –	  despite	  their	  broad	  definition	  –	  their	  own	  example	  again	  reverts	  back	  to	  the	  typical	  “gaze-­‐checking	  while	  pushing	  a	  toy	  truck”	   scenario.	   By	   pooling	   interactions	   into	   engagement	   states	   and	   then	  applying	   sequence	   analysis	   to	   extract	   global	   probabilities	   of	   transitions	  between	  states,	  Adamson	  and	  Bakeman	  are	  left	  with	  only	  speculating	  about	  why	   these	   sequences	   occur,	   or	   that	   the	   “passive	   joint	   engagement	   state	  
seems	   to	   be	   closely	   tied	   to	   the	  mother’s	   actions”.	   In	   short,	   local	   as	  well	   as	  global	  information	  about	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  interaction	  is	  lost.	  Therefore	  we	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here	   will	   use	   qualitative	   microanalysis	   to	   shed	   some	  more	   light	   on	   these	  local	  and	  global	  aspects	  of	  meaningful	  interaction:	  how	  exactly	  interaction	  is	  co-­‐ordinated,	  and	  what	  functional	  role	  specific	  actions	  play	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  larger	  meaningful	  interaction	  (see	  chapters	  3	  and	  4).	  
2.3.4 Comparing	  Hubley	  &	  Trevarthen	  with	  Adamson	  &	  Bakeman	  In	   Hubley	   and	   Trevarthen’s,	   as	   well	   as	   in	   Adamson	   and	   Bakeman’s	  approach,	   both	   focusing	   on	   “relational”	   aspects	   of	   the	   interaction,	   the	  challenge	  and	  achievement	  of	  the	  development	  of	   interacting	  over	  the	  first	  year	  and	  particularly	  over	  the	  final	  months	  of	  the	  first	  year	  are	  considered	  as	   the	   co-­‐ordination	   of	   relating	   to	   two	   different	   realms:	   people	   and	  
objects.	   Trevarthen	   –	   countering	   Piaget’s	   object-­‐centredness	   –	   stresses	  infants’	   intersubjectivity	   from	   birth	   –	   setting	   it	   apart	   from	   their	   way	   of	  relating	  to	  objects	  (based	  on	  his	  early	  observations	  of	  neonates	  responding	  differently	  to	  people	  and	  suspended	  objects),	  and	  insists	  that	  infants	  employ	  two	  separate	  “motives”	  or	  neural	  “action	  and	  regulation	  systems”	  for	  people	  and	  for	  objects	  (plus	  actually	  a	  third	  one,	  directed	  at	  the	  self),	  which	  need	  to	  be	  “assimilated”	  and	  integrated	  over	  time.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Adamson	  and	  Bakeman,	   who,	   interested	   in	   the	   development	   of	   communication,	   found	  themselves	   in	   a	   gap	   between	   early-­‐infancy-­‐focused	   proto-­‐conversation	  researchers	  and	  late-­‐infancy-­‐focused	  seekers	  of	  language-­‐precursors,	  frame	  their	  research	  question	  from	  the	  outset	  as:	  “coordinating	  attention	  between	  people	  and	  objects”	  as	  key	   to	  understanding	  communication	  development.	  This	  may	  be	  in	  part	  due	  the	  dichotomous	  structure	  inherent	  in	  the	  common	  conceptualization	   of	   their	   phenomenon	   of	   interest:	   communication	   with	  people	   about	   objects	   and	   its	   framing	   by	   previous	   research	   (Bates,	  Sugarman-­‐Bell	  etc.,	  Nelson),	  as	  in	  their	  discussion	  they	  affirmatively	  take	  up	  Nelson’s	   formulation	   that	   the	   main	   challenge	   for	   infants	   to	   master,	   is	   to	  coordinate	   separate	   “social	   and	   object	   realms”	   (Bakeman	   &	   Adamson,	  1984).	   Apart	   from	   this	   framing,	   Adamson	   and	   Bakeman	   largely	   remain	  descriptive,	   focused	   on	   the	   behavioural	   level,	   without	   speculating	   about	  inner	  psychological	  or	  physiological	  mechanisms.	  Both	   approaches,	   rooted	   in	   observing	   semi-­‐naturalistic	   interactions,	   do	  not	   restrict	   themselves	   to	   gaze	   measures	   for	   assessing	   “joint	   visual	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attention”,	   but	   use	   broad,	   complex	   terms	   to	   capture	   the	   complex	  ways	   of	  relating	   which	   develop	   towards	   the	   end	   of	   the	   first	   year:	   “secondary	  intersubjectivity”	   in	   its	   operationalized	   form	   encompasses:	   “joint	   praxis”,	  that	   is,	   “acts	   on	   objects	   that	   are	   oriented	   to	   the	   attention	   or	   action	   of	   the	  other	   person”,	   in	   combination	   with	   “interpersonal	   acts”	   (see	   section	   2.3).	  Similarly,	  “coordinated	  joint	  engagement”	  is	  constituted	  by	  “the	  infant	  being	  actively	   involved	  with	   and	   coordinating	   his/her	   attention	   to	   both	   another	  person	  and	  the	  object	  that	  person	  is	   involved	  with”	  (Bakeman	  &	  Adamson,	  1984).	  With	   regard	   to	   their	   conceptualization	   of	   (triadic)	   relating,	   both	   of	  these	  notions	  point	  towards	  complex	  multi-­‐strand,	  multi-­‐modal	  actions,	  and	  “joint	   praxis”	   and	   “active	   involvement”	   evoke	   actual	   physically-­‐effective	  (typically	  manual)	   object	   engagement,	   thus	   also	   fitting	   definitions	   of	   joint	  action	   and	   collaboration	   which	   typically	   require	   “jointly	   bringing	   about	   a	  change	  in	  the	  world”	  (compare	  Sebanz,	  Bekkering,	  &	  Knoblich,	  2006).	  Strikingly,	   both	   these	   conceptualizations	   also	   imply	   different	   forms	   of	  jointly	  engaging	  with	  objects	  before	  full-­‐fledged	  secondary	  intersubjectivity,	  or	   coordinated	   joint	   engagement,	   occurs:	   In	   Adamson	   and	   Bakeman’s	  approach	  this	  is	  described	  as	  “passive	  joint	  engagement”	  –	  localized	  on	  the	  attention	   or	   attentive-­‐communicative	   strand	   of	   joint	   engagement	   –	  effectively	   scaffolded	   by	   the	   mother	   following	   and	   guiding	   the	   infants’	  attention.	  Conversely,	  in	  Trevarthen	  and	  Hubley’s	  approach	  this	  is	  described	  as	   “joint	   praxis”	   –	   localized	   on	   the	   physically-­‐effective	   strand	   of	   joint	  engagement.	   Both	   categories	  make	   up	   a	   large	   part	   of	   the	   engagements	   of	  mother-­‐infant	   pairs:	   “passive	   joint	   engagement”	   constituted	   consistently	  around	   20%	   of	   the	   play	   interactions	   observed	   in	   Bakeman	   and	   Adamson	  (1984)	  from	  6-­‐18	  months	  and	  “joint	  praxis”	  accounted	  for	  a	   large	  majority	  of	   communicative	   acts	   (joint	   praxis,	   interpersonal	   acts,	   joint	   praxis	  combined	  with	  interpersonal	  acts)	  in	  Hubley	  &	  Trevarthen	  (1979).	  While	  Adamsom	  and	  Bakeman	  speculate	  on	   the	  potential	   importance	  of	  “passive	   joint	  attention”	  and	  the	  role	  of	   the	  caregivers	  establishing	   it,	  both	  categories	   have	   unfortunately	   not	   been	   investigated	   in	  more	   detail	   at	   this	  point,	   although	   this	   would	   be	   of	   key	   interest	   for	   understanding	   the	  development	  of	   triadic	   interaction.	   For	  both	  of	   the	  approaches	   these	  early	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not-­‐yet-­‐full-­‐fledged	   forms	   of	   joint	   engagement	   with	   objects	   are	   part	   of	   a	  larger	  account	  framing	  the	  development	  of	  triadic	  interactions	  as	  a	  gradual	  process	   (rather	   than	   a	   sudden	   emergence),	   with	   Hubley	   and	   Trevarthen	  sketching	   the	   development	   from	   proto-­‐conversations	   in	   primary	  intersubjectivity,	   first	  via	  “games	  of	  the	  person”,	  then	  “games	  with	  objects”	  and	   “inverted	   games	   with	   objects”	   to	   finally	   infants	   imitating	  demonstrations	   and	   following	   instructions	   in	   full	   fledged	   secondary	  intersubjectivity.	   While	   both	   accounts	   propose	   a	   gradual	   development,	   in	  accordance	   with	   their	   different	   focus	   and	   perspectives,	   this	   development	  follows	   to	   some	   extent	   inverse	   trajectories:	   In	   Adamson	   and	   Bakeman’s	  account	  –	  focused	  on	  the	  attentive-­‐communicative	  side	  and	  interested	  in	  the	  role	  of	  the	  caregiver	  –	  the	  infant	  moves	  from	  being	  “passively”	  attentionally	  engaged	   in	   “passive	   joint	   engagement”	   to	   actively	   participating	   in	   “co-­‐ordinated	  joint	  engagement”,	  whereas	  in	  Trevarthen	  and	  Hubley’s	  account	  –	  focused	  on	   endogenous	   infant	   action	   and	  development	   –	   the	   infant	  moves	  from	   only	   interacting	   cooperatively	   as	   far	   as	   the	   mother	   adapts	   to	   the	  infant’s	   interests	  and	  purposes,	   to	  becoming	  more	  receptive	  and	  malleable	  accepting	   adults	   in	  new	  ways	   and	  understanding	   and	   taking	   account	   their	  intentions	  –	  in	  particular	  with	  regard	  to	  objects,	  thus	  giving	  rise	  to	  truly	  co-­‐operative	  forms	  of	  interaction.	  What	  seems	  particularly	  relevant	  about	  these	  two	  seminal	  approaches	  for	  future	  research	  is	  that	  they	  –	   in	  contrast	  to	   later	  research	  narrowing	  in	  on	  visual	   joint	   attention	  –	  develop	  broad,	   complex	  notions	  of	   relating,	  pursue	  longitudinal	   investigations	   of	   semi-­‐naturalistic	   interactions	   and	   provide	  qualitative	   descriptions	   of	   gradual	   development,	   and	   in	   particular	   hint	   on	  different	   forms	  of	  early	   joint	  object	  engagement.	  All	   these	  aspects	  merit	   to	  be	   taken	   up	   again	   and	   looked	   into	   in	   more	   detail	   using	   current	   data	  collection,	  visualization,	  and	  analysis	  techniques.	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2.4 Accounts	  III:	  Cognitive	  Accounts	  (Tomasello	  and	  colleagues)	  Cognitive	   approaches	   have	   in	   common	   that	   they	   operate	   from	   a	  framework	   based	   on	   (classical)	   cognitive	   science	   and	   analytic	   philosophy	  and	  account	  for	  development	  by	  testing	  an	  individual’s	  cognitive	  capacities	  considered	  to	  be	  based	  on	  (and	  hence	  to	  some	  extend	  indicative	  of)	  specific	  forms	  of	  knowledge.	  They	  conceptualize	  the	  challenges	  of	  social	  interactions	  –	  and	  hence	  social	  development	  –	  in	  terms	  of	  problem-­‐tasks	  to	  be	  solved	  by	  individual	   rational	   agents	   using	   instrumental	   reason,	   that	   is,	   thinking,	  planning	   and	   deciding	   in	   advance,	   then	   simply	   executing	   the	   plan,	  monitoring,	   and	   in	   the	   end	   evaluating	   the	   result.	   Analogously,	   they	  conceptualize	   their	   own	  approach	   to	   the	  phenomenon	  under	   investigation	  as	  conceptually	  analysing	   it	   in	  advance	  (drawing	   from	  literature	  and	  using	  thought	  experiments	  and	  conceptual	  analysis),	  devising	  experiments	  to	  test	  and	  decide	  between	  different	  theories	  and	  hypotheses	  about	  capacities,	  and	  interpreting	  and	  evaluating	   the	  results.	  With	  regard	  to	   the	  development	  of	  triadic	  interactions,	  many	  researchers	  have	  made	  a	  range	  of	  important	  and	  quite	  varied	  contributions	   from	  a	   cognitive	  perspective	   (such	  as	  Barresi	  &	  Moore,	  1996	  who	  are	  primarily	   focusing	  on	  executive	   functioning;	  Rochat,	  2009,	  and	  many	  more);	  for	  our	  current	  purposes	  we	  primarily	  focus	  here	  on	  the	   approach	   pursued	   and	   popularized	   by	   Tomasello	   and	   colleagues	  because	  of	  its	  far-­‐reaching	  comparative	  scope,	  systematic	  development	  over	  an	  extended	  period	  of	  time	  and	  refined	  through	  multiple	  revisions,	  and	  high	  impact	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  current	  interpretation	  of	  the	  narrative.	  
2.4.1 Background,	  interests,	  and	  theoretical	  framework	  Michael	   Tomasello	   and	   colleagues	   (in	   particular	   at	   the	   Max	   Planck	  Institute	   in	   Leipzig)	   have	   been	   pursuing	   the	   (ever)	   notorious	   “what	   is	  special	  about	  the	  human	  species”	  –	  question	  (section	  2.7.),	  and	  in	  particular	  –	   asking	   from	   a	   cognitive	   science	   perspective	   –	   how	   have	   such	   complex	  human	  forms	  of	  cognition	  such	  as	  language,	  mathematics,	  complex	  tool	  use,	  and	  social	  institutions	  –	  typically	  associated	  with	  culture	  –	  come	  about?	  	  Expanding	  the	  cognitive	  science	  perspective	  with	  a	  comparative	  program,	  Tomasello	   and	   colleagues	   tackle	   this	   question	   by	   contrasting	   typically	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developing	  human	  children	  at	  different	  ages	  with	  autistic	  children,	  and	  with	  non-­‐human	  primates	  (as	  well	  as	  with	  dogs,	  with	  whom	  we	  share	  a	  cultural	  history	  of	  domestication	  rather	  than	  a	  close	  phylogenetic	  relationship).	  They	  effectively	  seek	  to	  construct	  a	   theoretical	   framework,	  a	   “matrix”,	  aiming	  to	  find	   features,	   which	   allow	   to	   logically	   and	   conceptually	   demarcate	   those	  groups	   from	   each	   other,	   at	   multiple	   levels:	   palpable	   cultural	   products,	  processes	   of	   cultural	   transmission,	   and	   –	   as	   the	   preferred	   level	   of	  “explanation”	  of	  cognitive	  science	  –	  (species-­‐specific	  and	  typical)	  individual	  cognition.	  On	  the	  surface	  level	  of	  palpable	  cultural	  products,	  Tomasello	  and	  colleagues	  (1993)	   foreground	  human	  culture	  being	  “cumulative”	  as	  a	  main	  “distinctively	  human”	  feature,	  that	  is,	  cultural	  products	  are	  building	  on	  each	  other	  and	  getting	  more	  complex	  across	   time	  and	  generations.	  The	  authors	  then	   link	   this	   cumulative	   character	   of	   culture	   to	   specific	   forms	   of	   cultural	  creation	   and	   transmission:	   collaborative	   invention	   and	   high	   fidelity	  transmission,	  which	   in	   turn	   they	   seek	   to	   link	   to	   specific	   forms	  of	   “cultural	  learning”	  and	  “social	  cognition”.	  For	   his	   theoretical	   framework	   Tomasello	   partly	   draws	   on	   (his	  interpretation)	   of	   Vygotksy’s	   ideas	   of	   “culture”,	   adopting	   in	   particular	   the	  idea	   of	   two	   different	   lines	   of	   development:	   a	   biological	   one,	   shared	   by	  humans	  with	  their	  great	  ape	  relatives	  (practical	  intelligence),	  and	  a	  cultural	  one,	   socio-­‐culturally	   mediated,	   –	   for	   Vygotsky	   starting	   with	   language,	   in	  Tomasello’s	  version	  starting	  earlier	  with	  specific	  forms	  of	  cultural	  learning:	  learning	   through	   other	   people	   –	   which	   then	   thoroughly	   re-­‐organizes	   the	  cognitive	   abilities	   of	   the	   biological	   line.	   The	   idea	   that	   cultural	   forms	   of	  learning	   are	   achieved	   “through”	   other	   people	   is	   the	   second	   aspect	   drawn	  from	  Vygotsky,	  from	  his	  notion	  of	  cultural	  mediation,	  and	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  Vygotsky’s	   formula:	   The	   path	   from	   object	   to	   child	   and	   from	   child	   to	   object	  
passes	  through	  another	  person	  (Vygotsky,	  1978a,	  p.	  30).	  In	  contrast,	  however,	  to	  Vygotsky’s	  focus	  on	  cultural	  mediation	  and	  how	  it	   transforms	   individual	   (biological)	  cognition,	  and,	   in	  contrast	   to	   the	  goals	  of	  cultural	  psychologists	  who	  -­‐	  also	  drawing	  on	  Vygotsky	  -­‐	  seek	  to	  develop	  methods	   to	   adequately	   capture	   how	  exactly	   cultural	   processes	   (also	   going	  beyond	  language)	  unfold,	  Tomasello	  selectively	  adopts	  some	  Vygotskian	  key	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concepts7	  (also	  see	  section	  2.5.1:	  Vygotsky)	  and	  gives	  them	  a	  cognitive	  twist	  to	   assimilate	   them	   to	   the	   capacity-­‐	   and	   individual-­‐focused	   cognitive	  Psychology	  framework	  (also	  heavily	  drawing	  on	  Piaget)	  and	  asks:	  what	  are	  an	  individual	  organism’s	  cognitive	  capacities,	  that	  are	  necessary	  to	  engage	  in	  culturally	  mediated	  activities	  such	  as	  cultural	  learning?	  
2.4.2 Tomasello	  and	   colleagues,	   first	   take:	   cultural	   learning,	   joint	   attention	  
and	  understanding	  people	  as	  intentional	  agents	  (1993,	  1995,	  1999)	  Inspired	   by	   Vygotsky,	   Tomasello	   and	   colleagues	   begin	   to	   analyse	   the	  general	   notion	   of	   “social	   learning”,	   conceptually	   organizing	   processes	   of	  learning	   found	   in	   various	   forms	   across	   the	   animal	   kingdom,	   seeking	   to	  identify	   and	   set	   apart	   more	   specific	   forms	   of	   human-­‐typical	   “cultural	  
learning”:	   Common	   to	   the	   basic	   forms	   of	   “social	   learning”	   (=	   any	   form	  of	  learning	  which	  is	  influenced	  by	  the	  social	  context	  in	  any	  way,	  including	  local	  and	   stimulus	   enhancement,	   as	   well	   as	   emulation)	   is	   that	   learning	   itself,	  however,	  can	  still	  be	  considered	  to	  be	  achieved	  by	  an	  organism	  individually	  through	  simply	  focussing	  on	  and	  interacting	  with	  the	  physical	  environment	  alone,	  without	  taking	  another’s	  perspective	  or	  specific	  action	  strategies	  into	  account.	  In	  contrast,	  in	  “cultural	   learning”	  in	  the	  narrow	  sense,	  learning	  is	  defined	   as	   occurring	   “through	   the	   other”	   (which	   in	   this	   early	   account	   is	  conceptualized	  very	  broadly	  and	   tentatively	  as	  occurring	  via	  some	   form	  of	  “intersubjectivity”	   and/or	   “perspective	   taking”).	   They	   differentiate	   three	  types	  of	  cultural	   learning:	  1)	   imitative,	  2)	   instructive,	  and	  3)	  collaborative,	  and	  go	  on	  to	  propose	  that	  these	  develop	  in	  a	  3	  step	  sequence.	  A	  main	  aim	  of	  their	   research	  program	   is	   to	   link	   each	   type	   of	   cultural	   learning	   to	   specific	  forms	  of	  infants’	  developing	  social-­‐cognitive	  capacities	  and	  knowledge,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 	  Tellingly,	   Tomasello	   dismisses	   cultural	   psychology	   in	   passing	   for	  exclusively	  focusing	  on	  the	  role	  of	  culture	  and	  neglecting	  the	  individual	  –	  a	  characterization	  not	  agreed	  with	  by	  proponents	  of	  cultural	  psychology	  who	  explicitly	  seek	  to	  overcome	  such	  dichotomies	  (Rogoff,	  Chavajay,	  &	  Matusov,	  1993).	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to	  contrast	  this	  developmental	  sequence	  with	  atypically	  developing	  children	  with	  autism	  and	  great	  ape	  relatives.	  
1)	   Imitative	   learning	   (emerging	  between	  9-­‐14	  months):	   in	  which	   the	  learner	   reproduces	   a	   model’s	   specific	   actions	   or	   “actual	   behavioural	  strategies”	   novel	   to	   the	   learner	   in	   an	   appropriate	   context.	   This	   form	   is	  considered	   to	  be	  prominently	  used	   in	   learning	  object	  directed	  actions	  and	  conventional	   linguistic	   symbols,	   and	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   achieved	   through	  some	  basic	  form	  of	  “perspective	  taking”.	  
2)	   Instructed	   learning	  (emerging	  around	  4	  years	  and	  characterized	  as	  “Vygotskyan	  learning”):	  in	  which	  the	  learner	  internalizes	  the	  instructions	  of	  a	   teacher	   and	   later	   re-­‐enacts	   them	   overtly	   in	   similar	   situations	   to	   self-­‐regulate	   their	   attentional	   mnemonic	   or	   other	   cognitive	   functions,	   in	   the	  form	   of	   e.g.	   performance	   monitoring,	   meta-­‐cognitive	   strategies,	   or	   self-­‐regulating	   speech.	   This	   form	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   achieved	   by	   recognizing	  two	  perspectives	   (the	   learners’	   own	   and	   their	   teacher’s)	   and	   coordinating	  them.	  
3)	   Collaborative	   learning	   (emerging	   around	   6	   years):	   in	   which	   two	  symmetric	  peers	  work	  together	  to	  solve	  a	  common	  problem	  co-­‐constructing	  knowledge	   neither	   of	   them	   had	   before,	   and	   which	   they	   then	   individually	  internalize.	   This	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   achieved	   by	   reflective	   integration	   of	  different	  perspectives.	  Tomasello	   and	   colleagues	   (1993)	   proposed	   differences	   between	  typically	  developing	  human	   children	   and	   atypically	  developing	   children	   as	  well	  as	  great	  apes	  already	  on	  the	  first	  level	  of	  (true)	  imitation	  learning,	  let	  alone	  on	  the	  more	  complex	  levels.	  
2.4.2.1 Joint	  attention	  and	  social	  cognition	  To	  better	   understand	   imitation	   learning	   Tomasello	   et	   al.	   (1993)	  draw	  attention	  to	  a	  number	  of	  other	  interactions	  appearing	  around	  the	  same	  time	  and	  take	  their	  synchronous	  appearance	  as	  an	  indicator	  for	  a	  newly	  emerging	  underlying	  capacity.	  The	   factor	  all	   these	   interactions	  have	   in	  common,	  and	  which	  thus	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  visible	  marker	  of	  this	  underlying	  capacity,	  is	  “joint	  attention”,	   sometimes	   taken	   to	   be	   the	   underlying	   capacity	   itself.	   This	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concept	   is	   further	   developed	   theoretically	   in	   Tomasello	   (1995)	   and	  empirically	   investigated	   with	   Carpenter	   and	   colleagues	   (Carpenter	   et	   al.,	  1998).	  In	  his	  1995	  “Joint	  attention	  as	  social	  cognition”	  paper,	  Tomasello	  seeks	  to	  establish	  “joint	  attention”	  as	  a	  marker	  for	  social	  cognition,	  thus	  pointing	  out	  the	   cognitive	   basis	   of	   joint	   attention	   he	   sees	   neglected	   in	  more	   behaviour	  oriented	   discussions	   of	   joint	   attention,	   primarily	   gaze	   following,	   and	   also	  making	  the	  case	  for	  earlier,	  more	  basic	  forms	  of	  social	  cognition	  than	  were	  proposed	  by	  “theory-­‐of-­‐mind”-­‐theorists.	  To	  this	  end	  he	  seeks	  to	  clarify	  and	  define	  what	  joint	  attention	  is:	  	  
“Joint attention is primarily a social, social-cognitive phenomenon: two 
individuals know that they are attending to something in common” 
(Tomasello, 1995) …	  and	  also	  what	  it	  is	  not,	  and	  basically	  claims	  that	  everything	  infants	  do	  before	  9	  months	  basically	   is	  NOT	   joint	  attention	  but	  merely	   “simultaneous	  looking”,	  including:	  	  1) orienting	  to	  the	  same	  spatial	  location,	  but	  not	  to	  the	  same	  object	  aspect	  2) looking	  to	  the	  same	  object,	  focusing	  on	  the	  same	  aspect,	  but	  simply	  watching	  the	  other	  person	  engaging	  with	  an	  object	  without	  engaging	  themselves	  (Bakeman	  &	  Adamson’s	  onlooking)	  3) mother	  and	  infant	  both	  being	  drawn	  to	  the	  same	  object	  fortuitously,	  as	  when	  barking	  leads	  each	  of	  them	  to	  look	  at	  a	  dog	  out	  separate	  windows	  of	  the	  house.	  	  4) cued	  looking,	  when	  infants	  have	  learned	  that	  looking	  in	  the	  direction	  another	  individual	  is	  looking,	  often	  results	  in	  interesting	  sights.	  5) even	  gaze	  alternation	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  marker	  for	  joint	  attention,	  as	  it	  might	  be	  cued	  (Bakeman	  &	  Adamson’s	  passive	  joint	  attention)	  6) looking	  up	  spontaneously	  to	  check	  whether	  to	  expect	  reward	  or	  punishment,	  i.e.	  not	  monitoring	  the	  other’s	  attentional	  focus	  on	  the	  object.	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  This	   definition	   of	   joint	   attention	   already	   implies	   that	   this	   process	  involves	   some	   kind	   of	   knowledge.	   According	   to	   Tomasello,	   the	   knowledge	  joint	  attention	  depends	  on	  is	  a	  specific	  understanding	  of	  the	  other	  person	  as	  an	  “intentional	  agent”	  whereby	  he	  understands	  “intentional”	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  Piaget	  as	  differentiating	  means	  and	  ends	  in	  their	  own	  actions	  (Piaget	  stage	  IV-­‐V).	   This	   uniquely	   human	   knowledge	   is	   supposed	   to	   emerge	   from	   the	  confluence	   of	   two	   different	   cognitive	   aspects:	   1)	   the	   uniquely	   human	  tendency	   to	   identify	  with	  others	  as	  being	   “like	  me”	  (e.g.	  Meltzoff	  &	  Gopnik,	  1993),	   exercised	   from	   early	   on	   in	   imitative	   and	   –	   extending	   Meltzoff	   –	  reciprocal	  interactions,	  and	  2)	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  self	  as	  an	  intentional	  agent,	   differentiating	   means	   and	   ends	   in	   instrumental	   actions,	   which	   is	  shared	  with	   great	   apes	   and	   emerging	   in	   humans	   around	   9	  months	   of	   age	  (see	  also	  section	  2.2.1:	  Piaget).	  	  
2.4.3 Tomasello	  and	  colleagues,	  second	  take:	  “shared	  intentionality”	  (2005-­‐)	  However,	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   progressing	   research	   program,	   a	  considerable	   number	   of	   studies,	   in	   particular	   studies	   from	   their	   own	  research	   group,	   suggested,	   that	   apes	   do	   understand	   others	   “as	   intentional	  agents”	   to	   a	   far	   greater	   extent	   than	   Tomasello	   and	   colleagues	   previously	  assumed,	   in	   particular	   they	   understand	   that	   other	   people	   have	   goals	   and	  perceptions	   (they	   e.g.	   differentiate	   between	   humans	   being	   unwilling	   or	  unable	   to	  give	   them	  food	  and	  respond	  more	  patient	   in	   the	   latter	  case	  etc.)	  (see	   e.g.	   Tomasello,	   2011	   for	   a	   summary),	   and,	   as	   has	   recently	   been	  demonstrated,	   even	   beliefs	   (Krupenye,	   Kano,	   Hirata,	   Call,	   &	   Tomasello,	  2016).	  In	  short:	  they	  were	  supposed	  to	  at	  least	  know	  the	  “peripheral	  aspects”	  of	  people’s	   minds,	   which	   can	   be	   inferred	   from	   observation.	   Apes	   seem	   to	  indeed	  understand	  intentions,	  which	  had	  been	  regarded	  as	  the	  crucial	  factor	  for	  engaging	  in	  triadic	  or	  co-­‐operative	  activities,	  yet	  they	  still	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  engage	   in	  sharing,	   triadic,	  or	  co-­‐operative	  activities.	  How	  come?	  Tomasello	  and	  colleagues	  thus	  had	  to	  revise	  their	  theory:	  Whereas	   the	   previous	   developmental	   trajectory	   exclusively	   focused	   on	  and	   framed	   infants’	   understanding	   of	   other	   people	   in	   terms	   of	   the	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perception	  and	  knowledge	  of	  an	  uninvolved	  bystander,	  passively	  observing	  from	   a	   distance,	   in	   their	   revised	   version	   (Tomasello	   et	   al.,	   2005)	   they	   1)	  refined	  their	  definition	  of	  “intentional	  action”	  previously	  based	  on	  Piaget	  by	  drawing	  on	  analytic	  philosophers	  such	  as	  Bratman,	  2)	  further	  differentiated	  the	   development	   of	   “understanding	   intentions”	   into	   3	   levels	   (see	   below),	  and	  3)	  extended	  the	   first	  perceptual-­‐cognitive	  and	  thus	  rather	  passive	   line	  of	   development	   by	   adding	   in	   parallel	   a	   second,	   more	   action-­‐	   and	  participation-­‐oriented	   one,	   labelled	   “shared	   intentionality”.	   This	   latter	   line	  refers	   to	   different	   levels	   of	   actually	   engaging	   in	   collaborative	   activities	  which	   (following	   Bratman,	   1989,	   1992)	   are	   defined	   as:	   being	   mutually	  responsive,	  having	  a	  shared	  goal	  the	  partners	  are	  knowingly	  committed	  to,	  and	   participants	   coordinate	   plans	   (including	   potential	   role-­‐reversal)	  (Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  This	   “double-­‐trajectory”	   suggested	   for	   development	   now	   reads	   as	  follows:	   During	   the	   first	   9	  months	   infants	   are	   considered	   to	  understand	  
people	  as	  animate	  agents	  (recognizing	  autonomously-­‐produced	  action	  and	  being	   able	   to	   predict	   actions	   in	   a	   familiar	   situation,	  without	   knowledge	   of	  their	   internal	  structure)	  and	  are	  motivated	  for	  and	  hence	  engage	   in	  dyadic	  
engagement,	   sharing	   behaviour	   and	   emotions	  with	   an	   animate	   agent,	  that	   is,	   merely	   “expressing	   emotions”	   and	   performing	   “behavioural	   turn	  taking”.	  By	  comparison	  with	  the	  diagram	  depicting	  full	  blown	  collaborative	  interaction	   (with	   the	   supposedly	   involved	   hierarchical	   representations	  superimposed	  on	  the	  interaction	  partners’	  heads,	  see	  figure	  2.1),	  Tomasello	  characterises	  this	  earlier	  phase	  as:	  “nothing	  inside	  the	  heads”	  (Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005,	  p.	  681),	   thus	  apparently	  not	  considering	  these	  processes	  to	  be	  “cognition”,	  to	  involve	  any	  “knowledge’”	  or	  “representation”,	  yet.	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Figure	   2.1:	   “Each partner’s conception of a collaborative activity in which a shared goal and 
joint intention (with complementary roles) are formed”. Tomasello and colleagues (2005) 
illustration of (visibly adult) shared intentionality in terms of coordinating individual knowledge. 
Note the (rationalist) depiction of the interaction partners as 2 completely symmetric large heads 
with small hands in the background, with all arrows linking hierarchical represenations of 
increasing complexity and recursivity pointing from the top down. For details see Tomasello et 
al. (2005).	  From	   9/10	   months,	   infants	   are	   considered	   to	   understand	   people	   as	  
goal	   directed	   agents,	   that	   is,	   persistently	   pursuing	   a	   goal	   after	   failed	  attempts,	   accidents,	   and	   around	   obstacles,	   and	   perceptually	   monitoring	  their	   actions	   (infants	   show	   surprise	   when	   an	   agent	   takes	   a	   detour	   in	   the	  absence	   of	   an	   obstacle	   (Csibra,	   2003),	   distinguish	   purposeful	   action	   from	  accident	   in	   responding	  more	   impatiently	   to	   unwilling	   compared	   to	   trying	  but	   unable	   action	   partners,	   and	   complete	   other’s	   action	   after	   only	   having	  seen	   failed	   trials	   (Behne,	   Carpenter,	   Call,	   &	   Tomasello,	   2005)).	  Correspondingly,	  they	  are	  supposed	  to	  engage	  in	  triadic	  interactions	  with	  
people	  understood	  as	  goal	  directed	  agents.	  Triadic	  interactions	  are	  here	  characterized	  as	   involving	  child,	   adult	   and	   some	  outside	   entity	   towards	  
which	   they	   both	   direct	   their	   actions	   (and	   in	   particular	   their	   gaze),	  
sharing	   goals	   (which	   they	   are	   jointly	   committed	   to)	   and	   perception	  
(“joint	   perception”).	   	  This	   is	   inferred	   from	   infants	   (but	  not	  chimpanzees)	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now	   attempting	   to	   reengage	   a	   recalcitrant	   adult	   in	   joint	   activities	  (Warneken,	   Chen,	   &	   Tomasello,	   2006).	   Projected	   into	   the	   heads	   of	   the	  interaction	  partners	  (see	  figure	  2.1)	  are	  now	  shared	  goals	  and	  perceptual	  
monitoring.	  
Between	  12-­‐15	  months	  infants	  are	  considered	  to	  understand	  people	  as	  
intentional	  agents,	  choosing	  one	  plan	  over	  another	  and	  employing	  selective	  attention.	  Suggested	  evidence:	  1)	  presented	  with	  a	  model	  pressing	  a	  button	  in	   an	   unusual,	   awkward	   way	   with	   their	   head,	   infants	   imitated	   this	   style:	  however	  they	  did	  so	  only	  if	  the	  adult-­‐model’s	  hands	  are	  free	  (shown	  placed	  flat	  on	  table),	  but	  not	  when	  the	  shivering	  adult	  uses	  their	  head	  while	  hands	  are	  occupied	  holding	  a	  blanket	  (Gergely,	  Bekkering,	  &	  Kiraly,	  2002)8;	  2)	  12	  month	   old	   infants,	   robustly	   –	   upon	   hearing	   an	   adult	   exclaiming	   an	  ambiguous	  “Oh,	  wow!	  That’s	  cool!	  Can	  you	  give	  it	  to	  me?”	  –	  handed	  over	  that	  one	   out	   of	   three	   objects	   they	  were	   familiar	  with,	   which	   the	   adult	   did	   not	  know	  yet	  (Tomasello	  &	  Haberl,	  2003).	  	  Now	   infants	   get	   involved	   in	   collaborative	   engagement	   with	   joint	  
intentions	   and	   attention	   (equated	   with	   Adamson	   and	   Bakeman’s	  coordinated	   joint	   engagement,	   see	   section	   2.3.2),	   they	   are	   credited	   with	  understanding	   specific	   action	   plans,	   understanding	   the	   situation	   from	   a	  “birds-­‐eye-­‐view”,	  and	  are	  supposedly	  able	  to	  reverse	  roles.	  Thus,	   interestingly,	   emerging	   results	   shifted	   the	   research	  program	   from	  its	   exclusive	   focus	   on	   understanding	   others	   based	   on	   visual	   observation	  from	   a	   distance	   to	   taking	   into	   account	   actual	   engagement	   in	   interaction,	  where	  the	  “uniquely	  human”	  aspects	  of	  cognition	  seem	  to	  reside.	  However,	  rather	  than	  taking	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  what	  happens	  in	  interactions	  in	  general,	  the	  peculiarities	  of	  human	  engagement	  in	  interaction	  are	  quickly	  translated	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 	  However,	   the	   Authors’	   claim	   that	   the	   study	   shows	   infants’	  understanding	  of	  “rational	  choice”,	  has	  by	  now	  been	  largely	  deconstructed,	  as	   the	   effects	   can	  be	  accounted	   for	  by	  more	  basic	   factors	   such	  as	  postural	  difficulty	   (Paulus,	   Hunnius,	   Vissers,	   &	   Bekkering,	   2011)	   and	   perceptual	  saliency	  (Beisert	  et	  al.,	  2012).	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into	   cognitive	   psychology’s	   language	   of	   hidden	   forces	   characterizing	   it	   as	  requiring:	   a	   (specifically	   human)	   motive	   to	   share	   experience,	   and	   a	  (specifically	   human)	   knowledge	   of	   intentions	   being	   shared.	   Thus	   the	  focus	   of	   investigation	   still	   remains	   (on)	   the	   individual;	   “social	   interaction”	  merely	  enters	  as	  content	  into	  his/her	  individual	  knowledge	  and	  motives.	  Placing	   this	   new	   version	   of	   the	   theory	   into	   a	   larger	   comparative	   and	  evolutionary	  context,	  Moll	  and	  Tomasello	  (2007)	  propose	  what	  they	  call	  the	  
“Vygotskian	   intelligence	   hypothesis”,	   in	   contradistinction	   to	   the	  Machiavellian	   Intelligence	   hypothesis	   (Byrne	   &	  Whiten,	   1989).	   The	   latter	  claims	   that	   the	   evolution	   of	   cognition,	   intelligence,	   and	   the	   brain	   was	   –	  particularly	   in	   primates	   –	   largely	   driven	   by	   (the	   requirements	   of)	   social	  competition.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   Vygotskyan	   intelligence	   hypothesis	   suggests	  that	  the	  evolution	  of	  human	  cognition	  and	  intelligence	  –	  in	  contrast	  to	  other	  primates	   –	   was	   primarily	   driven	   by	   (the	   requirements	   of)	   their	   uniquely	  collaborative	   ways	   of	   living.	   	   Tomasello	   and	   Carpenter	   (2007)	   go	   on	   to	  propose	   –	   again	   taking	   their	   cue	   from	  Vygotsky	   (see	   section	   2.5.1)	   –	   how	  shared	  intentionality	   in	  the	  course	  of	  evolution	  “transforms”	  older	  primate	  forms	   of	   individual	   cognition	   into	  more	   powerful	   socio-­‐cultural	   ones:	   it	   is	  argued	  to	  transform	  1)	  gaze	  following	  to	  gain	  knowledge	  about	  objects	  into	  initiating	  truly	  intersubjective	  joint	  attention	  for	  the	  sole	  purpose	  of	  sharing,	  2)	   social	   manipulation	   (gesturing	   to	   get	   things,	   proto-­‐imperatives)	   to	   co-­‐operative	   communication	   (pointing	   for	   sharing	   and	   getting	   attention,	   i.e.	  proto-­‐declaratives,	   and	   for	   giving	   information),	   3)	   group	   activity	   where	  everyone	   pursues	   their	   own	   goal	   to	   collaboration	   with	   shared	   goals	   and	  commitments,	   often	   apparently	   performed	   for	   its	   own	   sake,	   and	   finally	   4)	  social	  learning,	  where	  information	  is	  gathered	  individually	  and	  unilaterally,	  to	  forms	  of	  cultural	  learning	  involving	  imitation,	  and	  in	  particular	  instructed	  learning,	  which	   later	  on	   is	  going	  to	  be	  performed	  collaboratively	  and	  often	  involves	  the	  establishment	  and	  enforcement	  of	  social	  norms.	  In	  these	  and	  later	  publications	  Tomasello	  and	  colleagues	  lay	  out	  various	  evolutionary	  scenarios,	  how	  human	  forms	  of	  collaboration	  might	  have	  come	  about	   through	  several	  steps	   (Tomasello	  &	  Carpenter,	  2007;	  Tennie,	  Call,	  &	  Tomasello,	  2009;	  Tomasello,	  2011):	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1)	   A	   change	   in	   temperament:	   becoming	  more	   tolerant	   (in	   particular	   in	  food	  sharing	   situations)	  and	  more	   social-­‐comfort-­‐seeking.	  This	  might	  have	  been	  brought	  about	  by	  self-­‐domestication,	  where	  aggressive	  individuals	  are	  selected	   against	   in	   small	   social	   groups	   or	   by	   the	   requirements	   of	   co-­‐operative	  breeding.	  	  2)	   The	   now	   more	   tolerant	   and	   pro-­‐social	   individuals	   would	   do	   more	  things	   together	   (potentially	   fostered	   by	   situations	   like	   group	   hunts	  where	  collaboration	   in	   combination	   with	   food-­‐tolerance	   creates	   a	   win-­‐win	  situation	   for	   everyone)	   thus	   further	   developing	   the	   skills	   of	   shared	  intentionality	  and	  collaboration.	  3)	   In	   a	   third	   step	   group	   level	   processes	   may	   have	   developed:	   such	   as	  establishing	  and	  enforcing	  group	  norms	  and	  constituting	  social	  institutions,	  processes	  which	  from	  then	  on	  were	  driven	  further	  by	  group	  competition.	  In	  their	  later	  developmental	  research	  Tomasello	  and	  colleagues	  primarily	  focus	   on	   aspects	   of	   social	   cognition,	   which	   are	   related	   to	   these	   group	  processes	  and	  appear	  well	  after	  the	  first	  year,	  such	  as	  e.g.	  enforcing	  norms	  (Rakoczy,	  Warneken,	  &	  Tomasello,	  2008).	  	  
2.4.4 Analysing	  and	  comparing	  the	  approach	  of	  Tomasello	  and	  colleagues	  to	  
other	  approaches	  Putting	   forth	   a	   wide-­‐ranging	   framework	   spanning	   typical	   and	   atypical	  human	   development	   as	   well	   as	   great	   apes,	   tentatively	   accounting	   for	  evolution	  of	  culture	  in	  terms	  of	  (cultural)	  learning	  and	  cognition,	  Tomasello	  and	  colleagues	  provided	  1)	  a	  palpable	   structure	   for	  multiple	  disciplines	   to	  discuss	  a	  range	  of	  phenomena	  connected	  to	  cultural	  learning,	  and	  2)	  a	  grid	  of	   concrete	   hypotheses	   –	   reminiscent	   of	   Wittgenstein’s	   chessboard-­‐image	  from	   the	   Tractatus	   (Wittgenstein,	   1921)	   where	   each	   field	   represents	   a	  proposed	  “fact”	  to	  be	  tested	  to	  be	  the	  case	  or	  not	  –	  laying	  out	  the	  course	  of	  a	  systematic	   experimental	   research	  program.	  The	  drawback	  of	   putting	   forth	  such	   a	   speculative,	   largely	   conceptually	   guided	   –	   and	   hence	   logically	  intriguingly	  consistent	  –	   framework,	  however,	   is	   that	   it	   captures	  attention,	  binds	  the	  rational	  mind	  in	  its	  apparent	  completeness,	  potentially	  letting	  the	  world	   appear	   more	   alike	   to	   a	   logical	   grid	   than	   it	   might	   actually	   be,	   and	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thereby	  aspects	  missing	  in	  the	  framework	  (e.g.	  interaction	  flow,	  affect,	  etc.)	  might	  easily	  be	  overlooked,	  making	   it	  difficult	   to	  see	  and	  adopt	  alternative	  perspectives	  and	   frames:	   e.g.	   conceiving	  of	   co-­‐actors	  not	   as	   rational,	   equal	  agents	  co-­‐ordinating	  their	  stepwise	  actions	  by	  rational	  thought	   in	  advance,	  but	   as	   potentially	   diverse	   partners	   continuously	   co-­‐ordinating	   and	  negotiating	   their	   interaction	   throughout	  various	   levels	  on	   the	   flow	  as	   they	  go.	  	  Tomasello	   and	   colleagues’	   approach	  was	  widely	  welcomed	   for	   drawing	  attention	   to	   “sociality”	  within	   cognitive	   psychology,	   thus	   extending	   it	   at	   a	  point,	   where	   its	   exclusive	   focus	   on	   individual	   cognition	   would	   leave	  cognitive	  psychology	  at	  an	   impasse	   in	  how	   to	  account	   for	  higher	   cognitive	  functions.	  However,	   they	   introduced	   “the	   social”	   into	   cognitive	  psychology	  in	   terms	   compatible	   with	   its	   conceptual	   and	   methodological	   framework,	  simply	   adding	   “social	   cognition”	   as	   a	   new	   topic,	   a	   specific	   individual	  cognitive	  capacity	  to	  be	  investigated,	  with	  the	  level	  and	  unit	  of	  analysis	  still	  firmly	   on	   the	   individual.	   And	   social	   interaction	   and	   collaboration	   are	  conceived	  of	  as	  rational	  stepwise	  instrumental	  actions	  (also	  compare	  Piaget	  and	   Bates,	   section	   2.2)	   understood	   by	   observation	   from	   a	   distance	   and	  planned	  and	  negotiated	  in	  advance	  by	  rational	  agents	  as	  equals.	  A	  research	  program	  which	  frames	  social	  interactions	  in	  such	  rationalistic	  terms	   as	   driven	   by	   conceptual	   knowledge	   alone,	   runs	   the	   risk	   to	   be	  
incomplete	  and	  even	  potentially	  misleading	  when	  addressing	  how	  rich	  
embodied	   interactions	   between	   adults	   are	   coordinated	   and	   unfold	  
moment-­‐by-­‐moment.	   In	   combination	   with	   a	   conception	   of	   development	  based	  on	  abruptly	  emerging	  new	  capacities	  and	  forms	  of	  knowledge	  (giving	  rise	   to	   a	   “revolution”),	   this	   approach	   renders	   it	   futile	   to	   even	   look	   into	  earlier	   interactions	   at	   all,	   thus	   making	   it	   difficult	   if	   not	   impossible	   to	  
address	   and	  understand	   the	   developmental	   trajectories	  of	   social	   and	  
cultural	  engagement.	  A	   related	   problematic	   aspect	   of	   such	   a	   rationalist	   and	   concept-­‐centred	  approach	  is	  that	  it	  tends	  to	  blind	  out	  anything	  which	  apparently	  does	  not	  fit	  into	  the	  concept-­‐grid.	  A	  particularly	  striking	  example	  is	  arousal	  and	  affect:	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E.g.	   when	   trying	   to	   conceptually	   delineate	   joint	   (visual)	   attention	   and	  applying	   this	   concept	   to	   real-­‐life	   situations,	   Tomasello	   admits	   that	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  determine	   from	  gaze	  alternations	  whether	   joint	  attention	  really	  is	   achieved,	   but	   notes	   that	   cases	   become	   much	   more	   convincing	   when	  occurring	   spontaneously	   and	   integrated	  with	   ongoing	   social	   interaction	   in	  appropriate	   ways.	   His	   examples	   of	   such	   “convincing”	   instances	   of	   joint	  attention	   almost	   exclusively	   happen	   to	   be	   situations	   where	   affect	   plays	   a	  crucial	  role,	  such	  as	  in	  social	  referencing,	  when	  children	  check	  for	  the	  adult’s	  emotional	   response	   to	   an	   object	   and	   adapt	   their	   own	   relation	   to	   it.	  Tomasello	  acknowledges	  that	  in	  general	  “the	  child	  does	  not	  look	  to	  the	  adult	  
or	  attempt	  to	  secure	  their	  attention	  at	  random	  moments,	  but	  rather	   looks	  to	  
the	   adult	   or	   points	   to	   an	   object	   when	   surprised	   by	   something,	   pleased	  with	  
something,	   afraid	   of	   something,	   or	   in	   other	   socially	   meaningful	   situations”	  (Tomasello,	   1995).	   The	   meaningfulness	   in	   those	   situations	   is	   based	   on	  sharing	  affect.	  While	   the	   theory	   stays	   rather	   silent	   about	   the	   role	   of	   (shared)	   affect,	  many	  of	  Tomasello	  and	  colleagues’	  experimental	  paradigms	  actually	  heavily	  depend	  on	   it:	   For	  example,	   in	   the	  Tomasello	  and	  Haberl	   (2003)	   study,	   the	  experimenter	   engages	   the	   infant	   exclaiming:	   “Oh,	  wow!	  That’s	   so	   cool!	  Can	  
you	  give	  it	  to	  me?”	  while	  gesturing	  ambiguously	   to	  elicit	   the	   infant	   to	  hand	  over	  that	  of	   three	  objects	  equally	   familiar	  to	  the	  child,	  which	   is	  new	  to	  the	  adult.	   Tomasello	   and	   Haberl’s	   analysis	   and	   interpretation	   focuses	  exclusively	  on	  the	  kind	  of	  knowledge	  and	  understanding	  that	  can	  be	  inferred	  from	  the	  infants’	  robust	  responses,	  without	  considering	  the	  potential	  role	  of	  affective	   communication	   even	   for	   understanding	   what	   is	   relevant	   in	   the	  situation	   (similar	   to	   Piaget).	   Generally,	   earlier	   social	   interactions	   before	   9	  months	   are	   considered	   to	   be	   dyadic	   and	   in	   Tomasello’s	   terms	   merely	   an	  “expression	  of	   emotion	  and	  behavioural	   turn-­‐taking”	  having	  nothing	   to	  do	  yet	   with	   cognition	   or	   knowledge,	   which	   is	   also	   illustrated	   by	   Tomasello’s	  specification	  for	  a	  schematic	  depiction	  of	  co-­‐actors	  at	  this	  phase	  as:	  “nothing	  [that	  is	  no	  representations]	  inside	  the	  heads”	  (Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005,	  p.	  681).	  When	   shared	   affect	   finally	  does	   enter	  Tomasello’s	   account	   it	   does	   so	   in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  uniquely	  human	  “motivation	  to	  share	  experience”,	  that	  is,	  as	  an	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external	   force,	   an	   ad	   hoc	   deus	   ex	   machina,	   invoked	   to	   maintain	   the	  conceptual	   grid	   after	   testing	   of	   great	   apes	   and	   autistic	   children	   fails	   to	  establish	   clear-­‐cut	   deficits	   of	   cognitive	   capacities	   of	   intention	  understanding.	  This	  motivation	  remains	  difficult	  to	  address	  within	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  approach,	  as	   long	  as	  affect	  continues	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  either	  as	  random	  content,	   not	   affecting	   or	   informative	   for	   cognitive	   structures	   or	   an	  inscrutable	   force	  pushing	   the	  cognitive	   system	  “from	   the	  outside”	   towards	  sociality;	   rather	   than	   as	   an	   integral	   part	   of	   the	   system,	   an	   organizing	   and	  connecting	  force,	  a	  container	  or	  scaffold	  for	  developing	  cognitive	  structures.	  We	   suggest	   that	   jointly	   participating	   in	   early	   affect-­‐imbued	   social	  interactions,	  rather	  than	  being	  merely	  an	  expression	  of	  affect	  and	  automatic	  behavioural	   regulation,	   may	   help	   to	   learn	   about	   action	   structures	   and	  provide	   an	   important	   carrier	   structure	   for	   cognitive	   development	   (see	  section	  6.7).	  	  What	   role	   do	   social	   interactions	   and	   their	   cultural	   embeddedness	  play	   in	  Tomasello	  and	  colleagues’	  approach,	  who	  investigate	  culture,	  albeit	  with	  a	   focus	  on	   individual	  social	  cognition	  and	  capacities?	  Their	   treatment	  of	  social	  interactions	  takes	  different	  (and	  not	  necessarily	  coherent)	  forms	  in	  different	   places:	   Generally,	   they	   repeatedly	   stress	   the	   crucial	   role	   of	   the	  cultural	  niche	  with	   its	   rich	  social	   interactions	  as	   the	  second,	   indispensable	  pillar,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   capacities	   brought	   along	   by	   the	   individual,	   for	  culture	  to	  thrive	  (Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  1993;	  Tomasello,	  1999;	  Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  	  “Let	  us	  be	  very	  clear	  on	  this	  point.	  Participation	  in	  these	  interactions	  is	  
critical.	   A	   child	   raised	   on	   a	   desert	   island	   would	   have	   all	   of	   the	   biological	  
preparation	   in	   interactions	   involving	   shared	   intentionality,	   but	   because	   she	  
did	   not	   actually	   participate	   in	   such	   interactions	   she	   would	   have	   nothing	   to	  
internalize	  into	  perspectival	  cognitive	  representations.	  Ontogeny	  in	  this	  case	  is	  
critical”	   (Moll	   &	   Tomasello,	   2007).	   Looked	   at	   more	   closely,	   they	   seem	   to	  consider	  social	  interactions	  primarily	  as	  1)	  a	  source	  of	  culturally	  specific	  
empirical	   “content”	   (similar	   to	   Piaget),	   and	   2)	   secondarily	   as	   forms	   of	  
supporting	  activities	  for	  children.	  	  1)	  Social	  interactions	  provide	  content	  a)	  from	  early	  on	  through	  a	  specific	  “habitus”	   (now	  drawing	   on	  Bourdieu)	   understood	   as	   a	   specific	  way	   of	   life	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acquired	   by	   the	   inhabitants	   of	   a	   specific	   cultural	   niche,	   directing,	   and	  constraining	   content,	   but	   not	   considered	   to	   play	   a	   distinctive	   role	   for	  cultural	   learning	   in	  the	  narrow	  sense	  and	  hence	  disregarded9.	  And	  b)	   later	  on,	   cultural	   content	   conveyed	   in	   social	   interactions	   includes	   language	   or	  (conventional)	   object	   actions.	   	   2)	   Social	   interactions	   particularly	   provide	  
support	   for	   infants	   e.g.	   in	   the	   form	   of	   a)	   scaffolding,	   which,	   however,	   is	  considered	   to	   promote	   learning	   only	   on	   the	   individual	   rather	   than	   the	  cultural	   level,	   and	   b)	   in	   the	   form	   of	   active	   instruction;	   as	   this	   already	  operates	  on	  the	  cultural	  level	  it	  still	  does	  not	  necessarily	  help	  to	  bring	  about	  cultural	   learning,	  but	  may	  be	  utilized	  by	   children	  once	   they	  have	  achieved	  cultural	  capacities.	  Generally,	  when	  Tomasello	  and	  colleagues	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  social	  interactions,	  and	  how	  their	  richness	  can	  contribute	  to	  e.g.	  language	  learning,	  this	   cultural	   resource	   can	   only	   be	   “accessed”	   once	   the	   infant	   has	   already	  acquired	   the	   knowledge	   of	   others	   as	   intentional	   agents,	   and	   of	   shared	  intentionality,	   implying	  an	  already	  present	  capacity	  of	   joint	  perception	  and	  later	  joint	  attention.	  
A child in Quine's (1960) famous "Gavagai" situation has no way of 
figuring out for itself the referent of a novel linguistic item. But in the real 
world young children learn new pieces of language almost always in highly 
contextualized, often routinized, mutually understood (i.e., intersubjective) 
nonlinguistic formats such as the feeding situation, diaper changing, book 
reading, taking a walk, or playing a game of peek-a-boo […] These contexts 
are so replete with information about adult intentions - from the child's 
past experience in similar situations, as well as from the adult's current 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  The	  particular	  habitus	  into	  which	  a	  child	  is	  born	  determines	  the	  kinds	  of	  
social	   interactions	   she	   will	   have,	   the	   kinds	   of	   physical	   objects	   she	   will	   have	  
available,	   the	   kinds	   of	   learning	   experiences	   and	   opportunities	   she	   will	  
encounter,	  and	   the	  kinds	  of	   inferences	   she	  will	  draw	  about	   the	  way	  of	   life	  of	  
those	  around	  her.	  The	  habitus	  thus	  has	  direct	  effect	  on	  cognitive	  development	  
in	   terms	   of	   the	   “raw	   material”	   with	   which	   the	   child	   has	   to	   work	   [...]	  (Tomasello,	  1999,	  p.79)	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direction of gaze, tone of voice, and specific behaviors toward objects  - that 
they even support the acquisition of words for referents that are not 
perceptually present. (Tomasello et al., 1993) Spelling	   out	   in	  more	   detail	   how	   this	  might	  work,	   Tomasello	   points	   out	  that	   for	   establishing	   reference	   and	   sharing	   information	   (whether	   via	  pointing	   or	   words),	   and	   in	   particular	   for	   learning	   (e.g.	   language	   or	  perspective	   taking	   etc.),	   it	   is	   crucial	   to	   participate	   in	   what	   he	   calls	   “joint	  
attentional	  scenes”10	  in	  which	  a	  socially	  shared	  reality	  formed	  of	  a	  shared	  subset	  of	  each	  partner’s	  perceptual	  world,	  provides	  the	  broader	  context	  for,	  and	  hence	  grounds,	  language	  and	  acts	  of	  reference.	  In	  later	  texts	  “joint	  attentional	   frames”	  are	  primarily	  invoked	  as	  a	  crucial	  factor	   distinguishing	   apes	   from	   humans:	   their	   lack	   is	   used	   to	   account	   for	  apes’	  apparent	   inability	   to	  utilize	  pointing,	  and,	  more	  generally,	   they	  serve	  as	   a	   demarcation	   line	   between	   instrumental	   communication	   and	  communication	  for	  the	  sharing	  of	  information	  considered	  unique	  to	  humans.	  In	  order	  to	  successfully	  participate	  in	  creating	  a	  “joint	  attentional	  scene”,	  children	  need,	  according	  to	  Tomasello,	  to	  take	  an	  “outside”	  perspective	  on	  the	  situation	  and	  consider	  on	  one	  and	  the	  same	  conceptual	  plane:	  that	  which	  is	  shared,	   the	  adult,	   the	  child	  him/herself,	  as	  well	  as	   the	  (interchangeable)	  roles	   inherent	   in	   the	   situation.	   So,	   again	   this	   already	   requires	   a	   lot	   of	  complex	   “cognition”	   to	   be	   in	   place	   in	   order	   to	   benefit	   from	   social	  interactions.	  But	  how	  do	   children	  get	   there	   in	   the	   first	  place?	  And	  what	   about	  early	  
socio-­‐cultural	  interactions?	  Do	  they	  play	  any	  role?	  As	   already	   mentioned	   above,	   Tomasello	   and	   colleagues	   acknowledge	  “habitus”,	  but	  quickly	  dismiss	  it	  as	  not	  interesting	  for	  cultural	  learning	  in	  the	  narrow	   sense.	   In	   addition,	   we	   indirectly	   learn	   about	   the	   importance	   of	  
socially	   guiding	   attention	   at	   an	   early	   age,	   or	   in	   Tomasello’s	   words:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 	  In	   other	   places	   they	   are	   also	   referred	   to	   as	   joint	   attentional	  
“frames”/”formats”	   or	   “common	   ground”,	   taking	   up	   earlier	   labels	   by	   other	  researchers	  such	  as	  Goffman,	  Bruner	  and	  Clark.	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“socialisation	  of	  attention”,	  as	   it	   is	  proposed	  as	  the	  potentially	  distinctive	  factor	  setting	  apart	  enculturated	  from	  wild	  apes,	  enabling	  enculturated	  apes	  to	  e.g.	  perform	  some	  basic	  forms	  of	  imitation,	  nota	  bene	  not	  by	  helping	  them	  develop	   social	   cognition,	   but	   by	   extending	   their	   individual	   capacities	  (Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  	  
While	   later	   social	   interactions	   are	   considered	   crucial	   for	   cultural	  
transmission,	   the	   question,	   whether	   early	   social	   interactions	   play	   a	  
role	   in	   human	   infants’	   development	   of	   social	  motivation	   or	   knowledge	  (understanding	  others	  as	  intentional	  agents	  or	  shared	  intentionality)	  seems	  to	   remain	   inconclusive:	   confirmed	   in	   some	   places	   (Tomasello,	   1995),	   left	  open	  or	   denied	   in	   others	   (Tomasello,	   1999):	   “We	  do	  not	  know	  exactly	  how	  
much	   of	   an	   understanding	   of	   intentional	   action	   is	   necessary	   for	   children	   to	  
participate	  in	  collaborative	  activities.	  And	  conversely,	  we	  do	  not	  know	  whether	  
the	  kinds	  of	   collaborative	  activities	   that	   exist	   in	   cultures	  before	   children	  are	  
born	   are	   a	   necessary	   or	   only	   a	   facilitative	   component	   in	   the	   ontogenetic	  
process	   –	   or	  whether	   they	   play	   no	   effective	   role	   at	   all	   at	   the	   outset	   (though	  
clearly	  they	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  later)”.	  Taking	   a	   closer	   look	   reveals	   that	   Tomasello	   acknowledges	   that	   some	  amount	  of	  social	  interaction	  is	  necessary	  –	  (not	  unlike	  Chomsky’s	  view	  that	  a	   self-­‐maturing	   language	   acquisition	   device	   (LAD)	   still	   does	   need	  input/exercise	  to	  mature):	  
“It	  is	  very	  unlikely,	  in	  our	  view,	  that	  a	  human	  or	  ape	  kept	  in	  social	  isolation	  
for	  the	  first	  year	  of	  life	  would	  suddenly	  understand	  others	  as	  goal-­‐directed	  or	  
intentional	   agents	   on	   its	   initial	   encounter	   with	   them;	   presumably,	   the	  
developmental	   pathway	   for	   understanding	   intentional	   action	   depends	   on	  
species-­‐typical	   social	   interactions	   early	   in	   ontogeny.	   This	   does	   not	  
necessarily	   mean,	   however,	   any	   specific	   experiences.”	   (Tomasello	   et	   al.,	  
2005,	  my	  emphasis)	  But	   he	   further	   claims	   –	   referring	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   research	   demonstrating	  cultural	  variation	  –	  that	  particular	  ways	  of	  social	  interaction	  do	  not	  make	  a	  relevant	  difference	  and	  hence	  do	  not	  hold	  any	  explanatory	  value:	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“As	   noted	   above	   in	   this	   section,	   there	   has	   been	   almost	   no	   research	   –	   not	  
even	   training	   studies	   or	   correlational	   studies	   –	   that	   establishes	   a	   solid	  
relationship	   between	   any	   kind	   of	   particular	   social	   experience	   infants	   might	  
have	   and	   individual	   differences	   in	   the	   unfolding	   of	   this	   developmental	  
pathway.	   In	   the	   absence	   of	   such	   studies,	  we	  might	   tentatively	   conclude	   that	  
this	   is	   a	   very	   robust,	   heavily	   canalized	   ontogenetic	   pathway	   in	   humans	   that	  
emerges	  in	  all	  “normal”	  human	  environments.”	  (Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005)	  	  	  Thus,	  while	  the	  general	  notion	  of	  “social	  interaction”	  does	  play	  an	  active	  –	  and	   for	   the	   argument	   effective	   –	   role	   within	   the	   theoretical	   part	   of	  Tomasello’s	   approach,	   supposedly	   constituting	   the	   second	   pillar	   –	   in	  addition	  to	   the	  capacities	  brought	  along	  by	  the	   individual	  –	   for	   culture	   to	  
work,	  in	  his	  concrete	  statements	  he	  seems	  to	  be	  downplaying	  its	  role	  in	  
early	   development	   –	   reflecting	   the	   tension	   inherent	   in	   looking	   at	  
culture	   from	   a	   cognitive,	   capacity-­‐based	   perspective.	   The	   notion	   of	  “social	   interaction”	  does	  not	  play	  any	  effective	  role	   in	  the	  empirical	  part	  of	  the	   approach,	   but	   remains	   basically	   unadressable,	   and	   its	   relevance	  untestable	   in	   the	   empirical	   program	   focussing	   exclusively	   on	   individual	  capacity,	   thus	   actually	   leaving	   essential	   parts	   of	   the	   theory	   empirically	  ungrounded	  and	  suspended	  in	  mid-­‐air.	  	  The	   approach	   of	   Tomasello	   and	   colleagues	   shares	   with	   other	   cognitive	  approaches,	   primarily	   focusing	   on	   the	   individual	   and	   his/her	   capacities,	  (what	  sometimes	  seems	  to	  amount	  to)	  an	  outright	  disdain	  for	  social	  learning	  by	   training,	   as	   they	   construe	   a	   supposed	   dichotomy	   between	   mindless	  passive	   associative	   learning	   by	   drill	   and	   active	   learning	   by	   insight	   and	  understanding	  (compare	  Piaget,	  Bates,	  section	  2.2.1-­‐2	  as	  well	  as	  section	  6.7).	  Thus	   Tomasello	   dismisses	   learning	   by	   what	   he	   calls	   “ontogenetic	  
ritualization”11,	  a	  form	  of	  learning	  ascribed	  to	  chimpanzees	  and	  very	  young	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  In	   earlier	   texts	  Tomasello	   refers	   to	   Smith	   (1977)	  with	   respect	   to	   this	  notion.	   Discussing	   the	   process	   of	   “formalization”	   i.e.	   the	   “specialization	   of	  behavior	   to	   become	   informative”	   in	   the	   context	   of	   displays	   in	   animal	  communication,	   Smith	   (1977)	   articulates	   the	   need	   to	   complement	   the	  notion	   “ritualization”,	   which	   in	   biology	   had	   come	   to	   mean	   genetically	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children,	   which	   is	   socially	   trained,	   develops	   within	   particular	   social	  relations,	   thus	  showing	   individual	  variations,	   thus	   is	  not	  conventional,	  and	  hence	   –	   in	   contrast	   to	   insightful	   rational	   and	   faithful	   imitation	   –	   is	   not	  considered	  relevant	  for	  cultural	  learning	  and	  transmission	  by	  Tomasello	  and	  colleagues:	  	  
In ontogenetic ritualization a communicatory signal is created by two 
organisms shaping each other’s behavior in repeated instances of a social 
interaction. For example, an infant may initiate nursing by going directly to 
the mother's nipple, perhaps grabbing and moving her arm in the process. 
In some future encounter the mother might anticipate the infant's desire at 
the first touch of her arm and so become receptive at that point – leading the 
infant to abbreviate its behavior to a touch on the arm with response waiting 
(cf. Tinbergen 1951, on 'intention movements'). Note that there is no hint 
here that one individual is seeking to reproduce the behavior of another; 
there is only social interaction that results eventually in a communicative 
signal (Tomasello, 1996). “This is presumably the way that most human 
infants learn the “arms-over-head” gesture to request that adults pick them 
up, that is, first as a direct attempt to crawl up the adult’s body, and then, as 
the adult anticipates their desire and picks them up, as an abbreviated, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
controlled	  phylogenetic	  change	  of	  behavior,	  with	  a	  notion	  capturing	   learned	  
change	   and	   for	   this	   suggests	   to	   again	   take	   up	   the	   notion	   of	  “conventionalization”.	  In	  earlier	  texts	  Tomasello	  uses	  the	  notion	  “individual	  conventionalization”	  (e.g.	  Tomasello,	  1994)	  where	  the	  qualifier	  “individual”	  indicates	   the	  default	  meaning	  of	   conventional	   to	  be	  non-­‐individual,	   a	   little	  later	   he	   uses	   both	   “ritualization	   (or	   conventionalization)”	   (Tomasello	  1996a),	   and	   after	   that	   mostly	   “ontogenetic	   ritualization”	   (e.g.	   Tomasello	  1996b,	   1999)	  walking	   back	   Smith’s	  move	   to	   use	   “conventionalization”	   but	  instead	   using	   ritualization	   with	   the	   qualifier	   “ontogenetic”	   to	   distance	   it	  from	  the	  default	  phylogenetic	  interpretation	  of	  ritualization	  in	  biology,	  thus	  keeping	   the	   term	  “convention”	  completely	  out	  of	   this,	  presumably	  so	  as	   to	  reserve	   it	   for	   aspects	   operating	   beyond	   particular	   inter-­‐individual	  relationships	  at	  an	  impersonal	  level	  of	  social	  groups.	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ritualized version of this crawling activity performed for communicative 
purposes only (Lock, 1978).”(Tomasello, 1999) (W. J. Smith, 1977; Tomasello, 1996a, 
1996b, 1999; Tomasello, Call, Nagell, Olguin, & Carpenter, 1994) However,	   human	   infants	   and	   caregivers	   frequently	   enact	   jointly	  performed	  routines	   in	  which	   learning	  by	  training	  may	  occur	  (Negayama	  et	  al.,	  2015;	  Rączaszek-­‐Leonardi,	  Nomikou,	  &	  Rohlfing,	  2013;	  Reddy,	  Markova,	  &	   Wallot,	   2013);	   rather	   than	   dismissing	   those	   interactions	   outright,	   we	  should	   look	   at	   them	   in	  more	  detail	   and	   investigate	   the	  potential	   role	   they	  may	   play	   in	   the	   development	   of	   social	   understanding	   and	   joint	   acting.	  Indeed,	   learning	  by	  training	  and	  learning	  by	  understanding	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  mutually	  exclusive,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  jointly	  performed	  routines	  with	  their	  frequently	  repeated,	  affect-­‐imbued,	  and	  highly	  structured	  action	  sequences	  may	  provide	  a	  rich	  source	  and	  container	  for	  understanding	  and	  mastery	  of	  actions	  and	  people	  to	  develop	  in	  the	  first	  place	  (see	  section	  6.7).	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2.5 Accounts	   IV:	   Cultural	   Accounts	   (Vygotsky,	   Rodríguez,	   Zukow-­‐
Goldring)	  Cultural	   approaches	   to	   development	   are	   convinced	   that	   processes	   of	  learning,	  understanding,	  mastery	  and	  participation	  –	  rather	  than	  originating	  in	  the	  individual	  and	  to	  be	  accounted	  for	  exclusively	  with	  the	  individual	  as	  the	   sole	   unit	   of	   analysis,	   let	   alone	   in	   terms	   of	   individual	   capacity	   –	   are	   a	  product	   of	   socio-­‐cultural	   history.	   Therefore	   these	   approaches	   “zoom	   out”	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  unit	  of	  analysis	  and	  take	  into	  account	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	   larger	   culturally	   shaped	   and	   culture-­‐manifesting	   context,	   emphasising	  and	   actively	   investigating	   the	   role	   or	   caregivers,	   siblings,	   artefacts,	   and	  cultural	  routines.	  	  This	   chapter’s	   analysis	  will	   focus	   on:	   1)	   Lev	   Vygotsky,	   as	   his	  work	   not	  only	   serves	   as	   the	  major	   reference	   point	   for	   socio-­‐cultural	   approaches	   to	  trace	   themselves	   back	   to,	   but	   has	   also	   had	   tremendous	   influence	   on	  numerous	   approaches,	   many	   of	   the	   ones	   discussed	   here,	   cultural	   (see	  below)	   and	   beyond	   (e.g.	   Bruner	   tradition,	   and	   see	   also	   Tomasello).	   2)	  Christiane	   Moro’s	   and	   Cintia	   Rodríguez’	   explorations	   into	   triadic	  interactions	   to	   find	   out	   how	   infants	   learn	   the	   conventional	   meaning	   of	  objects,	   and	   3)	   Patricia	   Zukow-­‐Goldring’s	   Socio-­‐cultural	   Realism,	   spelling	  out	   in	   detail	   how	   infants	   learn	   to	   participate	   in	   close	   dialogue	  with	  more	  proficient	  members	  of	  a	  culture	  through	  “educating	  attention”	  and	  “assisted	  imitation”.	  	  The	   last	   two	  approaches	  were	   selected	   as	   they	   are	  particularly	   close	   to	  the	   topic	   of	   triadic	   interaction	   as	   well	   as	   may	   be	   particularly	   suited	   as	  
boundary	  objects	   for	   interdisciplinary	   dialogue:	   their	   units	   of	   analysis	   and	  conceptual	   frameworks	   seem	   relatively	   compatible	  with	  more	   individually	  oriented	   approaches	   of	   cognitive	   psychology	   as	   they	   both	   -­‐	   drawing	   on	  additional	  theoretical	  sources	  outside	  the	  cultural-­‐psychology	  tradition	  -­‐	  in	  a	   way	   seek	   to	   bridge	   the	   gap	   between	   psychology	   and	   the	   socio-­‐cultural	  traditions	  (see	  below).	  	  However,	   there	   are	   numerous	   other	   cultural	   approaches	   beyond	   the	  scope	  of	  the	  present	  chapter	  which	  should	  not	  be	  overlooked	  when	  seeking	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to	  investigate	  and	  better	  understand	  infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  interactions:	  in	  particular	   Barbara	   Rogoff’s	   approach	   investigating	   “guided	   participation”,	  working	   out	   multiple	   (non-­‐exclusive,	   but	   interrelated)	   levels	   or	   better	  perspectives	   of	   analysis	   for	   thoroughly	   understanding	   participation	   in	  cultural	  activities	  (Rogoff,	  1990;	  Rogoff,	  Mistry,	  Radziszewska,	  &	  Germond,	  1992;	   Rogoff,	   1995;	   Rogoff	   et	   al.,	   2007),	   or	   Valsiner’s	   cultural	   historical	  study	   (drawing	   on	   activity	   theory	   and	   Lewin’s	   field	   theory)	   on	   the	  development	  of	  the	  activity	  of	  feeding/eating	  (Valsiner,	  1987),	  etc.	  	  
2.5.1 Lev	  Semyonovich	  Vygotsky	  
2.5.1.1 Background,	  interests,	  and	  theoretical	  framework	  Vygotsky	  –	  who	  had	  studied	   law,	  history	  and	   literature/semiotics	  –	  was	  interested	   in	   the	   specifically	   human	   ways	   of	   thinking	   and	   relating	   to	   the	  world	   (e.g.	   through	   labour),	   which	   he	   called	   “higher	   mental/cognitive?”	  functions	   and	   which	   he	   considered	   as	   formed	   (and	   hence	   potentially	  formable)	  in	  a	  dialectic	  socio-­‐historically	  process.	  It	  was	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Russian	  revolution	  that	  these	  questions	  gained	  a	  particular	  urgency	  as	  well	  as	  practical	  relevance,	  as	  Vygotsky	  and	  his	  colleagues	  were	  actively	  involved	  in	   building	   a	   new	   psychology	   and	   education	   aimed	   at	   contributing	   to	  building	  a	  new,	  socialist	  society.	  	  The	   young	   Vygotsky	   grappled	   with	   and	   sought	   to	   free	   himself	   and	  Psychology	   from	   the	   (established)	   Psychological	   schools	   in	   Russia	  (Introspectionism,	  predominant	  Reflexology,	  and	  combinations	  thereof)	  and	  abroad	  (American	  behaviourism	  not	  unlike	  Reflexology),	  and,	   in	  particular,	  to	  bridge	  the	  gulf	  which	  he	  traced	  back	  to	  their	  one-­‐sided	  and	  incompatible	  perspectives:	   between	   (passive)	   stimulus-­‐response	   reactions	   (central	  concept	  of	  predominant	  Reflexology)	  and	  human	  volitional,	  conscious	  action	  –	  or,	  more	  generally,	  between	  “behaviour”	  and	  “mind”:	  “This	  is	  the	  other	  half	  
of	  the	  same	  dualism.	  Previously	  we	  had	  mind	  without	  behaviour.	  Now	  we	  have	  
behaviour	   without	   mind.	   In	   both	   cases,	   we	   have	   “mind”	   and	   “behaviour”	  
understood	  as	  two	  distinct	  and	  separate	  phenomena”	  (Minick,	  1987,	  p.	  19)	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2.5.1.2 Bridging	   the	   gap	   between	   passive	   stimulus-­‐response	   behaviour	   and	  
human	   volitional	   and	   conscious	   higher	   mental	   functions	   by	  
postulating	   the	   use	   of	   signs	   as	   “psychological	   tools”	   or	   “artificial	  
stimuli”	  to	  mediate	  and	  actively	  control	  behaviour.	  To	   bridge	   the	   gap,	   Vygotsky	   theorized	   that	   humans,	   rather	   than	   being	  forced	   to	   only	   respond	   automatically	   to	   conditioned	   stimuli	   as	   is	  characteristic	   of	   non-­‐human	   animals,	   are	   also	   able	   to	   actively	   and	  volitionally	  regulate	  their	  own	  behaviour	  by	  instrumentally	  using	  “signs”	  (in	  particular	   in	   the	   form	   of	   speech),	   presenting	   them	   as	  artificial	   stimuli	   to	  themselves,	  which	  then	  mediate	  their	  behaviour	  in	  analogy	  to	  physical	  tools	  as	   “psychological	   tools”,	   a	   new	   form	   of	   “instrumental	   act”	   which	  characterizes	   higher	   cognitive	   functions.	   “For	   higher	   functions,	   the	   central	  
feature	  is	  self-­‐generated	  stimulation,	  that	  is,	  the	  creation	  and	  use	  of	  artificial	  
stimuli	  which	  become	  the	  immediate	  causes	  of	  behaviour.”	  (Vygotsky,	  1978a,	  p.	  39)	  Vygotsky	   characterizes	   the	   difference	   between	   physical	   tools	   (analysed	  by	   Engels)	   and	   “signs”	   as	   “psychological	   tools“	   (which	   Vygotsky	   now	  develops	   in	   analogy	   to	   Engels)	   as	   a	   difference	   in	   direction	   from	   “other-­‐/object-­‐directed”	  to	  “self-­‐directed”:	  
The tool's function is to serve as the conductor of human influence on the 
object of activity; it is externally oriented; it must lead to changes in objects. 
It is a means by which human external activity is aimed at mastering, and 
triumphing over, nature. The sign, on the other hand, changes nothing in the 
object of a psychological operation. It is a means of internal activity aimed 
at mastering oneself; the sign is internally oriented. These activities are so 
different from each other that the nature of the means they use cannot be the 
same in both cases. (Vygotsky, 1978a, p. 55) 
Because this auxiliary stimulus possesses the specific function of reverse 
action, it transfers the psychological operation to higher and qualitatively 
new forms and permits humans, by the aid of extrinsic stimuli, to control 
their behavior from the outside. The use of signs leads humans to a specific 
structure of behavior that breaks away from biological development and 
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creates new forms of a culturally-based psychological process. (Vygotsky, 
1978a, p. 40) 
The use of artificial means, the transition to mediated activity, 
fundamentally changes all psychological operations just as the use of tools 
limitlessly broadens the range of activities within which the new 
psychological functions may operate. In this context, we can use the term 
higher psychological function, or higher behavior as referring to the 
combination of tool and sign in psychological activity. (Vygotsky, 1978a, p. 
55) 
2.5.1.3 Vygotsky’s	  mediation	  triangle	  and	  the	  infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  triad	  
	  
Figure	   2.2:	   Vygotsky’s	   depiction	   of	   mediated	   action,	   details	   see	   text,	   redrawn	   from	  Vygotsky	  (1978)	  	  In	   Vygotsky’s	   graphical	   sketch	   (figure	   2.2)	   of	   the	   sign-­‐mediated	  instrumental	   act	   we	   recognize	   another	   three-­‐pole	   structure,	   akin	   to	   the	  depictions	  of	  the	  infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  triad,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  considered	  to	   mark	   the	   transition	   into	   culture.	   It	   shows	   a	   “stimulus”	   (equivalent	   to	  either	   the	   object	   or	   the	   caregiver	   in	   the	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	   triad),	   a	  “response”	  (the	  equivalent	  of	  the	  child	  and	  his/her	  actions),	  only	  here	  we	  do	  not	   have	   a	   human	   partner	   but	   a	   product	   of	   culture,	   a	   sign	   or	   artificial	  stimulus	   X,	   mediating	   the	   interaction.	   The	   depiction	   illustrates	   processes,	  which	  find	  their	  analogy	  in	  the	  triad	  as	  well:	   it	  shows	  how	  by	  mediation	  of	  and	   engaging	   via	   a	   third	   pole,	   distance	   is	   created,	   breaking	   up	   the	   tight	  connection	  between	  stimulus	  and	   response,	  making	   them	  discernable	  and,	  by	   inhibiting	  the	   immediate	  response,	  creating	  more	  action	  flexibility	  (also	  reminiscent	  of	  Piaget’s	  instrumental	  act).	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2.5.1.4 Socio-­‐historical	   origins	   of	   sign	   mediation	   and	   the	   process	   of	  
internalization	  Vygotsky	   regards	   speech	   as	   the	   primary	   mediating	   sign/psychological	  tool,	   and	   investigated	   in	   detail	   its	   role	   in	   children’s	   thinking.	   Noting	   that	  “Signs	  and	  words	  serve	  children	  first	  and	  foremost	  as	  a	  means	  of	  social	  contact	  
with	  other	  people”	  (Vygotsky,	  1978a,	  p.	  28)	   he	   proposed	   that	   “subsequently,	  
the	  individual	  "begins	  to	  apply	  to	  himself	  the	  same	  forms	  of	  behavior	  that	  were	  
initially	   applied	   to	   him	   by	   others"	   (quoted	   in	   Minick,	   1987,	   p.	   21),	   and,	  conversely,	   “the	   child	   begins	   to	   master	   his	   surroundings	   with	   the	   help	   of	  
speech”	   –	   foreshadowing	   Bates	   notion	   of	   “social	   tool	   use”	   –	   “prior	   to	  
mastering	   his	   own	   behavior”	   (Vygotsky,	   1978a,	   p.	   25).	   Thus	   he	   came	   to	  regard	  the	  sign	  mediated	  action	  characteristic	  of	  higher	  mental	  functions	  as	  originating	  out	  of	  social	   interaction,	   from	  where	   it	   later	  gets	   “internalized”	  to	  intrapersonal	  thinking:	  thus	  speech	  is	  first	  used	  in	  conversation,	  then	  as	  self-­‐directed	   vocalization	   for	   problem	   solving	   (countering	   Piaget’s	  interpretation	  of	  ego-­‐centric	  speech),	  and	  finally	  fully	  internalized	  as	  silent	  inner	  speech	  in	  thinking.	  
An interpersonal process is transformed into an intrapersonal one. Every 
function in the child's cultural development appears twice: first, on the 
social level, and later, on the individual level; first, between people 
(interpsychological), and then inside the child (intrapsychological). This 
applies equally to voluntary attention, to logical memory, and to the 
formation of concepts. All the higher functions originate as actual relations 
between human individuals (Vygotsky, 1978a, p. 57). 
The internalization of socially rooted and historically developed activities is 
the distinguishing feature of human psychology, the basis of the qualitative 
leap from animal to human psychology. As yet, the barest outline of this 
process is known (Vygotsky, 1978a, p. 57). Thus	   a	   first	   integration	   of	   the	   stimulus-­‐response	   behaviour	   with	  conscious-­‐volitional	   thought	   into	   one	   framework	   is	   achieved	   via	   appeal	   to	  the	  origins	  of	   thinking	   in	   social	   interactions	  and	  hence	  a	  product	  of	   socio-­‐cultural	  history.	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2.5.1.5 Vygotsky’s	   puzzling	   lack	  of	   empirical	   investigations/studies	  of	   social	  
interaction	  However,	  this	  social	  origin	  remains	  a	  theoretical	  claim,	  supported	  with	  a	  few	   anecdotal	   or	   common-­‐sense	   examples,	   since,	   as	   Minick	   notes:	  “Noticeably	   absent	   in	   this	   work	   was	   any	   attempt	   to	   carry	   out	   empirical	  
research	   on	   the	   development	   of	   mental	   processes	   in	   social	   interaction”	  (Minick,	  1987,	  p.	  22).	  Rather	   than	   looking	   at	   social	   interaction	   per	   se,	   Vygotsky’s	   own	  systematic	   experimental	   studies	   remain	   confined	   to	   how	   products	   of	  
culture	   such	   as	   signs	   (in	   form	   of	   speech	   or	   pictures	   etc.)	   are	   used	   by	  children	  of	  different	  ages	  and	  degrees	  of	  experience	   in	   individual	  problem	  solving	  activities,	  and	  how	  they	  impact	  on	  the	  children’s	  thinking.	  	  According	  to	  Minick,	  this	  may	  have	  been	  due	  to	  1)	  their	  primary	  concern	  being	   to	   show	   in	   principle	   the	   difference	   in	   quality	   and	   origin	   between	  natural	  and	  cultural	  thinking	  rather	  than	  their	  earliest	  development	  and	  2)	  that	   for	   the	   semiotically	   well	   versed	   Vygotsky	   the	   conceptual	   framework	  used	   back	   then,	   based	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   conditioned	   reflexes	   (albeit	  extended	   by	   artificially	   mediated	   ones)	   ultimately	   did	   not	   seem	   to	   be	  sufficient	  to	  address	  a	  complex	  phenomenon	  like	  meaningful	  language.	  
2.5.1.6 Claiming	   two	   separate	   lines	   of	   development	   with	   different	   roots	   in	  
ontogenesis	  to	  motivate	  the	  demand	  for	  a	  new	  method	  –	  recognizing	  
a	  familiar	  narrative	  Vygotsky	   discussed	   this	   methodological	   question	   in	   detail	   in	   his	   1930	  
Problems	   of	   Method	   and	   explicitly	   puts	   himself	   in	   line	   with	   Wundt	   who	  considered	   experimental	   research	   methods	   only	   applicable	   to	   elementary	  function	   while	   for	   higher	   mental	   functions	   turned	   to	   developing	   an	  alternative	   approach	   (his	   Völkerpsychologie).	   In	   this	   paper,	   the	   close	  connections	   between	   theory,	   methodology,	   and	   politics	   also	   become	  palpable	  in	  Vygotsky’s	  reference	  to	  Engels:	  
 The keystone of our method, […] follows directly from the contrast Engels 
drew between naturalistic and dialectical approaches to the understanding 
of human history. Naturalism in historical analysis, according to Engels, 
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manifests itself in the assumption that only nature affects human beings and 
only natural conditions determine historical development. The dialectical 
approach, while admitting the influence of nature on man, asserts that man, 
in turn, affects nature and creates through his changes in nature new 
natural conditions for his existence.' This position is the keystone of our 
approach to the study and interpretation of man's higher psychological 
functions and serves as the basis for the new methods of experimentation 
and analysis that we advocate. All stimulus-response methods share the 
inadequacy that Engels ascribes to naturalistic approaches to history. Both 
see the relation between human behavior and nature as unidirectionally 
reactive. My collaborators and I, however, believe that human behavior 
comes to have that "transforming reaction on nature" which Engels 
attributed to tools. We must, then, seek methods adequate to our conception. 
In conjunction with new methods, we also need a new analytic framework. 
(Vygotsky, 1978a, pp. 60–61; emphasis ours) It	   is	   against	   this	   background	   of	   a	   naturalistic	   cause-­‐effect	   framework,	  experienced	  as	  all-­‐encompassing	  and	  rendering	  humans	  passive	  victims	  of	  inevitable	   historic	   processes,	   that	   Vygotsky’s	   next	   move	   has	   to	   be	   seen,	  effectively	   separating	   and	   hence	   freeing	   humans	   from	   nature,	   narrowly	  determined	  by	  mechanistic	  laws:	  Responding	  to	  Köhler’s	  and	  Bühler’s	  empirical	  findings	  that	  some	  kind	  of	  practical	   intelligence	   can	   already	   be	   found	   in	   language-­‐less	   apes	   and	   in	   a	  similar	   form	   in	   pre-­‐verbal	   infants	   and	   their	   resulting	   claim	   that	   hence	  practical	   intelligence/“Werkzeugdenken”	   and	   language	   seem	   to	   constitute	  different,	   relatively	   independent	   systems,	  Vygotsky	   counters	   that	   the	   tool-­‐use	   of	   apes	   and	   the	   tool	   use	   of	   children	   already	   capable	   of	   language	   [let	  alone	  the	  adult	  shaping	  his	  world	  through	  labour]	  are	  not	  expressions	  of	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  intelligence	  only	  differing	  in	  degree,	  but	  rather	  represent	  two	  different	   lines	   of	   development	   originating	   from	   separate	   roots	   in	  ontogenesis:	   a	   natural	   line	   (subject	   to	   stimulus-­‐response	   laws	   and	   hence	  addressable	  by	  a	  naturalistic	  framework)	  and	  a	  second,	  cultural	  line,	  which	  
cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   stimulus	   response	   laws,	   but	   –	   being	   part	   of	   socio-­‐cultural	  history	  –	  necessitates	  a	  different	  framework	  and	  methodology.	  
	   106	  
Vygotsky,	   somewhat	   confusingly,	   conceived	   of	   the	   cultural	   line	   as	   itself	  emerging	  when	   two	  hitherto	   separate	   lines	  of	  development:	   “natural”	  pre-­‐verbal	   thinking	   (associated	   with	   some	   basic	   form	   of	   intelligence)	   and	  “natural”	   pre-­‐intellectual	   speech	   (associated	   with	   emotion)	   converge	   in	  children	   around	   2	   years	   of	   age	   (while	   remaining	   separate	   in	   apes	   and	  continuing	  only	  on	  the	  natural	  line	  of	  development),	  transforming	  the	  child’s	  natural	  thinking	  and	  speech	  into	  their	  intertwined	  cultural	  forms:	  giving	  rise	  to	  meaningful	  speech	  and	  verbal	  thought	  and	  new	  forms	  of	  learning.	  	  
“1. As we found in our analysis of the phylogenetic development of thinking 
and speech, we find that these two processes have different roots in 
ontogenesis. 
2. Just as we can identify a "pre-speech" stage in the development of the 
child's thinking, we can identify a "pre-intellectual stage" in the 
development of his speech. 
3. Up to a certain point, speech and thinking develop along different lines 
and independently of one another. 
4. At a certain point, the two lines cross: thinking becomes verbal and 
speech intellectual.” 
“conclusion: the most significant moment in the course of intellectual 
development, which gives birth to the purely human forms of practical and 
abstract intelligence, occurs when speech and practical activity, two 
previosly completely independent lines of development, converge.” 
(Vygotsky, 1978a, p. 24) Here	   we	   clearly	   recognize	   a	   variant	   of	   today’s	   familiar	   developmental	  narrative,	  only	  in	  this	  older	  version	  one	  of	  the	  lines	  is	  labelled	  with	  a	  slightly	  narrower	   “speech”,	   and	   the	   convergence	   and	   resulting	   transformation	   is	  supposed	   to	   take	   place	   later,	   only	   around	   2	   years	   of	   age	   resulting	   in	  “meaningful	  language	  and	  verbal	  thinking”,	  whereas	  in	  the	  modern	  version	  “natural	   speech”	   has	   been	   replaced	   by	   “(dyadic)	   social	   engagement”	   (and	  social	   knowledge)	   and	   the	   point	   of	   convergence	   and	   transformation	   has	  been	   pulled	   downward(s)	   to	   9	   months,	   giving	   rise	   to	   “cultural	   learning”	  “through	   the	  other	  person”	   (in	  Tomasello’s	  1995	  words).	   Interestingly,	  we	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now	  see	  that	  Vygotsky’s	  original	  separation	  of	  lines	  arguably	  can	  be	  seen	  at	  least	   in	  part	  as	  serving	   the	   function	  of	   justifying	   the	  rejection	  of	  a	   limiting	  stimulus-­‐response	   framework	   and	   demanding	   a	   new	   method.	   In	   today’s	  narrative,	   the	   twofold	   separation	   (nature	   vs.	   culture,	   speech	   vs.	   practical	  intelligence)	   remains	   firmly	   in	   place	   (dyadic	   vs.	   triadic,	   social	   vs.	   object	  engagement),	   though	   the	   practical,	   methodo-­‐ideological	   functions	   it	   had	  arguably	  served	  in	  Vygotsky’s	  version,	  and	  indeed	  the	  awareness	  thereof	  –	  have	  mostly	  been	  lost.	  	  Separating	   out	   a	   specific	   area	   of	   research,	   declaring	   its	   independence,	  and	   seeking	   to	   develop	   an	   additional	   specifically	   tailored	   research	  methodology	   (as	   practiced	   here	   by	   Vygotsky	   or	   previously	  Wundt)	   is	   one	  specific	   strategy	   to	  deal	  with	  a	   framework	  experienced	  as	   inadequate.	  The	  advantage	   of	   this	   strategy	   is	   that	   it	   momentarily	   allows	   to	   productively	  continue	  and	  expand	  work	  into	  new	  territories	  while	  ideally	  minimizing	  the	  friction	  with	   the	  opposed	  established	   framework.	  The	  drawback,	  however,	  is	  that	  in	  the	  long	  run	  it	  leaves	  Psychology	  and	  its	  related	  disciplines	  with	  a	  seemingly	   unbridgeable	   conceptual	   and	  methodological	   fault	   line	   running	  right	  through	  the	  middle	  of	  it,	  separating	  nature	  from	  culture,	  behaviour	  and	  affect	   from	   (rational)	   higher	   cognition,	   learning	   by	   training	   from	   learning	  based	   on	   knowledge	   and	   understanding,	   etc.,	   also	   playing	   out	   in	   an	  illustrative	   way	   in	   investigating	   the	   development	   of	   triadic	   interaction,	  which	  we	  will	  explore	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  discussion	  in	  section	  2.8.	  	  
2.5.1.7 Vygotsky’s	  take	  on	  children’s	  way	  of	  relating	  to	  objects	  Indeed,	   children’s	   way	   of	   relating	   toward	   objects	   (as	   towards	   their	  environment	   in	   general)	   is	   changed	   by	   the	   proposed	   cultural	  transformation,	  which	  –	  according	   to	  Vygotsky	  –	  occurs	  around	  2	  years	  of	  age	   once	   practical	   thinking	   and	   speech	   have	   converged:	   children	   now	  conceive	   of	   objects	   as	   part	   of	   a	   socially-­‐constituted	   networks	   of	  meanings	  [which	  Vygotsky	  considers	  primarily	  linked	  to	  language]:	  
A special feature of human perception – which arises at a very young age – 
is the perception of real objects. This is something for which there is no 
analogy in animal perception. By this term I mean that I do not see the 
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world simply in color and shape but also as a world with sense and 
meaning. I do not merely see something round and black with two hands; I 
see a clock and I can distinguish one hand from the other. Some brain-
injured patients say, when they see a clock, that they are seeing something 
round and white with two thin steel strips, but they do not know it is a clock; 
such people have lost their real relationship with objects. These 
observations suggest that all human perception consists of categorized 
rather than isolated perceptions. (Vygotsky, 1978a, p. 33) Also	   for	   actively	   engaging	   with	   objects	   (whether	   concrete	   or	   abstract	  objects),	   and	   in	  particular	  when	  encountering	  problems	  with	   the	  object	  of	  engagement,	   children	   who	   enact	   cultural	   ways	   of	   engaging	   have	   a	   whole	  range	  of	  flexible	  interaction	  opportunities	  at	  their	  disposal,	  enhancing	  their	  chances	   to	   solve	   the	   problem:	   “In	   summary,	   children	   confronted	   with	   a	  
problem	  that	  is	  slightly	  too	  complicated	  for	  them	  exhibit	  a	  complex	  variety	  of	  
responses	   including	   direct	   attempts	   at	   attaining	   the	   goal,	   the	   use	   of	   tools,	  
speech	  directed	  toward	  the	  person	  conducting	  the	  experiment	  or	  speech	  that	  
simply	   accompanies	   the	   action,	   and	   direct,	   verbal	   appeals	   to	   the	   object	   of	  
attention	   itself”	   (Vygotsky,	   1978a,	   p.	   30).	   Here	   we	   encounter	   in	   one	  paragraph	  all	  the	  various	  ways	  of	  engaging	  with	  objects	  (now	  at	  the	  disposal	  of	   a	   slightly	   older	   child),	   which	   were	   emphasized	   in	   one	   or	   the	   other	  approach	  discussed:	  Piaget’s	   instrumental	  act,	  Bates’	  et	  al.’s	  social	  tool	  use,	  Vygotsky’s	  self-­‐directed	  speech	  (taken	  up	  again	  by	  Rodriguez	  as	  well	  as	  by	  Tomasello),	   and,	   interestingly,	   one	   additional	   way	   of	   engagement:	   “direct	  
verbal	  appeal	   to	   the	  object”,	   typically	   used	   for	   relating	   to	   the	   social	  world:	  “Our	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  very	  small	  children	  solve	  problems	  using	  unique	  
mixtures	  of	  processes.	  In	  contrast	  with	  adults,	  who	  react	  differently	  to	  objects	  
and	   to	   people,	   young	   children	   are	   likely	   to	   fuse	   action	   and	   speech	   when	  
responding	  to	  both	  objects	  and	  social	  beings”	   (Vygotsky,	  1978a,	  p.	  29).	  This	  complicates	  current	  notions	  of	  distinct	  people	  vs.	  object	  engagement.	  However,	   how	   children	   come	   to	   understand	   objects	   conventionally	   and	  engage	   with	   objects	   in	   the	   complex	   and	   flexible	   ways	   described	   remains	  unclear.	   In	   the	   often-­‐quoted	   final	   paragraph	   of	   “Tool	   and	   symbol	   in	   child	  development”,	  Vygotsky	  writes:	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From the very first days of the child's development his activities acquire a 
meaning of their own in a system of social behavior and, being directed 
towards a definite purpose, are refracted through the prism of the child's 
environment. The path from object to child and from child to object passes 
through another person. This complex human structure is the product of a 
developmental process deeply rooted in the links between individual and 
social history. (Vygotsky, 1978a, p. 30, emphasis mine). A	  formulation	  which	  –	  with	  intriguingly	  capturing	  imagery	  –	  suggests	  the	  important	   role	   of	   adults	   and	   social	   interaction	   in	   developing	   object	  understanding	   and	  use,	   but	   seems	   to	   stand	   alone	   at	   the	   end	  of	  Vygotsky’s	  chapter	  as	  a	  rather	  isolated	  theoretical	  thought,	  and	  does	  not	  further	  specify	  how	   this	   is	   concretely	   achieved.	   This	   is	   also	   one	   of	   the	   passages	   where	  certain	   inconsistencies	   and	   tensions	   in	   Vygotsky’s	   writings	   become	  apparent.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  passage	  is	   located	  in	  a	  context	  referring	  to	  slightly	   older	   children	   and	  Vygotsky	   states	   that	   the	  natural	   lines	   converge	  into	   culture	   only	   around	   2	   years	   of	   age.	   Whereas	   here	   he	   notes	   that	   the	  infant	  is	  from	  the	  beginning	  embedded	  in	  a	  system	  of	  social	  behaviour.	  
2.5.1.8 Specific	  forms	  of	  cultural	  learning	  –	  the	  zone	  of	  proximal	  development	  
and	  imitation	  In	  another	  manuscript,	  he	  proposed	  forms	  of	  learning	  typical	  for	  human	  children,	   which	  may	   address	   our	   question	   about	   how	   conventional	   object	  understanding	  and	  mastery	  develop.	   In	  particular,	  he	  directs	  our	  attention	  to	   the	   role	   of	  what	   he	   calls	   the	   zone	  of	  proximal	  development	   in	   children’s	  learning,	  where	  they	  can	  learn	  what	  is	  just	  outside	  their	  current	  abilities	  by	  utilizing	  the	  help	  of	  an	  adult	  guide:	  
[The zone of proximal development] is the distance between the actual 
developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the 
level of potential development as determined through problem solving under 
adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers (Vygotsky, 
1978a, p. 86) He	  further	  points	  out	  that	  to	  understand	  what	  is	  going	  on	  in	  this	  learning	  process	   might	   require	   a	   reconsideration	   of	   “imitation”,	   which	   at	   the	   time	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was	   considered	   as	   rather	   mindless	   parroting.	   This	   conception	   is	   also	  illustrated	  in	  Köhler’s	  experiments,	  referred	  to	  by	  Vygotsky,	  in	  which	  Köhler	  tried	  to	  find	  out,	  whether	  the	  apes	  were	  learning	  autonomously	  or	  “merely	  copying”	  what	  someone	  else	  was	  doing,	  and	  which	  ended	  up	  indicating	  that	  the	  apes	  were	  only	   imitating	  what	   they	  were	  already	  able	   to	  do.	  Vygotsky	  now	  comments:	  
Kohler failed to take account of an important fact, namely, that primates 
cannot be taught (in the human sense of the word) through imitation, nor 
can their intellect be developed, because they have no zone of proximal 
development. A primate can learn a great deal through training by using its 
mechanical and mental skills, but it cannot be made more intelligent, that is, 
it cannot be taught to solve a variety of more advanced problems 
independently. For this reason animals are incapable of learning in the 
human sense of the term; human learning presupposes a specific social 
nature and a process by which children grow into the intellectual life of 
those around them.  
Children can imitate a variety of actions that go well beyond the limits of 
their own capabilities. Using imitation, children are capable of doing much 
more in collective activity or under the guidance of adults. This fact, which 
seems to be of little significance in itself, is of fundamental importance in 
that it demands a radical alteration of the entire doctrine concerning the 
relation between learning and development in children” (Vygotsky, 1978a, 
p. 88). In	   these	   lines	   we	   readily	   recognize	   where	   Tomasello	   –	   after	   already	  taking	  up	  the	  ideas	  of	  two	  separate	  lines	  of	  development,	  their	  convergence	  resulting	   in	   specifically	   human	   forms	   of	   cultural	   learning,	   including	  imitation	   and	   internalization	   –	   takes	   part	   of	   the	   mission	   of	   his	   research	  programme	   from	   Vygotsky,	   and	   where	   –	   in	   line	   with	   his	   cognitivist	  psychology	  perspective	  –	  it	  is	  heading:	  as	  Tomasello’s	  programme,	  seeks	  to	  investigate	   this	   “special	   social	   nature”	   presupposed	   in	   imitation	   learning,	  and	  to	  find	  the	  “capacities”	  considered	  to	  be	  developed	  out	  of	  the	  “natural	  or	  biological”	   lines	   which	   make	   this	   “special	   social	   nature”	   and	   cultural	  imitation	  learning	  possible.	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However,	  another	  quotation	  makes	  clear	  that	  Vygotsky	  certainly	  was	  not	  prepared	   to	   cede	   all	   developmental	   agency	   to	   individual	   capacities	   but	  considered	   learning	   and	   social	   interactions	   to	   be	   intertwined	   in	   both	  directions:	  
We propose that an essential feature of learning is that it creates the zone of 
proximal development; that is, learning awakens a variety of internal 
developmental processes that are able to operate only when the child is 
interacting with people in his environment and in cooperation with his 
peers. Once these processes are internalized, they become part of the child's 
independent developmental achievement (Vygotsky, 1978a, p. 90) However	  it	  still	  remains	  unclear,	  how	  infants	  come	  to	  be	  able	  to	   imitate	  and	   learn,	   and	   what	   this	   “specific	   social	   nature”	   necessary	   for	   imitation	  learning	   exactly	   entails.	   Also,	   the	   age	   of	   the	   children	   Vygotsky	   is	   talking	  about	  again	  remains	  open,	  but	  most	  certainly	  he	  is	  speaking	  about	  children	  who	   have	   already	   undergone	   the	   cultural	   transformation	   and	   are	   already	  capable	   of	   language.	   This	   only	  moves	   the	   challenge	   forward	   in	   time:	   how,	  why,	   or	   through	   which	   processes	   does	   the	   convergence	   of	   speech	   and	  practical	   intelligence	   –	   supposedly	   leading	   to	   this	   transformation	   –	   come	  about,	  also	  remain	  unclear.	  In	   “Mastery	   of	   Memory	   and	   Thinking”	   Vygotsky	  makes	   some	   tentative,	  suggestive,	  but	  also,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  translation,	  slightly	  cryptic	  remarks:	  
This means that sign-using activity in children is neither simply invented nor 
passed down by adults; rather it arises from something that is originally not 
a sign operation and becomes one only after a series of qualitative 
transformations. (Vygotsky, 1978a, p. 46) So	  he	  rejects	  the	  notion	  that	  signs/language	  are	  a	  taken-­‐for-­‐granted	  part	  of	   human	   inherent	   “logos/reason”,	  which	   simply	  need	   to	  be	  discovered	   as	  assumed	  by	  some	  earlier	  accounts	  of	  language	  acquisition	  (e.g.	  W.	  Stern),	  as	  well	  as	  the	  idea	  that	  signs	  are	  simply	  and	  directly	  “transferred”	  probably	  by	  instruction	  or	   simple	   copying	   and	  points	   out	   instead	   that	  we	  have	   to	   take	  into	  account	  a	  more	  complex	  process	  of	  “qualitative	  transformations”	  going	  on.	  Again	  leaving	  in	  the	  dark	  how	  these	  transformations	  go	  about.	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If we include this history of higher psychological functions as a factor in 
psychological development, we must arrive at a new concept of development 
itself. Within a general process of development, two qualitatively different 
lines of development, differing in origin, can be distinguished: the 
elementary processes, which are of biological origin, on the one hand, and 
the higher psychological functions, of sociocultural origin, on the other. The 
history of child behavior is born from the interweaving of these two lines. 
The history of the development of the higher psychological functions is 
impossible without a study of their prehistory, their biological roots, and 
their organic disposition. The developmental roots of two fundamental, 
cultural forms of behavior arise during infancy: the use of tools and human 
speech. This alone places infancy at the center of the prehistory of cultural 
development (Vygotsky, 1978a, p. 46). These	  passages	  spark	  some	  suggestive	  ideas,	  but	  again	  leave	  many	  things	  open,	   thus	   opening	   up	   spaces	   and	   potential	   paths	   in	   multiple	   different	  directions.	  	  Tomasello,	  interpreting	  Vygotsky	  from	  a	  cognitivist	  perspective,	  goes	  for	  the	   “biological	   roots”	   and	   “organic	   disposition”,	   and	   investigates	   the	   early	  supposedly	  exclusively	  “natural”	  lines	  of	  development	  looking	  for	  individual	  capacities	   (to	   emerge)	   which	   could	   account	   for	   the	   “convergence	   of	   the	  lines”	   and	   the	   resulting	   cultural	   transformation,	   or	   in	   Tomasello’s	   words	  “revolution”.	   That	   is,	   he	   investigates	   the	   in	   his	   opinion	   overlooked	   aspect,	  what	   capacities	   individuals	   bring	   to	   cultural	   forms	   of	   interaction	   and	  learning.	   In	   contrast,	   cultural	   approaches	   move	   in	   a	   different	   direction,	  seeking	   to	   spell	   out	   other	   parts	   Vygotsky	   himself	  was	   only	   hinting	   at:	   e.g.	  how	   socio-­‐cultural	   interactions	   exactly	   interact	   with	   development,	   or	   in	  more	   general,	   how	   cultural	   processes	   unfold	   in	   a	   culturally	   structured	  environment	   through	   ongoing	   socio-­‐cultural	   interactions.	   	   Some	   of	   them	  (see	   e.g.	   Rodriguez	   and	   Zukow	   below)	   also	   seek	   to	   extend	   these	  investigations	   to	   early	   ages,	   as	   proponents	   of	   these	   approaches	   typically	  relativize	   the	   formulation	   from	   Vygotsky’s	   middle	   period,	   that	   early	  development	  is	  strictly	  “natural”:	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After all, even in children at the very earliest ages mental processes are 
being formed under the influence of verbal social interaction with the adults 
who surround them. Consequently these mental processes are not ‘natural’” 
(Leont'ev and Luria quoted in Wertsch, 1988, p. 44) And	   indeed	   in	   the	   latest	   phase	   of	   his	   work,	   Vygotsky	   –	   as	   laid	   out	   by	  Minick	   (1987)	   –	   apparently	   sought	   to	   understand	   how	   changes	   in	   activity	  practices	  (and	  in	  particular	  social	  practices	  and	  ways	  of	  relating),	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  changes	  in	  thinking,	  how	  –	  from	  the	  beginning	  –	  they	  affect	  each	  other,	  or	  –	  seeking	  to	  overcome	  the	  “personality”-­‐“environment”	  distinction	  altogether	  –	  how	  they	  are	  actually	  two	  (only	  conceptually	  separated)	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  ongoing	  process	  of	  experience	  in	  transformation:	  
“Fundamental to all Vygotsky's work during this period was the notion that 
psychological processes develop in connection with transformations in 
behavior, whether these transformations are the consequence of biological 
maturation […], the internal development of the child's own activity […], or 
the inclusion of the child in new forms of social interaction and social 
practice […]” (Minick, 1987, p. 26) 
The social situation of development, which is specific to each age, strictly 
defines the child's entire mode of life, his social existence... Having clarified 
the social situation of development that forms at the beginning of a given 
age and defines the relationships between the child and the environment, we 
must then clarify how the new formations characteristic of this age 
necessarily arise and develop from the child's life in this social situation” 
(quoted in Minick, 1987, p. 30). 
We have inadequately studied the internal relationship of the child to the 
people around him... We have recognized in words that we need to study the 
child's personality and environment as a unity. It is incorrect, however, to 
represent this problem in such a way that on one side we have the influence 
of personality while on the other we have the influence of the environment. 
Though the problem is frequently represented in precisely this way, it is 
incorrect to represent the two as external forces acting on one another. In 
the attempt to study the unity, the two are initially torn apart. The attempt is 
then made to unite them” (quoted in Minick, 1987, p. 32).  
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“The child's experience is the kind of simple unit of which it is impossible to 
say that it is the influence of the environment on the child or a characteristic 
of the child himself. Experience is a unit of personality and environment as 
they exist in development.... Experience must be understood as the internal 
relationship of the child as an individual to a given aspect of reality” 
(quoted in Minick, 1987, p. 32).  Thus	  Vygotsky	  has	  come	  full	  circle	  in	  his	  vision	  to	  come	  to	  an	  integrative	  understanding	  of	  artificially	  torn	  apart	  “behavior”	  and	  “mind”.	   	  However	  in	  psychology	  researchers	  have	  had	  and	  will	  have	  a	  long	  way	  to	  go	  and	  a	  busy	  time	  to	  put	  such	  a	  vision	  into	  practice	  to	  more	  thoroughly	  understand	  how	  we	   jointly	   create,	   sustain	   and	   transform	   the	   world	   and	   ourselves	   in	  continuous	  inter-­‐/transaction.	  The	  approaches	  discussed	  below	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  efforts	  towards	  such	  a	  vision.	  	  
2.5.2 Moro	  and	  Rodríguez,	  and	  Mureno-­‐Núñez:	  How	  do	   infants	  acquire	  the	  
social/conventional	  meanings	  and	  uses	  of	  objects?	  	  
2.5.2.1 Background,	  interest	  and	  theoretical	  framework	  Standing	   in	   the	   tradition	   of	   Piaget’s	   Geneva	   School	   and	   interested	   in	  materiality,	   semiotics,	   as	   well	   as	   education,	   Moro	   &	   Rodríguez	   seek	   to	  explore	  how	  infants	  come	  to	  master	  the	  conventional	  meanings	  and	  uses	  of	  objects.	  They	   criticize	  developmental	  psychology	   for	   largely	   taking	  objects	  for	   granted,	   that	   is,	   for	   considering	   object	   meaning	   as	   self-­‐evident	  (“natural”):	   Infants	   are	   considered	   to	   interact	   with	   objects	   from	   early	   on	  merely	  as	  part	  of	   their	  physical	  world,	  and	  supposedly	   learn	  about	  objects	  mostly	   spontaneously	   through	   interaction	   with	   them,	   where	   the	   object	  discloses	  its	  meaning	  by	  affording	  one	  or	  another	  action	  (Gibson).	  	  Instead	   Moro	   and	   Rodríguez	   insist	   that	   objects	   are	   by	   no	   means	  “obvious”,	  but	  are	  on	  the	  contrary	  “opaque”,	  that	  their	  meaning	  and	  function	  are	  not	  directly	  visible	   -­‐	   “objects	  do	  not	  say	  what	  they	  are,	  or	  what	  they	  are	  
for”	   (now	   countering	   Gibson)	   -­‐	   that	   “besides	   having	   physical	   properties	  
objects	  also	  have	  [opaque]	  functional	  properties	  of	  use”	  which	  are	  subject	  to	  social	  convention,	  that	  is,	  they	  are	  part	  of	  culture.	  Consequently,	   infants	  do	  not	  spontaneously	  start	  to	  appropriate	  the	  canonical	  uses	  of	  objects,	  rather	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these	  canonical	  uses,	  as	  Moro	  and	  Rodríguez	  put	  it:	  “need	  to	  be	  mediated	  by	  
additional	   ‘signs’”	   and	   infants	   need	   adults	   as	   guides	   to	   “provide	   them	  with	  
semiotic	  mediators”	  (Rodríguez,	  2007).	  	  Whereas,	   in	  the	  case	  of	   language,	   it	  was	  established	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  pragmatic	   turn	   that	   understanding	   the	   meaning	   of	   a	   word	   is	   rooted	   in	  understanding	   its	   use	   and	   function	   in	   interaction	   (Wittgenstein,	   Austin,	  Bruner)	   –	   initiating	   a	   whole	   field	   of	   research	   to	   figure	   out	   how	   this	   is	  achieved	  by	  young	  infants	  (see	  e.g.	  Bates,	  Sugarman,	  Adamson	  section	  2.2.2-­‐3,	   and	  2.3.2)	   –	  Rodríguez	   (2007)	  wonders	  why	   this	   has	  not	   been	   the	   case	  with	   the	   “meaning”	   of	   objects	   with	   regard	   to	   their	   conventional	   uses	   in	  interaction.	  They	   point	   out	   that	   even	   Vygotsky,	   who	   famously	   stressed	   the	  importance	  of	   cultural	  mediation,	   came	   to	  neglect	   the	   role	  of	   conventional	  object	  meaning	  before	  language.	  According	  to	  his	  framework,	  infants,	  when	  interacting	  with	   objects,	   first	   exercise	   their	   “natural”	   practical	   intelligence	  (shared	  with	   our	   ape	   relatives),	  which	   only	   after	   the	   onset	   of	   language	   is	  finally	  reorganized	  and	  transformed	  into	  its	  uniquely	  human	  cultural	  forms	  (again	  refining	  what	  was	  at	  the	  time	  counted	  into	  the	  human	  logos-­‐culture-­‐complex).	   Thus	   –	   according	   to	  Vygotsky	   –	   all	   object	   interactions	   based	   on	  practical	   intelligence	   prior	   to	   their	   reorganisation	   through	   language	   are	  explicitly	   not	   part	   of	   culture	   (Moro	   &	   Rodríguez,	   2004;	   Rodríguez,	   2007;	  Moro,	  2011).	  However,	  despite	   this	  distinction	  between	  early	  physical	   tool	  and	  later	  cultural	  sign,	  Vygotsky’s	  analysis	  of	   the	  sign	  and	  how	  it	  mediates	  cognition	   in	  principle	  opened	  up	  a	  pathway	  to	  perform	  a	  semiotic	  analysis	  for	  earlier,	  preverbal	  processes	  as	  well	  (Moro,	  2011).	  	  Now	  Moro	  &	   Rodríguez	  moved	   one	   further	   step	   and	   responded	   to	   and	  refined	  Vygotsky’s	   framework	   by	   in	   effect	   separating	   “conventional	   object	  meaning	  and	  use”	  from	  the	  logos-­‐language-­‐culture	  complex,	  suggesting	  that	  language	   already	   rests	   on	   a	   network	   of	   these	   conventionally	   and	   hence	  culturally	  established	  object	  meanings	  and	  practices	  broader	  than	  language	  and	   occurring	   prior	   (and	   hence	   transforming	   thinking	   already	   prior)	   to	  language.	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Assuming	   that	   objects	   are	   indeed	   opaque	   and	   given	   that	   the	   child	  “towards	   the	  end	  of	   the	   first	  year	   [and	   prior	   to	   language]	   […]	  begins	   to	  use	  
objects	   according	   to	   their	   social	   and	   conventional	   everyday-­‐life	   functions.”	  (261),	   the	   question	   arises	   how	   infants	   acquire	   these	   meanings	   prior	   to	  language	  or	  in	  Rodríguez’	  terms:	  “At	  what	  point	  and	  through	  which	  semiotic	  
processes	   do	   objects	   become	   signs	   of	   their	   conventional	   use?”	   (Rodríguez,	  2007).	  They	   criticise	   existing	   research	   on	   triadic	   interactions	   (Trevarthen	   &	  Hubley,	  Bates,	  Tomasello)	   for	  only	   telling	  part	  of	   the	  story	  when	   focussing	  on	   triadic	   interactions	   from	   9	   months	   when	   infants	   are	   already	  communicating	  “intentionally”,	  missing	  out	  on	  previous	  triadic	  interactions	  (from	  which	   the	   later	   ones,	   so	   Rodríguez,	   “necessarily	   emerge”).	  Whereas	  Tomasello	  et	  al.	  consider	  such	  earlier	  interactions	  as	  “dyadic”,	  the	  caregivers	  actually	   establish	   and	   sustain	   triadicity	   in	   didactic	   interactions,	   as	  well	   as	  demonstrate	  object	  use	  from	  early	  on;	  this	  key	  role	  of	  the	  adult	  as	  guide	  is	  absent	  from	  standard	  accounts	  of	  early	  development.	  
We seem to forget that, from the moment children are born, adults use 
objects in their daily chores, in a space of public and everyday uses children 
continuously attend to and participate in these “performances” well before 
they themselves are able to perform the first conventional uses of objects. 
(Rodríguez, 2007) Moro’s	  and	  Rodríguez’	   conception	  of	   triadicity	   thus	  differs	   considerably	  from	   the	   more	   cognitive	   approaches:	   The	   latter	   focus	   on	   the	   infant’s	  individual	  capacities	  and	  accordingly	  define	  triadicity	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  infant’s	  actions,	  requiring	  an	  active	  “co-­‐ordination	  between	  people	  and	  objects”	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  infant	  for	  an	  interaction	  to	  be	  counted	  as	  triadic.	  It	  has	  to	  be	  pointed	   out,	   however,	   that	   the	   exact	   nature	   of	   this	   co-­‐ordination	   despite	  extensive	   treatises	   ultimately	   remains	   unclear	   and	   hence	   the	   criteria	   for	  attributing	   active	   coordination	   to	   infants	   remain	   theoretically	   under-­‐specified	   –	   while,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   for	   practical	   purposes	   infant	   triadic	  engagement	   is	   typically	   operationalized	   in	   terms	   of	   infant-­‐initiated,	  (uncued)	   gaze	   alternation,	   hence	   being	   methodologically	   over-­‐specified,	  focusing	   on	   the	   singular	   aspect	   of	   gaze	   alternation	   which	   is	   neither	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necessary	   nor	   sufficient	   for	   defining	   joint	   attention	   or	   co-­‐ordinated	  engagement;	  as	  gaze	  alternations	  by	  themselves	  do	  not	  necessarily	  indicate	  joint	  attention/co-­‐ordinated	  engagement	  and	  there	  may	  be	  episodes	  of	  co-­‐ordinated	  engagement/joint	  attention	  utilizing	  other	  modalities	  apart	  from	  gaze	  (Carpenter	  et	  al.,	  1998;	  see	  section	  2.8:	  conclusions	  and	  outlook).	  In	  contrast,	  Moro	  and	  Rodríguez	  use	  “triadic”	  in	  a	  much	  broader	  sense:	  1)	  they	   explicitly	   include	   interactions	   in	  which	   it	   is	   exclusively	   the	   caregiver	  who	   actively	   establishes	   and	   sustains	   triadicity,	   and	   indeed	   criticise	  cognitive	  approaches	  for	  “missing”	  these	  kind	  of	  triadic	  interactions,	  which	  they	   claim	   to	   be	   particularly	   crucial	   as	   a	   necessary	   foundation	   for	   later	  (infant-­‐initiated)	   triadic	   interactions.	   (It	   has	   to	   be	   noted,	   though,	   that	   the	  criticized	  cognitive	  approaches	  are	  by	  no	  means	  unaware	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  these	   caregiver-­‐led	   interactions,	   rather	   they	   go	   to	   great	   lengths	   to	  operationally	  distinguish	  and	  explicitly	  exclude	  all	   interactions	  which	  don’t	  allow	  to	  deduce	  the	  infant’s	  capacities	  clearly12).	  In	   keeping	   with	   the	   cultural	   tradition	   taking	   into	   account	   and	   starting	  their	   investigation	   from	   the	   material	   aspects	   and	   situatedness	   of	   the	  interaction,	  Moro	  and	  Rodríguez	  2)	  use	  “triadic”	  to	  characterize	  interactions	  whenever	   infant-­‐caregiver	   and	   object	   are	   present,	   and	   they	   3)	   –	   drawing	  from	   Vygotsky	   and	   semiotics	   –	   even	   speak	   of	   “a	   triadic	   perspective”	   that	  researchers	  may	   adopt:	   “From	  a	   triadic	  perspective,	   the	  role	  of	   the	  adult	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  e.g.	   Tomasello	   (Tomasello	   et	   al.,	   1993)	   painstakingly	   carving	   out	   by	  thought	   experiment	   “true”	   joint	   attention,	   ruling	   out	   a	   range	   of	   situations	  where	   a	   shared	   visual	   focus	   is	   present,	   but	  which	   do	   not	   allow	   to	   clearly	  infer	   the	   infant’s	   awareness	   of	   this	   shared	   focus;	   Adamson	   and	   Bakeman	  (1984)	  differentiating	   “passive	   joint	   engagement”	   from	   “co-­‐ordinated	   joint	  engagement”	   thus	   explicitly	   introducing	   a	   “not-­‐yet-­‐proper-­‐joint-­‐engagement”	   category.	   These	   examples	   do	   not	   illustrate	   an	   oversight	   on	  their	  part	  but	  their	  different	  focus	  and	  evaluation	  of	  the	  situation.	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guide	  in	  providing	  the	  child	  with	  the	  semiotic	  mediators,	  which	  allow	  him/her	  
to	  incorporate	  increasingly	  complex	  levels	  of	  meaning.”	  With	  this	  move	  they	  interestingly	  transfer	  the	  concept	  “triadic”	  from	  the	  level	   of	   phenomena	   to	   the	   level	   of	   observation	   and	   linking	   it	   to	   semiotics:	  conceiving	   of	   [any?]	   interaction	   as	   involving	   three	   poles	   and	   taking	   into	  account	  all	   three	  poles	   in	  analysis:	   the	  participants,	   in	   this	   case	   infant	  and	  caregiver	   and	   a	   third	   pole	   –	   the	   latter	   may	   include	   any	   “meaning”	   or	  anything	  which	  serves	  as	  a	  “semiotic	  mediator”,	  be	  it	  a	  gesture	  or	  an	  object.	  	  From	  this	  perspective	  –	  taking	  up	  Vygotsky	  –	  essentially	  all	  “construction	  of	  knowledge”	  (echoes	  of	  Piaget),	  which	  is	  what	  they	  seek	  to	  understand,	  is	  necessarily	  triangular	  (extending	  Piaget	  with	  Vygotsky	  and	  Peirce):	  
The construction of knowledge is triangular. This means the child holds an 
indirect relation with his environment, one that is, instead, mediated 
through the semiotic systems adults produce. The unit of analysis for the 
construction of human psychological processes has to be triadic. In other 
words, without communication and education, cognitive development simply 
does not – could not – take place.” (Rodríguez, 2007) With	  this	  agenda,	  Moro	  &	  Rodríguez	  seek	  to	  extend	  Vygotsky	  and	  Bruner	  by	   looking	   at	   earlier	   object	   interactions,	   rather	   than	   later	   ones	   based	   on	  language,	   and	   to	   extend	   existing	   research	   on	   triads	   again	   by	   starting	   at	  earlier	   ages	   and	   emphasising	   in	   particular	   the	   adult’s	   role	   as	   a	   guide.	   To	  extend	  the	  theoretical	   framework,	   they	  draw	  on	  Peirce’s	  semiotics,	  as	   it	  1)	  provides	  a	  theory	  of	  meaning	  broader	  than	  language	  and	  is	  hence	  suited	  for	  looking	   at	   pre-­‐verbal	   infants,	   2)	   is	   not	   restricted	   to	   “intentional	  communication”	  as	  meaning	   is	  defined	  by	   its	  effect	  and	   interpretation	  (the	  interpretant)	  rather	  than	  by	  the	  speaker’s	  intent,	  and	  3)	  is	  dynamic,	  that	  is,	  meaning	  changes	  in	  an	  ongoing	  process	  of	  semiosis.	  
2.5.2.2 Empirical	  study	  For	   the	   empirical	   part	   they	   conducted	   a	   qualitative	   longitudinal	   study,	  visiting	  6	  infants	  (3	  male,	  3	  female)	  at	  home	  at	  7,	  10	  and	  13	  months	  of	  age	  (starting	   when	   infants	   already	   handle	   objects	   and	   ending	   just	   before	  speech),	  and	  each	  time	  videotaped	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  play	  with	  2	   toys	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(5	   min	   each)	   provided	   by	   the	   researchers:	   a	   toy	   phone	   (which	   suggests	  acting	   in	   an	   symbolic	   space)	   and	   a	   truck	   with	   blocks	   to	   insert	   (which	  suggests	  manipulating	  blocks	  in	  a	  canonical	  way),	  instructing	  the	  caregivers	  to	  	  “play	  with	  your	  child	  as	  you	  usually	  do”.	  In	   order	   to	   gain	   insight	   into	   “processes	   of	   construction	   rather	   than	  results”,	   they	   performed	   a	   microgenetic	   analysis	   aiming	   to	   focus	   on	   “all	  parts	  of	  the	  triad”,	  asking	  how	  the	  use	  of	  objects	  (whether	  non-­‐canonical	  or	  canonical	   use)	   and	   the	   communication	   about	   objects	   change,	   and	   in	  particular,	   how	   signs	   (ostension	   (showing),	   indexical	   pointing	   (distal,	  immediate,	  multiple),	  demonstrations	  (distal	  or	  immediate),	  verbalisations)	  are	  used	  in	  the	  process	  (Moro	  &	  Rodríguez,	  2004).	  	  
2.5.2.3 Results	  Moro	   and	   Rodríguez	   report	   a	   gradual	   socially	   guided	   development	   for	  infant’s	   appropriation	   of	   social	   (canonical	   and	   symbolic)	   uses	   of	   objects:	  before	   9/10	   months	   infants	   spontaneously	   performed	   only	   non-­‐canonical	  uses	   such	   as	   sucking	   or	   banging.	   Adults	   produced	   a	   lot	   signs,	   including	  ostensive	   gestures	   	   (showing	   and	   giving,	   e.g.	   shaking	   a	   noise-­‐producing	  hoop),	   demonstrations	   of	   canonical	   uses,	   immediate	   ones	   (putting	   the	  receiver	  to	  the	  infant’s	  ear	  and	  saying	  “hello”),	  distant	  ones	  (putting	  a	  hoop	  around	  a	  stack,	  inserting	  a	  block	  into	  the	  truck,	  saying	  “Hello”	  on	  the	  phone)	  and	   conventional	   indexical	   pointing	   as	   well	   as	   verbalisations.	   These	  demonstrations	  often	  prompted	  infants	  to	  engage	  with	  objects,	  albeit	  more	  complex	  signs	  like	  complete	  demonstrations	  or	  conventional	  pointing	  were	  in	   the	   beginning	   only	   understood	   ostensively,	   resulting	   mostly	   in	   infants	  focusing	   on	   and	   engaging	   with	   the	   objects,	   but	   in	   their	   own	   mostly	   non-­‐canonical	  way.	  However,	   it	  was	   following	  demonstrations	   that	   infants	   first	  performed	  (to	  some	  extent)	  canonical	  object	  uses	  whose	  meaning	  they	  claim	  was	  thus	  agreed	  between	  infant	  and	  adult.	  Those	  first	  canonical	  uses	  were	  single	  holistic	  acts	  (e.g.,	  receiving	  a	  noise-­‐producing	  hoop	  and	  shaking	  it,	  or	  when	  the	  receiver	  is	  held	  to	  the	  infant’s	  ear	  by	  the	  adult,	  adopting	  an	  upright	  “phoning”	   posture),	   slightly	   more	   complex	   ones	   at	   10	   months	   (putting	   a	  receiver	  to	  one’s	  ear),	  and	  it	  was	  only	  later	  (13	  m)	  that	  sequences	  of	  object-­‐object	   relative	  movements	   (e.g.	   inserting	   blocks	   into	   truck	   or	   dialling	   and	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phoning)	  were	  performed	  (Moro	  &	  Rodríguez,	  2004;	  Rodríguez,	  2007;	  Moro,	  2011).	  	  Looking	   at	   infants’	   actions	   in	   terms	  of	   interpretation	   and	  production	  of	  signs,	  the	  phone	  example	  illustrates	  how	  they	  move	  from	  iconic	  to	  indexical:	  the	  action	  of	  “adopting	  an	  upright	  position	  when	  holding	  a	  receiver	  to	  one’s	  ear”	   moves	   from	   functioning	   as	   an	   icon	   as	   the	   mother	   repeatedly	  demonstrated	  it	  (referring	  to	  itself	  by	  virtue	  of	  similarity)	  to	  functioning	  as	  an	   index	   as	   the	   infant	   accepts	   the	   receiver	   held	   to	   his	   ear	   and	   adopts	   an	  upright	   “phoning”	   position,	   thus	   having	   established	   a	   connection	   between	  the	  action	  and	  the	  receiver:	   if	  receiver:	  put	  it	  to	  the	  ear	  and	  adopt	  a	  phoning	  
position.	   Similarly	   a	   little	   later	   in	   the	   infant’s	   own	   actions:	   as	   the	   receiver	  accidentally	   ended	   up	   next	   to	   the	   infant’s	   ear	   during	   play,	   the	   infant’s	  vocalisation	   “euu”	   suggested	   an	   iconic	   recognition	   of	   his	   earlier	   similar	  experience	  and	  a	  little	  later,	  as	  the	  boy	  completes	  the	  action	  by	  adopting	  an	  upright	   “phoning”	   position,	   the	   just	   before	   iconically	   recognised	   action	   of	  holding	   the	   receiver	   to	   ones	   ear	   can	   now	   be	   seen	   as	   functioning/being	  interpreted	   as	   an	   index	   pointing	   to	   the	   [rest]	   of	   the	   “phoning”	   action.	  Already	   realising	   aspects	   of	   the	   canonical	   use	   without,	   however,	   being	  aware	  of	  it	  (Moro,	  2011).	  	  	  This	   example	   also	   demonstrates	   how	   actions	   first	   encountered	   in	  situations	   led	   by	   the	   caregiver	   later	   on	   show	   up	   in	   infants’	   spontaneous	  behaviour.	   Taking	   up	   this	   Vygotskyan	   theme,	   Rodríguez	   also	   reports	   how	  gestural	  signs	  first	  used	  by	  adults	  to	  guide	  infants	  were	  later	  on	  adopted	  by	  the	   infants	   as	   “private	   gestures”	   regulating	   their	   own	   behaviour	   in	   a	  longitudinal	  study	  focussing	  on	  a	  girl	  with	  Down	  Syndrome:	  the	  girl,	  who	  at	  12	   months	   only	   was	   able	   to	   put	   hoops	   around	   a	   pivot	   after	   adult’s	  exaggerated	   ostensions,	   repeated	   pointing,	   and	   demonstrations,	   by	   18	  months	   used	   such	   ostensive	   and	   pointing	   gestures	   as	   private	   gestures	   to	  herself	   to	   guide	   herself	   towards	   the	   conventional	   use	   of	   the	   object	  (Rodríguez,	  2007;	  Rodríguez	  &	  Palacios,	  2007)	  Extending	   their	   observations	   to	   earlier	   ages,	   Ana	  Mureno-­‐Núñez	   in	   her	  doctoral	   research	   (2014)	   performed	   further	   longitudinal	   studies	   visiting	  typically	  developing	   infants	   and	   their	   caregivers	   at	   their	  homes,	   recording	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video	   of	   object	   play	   sessions,	   again	   instructing	   the	   parents	   to	   “play	   with	  your	  child	  as	  you	  normally	  would”:	  1)	  3	  infants	  at	  2,	  4,	  6	  months	  of	  age	  were	  recorded	   engaging	   in	   5-­‐minute	   play	   sessions	   with	   a	   stacking	   cone	   with	  sonorous	  and	  non-­‐sonorous	  rings”.	  2)	  6	  infants	  at	  2,	  3,	  and	  4	  months	  of	  age	  with	   the	   same	  procedure	   but	  with	   a	   different	   object:	   a	   rattle	   (maraca).	   3)	  Infants	   at	   9,	   11,	   and	   13	   months	   for	   10-­‐minute	   play	   sessions	   each	   with	   8	  different	  (sets	  of)	  toys	  (Moreno-­‐Núñez,	  2014;	  Moreno-­‐Núñez,	  Rodríguez,	  &	  Del	  Olmo,	  2015).	  A	  main	  focus	  of	  the	  analysis	  was	  again	  on	  the	  adults’	  actions:	  object	  uses	  and	  sign	  acts,	  although	  the	  infants’	  actions	  were	  coded	  as	  well.	  She	  reports	  that	   caregivers	   interacting	   with	   these	   young	   children	   rather	   than	  performing	  complex	  demonstrations	  of	  canonical	  uses	  (stacking	  hoops	  on	  a	  stacking	   pole),	   or	   engaging	   in	   conventional	   pointing	   actions,	   preferred	  ostensive	  uses	   (showing,	   giving),	   in	  particular	  making	  use	  of	   the	   sonorous	  rings,	  rhythmically	  shaking	  them	  to	  capture	  the	  infants’	  attention.	  The	  older	  infants	   (study	  3)	  engaged	   in	  a	  host	  of	   communicative	  gestures,	  but	  mainly	  with	  objects	  themselves	  –	  (self-­‐)ostensive	  as	  well	  as	  giving	  and	  taking	  –	  and,	  to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	   engaged	   in	   pointing,	   they	   mainly	   used	   proximal	  gestures	   (“touch-­‐pointing”)	   rather	   than	   the	   distal	   type	   of	   pointing	  emphasized	   in	   the	  cognitive	   literature	   (e.g.	  by	  Tomasello).	  Taken	   together,	  her	   research	   underlines	   the	   importance	   of	   ostensive	   actions	   in	   particular	  and	  communicative	  object	  actions	  in	  general,	  pointing	  to	  the	  role	  of	  objects	  as	  means	  rather	   than	  merely	  as	   targets	  of	  communication	  (Moreno-­‐Núñez,	  2014;	  Rodríguez,	  Moreno-­‐Núñez,	  Basilio,	  &	  Sosa,	  2015).	  
2.5.3 Patricia	  Zukow-­‐Goldring:	  Educating	  attention	  and	  assisted	  imitation.	  
2.5.3.1 Background,	  interest,	  theoretical	  framework	  Patricia	  Zukow-­‐Goldring	  has	  been	  interested	  in,	  and	  conducted	  research	  on,	  how	  infants	  become	  adept	  members	  of	  a	  culture,	   “how	  they	  learn	  what	  
everyone	   else	   already	   knows”	   (Zukow-­‐Goldring,	   2012),	   how	   they	   learn	   to	  participate	   in	   cultural	   activities,	   and,	   in	   particular,	   how	   they	   master	  language	   (how	   they	   understand	   the	   word-­‐world	   fit),	   where	   the	   former	   is	  also	   seen	   as	   the	   foundation	   for	   the	   latter,	   as	   also	   illustrated	   by	   her	   SEED	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(Situated,	   culturally	   Embodied,	   Emergent	   and	   Distributed)	   model	   of	  language.	  Her	  studies	  investigate	  and	  document	  cross-­‐culturally	  “how	  more	  skilled	  members	  of	  a	  culture,	  older	  siblings	  and	  adults,	  assist	  infant–novices	  to	   notice,	   participate	   in,	   and	   finally	   communicate	   about	   ongoing	   events”	  (Zukow-­‐Goldring,	  2012)	  through	  the	  processes	  of	  “educating	  attention”	  and	  “assisted	  imitation”	  (Zukow-­‐Goldring,	  1997,	  2006,	  2012).	  Looking	  for	  a	  way	  to	  address	  her	  questions,	  the	  existing	  approaches	  did	  not	  quite	  seem	  to	  be	  sufficient:	  
Cognitive theories concentrate on autonomous mental mechanisms 
untouched by direct contact with ongoing events to explain the growing 
abilities of children (they examine what children put in their head), whereas 
ecological [cultural] approaches emphasise that the social world guides 
development (elaborate the active where). Neither tells us the particulars of 
how children make sense, and thus learn, from the details of actual events. 
(Zukow-Goldring, 1997, p. 203, 2 paragraphs merged). Therefore	   Zukow-­‐Goldring	   combines	   aspects	   from	   multiple	   different	  approaches,	   each	   contributing	   one	   crucial	   piece	   to	   a	   possible	   working	  methodology	   to	   tackle	   this	   question:	   1)	   Linguistic	   anthropology	   and	  ethnomethodology	  take	  a	  detailed	  look	  at	  how	  (mostly	  language	  competent	  adult)	  members	  of	  a	  culture	  negotiate	  meaning	  in	  the	  unfolding	  interactions	  of	   daily	   life,	   ”continuously	   embodying	   their	   verbal	   messages	   by	   making	  them	  visible	  to	  one	  another	  in	  a	  seamless	  ensemble	  of	  spectacle	  and	  talk”	  in	  order	   to	   reach	   a	   working	   “consensus	   for	   all	   practical	   purposes”	   (Zukow-­‐Goldring,	   1997).	   These	   approaches,	   however,	   do	   not	   specify	   how	   exactly	  perceiving	  and	  acting	  create	  knowledge	  and	  thus	  inform	  action	  to	  negotiate	  meaning	   and	   act	   together,	   in	   particular	   across	   a	   discrepancy	   between	   the	  knowledge	  and	  communicative	  competences	  of	  novice-­‐infant	  and	  proficient	  adult.	  2)	  Vygotsky	  and	  sociocultural	  approaches	   in	  general	  emphasise	  the	  role	  of	   proficient	  members	   of	   a	   culture	   in	   guiding	   the	   infant-­‐novice	   to	   achieve	  cultural	   competence.	   Vygotsky	   even	   constructed	   a	   rich	   theoretical	  framework,	  stating	  that	  new	  competences	  and	  knowledge	  first	  “arise	  for	  the	  child	  within	  social	  interaction”	  –	  along	  a	  constantly	  moving	  zone	  of	  proximal	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development,	   just	   beyond	  what	   the	   infant	   could	   hitherto	   do	   on	   his	   own	   –	  and	   “only	   later	   appear	   as	   an	   individual	   achievement”	   (Zukow-­‐Goldring,	  1997).	  	  Still,	  they	  again	  are	  lacking	  in	  details	  how	  exactly	  this	  is	  achieved	  by	  caregivers	  and	  (in	  particular	  pre-­‐verbal)	  infants	  (compare	  section	  2.5.1).	  3)	   In	   contrast,	   Ecological	   Psychology,	   (J.J.	   &	   E.	   Gibson)	   finally	   details	   a)	  how	  organisms	  through	  interaction	  with	  the	  (physical)	  environment	  detect	  the	   perceptual	   structure	   that	   specifies	   what	   the	   world	   affords	   for	   action	  (depending	   on	   their	   respective	   phylogenetic	   and	   ontogenetic	   history),	  guiding	  them	  what	  to	  do,	  and	  b)	  how	  experience,	  as	  we	  continuously	  move	  through	  perception-­‐action	   loops	   “educates	  attention”,	   increasingly	   refining	  affordances	   and	   effectivities.	   	   	   The	   effect	   of	   the	   social	   world	   on	   these	  processes,	  however,	  is	  “conspicuously	  absent”	  (Zukow-­‐Goldring,	  1997).	  	  Integrating	   these	   approaches	   into	   what	   she	   calls	   “social	   ecological	  realism”	   –	   Zukow	   seeks	   to	   investigate	   1)	   how	   caregivers	   and	   infants	   in	  everyday	   interactions	   negotiate	   meaning	   and	   “practical	   consensus”	   by	  educating	  each	  other’s	  attention	  to	  perceive	  a	  common	  ground	  for	  action	  in	  everyday	   activities	   across	   the	   knowledge	   and	   capacity	   gap	   between	   them,	  and,	  in	  particular,	  2)	  how	  this	  gap	  is	  bridged:	  “how	  more	  skilled	  members	  of	  a	  
culture,	  older	  siblings	  and	  adults,	  assist	  infant–novices	  to	  notice,	  participate	  in,	  
and	   finally	   communicate	   about	   ongoing	   events”	   (Zukow-­‐Goldring,	   2012)	  through	   the	  processes	  of	   “educating	   attention”	   and	   “assisted	   imitation”.	   In	  turn,	   3)	   how	   this	   is	   achieved	   through	   caregivers	   “making	   prominent	  culturally	   relevant	   possibilities	   of	   perceiving	   and	   acting”,	   making	   visible	  previously	   unnoticed	   affordances	   (possibilities	   for	   action)	   in	   the	  environment	   and	   their	   dynamically-­‐coupled	   relation	   to	   the	   infants’	   own	  bodily	  abilities	  (effectivities)	  (Zukow-­‐Goldring,	  1997)	  
2.5.3.2 Empirical	  study	  As	   an	   empirical	   basis	   for	   pursuing	   these	   questions,	   Zukow-­‐Goldring	  conducted	  a	  cross-­‐cultural	  naturalistic	  longitudinal	  study	  visiting	  12	  infants	  -­‐	  from	  6	  European	  American	  middle-­‐class	  families	  and	  6	  Latino	  low-­‐income	  families	  -­‐	  from	  6	  to	  30	  months	  of	  age,	  using	  video	  recordings,	  field	  notes	  and	  diary	  entries	  for	  data	  collection.	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Engaging	  in	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  analysis,	  she	  investigates	  the	  role	  of	   educating	   attention	   and	   creating	   invariances	   across	   modalities	   in	   the	  acquisition	   of	   the	   lexicon,	   thus	   moving	   beyond	   (standard)	   labelling-­‐by-­‐association	   accounts	   of	   word	   learning	   and	   their	   inherent	   ambiguity	  problems,	  how	  to	  know	  which	  aspect	  of	  a	  situation	  a	  word	  stands	  for	  (often,	  but	   as	   Zukow	   shows,	   inappropriately,	   associated	   with	   Quine’s	  indeterminacy	  of	  reference:	  “gavagai”)	  (Zukow-­‐Goldring,	  1997).	  Beyond	   her	   focus	   on	   lexicon	   acquisition,	   Zukow-­‐Goldring	   also	  investigates	   more	   generally	   how	   children	   come	   to	   participate	   in	   and	  gradually	   master	   specific	   cultural	   activities	   being	   guided	   step	   by	   step	   by	  parents	   and	   siblings	   -­‐	   more	   skilled	   members	   of	   the	   culture	   –	   through	  “assisted	   imitation”	   and	   “cultural	   embodiment”,	   continuously	   refining	  affordances	  and	  effectivities.	  (Zukow-­‐Goldring,	  2006,	  2012)	  
2.5.3.3 Results	  1:	  Educating	  Attention	  in	  lexicon	  acquisition	  Qualitatively	   analysing	   example	   situations,	   she	   specifies	   how	   exactly	  caregivers	  gather	  and	  then	  “direct	  attention	  to	  one	  specific	  element,	  relation	  
or	   event,	   over	   the	  multitude	   of	   other	   possibilities	   present	   in	   a	   specific	   place	  
and	  time”,	  using	  multiple	  modalities	  and	  creating	  invariances	  across	  them	  so	  the	   infant	  can	  ”detect	   invariance	  within	  a	  unitary	  whole”	  and	  “equivalence	  across	  dissimilars”.	  For	  example,	  a	  caregiver	  shakes	  an	  open	  bottle	  of	  sweet	  smelling	  vitamins:	  
 “When she says and does “shakey = sha::key = SHA:::KEY!, she 
coordinates in action, vision, odor, and sound the target of attention, 
cultivating perceptual pickup of amodal invariant relations through tempo, 
rhythmicity, synchronous initiation-termination, accelerating intensity, and 
so on.” (Zukow-Goldring, 1997) She	   develops	   an	   “ethnography	   of	   attention	   directing”,	   differentiating	  different	  ways	   and	   targets	   of	   directing	   attention,	   pointing	   out	   affordances	  and	  effectivities	  to	  the	  infants:	  
In act-ons caregivers put infants through the motions of some activity 
(caregivers pull infants up as they say up); In shows caregivers control the 
infant’s line of sight with a translational movement in which they loom-
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magnify an object toward the infants (saying ribbit while looming a frog) in 
demonstrations infants who are monitoring their caregivers must detect or 
pick up in the perceptual flow the action to be repeated o completed (saying 
hi when catching gaze, smiling, and greeting) of infants may be invited to 
see-feel-say the texture of bristles in a broom while caregivers say stick; 
finally in points infants must detect the intersection as a gesture’s trajectory 
through space to the place where it intersects with some target of attention 
(caregivers pointing to and saying over there) (Zukow-Goldring, 1997 
emphasis mine) Quantitative	  measure	  of	  occurrences	  showed	  the	  way	  of	  guiding	  attention	  and	  the	  target	  attention	  is	  guided	  to	  (and	  its	  complexity)	  changed	  over	  time:	  the	   semantic	   complexity	   of	   the	   target	   increased	   in	   both	   US	   and	   Latino	  families	   (in	   the	   beginning,	   simple	   non-­‐dynamic	   objects,	   initially	   dominant,	  decrease	   in	   comparison	   to	   actions,	   complex	   relations,	   and	   events.	   Specific	  ways	   of	   guiding	   attention	   correlated	   with	   specific	   targets:	   shows	   were	  mainly	   used	   for	   non-­‐dynamic	   objects	   and	   animate	   beings	   (supposedly	  helping	  the	  infant	  to	  link	  words/sounds	  to	  structural	  invariances),	  while	  for	  actions,	   act-­‐ons	   and	   demonstrations	   were	   used	   preferentially	   (displaying	  transformational	   invariances	   potentially	   linking	   words	   to	   action	  affordances).	   In	  general,	   “what	   caregivers	   communicate	   foreshadows	  what	  infants	  express	  several	  months	  later”.	  (Zukow-­‐Goldring,	  1997)	  
2.5.3.4 Results	   2:	   Learning	   to	   participate	   in	   cultural	   activities	   through	  
assisted	  imitation	  and	  cultural	  embodiment	  Beyond	   her	   focus	   on	   lexicon	   acquisition,	   Zukow-­‐Goldring	   also	  investigates	  more	  generally	  how	  children	  come	  to	  participate	  in	  and	  master	  specific	   cultural	   activities.	   She	   reports	   from	   cross-­‐cultural	   analysis	   that	  children’s	  learning	  and	  mastery	  of	  cultural	  activities	  –	  be	  it	  pulling	  the	  string	  of	   a	   vibrating	  music	   box,	   peeling	   an	   orange,	   or	   kicking	   a	   football	   –	   do	  not	  usually	  occur	  by	  children	  spontaneously	  copying	  complex	  actions	  they	  have	  observed	  from	  a	  distance,	  as	  e.g.	  suggested	  by	  approaches	  like	  Tomasello’s.	  Indeed,	   such	   “spontaneous	   imitations”	  occurred	   in	   less	   than	  10%	  of	   cases,	  with	   the	   remaining	   90+%	   of	   imitations	   being	   examples	   of	   “assisted	  imitation”.	  Infants	  were	  guided	  through	  a	  longer	  process	  of	  interaction	  and	  
	   126	  
dialogue	  with	  (more)	  proficient	  members	  of	  the	  culture,	  as	  parents	  again	  set	  up	  scaffolded	  situations,	  demonstrated	  and	  invited	  infants	  into	  actions,	  and	  “culturally	   embodied”	   the	   activity	   by	   putting	   infants	   through	   the	  motions	  including	  acting	  on	  the	  infant’s	  body,	  continuously	  refining	  affordances	  and	  effectivities.	  (Zukow-­‐Goldring,	  2006,	  2012).	  A	   particularly	   striking	   example	   illustrates	   how	   the	   cultural	   activity	   of	  “playing	  soccer”	  was	  “culturally	  embodied”,	  assisting	  the	  child	  in	  an	  ongoing	  process	   of	   guiding	   attention	   by	   his	   mother	   and	   family	   members	  continuously	   refining	   affordances	   and	   effectivities,	   to	   develop	   from	   soccer	  novice	  to	  expert	  in	  the	  short	  time	  span	  from	  6	  months	  to	  3	  years:	  1)	  At	  six	  months,	  a	  soccer	  ball	  was	  repeatedly	  shown	  and	  loomed	  towards	  the	  boy,	  as	  well	  as	  thrown	  to	  family	  members,	  accompanied	  by	  “going	  up!”,	  carving	  out	  the	  ball	  as	  a	  relatively	  stable	  noticeable	  pattern.	  2)	  At	  8	  months,	  the	  infant	  was	  gently	  swung	  like	  a	  pendulum	  –	  stiffening	  his	  body	  –	  by	  the	  mother	   shouting	   “Andale!”	   to	   hit	   the	   ball	   the	   brother	   rolled	   towards	   him,	  making	   experienceable	   his	   effect	   on	   the	   ball	   (effectivity).	   The	  mother	   also	  supported	  him	  in	  a	  sitting	  position	  and	  was	  acting	  on	  his	  leg,	  moving	  it	  and	  thus	  providing	  him	  with	  the	  first	  culturally	  embodied	  practice	  of	  kicking	  the	  ball	  –	  which	  was	  held	  in	  front	  of	  him	  by	  his	  brother	  –	  accompanied	  by	  “kick!”	  and	  “goal!”	  which	  came	  to	  be	  among	  his	  first	  words.	  3)	  At	  10	  month,	  before	  he	   could	   walk	   autonomously,	   he	   was	   held	   on	   both	   hands	   and	   (while	  attentively	  tracking	  but	  failing	  to	  kick	  a	  moving	  ball)	  he	  successfully	  adapted	  his	  posture	  to	  an	  emerging	  situation,	  taking	  a	  preparatory	  step	  towards	  the	  ball	  at	   rest	  and	  kicking	   it.	  4)	  At	  13	  months,	  he	  was	  held	  on	  one	  hand	  only	  and	  placed	  the	  ball	  himself	  and	  even	  used	  the	  ball	  instrumentally	  to	  remove	  obstacles	   getting	   in	   the	   way	   so	   he	   could	   kick	   it,	   now	   flexibly	   adapting	   to	  dynamic	   circumstances.	  5)	  At	  22	  months,	  while	   tossing	   the	  ball	   to	   and	   fro	  with	  his	  grandmother,	  he	  accidentally	  drop-­‐kicked	  the	  ball	  and	  his	  following	  joyous	   jump	   could	   be	   seen	   as	   indicating	   a	   positive	   self-­‐evaluation	   of	   his	  success	  6)	  by	  3	  years	  he	  also	  shows	  his	  built-­‐up	   “expertise”,	   criticising	  his	  older	  brother’s	  technique	  and	  showing	  him	  the	  correct	  way	  to	  kick	  the	  ball	  with	  the	  inner	  foot	  (Zukow-­‐Goldring,	  2012).	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2.6 Accounts	  V:	  Current	  and	  interactive	  accounts	  This	  section	   focuses	  on	  studies	  with	  recent	  and	  ongoing	  data	  collection,	  whose	   reports	   are	   easily	   accessible,	   and	   are	   the	   subject	   of	   current	  discussions	   within	   the	   field.	   Therefore,	   unlike	   the	   previous	   sections,	   this	  section	  will	   give	   a	  much	   briefer	   overview	   of	   and	   localize	   selected	   current	  research	   programmes	   investigating	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	   interactions	   in	  semi-­‐naturalistic	   settings.	   As	   before,	  we	  will	   provide	   a	   summary	   of	  where	  the	  researchers	  are	  coming	  from,	  what	  phenomena	  of	  interest	  they	  focused	  on,	   and	   how	   they	   exerted	   control	   to	   make	   the	   semi-­‐naturalisttic	   settings	  more	  amenable	  for	  observation	  and	  analysis.	  While	  there	  have	  been	  sections	  within	  developmental	  psychology	  which	  have	   continued	   conducting	   (qualitative)	   home	   visits	   and	   developing	  theoretical	  frameworks	  to	  address	  and	  capture	  the	  richness	  of	  multi-­‐modal	  multi-­‐strand	   interactions	   (see	   previous	   section),	   most	   of	   the	   field	   has	  focused	   on	   data	   from	   experimental	   investigations	   spelling	   out	   ever	   finer	  distinctions	   of	   scripted,	   normative	   interaction	   patterns	   such	   as	   those	  involved	  in	  “joint	  attention”.	  However,	  (semi-­‐)naturalistic	  investigations	  are	  currently	   enjoying	   a	   (small)	   renaissance,	   with	   multiple	   research	   groups	  extending	   and	   actively	   developing	   new	   methodologies	   to	   address	   infants	  everyday	   life	   social	   and	   object	   interactions.	   In	   the	   meanwhile,	  developmental	   science	   –	   as	   well	   culture	   more	   generally	   –	   have	   been	  rethinking	   the	   pace	   of	   cognitive	   development	   and	   are	   much	   more	   open	  about	  attributing	  (precursors	  of)	  quite	  sophisticated	  cognitive	  capacities	  to	  even	   very	   young	   infants.	   Therefore,	   the	   studies	   discussed	   in	   this	   section	  tend	  to	  begin	  data	  collection	  at	  earlier	  ages,	  looking	  towards	  describing	  and	  relating	   the	   experiences	   and	   abilities	   of	   infants	   much	   younger	   than	   6	  months	  –	  which	  was	  the	  starting	  age	  of	  e.g.	  the	  seminal	  studies	  of	  Adamson	  and	   Bakeman	   who	   categorized	   interaction	   patterns	   of	   infants	   at	   this	   age	  mostly	   in	   rather	   non-­‐descript	   terms	   as	   “passive	   joint	   engagement”	   (see	  section	  2.3.2).	  The	   studies	   discussed	   here,	   while	   heterogeneous,	   all	   have	   in	   common	  that	   they	   reflect	   one	   or	   more	   of	   recent	   trends	   in	   cognitive	   science	   (see	  Reichelt	   &	   Rossmanith,	   2011),	   here	   in	   the	   context	   of	   developmental	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psychology.	  The	  embodied	  action	  trend,	  here	  especially	  impacting	  on	  infant	  research	   in	   form	   of	   collaborations	  with	   (developmental)	   robotics	   (see	   e.g.	  Vollmer	   et	   al.,	   2014)	  has	  put	   a	   firm	  emphasis	   on	   the	   role	   of	   sensorimotor	  control	   of	   an	   agent’s	   own	   actions,	   including	   eye	  movements	   supportive	   of	  action	   control,	   in	   particular	   as	   a	   basis	   for	   learning.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	  machine	   learning	   approaches	   have	   led	   to	   a	   renewed	   interest	   in	   the	   rich	  perceptual	   world	   of	   infants	   (an	   emphasis	   they	   share	   with	   Gibsonian	  ecological	   psychology),	   guided	   by	   a	   general	   appreciation	   of	   the	   extensive	  learning	   opportunities	   inherent	   in	   large	   sets	   of	   time-­‐series	   data,	   both	   for	  unstructured	   learning	   mechanisms	   (model-­‐free)	   as	   well	   as	   for	   learners	  driven	   by	   prior	   expectations	   of	   particular	   patterns,	   markers,	   and	  relationships	  within	  the	  dataset	  (model-­‐based;	  see	  e.g.	  Smith,	  Suanda,	  &	  Yu,	  2014).	   Such	   trends	   have	   helped	   re-­‐ignite	   interest	   in	   what	   was	   previously	  mostly	   relegated	   to	   “socio-­‐cultural	   context”,	   taking	   seriously	   the	   ideas	   the	  cognition	  develops	  situated	  in	  a	  (social	  and	  cultural)	  environment	  and	  needs	  to	   be	   understood	   in	   these	   terms.	   Finally,	   the	   many	   ways	   persons	   may	  (directly)	   engage	   with	   each	   other	   –	   which	   necessarily	   also	   includes	   the	  relationship	   the	   researchers	   themselves	   adopt	   towards	   their	   “subjects”	   of	  study	  –	  have	  been	  emphasized	  by	   “second	  person”	  approaches	   (see	  e.g	  De	  Jaegher,	  Di	  Paolo,	  &	  Gallagher,	  2010;	  Hobson,	  2005;	  Reddy,	  2008).	  
2.6.1.1 Mother-­‐infant	   sensorimotor	   coordination	   at	   multiple	   timescales:	   de	  
Barbaro,	  Johnson,	  &	  Deák	  (2013)	  Based	   in	   San	   Diego,	   Kaya	   de	   Barbaro	   and	   colleagues	   bring	   the	   “west-­‐coast”	  flavour	  of	  situated	  (distributed)	  cognitive	  science	  into	  developmental	  psychology,	  most	  clearly	  that	  of	  Edwin	  Hutchins	  who	  arguably	  has	  been	  the	  most	   influential	   proponent	   of	   situated	   cognition	   (Hutchins,	   1995,	   2008).	  This	  development	  and	  shift	   in	  research	  direction	   is	  most	  visible	   in	  Gedeon	  Deák’s	   research	   who	   was	   previously	   involved	   in	   a	   large-­‐scale	   project	   of	  modelling	   a	   well-­‐defined	   computational	   capacity,	   gaze	   following,	   as	   it	  develops	  over	  the	  first	  year	  of	   life	  as	  reflected	  in	  experimental	  tests	  of	  this	  ability	   (Triesch,	   Teuscher,	  Deák,	  &	  Carlson,	   2006).	  However,	   neither	   these	  experiments,	  nor	  the	  computational	  model	  that	  accounts	  for	  them,	  actually	  address	   the	   relative	   importance	   of	   gaze	   following	   for	   engaging	   in	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observational	   learning	   and	   social	   interactions.	   Semi-­‐naturalistic	  observations	   (Deák,	   Krasno,	   Jasso,	   &	   Triesch,	   2017),	   and	   controlled	  laboratory	   studies	   (Yu	   &	   Smith,	   2013)	   led	   Deák	   to	   question	   whether	   this	  capacity	   is	   of	   any,	   let	   alone	   central,	   importance	   as	   implicit	   in	   standard	  accounts	   of	   joint	   attention.	   Instead,	   infants	   simply	   monitor	   the	   activities	  themselves	   as	   they	  unfold,	   shifting	  gaze	   towards	  hands	  and	  objects	   rather	  than	   focusing	   on	   gaze	   direction	   to	   anticipate	   upcoming	   actions.	   This	   is	   an	  example	   of	   the	   general	   attitude	   of	   situated	   cognition	   that	   cognitive	  processes	   –	   rather	   than	   being	   a	   hidden	   realm	   that	   observers	   need	   to	  painstakingly	   infer	   from	   indirect	   cues	   –	   are	  more	   often	   than	   not	   publicly	  available	  as	  they	  expand	  into	  the	  world	  through	  engagement	  with	  activities	  (see	  also	  Leudar	  &	  Costall,	  2009;	  Reddy	  &	  Morris,	  2004).	  From	  the	  series	  of	  studies	  de	  Barbaro	  and	  colleagues	  have	  conducted,	  we	  have	  selected	  the	  one	  investigating	  triadic	  behaviour	  most	  closely.	  Here	  they	  report	  from	  home	  visits	  of	  5	  mother-­‐infant	  pairs	  at	  the	  ages	  of	  4,	  6,	  9,	  and	  12	  months.	   At	   each	   session,	   a	   free	   play	   activity	   was	   staged	   lasting	   several	  minutes,	   with	   identical	   sets	   of	   objects	   brought	   in	   and	   infants’	   posture	  stabilized	  with	  infant	  walkers	  (for	  the	  4-­‐9	  month	  olds)	  and	  captured	  with	  a	  set	   of	   3	   synchronized	   cameras	   directed	   at	   infant,	   caregiver,	   and	   overall	  scene,	  for	  later	  frame-­‐by-­‐frame	  microanalysis	  of	  sensorimotor	  coordination	  in	  the	  mother-­‐infant-­‐toy	  triad.	  For	  their	  analysis,	  de	  Barbaro	  and	  colleagues	  stressed	   the	   importance	   of	   taking	   a	   comprehensive	   look	   at	   multiple	  modalities	   involved,	  multiple	  parties,	  and	  multiple	   time	  scales	  (see	  also	  de	  Barbaro,	  Johnson,	  Forster,	  &	  Deak,	  2013):	  
At the microsecond scale, we observe shifts of gaze, facial expression (e.g., 
gleeful smiles), and hand movement. At the macroscale, a particular look or 
grasp is positioned within an ongoing routine where, for example, it may 
repeat (as in peek-a-boo), or change, or organize with other events. At the 
historic-developmental timescale, the dyad’s long-term experience with such 
routines (e.g., a playful father’s tendency to initiate exciting games) comes 
into play (de Barbaro, Johnson, & Deák, 2013) Aside	  from	  the	  measures	  that	  introduced	  a	  level	  of	  control	  over	  the	  free	  play	  situation	  and	  spatial	  configuration	  itself	  mentioned	  above,	  de	  Barbaro	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and	   colleagues	   necessarily	   had	   to	   be	   selective	   in	   coding	   and	   analysing	  behaviours	  between	   these	  multiple	   time-­‐lines.	  They	   focused	  on	   the	   role	  of	  different	  modalities	   in	  object	  play,	   sharing	  of	   arousal,	   and	   in	  particular	  on	  “maternal	  bids	  for	  the	  infant’s	  attention	  to	  objects	  and	  the	  infants’	  responses	  to	  them”.	  Among	   their	  many	  results	   stand	  out	   in	  general	   the	  gradual	   character	  of	  the	  development	  of	  triadic	  attention,	  and	  in	  particular,	  mapping	  trajectories	  within	  these	  overall	  gradual	  changes	  such	  as	  a	  decoupling	  of	  eyes	  and	  hands	  from	   around	   6	  months	  which	   before	   had	   showed	   a	   “convergent”	  mode	   of	  attention	  coordination,	  with	  all	  modalities	  linked	  and	  focused	  on	  the	  actions	  at	  hand.	  
2.6.1.2 Educating	   attention	   in	   early	   nappy-­‐change	   activities:	   Nomikou,	  
Rohlfing,	  &	  Szufnarowska	  (2013)	  Nomikou	   and	   Rohlfing	   both	   contribute	   their	   background	   in	   linguistics,	  translation	   studies	   –	   as	   well	   in	   cognitive	   science	   (Rohlfing)	   to	   qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  longitudinal	  studies	  of	  semi-­‐naturalistic	  interactions.	  In	  the	  dataset	  of	  the	  selected	  study	  –	  partially	  overlapping	  with	  (Nomikou	  &	  Rohlfing	  (2011)	  –	  the	  authors	  conducted	  home	  visits	  to	  17	  mother-­‐infant	  pairs	   first	   at	   3	  month	   and	   then	   again	   at	   6	  month	   to	   look	   at	   nappy	   change	  interactions.	  To	  standardize	  the	  setting,	  they	  brought	  in	  a	  foldable	  changing	  table	  and	  2	  cameras	  to	  capture	  both	  the	  mother’s	  and	  infant’s	  (face	  to	  face)	  communication	   and	   actions.	   In	   their	   earlier	   study	   relying	   more	   on	  quantitative	   analyses	   Nomikou	   and	   Rohlfing	   illustrated	   the	   rich,	   multi-­‐modal	   character	   of	   the	   infant’s	   perceptual	   streams	   in	   connection	   with	  language	   (which	   are	   emphasized	   by	   machine	   learning	   approaches	   to	   e.g.	  language	   acquisition),	   noting	   in	   particular	   the	   co-­‐occurrence	   of	   language	  and	   action,	   describing	   how	   caregivers	   place	   maintain	   tight	   temporal	  relationships	  between	  their	  manual	  actions	  and	  vocal	  actions	  thus	  “making	  the	   vocal	   signal	   both	   perceivable	   and	   tangible”	   (“acoustic	   packaging”)	   in	  creating	  multi-­‐modal	  invariances	  for	  learners.	  In	   the	  present	   study,	  Nomikou	  and	   colleagues	   go	  one	   step	   further,	   now	  relying	   more	   on	   qualitative	   analyses,	   to	   show	   the	   contingent,	   interactive	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character	   of	   the	   mother’s	   actions	   in	   the	   interplay	   with	   the	   infant.	   They	  singled	  out	  episodes	  of	  mutual	  eye	  contact,	  and	   in	  particular	  how	  mothers	  follow	   their	   infants’	   lead,	   entrain	   their	   actions	   and	   use	   ostensive	   gestures	  and	   vocalizations	   welcoming	   them	   to	   achieve	   eye	   contact	   and	   mark	  particular	  points	  of	  the	  activity,	  especially	  its	  beginning.	  The	  approach	  taken	  here	   is	   thus	   in	   many	   ways	   complementary	   of	   that	   of	   de	   Barbaro	   and	  colleagues	   discussed	   above,	   as	   they	   focused	   on	   nappy	   change	   rather	   than	  free-­‐play	   and	   looked	   at	   eye	   contact	   rather	   than	   directing	   attention	   to	  objects.	   Both	   approaches	   exert	   comparability	   of	   instances	   by	   staging	  cultural	   activities	   and	   furnishing	   the	   required	   objects	   (but	   see	   Rączaszek-­‐Leonardi,	  Nomikou,	  &	  Rohlfing,	  2013	  for	  qualitative	  analyses	  of	  unscripted	  triadic	  interactions).	  
2.6.1.3 Second	  person	  approach	  to	  triadic	  interaction:	  how	  infants	  feel	  minds	  
(Reddy,	  2008)	  Similar	   to	   both	   the	   previous	   accounts,	   Reddy	   argues	   for	   the	   gradual	  emergence	   of	   triadicity	   in	   attentional	   engagements.	   Also	   in	   line	  with	   both	  these	  accounts,	  Reddy	  adopts	  a	  strongly	  adualist	  stance	  towards	  the	  notion	  of	   attention;	   it	   is	   posited	   to	   be	   something	   that	   is	   perceptually	   available	  within	   engagement.	   Somewhat	   different	   from	   these	   accounts,	   however,	  Reddy	  emphasises	  affect	  as	  key	  to	  the	  understanding	  of	  attention.	  Strongly	  influenced	   by	   Martin	   Buber’s	   notion	   of	   I-­‐Thou	   relating	   as	   a	   mode	   of	  knowing,	   Reddy’s	   account	   of	   the	   emergence	   of	   triadic	   attentional	  engagements	   begins	   with	   the	   infant’s	   affective	   responses	   to	   attention	   in	  dyadic	   engagements.	   	   Being	   addressed	   as	   a	   You	   by	   another’s	   gaze,	   she	  argues,	   is	   a	   powerful	   arouser	   of	   emotional	   response.	   And	   this	   response,	  experienced	   within	   engagement	   and	   inevitably	   intertwined	   with	   the	  perception	  of	  the	  other’s	  gaze	  (in	  the	  case	  of	  visual	  attention)	  becomes	  the	  key	   to	   the	   emerging	   meaning	   of	   attention	   for	   the	   infant.	   Merleau-­‐Ponty	  focused	   on	   the	   perceivability	   of	   engagement	   as	   the	   key	   challenge	   to	  Descartes’	  emphasis	  on	  thought:	  “I	  discover	  vision,	  not	  as	  a	  “thinking	  about	  seeing,”	   to	   use	  Descartes’	   expression,	   but	   as	   a	   gaze	   at	   grips	  with	   a	   visible	  world,	  and	  that	  is	  why	  for	  me	  there	  can	  be	  another’s	  gaze”	  (Merleau-­‐Ponty,	  1962,	   p.	   410).	   Reddy	   takes	   the	   point	   further,	   arguing	   that	   attention	   is	   not	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only	  perceivable,	  it	  is,	  in	  the	  typical	  case,	  experience-­‐able:	  “I	  discover	  vision	  […]	  as	  a	  gaze	  at	  grips	  with	  me,	  and	  that	  is	  why	  for	  me	  there	  can	  be	  another’s	  gaze”	   (Reddy,	  2011).	  And	   it	   is	  precisely	   this	   experiencing	  of	   attention,	   she	  argues,	   which	   draws	   dyadic	   attentional	   engagements	   into	   expanding	   and	  developing	  into	  and	  beyond	  the	  triadic.	  	  The	  dyadic	  experience	  of	  attention	  is	  evidenced	  in	  the	  first	  few	  months	  of	  life	   with	   roughly	   similar	   responses	   –	   positive,	   negative,	   ambivalent	   and	  indifferent	  –	  to	  those	  that	  can	  be	  found	  later	  in	  the	  first	  year.	  What	  changes	  is	   the	   complexity	   and	   scope	   of	   the	   objects	   of	   attention	   that	   the	   infant	   can	  grasp.	   Reddy	   argues	   that	   it	   is	   not	   a	   late	   appearing	   ‘discovery’	   of	   attention	  (the	   position	   adopted	   by	   Bates	   and	   colleagues,	   for	   instance)	   that	  characterizes	  changes	  during	  the	  first	  year	  but	  an	  expanding	  understanding	  of	   the	   objects	   of	   attention.	   What	   is	   needed	   here	   to	   understand	  developmental	   shifts	   is	   to	   re-­‐think	   what	   can	   constitute	   an	   object	   of	  attention,	  or	  what	   the	   ‘third	  element’	   can	  be,	  which	  enables	   triadicity.	   She	  argues	   that	   the	   triad	   is	   present	   much	   earlier	   than	   the	   9	   or	   10	   months	  assumed	   typically,	   and	   that	   the	   ‘object’	   can	  be	  not	   only	  distant	   things,	   but	  also	   aspects	   of	   the	   infant’s	   body	   and	   actions.	   These	   objects	   of	   the	   other’s	  attention	   (as	   grasped	  by	   the	   infant)	   expand	   in	   an	  outward	  direction	  going	  from	   the	   self,	   to	   its	   body	   parts	   and	   then	   to	   actions	   by	   the	   self,	   before	  involving	  distal	  objects.	  In	  the	  second	  year	  the	  expansion	  continues	  further,	  moving	  to	  objects	  which	  are	  not	  currently	  present	  or	  perceivable	  (see	  also	  Tomasello	  &	  Haberl,	  2003	  and	  compare	  section	  2.2.3:	  Sugarman).	  Evidence	  for	   these	   expanding	   attentional	   engagements	   comes	   from	   naturalistic	  observations:	   of	   coy	   responses	   to	   mutual	   gaze	   between	   2	   and	   4	   months	  (Reddy,	  2000,	  2003)	  and	  of	   clowning	  and	  showing-­‐off	  beginning	  around	  7	  months	  (Reddy,	  1991,	  2001).	  
2.6.1.4 Sampling	  of	   infants’	   visual	  world	  and	  mapping	  gaze	   coordination	   in	  
caregiver-­‐infant-­‐object	   interactions:	   (Fausey,	   Jayaraman,	   &	   Smith,	  
2016;	  and	  Yu	  &	  Smith,	  2013)	  Having	   co-­‐written	   the	   book	   on	   dynamical	   systems	   theory	   in	  (developmental)	   cognitive	   science	   (Thelen	  &	   Smith,	   1994),	   Linda	   Smith	   in	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collaboration	  with	   the	  computer	  scientists	  Chen	  Yu	  and	  colleagues	   in	   their	  labs	   have	   pioneered	   an	   approach	   that	   uses	   infant	   head	   cameras	   to	   create	  corpora	   of	   the	   (visual	   aspects	   of	   the)	   world	   of	   everyday	   life	   of	   infants	  (Smith,	  Yu,	  Yoshida,	  &	  Fausey,	  2015),	  allowing	  to	  explore	  and	  map	   infants’	  experience	   statistically	   rather	   than	   relying	   on	   researchers	   selections	   of	  example	   episodes,	   thus	   sketching	   how	   the	   actual	   perceptual	   data	   streams	  that	   infant	   learners	  rely	  on	  look	  like	  with	  direct	  relevance	  for	  statistical	  or	  machine	  learning	  approaches	  (Smith	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  In	  addition,	  they	  also	  have	  pioneered	  a	  laboratory	  based	  dual-­‐eye	  tracking	  setup	  based	  on	  the	  positive	  science	  trackers	  and	  infant	  harness	  that	  allows	  describing	  gaze	  coordination	  in	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	   interactions.	   While	   this	   system	   samples	   eye	  movements	  only	  30	  times	  per	  second	  identical	  to	  frame-­‐by-­‐frame	  analyses,	  automated	  gaze	  estimations	  allow	  describing	  both	  the	  micro-­‐structure	  and	  overall	  statistics	  of	  gaze	  coordination	  patters	  (Yu	  &	  Smith,	  2013).	  While	  the	  video-­‐libraries	  compiled	  by	  means	  of	  the	  head	  cameras	  reflect	  a	   less	   constrained	   aspect	   of	   the	   infants’	   visual	   world	   compared	   to	   those	  created	   specifically	   for	   e.g.	   object	   play	   and	   nappy	   change	   contexts	   (see	  above),	  meaningful	  coding	  and	  analyses	  of	  such	   large	  data	  sets	  clearly	  still	  need	   to	   be	   theoretically	   guided.	   An	   initial	   question	   posed	   by	   Smith	   and	  colleagues	  concerned	  the	  relative	  frequency	  of	  faces	  and	  hands	  that	  infants	  get	   to	   see	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   first	   2	   years	   of	   life.	   Based	   on	   their	  quantitative	   sampling,	   they	  established	   that	  young	   infants	  of	  2-­‐4	  month	  of	  age	  have	  a	  bias	   for	   faces	  which	  gradually	  gets	  reduced	  and	   inverted	   into	  a	  bias	  for	  hands	  for	  infants	  9	  month	  and	  older	  (Fausey	  et	  al.,	  2016).	  Additional	  controlled	  studies	  indicate	  that	  this	  bias	  reflects	  active	  interest	  of	  infants	  at	  least	  in	  part	  rather	  than	  only	  the	  presence	  of	  faces	  rather	  than	  hands	  close	  by	  (Jayaraman,	  Fausey,	  &	  Smith,	  2017).	  This	  result	  goes	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  their	  main	   finding,	  mentioned	   above,	   that	   episodes	   of	   shared	   attention	   of	  infants	   (around	  1	  year	  of	   age)	   and	   caregivers	  on	  objects	   are	   rarely	   if	   ever	  preceded	   looking	   at	   faces	   (to	   extract	   cues	   to	   engage	   in	   gaze	   following	   as	  assumed	  in	  the	  normative	  model	  for	  joint	  attention),	  but	  rather	  that	  infants	  (and	   caregivers)	   directly	   look	   at	   hands	   and	   the	   objects	   acted	   on	   (see	   also	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Flanagan	   &	   Johansson,	   2003;	   Flanagan,	   Rotman,	   Reichelt,	   &	   Johansson,	  2013).	  
2.6.1.5 Comparison	  	  Juxtaposing	  these	  quite	  different	  research	  programs	  showcases	  the	  many	  aspects	   of	   interaction	   that	   can	   be	   made	   visible	   and	   addressed	   when	  investigating	  interactions	  systematically,	  looking	  at	  the	  roles	  of	  each	  person	  involved,	  as	  well	  as	  crucially	  their	  interplay	  (see	  also	  De	  Jaegher	  &	  Di	  Paolo,	  2007),	   and	   how	   objects	   and	   the	   (cultural)	   configuration	   impact	   on	   and	  shape	  this	  interplay.	  In	  particular,	  the	  multi-­‐modal	  character	  of	  interactions	  –	   vision,	   vocalization,	   and	   (felt)	   action	   –	   is	   shown	   to	   be	   fundamental	   to	  aspects	  of	  development	   from	   labelling	   (“acoustic	  packaging”)	   to	   social	   and	  object	  play.	  Multi-­‐modality	  may	   be	   important	   for	   all	   these	   research	   programs	   since	  they	  are	   investigating	   situations	  where	   the	   infant	  has	  much	  more	   to	  work	  with	   than	   in	  simplified	  artificial	   laboratory	  experiments,	  which	  often	   focus	  on	   vision	   in	   isolation:	   (semi-­‐)naturalistic	   settings	   are	  much	   richer,	   and	   in	  particular	   involve	   direct	   bodily	   contact	   and	   contact	   with	   objects	   (nappies	  and	  toys),	  so	  gaze	  coordination	  occurs	  in	  parallel	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  ongoing	  activities.	  	  Perhaps	   because	   these	   accounts	   cast	   a	  much	  wider	   net	   –	   including	   the	  cultural	  environment,	  and	  the	  infants’,	  not	  the	  experimenter’s,	  time-­‐scales	  of	  experience	  –	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  looking	  into	  the	  micro-­‐level	  of	  affective	  exchange	  and	  gaze	  coordination,	  they	  each	  in	  their	  own	  way	  emphasize	  the	  gradual	   character	   of	   development	   in	   general	   and	   triadic	   interactions	   in	  particular	   by	   pointing	   out	   earlier	   engagements	   that	   prefigure	   the	   infants’	  later	  challenges	  and	  abilities.	  	  By	   showcasing	   the	   intricacies	   of	   particular	   activities	   (nappy-­‐change,	  object	  play)	  or	  classes	  of	  activities	  (sharing	  of	  attention,	  even	  the	  totality	  of	  the	  visual	  life	  world	  over	  a	  particular	  temporal	  window),	  starting	  from	  one	  or	   more	   central	   relationships	   of	   interest	   (eye	   contact,	   maternal	   bids,	  involved	  engagement,	   statistical	   shifts	   from	  faces	   to	  hands)	  and	  expanding	  outward,	   these	   approaches	   also	   show	   their	   limitations,	   as	   results	   from	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particular	   activities	   such	   as	   nappy	   change	   and	   object	   play	   may	   not	  generalize	   and	   may	   miss	   other	   important	   interaction	   dynamics	   and	  experience	   (compare	   chapter	   3:	   book	   sharing).	   Even	   the	   focus	   of	   interest	  within	   a	   particular	   activity	   may	   lead	   to	   a	   somewhat	   different	   account	  (compare:	   Nomikou	   &	   Rohlfing,	   2011;	   Nomikou	   et	   al.,	   2013;	   Rączaszek-­‐Leonardi	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  While	  de	  Barbaro	  and	  colleagues	  (2013)	  provide	  an	  explicit	  statement	  of	  the	  benefits	  and	  methodological	  challenges	  inherent	  in	  multi-­‐scale	  analyses,	  their	  coding	  methodology	  focusing	  on	  singular	  events	  (maternal	  bids	  for	  the	  infant’s	   attention	   on	   objects)	   foregrounds	   “islands”	   of	   events	   and	   their	  immediate	   context	   in	   the	   configuration	   to	   abstract,	   pool,	   and	   compare.	  While	   shedding	   light	   on	   the	   event	   of	   interest	   and	   enabling	   statistical	  analyses,	  such	  a	  perspective	  may	  miss	  activity	  structures	  linking	  the	  local	  to	  the	  global	  time	  scales,	  such	  as	  action	  arcs	  (see	  section	  6.7).	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2.7 Context	  box:	  On	  the	  separation	  of	  (manual)	  object	  -­‐	  and	  (language-­‐
mediated)	   people	   interactions;	   parallels	   and	   interconnections	  
between	   infant	   research,	   human-­‐	   and	   world-­‐conceptions,	   and	  
socio-­‐political	  developments	  
2.7.1 Empirical	  and	  conceptual	  roots	  Where	   does	   the	   notion	   that	   object	   engagement	   and	   (in	   the	   long	   run	  language-­‐and-­‐reason	  related)	  social	  engagement	  constitute	  separate	  realms	  for	   infants	   through	   large	   parts	   of	   the	   first	   year,	   with	   its	   far-­‐reaching	  consequences,	  come	  from?	  It	  echoes	  through	  many	  of	  the	  seminal	  papers	  on	  infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	   interaction	   from	   the	  1970s	   (see	  below),	   apparently	  either	   considered	   self-­‐evident,	   as	   an	   unquestioned	   underlying	   assumption	  made	  from	  the	  outset	  –thus	  often	  not	  even	  considered	  to	  require	  a	  reference	  (e.g.	  Bates	  et	  al.,	  1979;	  Bakeman	  &	  Adamson,	  1984)	  –	  or	  as	  a	  conclusion	  that	  is	  quickly	  drawn	  or	  jumped	  to.	  One	  relatively	  recent	  empirical	  root	  is	  constituted	  by	  the	  seminal	  studies	  performed	  by	  Brazelton,	  Richards,	  and	  Trevarthen	  in	  the	  1970s	  (in	  Jerome	  Bruner's	   Center	   for	   Cognitive	   Studies	   in	   Harvard):	   they	   have	   documented	  differences	   between	   young	   infants'	   responses	   towards	   their	   caregiver	  (communicative	   attempts	   and	   a	   smooth	   flow	   of	  engagement/disengagement)	   and	   towards	   a	   suspended	   object	   (jerky	  attention	   bouts	   and	   pre-­‐grasping	   attempts).	   Suggesting	   two	   separate	  interaction	   classes,	   action-­‐systems,	   or	  motives,	   allowed	   them	   to	   point	   out	  and	   highlight	   the	   astonishing	   social	   skills	   displayed	   by	   even	   very	   young	  infants,	   which	   –	   since	   not	   captured	   by	   e.g.	   the	   Piagetian	   model	   of	  development	   –	   had	   been	   neglected	   at	   the	   time.	   However,	   differential	  responding	   to	   distinct	   setups	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   objects	   and	   people	  constitute	   two	   separate	   worlds	   for	   young	   infants	   (Brazelton	   et	   al.,	   1974;	  Trevarthen,	  1977).	  Analogously,	   in	   approaches	   such	  as	   those	  of	  Bates	   and	   colleagues,	   or	  of	  Sugarman-­‐Bell	   (see	   section	   2.2.3)	   –	   starting	   from	   language	   and	   linguistic	  reference	   typically	   associated	   with	   the	   classic	   labelling	   situation	  
	   137	  
“communicating	  with	  people	  about	  objects”	  and	  then	  seeking	  to	  find	  its	  first	  non-­‐verbal	  forms	  –	  the	  dichotomy	  was	  already	  pre-­‐shaped	  to	  some	  extent	  in	  the	  underlying	  theoretical	  assumptions	  as	  well.	  However,	   as	   Trevarthen's	   PhD	   student	   Penelope	  Hubley	   pointed	   out	   in	  her	   dissertation	   that	   while	   first	   aiming	   to	   conduct	   2	   separate	   studies	   on	  object	   and	   social	   interaction,	   respectively,	   it	   became	   soon	   clear	   that	   [at	  least?]	   “from	   5	  months	   on	   these	   lines	   of	   development	  were	   not	   separate”	  (Hubley,	   1983).	   This	   marked	   the	   beginning	   of	   Trevarthen	   and	   Hubley’s	  seminal	   studies	  documenting	   the	  gradual	  development	  of	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  interaction	  from	  dyadic	  primary	  to	  triadic	  secondary	  subjectivity	  (see	  section	  2.3.1).	  This	  gradual	  character,	  however,	  was	  once	  again	  lost	  in	  later	  accounts,	   re-­‐entrenching	   the	   image	   of	   separate	   lines	   of	   development	  enduring	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  year.	  
2.7.2 Division	  of	  labour	  within	  psychology	  This	   distinction	   is	   not	   a	   theoretical	   detail,	   nor	   simply	   an	   empirical	  question	   to	   be	   addressed	   by	   observation	   and	   experiment,	   but	   runs	   far	  deeper,	  and	  the	  way	  questions	  are	  posed	  and	  results	  interpreted	  are	  in	  part	  already	   shaped	   by	   our	   expectations.	   The	   distinction	   runs	   through	   the	  practical	   organization	   of	   introductory	   textbooks	   where	   object	   and	   social	  engagement	  routinely	  form	  distinct	  chapters,	  neatly	  partitioning	  the	  infant’s	  world	  and	  mind	  -­‐	  as	  well	  as	  the	  reader’s	  thinking	  while	  reading	  along	  -­‐	  into	  separate	   realms	   (see	   e.g.	  Rochat,	   2001	  The	   Infant’s	  World:	   Chapter	  3,	   The	  Object	  World	  in	  Infancy;	  Chapter	  4,	  The	  Infant	  and	  Others).	  Fundamentally,	  the	  division	  is	  built	  in	  right	  into	  Psychology’s	  own	  division	  of	  labour:	  object	  engagement,	  physical	  knowledge,	  and	  tool	  use	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  infants’	  social	   interaction,	   social	   cognition	  and	  knowledge	  on	   the	  other,	   have	  been	  largely	   investigated	   by	   different	   fields	   of	   research,	   pursued	   by	   different	  research	   communities,	   using	   different	  methods,	   frameworks,	   etc.,	   and	   not	  necessarily	  communicating	  with	  each	  other.	  At	  times,	  the	  distinction	  is	  even	  reflected	   in	  completely	  distinct	  phases	   in	  a	  given	  researcher’s	  career.	  Take	  as	   an	   example	   again	   the	   work	   of	   Rochat	   encompassing	   his	   first	   seminal	  contributions	   to	   object	   engagement	   based	   on	   a	   Gibsonian	   ecological	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cognition	   approach	   (Rochat,	   1987,	   1989),	   and	   later	   ones	   to	   infant	   social	  cognition	  based	  on	  a	  cognitivist	  framework	  (Rochat,	  2009).	  Why	  does	  it	  matter?	  Social	  object	  interactions	  involving	  young	  infants	  are	  in	  danger	  of	  falling	  through	  the	  cracks	  of	  this	  divide	  and	  understanding	  the	  development	   of	   culture	   –	  which	   characteristically	   involves	   jointly	   creating	  and	  interacting	  with	  and	  via	  artifacts	  –	  is	  made	  difficult	  if	  not	  impossible.	  
2.7.3 Philosophical	  background:	  differentiating	  “logos”	  and	  the	  ever	  shifting	  
“man	  vs.	  animal”	  divide	  This	  distinction	  may	  reflect	  even	  larger	  (under-­‐)currents	  in	  the	  history	  of	  Western	   philosophy	   and	   psychology,	   in	   the	   latter	   playing	   themselves	   out	  within	  comparative	  as	  well	  as	  developmental	  psychology.	  It	  becomes	  visible	  in	  (the	  turns	  of)	  an	  unfolding	  argument	  concerning	  the	  nature	  and	  thus	  the	  status	   of	   (white)	  man	   among	   his	   fellow	   creatures,	  which	   turns	   to	   and	   fro	  between	   finding	   similarities,	   then	   new	   differences,	   differentiating	   the	  concepts	   of	   mind	   and	   mental	   capacities	   slightly	   further	   with	   each	   turn,	  maintaining	   man’s	   (supposedly)	   special	   position	   among	   fellow	   beings	   by	  pushing	   the	   demarcation	   lines	   for	   “intelligent/sensible	   being”	   along	   the	  newly	  emerging	  distinctions	  ever	  further.	  For	   a	   long	   time	   language	   and	   reason	   combined	   in	   “logos”	   have	   been	  considered	  the	  defining	  attribute	  of	  humanity,	  only	  allowing	  fellow	  animals	  the	  ability	  to	  act	  “as	  if”	  from	  reason.	  However,	  researchers	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	   the	   20th	   century	   began	   to	   increasingly	   break	   up	   that	   “bastion”	   of	  humanity.	   Researchers	   like	   Otto	   Köhler	   and	   Karl	   Bühler	   argued	   that	  language-­‐lacking	  apes	  and	  infants	  nevertheless	  are	  capable	  of	  some	  kind	  of	  reason,	   separate	   from	   and	   prior	   to	   language:	   “practical”	   or	   “technical”	  reason/intelligence	   as	   exercised	   in	   instrumental	   object	   actions.	   Köhler’s	  successful	   non-­‐verbal	   testing	   methods	   (Köhler,	   1917)	   were	   fruitfully	  adapted	  by	  the	  Bühlers	  for	  use	  with	  pre-­‐verbal	  infants	  (Bühler,	  1930,	  1936),	  thus	   placing	   apes	   and	   human	   infants	  within	   one	   research	   framework	   and	  thus	   extracting	   “practical	   intelligence”	   from	   the	   unity	   of	   “logos”/”logos-­‐conglomerate”	  and	  pulling	  it	  downward	  and	  outward,	  claiming	  it	  for	  young	  infants	  and	  close	  relatives	  of	  our	  species.	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In	   the	  next	   turn	  of	   the	   argument	   and	   research	  process,	  Vygotsky	  at	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  1930s	  criticized	  Bühler’s	  move	   to	  equate	  apes	  and	  young	  children	   as	   simplistic	   and	   countered	   by	   pointing	   out	   that	   the	   coming	  together	  of	  practical	  intelligence	  and	  language	  re-­‐organizes	  children’s	  object	  interactions	  and	  tool	  use,	  thus	  further	  differentiating	  “practical	  intelligence”	  into	   a	   “natural/biological	   stream”	   outside	   of	   and	   prior	   to	   language	   and	   a	  “cultural	   stream”	   transformed	   in	   human	   infants	   from	   the	   2nd	   year	   on	   by	  language	  based	  socio-­‐cultural	  interactions.	  Whereas	  Vygotsky	  criticized	  the	  then	  standard	  practice	  to	  study	  tool	  use	  and	  symbol	  use	  isolated	  from	  each	  other	   (with	   the	   latter	   regarded	   as	   a	   spontaneously	   discovered	   product	   of	  pure	   reason	   rather	   than	   of	   developmental	   history),	   since	   he	   regarded	   the	  “dialectical	   unity	   of	   these	   systems	   in	   the	   human	   adult	   the	   very	   essence	   of	  
complex	   human	   behavior”,	   nevertheless	   his	   conceptualization	   of	   early	  development	   claims	   the	   existence	   of	   two	   separate	   lines	   of	   development	  foreshadowing	   today's	   developmental	   narrative:	   “The	   most	   significant	  
moment	   in	   the	   course	   of	   intellectual	   development,	   which	   gives	   birth	   to	   the	  
purely	  human	  forms	  of	  practical	  and	  abstract	  intelligence,	  occurs	  when	  speech	  
and	   practical	   activity,	   two	   previously	   completely	   independent	   lines	   of	  
development,	  converge.”	  (Vygotsky,	  1978b	  p.	  24).	  Similarly,	  Piaget’s	  infamous	  “neglect	  of	  the	  social”	  can	  be	  seen	  against	  the	  background	   (and	   result)	   of	   an	  already	  established	   separation	  between	   the	  workings	   of	   language-­‐bound	   “reason”	   and	   all	   other	   motions	   of	   life.	  Countering	   his	   own	   previous	   “overemphasis”	   on	   the	   social,	   which	   he	   had	  considered	  crucial	  to	  overcome	  a	  child's	  egocentrism	  when	  doing	  interview	  studies	  with	  slightly	  older	  children,	  he	  sought	  to	  demonstrate	  in	  his	  work	  on	  early	   sensorimotor	   development	   that	   all	   cognitive	   foundations	   for	   later	  cultural	   activities	   develop	   autonomously	   from	   the	   infant's	   sensorimotor	  interactions	   with	   the	   object-­‐world	   independent	   of	   social	   influence.	   The	  latter	   was	   only	   supposed	   to	   play	   a	   big	   role	   later	   on	   as	   arbitrary	   socially	  established	   word	   labels	   and	   morals	   are	   learnt,	   and	   as	   logic	   is	   developed	  further	  through	  argumentation	  (Piaget,	  1962;	  Lourenço	  &	  Machado,	  1996).	  	  Approaching	   current	   times	   the	   movement	   continues	   to	   result	   in	   more	  complex	   pictures:	   Starting	   at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   20th	   century	   (e.g.	  
	   140	  
Wittgenstein,	  Bühler	  etc.)	   and	   taking	  off	   in	   the	   second	  half	   (Austin,	   Searle,	  Ryan)	  language	  is	  further	  differentiated:	  apart	  from	  its	  “cognitive”	  functions	  related	  to	   logic	  and	  semantic	  reference,	   it’s	  use	  and	  pragmatic	  aspects	  and	  its	  functional	  role	  in	  interaction	  come	  into	  focus	  and	  are	  further	  investigated	  (e.g.	  conversation	  analysis)	  –	  moving	  at	   least	  parts	  of	   language	  closer	  back	  again	   to	   “practical	   intelligence”.	   Yet	   again	   various	   aspects	   previously	  regarded	  as	  part	  of	  the	   language-­‐logos	  complex,	  such	  as	  communication	  as	  social	   regulation	   (Bateson,	   1975,	   1979;	  Brazelton	   et	   al.,	   1974;	  Trevarthen,	  1977;	   Tronick,	   1982),	   as	  well	   as	   the	   “transmission”	   of	  meaning	   in	   various	  forms,	   were	   isolated,	   extracted	   and	   pulled	   downward	   and	   claimed	   for	  human	   infants	   as	   well	   as	   non-­‐human	   animals,	   stimulating	   further	  investigation	   in	   newly	   emerging	   research	   fields	   (for	   infants	   see	   Halliday,	  1975;	  J.	  Bruner	  &	  Watson,	  1983;	  Bates,	  Sugarman:	  see	  section	  2.2.2-­‐3).	  The	   situation	   we	   face	   today	   within	   developmental	   psychology	   has	  become	   even	  more	   complex,	   as	  multiple	   lines	   of	   development	   (or	   at	   least	  complexes	  of	  behaviours	  investigated	  by	  specific	  research	  communities)	  can	  be	   discerned	   –	   depending	   on	   the	   respective	   research	   perspective	   and	  approach	  –	  the	  interrelations	  between	  which	  remain	  to	  be	  clarified:	  These	  multiple	  lines	  of	  development	  include:	  -­‐ early	   solitary	   object	   interactions,	   including	   (instrumental)	   tool	   use	  and	   related	   object	   knowledge	   (e.g.	   object	   permanence)	   associated	  with	   practical/technical	   intelligence	   (as	   singled	   out	   by	   Köhler,	  Bühler)	  and	  autonomous	  sensorimotor	  object	  interaction	  experience	  (Piaget)	  -­‐ further	   extracted	   from	   this	   object-­‐complex	   and	   countering	   Piaget:	  (“innate”?)	  knowledge	  about	  the	  physical	  domain	  from	  early	  on	  and	  apparently	   independent	   from	   object	   manipulation	   experience	   (see	  e.g.	  Baillargeon,	  1987;	  Spelke,	  1985).	  -­‐ early	  communication	  and	  social	  mutual	  regulation	  (including	  arousal,	  affect,	  and	  turn-­‐taking)	  from	  birth	  and	  flourishing	  from	  2	  months	  in	  proto-­‐conversation	   (Bateson,	   1975,	   1979;	   Tiffany	   Field	   &	   Fogel,	  1982;	  Jaffe,	  Stern,	  &	  Peery,	  1973;	  Trevarthen,	  1977;	  Tronick,	  1982).	  -­‐ (as	   well	   as	   attachment	   for	   longer	   term	   relating:	   Spitz,	   Bowlby,	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Ainsworth)	  -­‐ early	   forms	   of	   reference	   in	   form	   of	   proto-­‐imperatives	   and	   proto-­‐declaratives	   as	   described	   by	   Bates	   et	   al.	   from	   9/10	  months	   of	   age	  (see	  section	  2.2.2)	  -­‐ (in	   part)	   further	   extracted	   from	   language	   and	   communication:	  “knowledge”	   about	   the	   “social	   domain”,	   including	   animate	   vs.	  inanimate	   distinction	   (biological	   motion	   perception,	   bias	   for	   faces,	  etc.)	   from	   birth	   (Legerstee,	   1992),	   goal	   directedness	   of	   (hand)	  actions	  (Woodward,	  1998).	  This	  still	  leaves	  in	  the	  logos-­‐language	  domain	  (to	  emerge	  at	  a	  later	  point)	  capacities	  which	  can	  considered	   to	  belong	   to	  what	  Vygotsky	  claimed	   to	  be	  socially	  mediated	  and	  constituting	  the	  cultural	  line	  of	  development,	  such	  as:	  learning	   by	   imitation,	   following	   instructions,	   conventional	   object	   use,	   and	  symbol	  use.	  However	  some	  of	  those	  have	  also	  been	  singled	  out	  and	  claimed	  to	  occur	  prior	  to	  language	  onset:	  Moro	  and	  Rodríguez	  e.g.	  explicitly	  seek	  to	  extend	  and	  refine	  Vygotsky	  by	  pointing	   out	   that	   not	   only	   language	   but	   also	   conventional	   object	  meaning	  already	  needs	  social	  mediation,	  and	  –	  occurring	  prior	  to	  language	  –	  indicates	  earlier	  cultural	  impact	  and	  transformation,	  which	  can	  actually	  be	  considered	  to	  form	  part	  of	  the	  basis	  for	  language	  (see	  section	  2.5.2).	  	  Tomasello	  –	  also	  draws	  the	  start	  of	  cultural	  mediation	  to	  an	  earlier	  point	  –	   but	   in	   contrast	   to	   Moro	   and	   Rodríguez	   not	   as	   occurring	   through	   or	  initiated	   by	  mediation	   but	   as	   arising	   endogenously,	   with	   the	   two	   lines	   of	  development	   of	   social	   communication	   (from	   birth)	   and	   (instrumental)	  object	  knowledge	  (Piagetian	  intelligence	  emerging	  at	  9	  m)	  coming	  together.	  They	  are	  not	  mediated	  later	  by	  language	  but	  from	  around	  9	  months	  by	  new	  forms	  of	  social	  knowledge	  and	  motivation	  (“shared	  intentionality”)	  allowing	  infants	  to	  benefit	  from	  cultural	  mediation	  (see	  section	  2.4).	  
2.7.4 Socio-­‐political	  entanglements	  The	   separation	   between	   object	   engagement	   and	   language-­‐mediated	  social	  engagement	  has	  not	  been	  relegated	  to	  theoretical	  discussions	  within	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science	   and	   philosophy	   but	   has	   pervaded	   society,	   culture	   and	   politics	  impacting	  on	  everyday	  life	  -­‐	   this	  may	  help	  explain	  why	  it	   is	  so	  persistently	  comes	  up	  essentially	  as	  a	  default	  position,	  and	  is	  difficult	  to	  address	  within	  the	  confines	  of	  a	  single	  discipline.	  The	  separation	  lives	  e.g.	  in	  the	  (also	  class-­‐related)	  distinction	  between	   “blue	   collar”	   and	   “white	   collar”	  work	  with	   its	  disdain	  for	  working	  with	  the	  hands	  (on	  material	  objects),	  which	  has	  a	  long	  history,	  and,	  e.g.	   in	  the	  early	  modern	  age	  –	  as	  argued	  by	  Edgar	  Zilsel	   in	  his	  “Social	  Roots	  of	  Modern	  Science”	  –	  first	  had	  to	  be	  (at	  least	  partly)	  overcome	  to	  make	  possible	  experimentation	  and	  engineering	  work	   thus	  enabling	   the	  birth	  of	  science	  (Zilsel,	  2000).	  The	  gulf	  was	  arguably	  again	  further	  deepened	  during	   the	   19th	   and	  20th	   century	   in	   the	   course	   of	   industrialization	   shifting	  from	  the	  skillful	  expertise	  of	  a	  master	  craftsman	  based	  on	  extensive	  training	  to	  the	  monotony	  of	  simplistic	  repetitive	  conveyer-­‐belt	   jobs	  (which	  also	   led	  to	  Marx’s	  notion	  of	  ‘alienation	  of	  labour’,	  Marx,	  1844).	  The	  distinction	  keeps	  riding	  high	  throughout	  the	  20th	  century,	  the	  age	  of	  “formalization”	   and	   “operationalization”,	   where	   larger	   and	   larger	   parts	   of	  thinking	   and	   action	   get	   formalized	   and	   operationalized,	   thus	   emphasizing	  their	   abstract	   aspects	   and	   moving	   them	   further	   apart	   from	   effective	  interactions	  with	  the	  material	  world	  (Graeber,	  2015;	  Mirowski,	  2004).	  	  This	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  highly	  abstract	  logic-­‐based	  conceptions	  of	  thinking	  common	   in	   cognitive	   science	   and	   psychology	   such	   as	   “information-­‐processing”	  and	  “rule	  based	  symbol	  manipulation”.	   	  These	  notions	  not	  only	  point	   to	   a	   highly	   abstract	   conception	   of	   thinking,	   but	   also	   to	   how	   even	  aspects	   of	   thinking	   became	   increasingly	   mechanized	   and	   implemented	   in	  computers.	   This	   1)	   leaves	   apparently	   less	   and	   less	   room	   for	   a	   “uniquely	  human”	   “logos”,	   condensing	   the	  puzzles	  of	   thinking	  –	   sustained	  or	   created	  by	  the	  current	  conception	  –	  into	  a	  couple	  of	  opaque	  labels	  such	  as	  “making	  sense”,	   “intentionality”,	   “free	  will”,	   “creativity”;	   and	   2)	   is	   poised	   to	   do	   the	  same	  to	  white	  collar	  jobs	  what	  industrialization	  did	  to	  blue	  collar	  jobs,	  as	  is	  e.g.	  experienced	  in	  everyday	  office	  work	  with	  process	  managing	  software	  re-­‐organizing,	   standardizing	   and	   determining	   human	   work	   flows	   (O’Neil,	  2016);	  it	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  education	  curricula,	  which	  already	  traditionally	  valued	   languages	   and	   maths	   above	   shop	   class	   and	   solving	   practical	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problems,	   and	   which	   are	   now	   centred	   around	   acquiring	   knowledge	   and	  skills	   organized	   in	   distinct	   definable	   and	   interchangeable	   pieces	   to	   attain	  transferable	  credits.	  However	   in	   parallel	   with	   pushing	   further	   the	   distinction	   between	  effective	   interaction	   with	   the	   material	   world	   and	   language-­‐and-­‐reason(logos)-­‐mediated	   interactions	   with	   people	   there	   always	   have	   been	  tendencies	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction	  as	  well,	  seeking	  to	  reclaim	  and	  reunite	  these	   driven-­‐apart	   aspects	   in	   theory	   and	   practice:	   including	   e.g.	   John	  Dewey’s	   pragmatism	   with	   its	   emphasis	   on	   practical	   “occupation”,	   the	  movements	   of	   embodiment	   and	   situatedness	   in	   cognitive	   science	   (Varela,	  Thompson,	   &	   Rosch,	   1991;	   Hutchins,	   2008;	   Suchman,	   1987;	   Núñez	   &	  Freeman,	   2000;	   Chrisley	   &	   Ziemke,	   2006),	   efforts	   to	   bring	   the	   material	  world	   to	   the	   attention	   of	   psychology	   (Costall	   &	   Dreier,	   2006;	   Moro	   &	  Rodríguez,	   2004)	   appeals	   for	   working	   with	   one’s	   hands	   (e.g.	   Crawford,	  2011),	   and	   cultural	   trends	   such	   as	  maker’s	   spaces,	   or	   a	   predicted	  maker’s	  revolution	  (Anderson,	  2012;	  Gershenfeld,	  2008).	  	  In	   the	   meanwhile	   new	   aspects	   of	   the	   dichotomy	   are	   found	   and	   the	  demarcation	   lines	   between	   humans	   and	   the	   rest	   of	   life	   are	   continuously	  redefined.	   In	  many	   approaches	   like	   the	   one,	   of	   Tomasello	   and	   colleagues,	  already	   mentioned	   above,	   object	   engagement	   –	   in	   continuation	   of	   Bühler	  and	  Vygotsky	  –	   is	   associated	  with	   instrumental	   reason	   (though	  not	   its	   full	  flourished	   cultural	   forms),	  whereas	   social	   interactions	   are	   associated	  with	  empathy	  and	  co-­‐operation,	  which	  are	  now,	  rather	  than	  language	  regarded	  as	  the	  uniquely	  human	  characteristics	  ultimately	  enabling	  instrumental	  reason	  and	   language	   to	   flower	   into	   their	   cultural	   forms.	   While	   these	  conceptualizations	  still	  attempt	  to	  squeeze	  non-­‐rational	  phenomena	  into	  the	  traditional	  logos-­‐framework,	  these	  phenomena	  do	  not	  quite	  seem	  to	  fit	  and	  already	   start	   to	   fracture	   traditional	   rationalist	   frameworks,	   asking	   for	   a	  larger	  reconceptualization	  and	  integration.	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2.8 Conclusions	  and	  Outlook	  Our	   analysis	   has	   shown	   that	   depending	   on	   the	   different	   historically	  grown	   agendas,	   theoretical	   assumptions	   and	   frameworks,	   methods,	   and	  ways	  of	  explanation	  the	  narrative	  has	  taken	  various	  different	  shapes.	  	  
2.8.1 Criteria	  for	  defining	  what	  counts	  as	  triadic	  interactions	  While	   the	   analysed	   approaches	   all	   agree	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   triadic	  interactions,	   taking	   a	   closer	   look,	   there	   is	   little	   consensus	   concerning	   the	  exact	   criteria	   of	   what	   actually	   counts	   as	   a	   triadic	   interaction	   in	   the	   first	  place.	   (In	   some	   cases	   there	   may	   even	   exist	   differences	   between	   the	  theoretical	   definition,	   practical	   examples	   given,	   and	   how	   they	   are	  operationalized	  for	  coding	  and	  or	  experimentation	  within	  a	  single	  research	  programme.)	  	  Some	   cultural	   approaches,	   taking	   into	   account	   and	   starting	   their	  
investigation	   from	   the	   material	   aspects	   and	   situatedness	   of	   an	  interaction,	   use	   “triadic”	   to	   characterize	   interactions	   whenever	   infant,	  
caregiver,	   and	   object	   are	   present,	   or	   even	   speak	   of	   “triadic”	   as	   a	  perspective	   adopted	   by	   a	   researcher,	   when	   analysing	   (any)	   interaction	   in	  terms	  of	  3	  poles:	  the	  participants	  and	  the	  “object”,	  the	  meaning	  or	  topic	  they	  negotiate	   (Rodriguez).	   Perhaps	   the	   most	   central	   characteristic	   of	   triadic	  interactions	  which	  all	  or	  most	  approaches	  could	  agree	  on	  is	  two	  people	  –	  in	  our	  case	  infant	  and	  caregiver	  –	  sharing	  a	   common	   focus	  of	  engagement.	  For	  most	  approaches,	  however,	  such	  a	  shared	  focus	  is	  necessary	  but	  still	  not	  sufficient,	   as	   the	   criterion	   of	   “shared	   focus”	   would,	   after	   all,	   already	   be	  fulfilled	   by	   a	  mother	   presenting	   an	   object	   to	   her	   infant	   and	  watching	   him	  play	  with	   it,	  without	   the	   infant	   showing	  any	   signs	  of	   engagement	  with	   the	  mother	   and	   hence	   not	   necessarily	   being	   aware	   of	   the	   mother	   at	   all	  (Adamson’s	   and	   Bakeman’s	   “passive	   joint	   engagement”).	   This	   definition	  might	  be	  sufficient	  for	  some	  accounts	  particularly	  emphasizing	  the	  caregiver	  (e.g.	   Rodriguez),	   however,	  most	   relational	   as	  well	   as	   cognitive	   approaches	  require	  the	  infant	   to	  show,	  in	  Adamson	  and	  Bakeman’s	  terms,	  some	  active	  
co-­‐ordination	  of	  engagement	  between	  people	  and	  objects,	  as	  well.	  While	  Adamson	   and	   Bakeman’s	   terminology	   and	   theoretical	   definition	   is	   kept	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deliberately	  broad,	  and	  remains	  slightly	  vague,	  but	  leaving	  room	  for	  various	  different	   forms	   of	   engagement,	   the	   practical	   examples	   they	   are	   giving	   are	  restricted	   to	   a	   much	   narrower	   understanding	   of	   attention	   co-­‐ordination:	  gaze	   alternation	   while	   following	   the	  mother’s	   instructions	   to	   put	   wooden	  figures	  into	  a	  wooden	  truck.	  	  Indeed	   for	   most	   cognitivist	   or	   cognitive	   psychology	   approaches	  
focussing	  on	  and	  testing	  the	  infant’s	  individual	  actions,	  and	  (supposedly	  underlying)	  capacities	  and	  knowledge,	  the	  criteria	  for	  triadic	  interactions	  have	   been	   narrowed	   down	   and	   condensed	   to	   the	   shorthand	   formula	   of	  
“[visual!]	   joint	   attention”	   (or	   “joint	   perception”,	   Tomasello),	   used	  sometimes	  for	  a	  specific	  behaviour,	  sometimes	  for	  a	  capacity.	  Joint	  attention	  is	   theoretically	   defined	   as	   “two	   people	   looking	   at	   something	   and	   knowing	  that	   they	   are	   looking	   at	   it	   together”,	   and	   typically	   operationalized	   for	  
coding	  and	  experimentation	  as	  “gaze	  alternation”	  or	  “gaze	  checking”.	  It	  is	   during	   this	   process	   of	   operationalization	   that	   problems	  with	  definitions	  become	   apparent:	   as	   it	   became	   clear	   that	   “sharing	   the	   focus	   of	   attention”	  might	   not	   be	   enough,	   Bakeman	   and	   Adamson	   introduced	   the	   category	  “passive	   joint	   engagement”,	   for	   cases	   where	   the	   mother	   establishes	   the	  shared	   focus,	   to	   distinguish	   it	   from	   proper,	   active	   “co-­‐operative	   joint	  engagement”.	   However,	   not	   even	   active	   gaze	   alternation	   was	   sufficient	   to	  conclude	  that	  an	  infant	  was	  knowingly	  involved	  in	  true	  joint	  attention,	  as	  it	  could	  be	  the	  result	  of	  external	  cues	  or	  a	  previously	  learned	  routine,	  leading	  researchers	   to	   further	   restrict	   analysis	   exclusively	   to	   non-­‐cued,	   infant-­‐initiated	   actions	   and	   explicitly	   excluding	   caregiver	   cued	   gaze	   and	   familiar	  routines	   (e.g.	   Tomasello	   &	   Carpenter,	   2007;	   Sugarman-­‐Bell,	   1978),	   thus	  however	  excluding	  large	  parts	  of	  typical	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	   interaction	  potentially	  playing	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  learning	  and	  the	  development	  of	  triadic	  interaction.	  	  Interestingly	  the	  early	  seminal	  approaches	  of	  Hubley	  and	  Trevarthen	  and	  Bakeman	  and	  Adamson,	   rooted	   in	  observing	  semi-­‐naturalistic	   interactions,	  do	   not	   restrict	   themselves	   to	   gaze	   measures	   for	   assessing	   “joint	   visual	  attention”,	  but	  ended	  up	  using	  broad,	  complex	  terms	  to	  capture	  the	  complex	  ways	   of	   relating	   developing	   towards	   the	   end	   of	   the	   first	   year:	   “secondary	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intersubjectivity”	   which	   is	   conceived	   of	   as:	   joint	   praxis,	   that	   is	   “acts	   on	  objects	   that	  are	  oriented	  to	   the	  attention	  or	  action	  of	   the	  other	  person”,	   in	  combination	  with	  interpersonal	  acts	  (Hubley	  &	  Trevarthen,	  1979),	  as	  well	  as	  “coordinated	   joint	   engagement”	   which	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   constituted	   by	  “the	   infant	  being	  actively	   involved	  with	  and	  coordinating	  his/her	  attention	  to	   both	   another	   person	   and	   the	   object	   that	   person	   is	   involved	   with”	  (Bakeman	   &	   Adamson,	   1984),	   both	   point	   to	   triadic	   interactions	   being	  complex	   multi-­‐strand,	   multi-­‐modal	   actions,	   themselves	   already	   based	   on	  simpler	   forms	   of	   joint	   relating	   to	   objects	   (joint	   praxis	   and	   passive	   joint	  engagement),	  which	  for	  better	  understanding	  should	  be	  looked	  into	  in	  more	  detail.	  	  
2.8.2 Underlying	   conceptions	   of	   thinking,	   acting,	   and	   co-­‐ordination:	  
One-­‐dimensional	  vs.	  multi-­‐modal,	  multi-­‐strand	  As	   already	   briefly	   mentioned	   above,	   more	   general	   notions	   of	   “co-­‐ordination	  of	  engagement”	  from	  early	  seminal	  studies	  taking	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  (semi-­‐)naturalistic	  interactions,	  have	  mostly	  been	  narrowed	  down	  to	  “gaze”,	  probably	   in	   the	   course	   of	   operationalizing	   action-­‐and-­‐attention-­‐coordination	   to	   get	   observable	   markers	   for	   conducting	   controlled	  laboratory	   experiments.	   Thus	   gaze	   often	   becomes	   1)	   the	   only	   modality	  looked	  at,	   coded,	   and	  analysed	   in	  observations,	   and	  2)	   the	  main	  and	  often	  only	   modality	   presented	   to	   children	   in	   experimental	   setups	   testing	  behaviours	   such	   as	   gaze	   following,	   considered	   as	   markers	   for	   children’s	  social	  abilities.	  Even	  when	  gaze	  cues	  are	  not	  presented	  in	  isolation,	  but	  are	  accompanied	   by	   an	   exclamation	   of	   surprise	   “.h!”,	   or	   a	   particularly	   salient	  facial	   expression,	   it	   is	   mostly	   for	   the	   practical	   purposes	   of	   making	   the	  experiment	   work	   better,	   and	   analysis	   still	   typically	   remains	   restricted	   to	  gaze.	  	  While	   it	   is	   interesting	   in	   itself	   that	   children	  are	  able	   to	  coordinate	   their	  attention	   and	   action	   appropriately	   and	   effectively	   even	   under/in	   such	  impoverished	   circumstances,	   and	   though	   gaze	   measures	   may	   work	   as	   a	  marker	   e.g.	   for	   predicting	   later	   diagnoses	   of	   autism	   (Mundy	   &	   Newell,	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2007),	   we	   still,	   in	   order	   to	   understand	   the	   development	   of	   these	  coordination	   abilities,	   need	   to	   look	   at	   and	   analyse	   the	   much	   richer	  multimodal-­‐multistrand	   action	   organisation	   of	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  interactions	  that	  infants	  are	  participating	  in	  from	  early	  on	  in	  everyday	  life.	  	  In	   general,	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   interpret	   these	   isolated	   gaze	  measures	   since	  we	   as	   of	   yet	   know	   very	   little	   about	   the	   role	   gaze	   plays	   in	   concert	   and	  dynamic	  interplay	  with	  the	  other	  modalities	  and	  strands	  of	  action	  in	  jointly	  co-­‐ordinated	  object	  practices.	  	  The	  pioneering	  research	  of	  Michael	  Land	  and	  colleagues	   using	   light-­‐weight,	   head-­‐worn	   eye-­‐trackers	   has	   described	   in	  detail	   how	   gaze	   is	   used	   to	   guide	   everyday	   activities	   such	   as	   tea	   making,	  sandwich	   making,	   driving…	   but	   apart	   from	   a	   few	   studies	   on	   sports	   has	  essentially	   been	   restricted	   to	   solitary	   activities	   (reviewed	   in	   Land,	   2006).	  The	  role	  of	  gaze	  in	  interactions	  has	  mostly	  been	  looked	  at	  in	  terms	  of	  gaze	  cues	   for	   engaging	   and	   disengaging	   from	   dyadic	   conversations	   (Rossano,	  2012),	   with	   very	   few	   if	   any	   studies	   looking	   at	   how	   gaze	   guides	   social	  interactions	  involving	  objects,	  at	  least	  outside	  of	  highly	  artificial	  laboratory	  contexts	   (but	   see	   e.g.	   Ho,	   Foulsham,	   &	   Kingstone,	   2015;	   Wu,	   Bischof,	   &	  Kingstone,	  2013).	  Interestingly	   recent	   data	   from	   the	   first	   few	   studies	   looking	   at	   gaze	  interactions	  in	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	   interactions	  staged	  in	  the	   laboratory	  (Yu	  &	   Smith,	   2013;	   see	   section	   2.2.6.4),	   indicated	   that	   infants	   in	   free	   play	  activities	   rarely	   engaged	   in	   the	   normative	   steps	   of	   “visual	   joint	   attention”,	  not	   engaging	   in	   gaze	   following	   but	   rather	   monitoring	   moving	   hands	   and	  objects	  directly,	  or	  –	  when	  freely	  roaming	  around	  on	  the	  floor	  –	   looking	  at	  objects	  and	  at	  the	  legs	  of	  talking	  adults	  who	  towered	  over	  them	  (Franchak,	  Kretch,	  Soska,	  Babcock,	  &	  Adolph,	  2010).	  Narrowing	   down	   and	   confining	   the	   question	   how	   joint	   acting	   (and	  thinking)	  is	  co-­‐ordinated	  to	  the	  modality	  of	  gaze	  (in	  particular	  specific	  series	  of	   gaze	   events	   such	   as	   “joint	   attention”	   and	   “gaze	   checking”),	   seems	   to	   be	  part	   of	   a	  more	   general	   tendency	   found	   in	   (particularly	   classical)	   cognitive	  science	   and	   cognitive	  psychology	   and	   reflected	   in	   some	  of	   the	   approaches	  analysed	  here	  (see	  in	  particular	  section	  4.2.4):	  It	  is	  the	  tendency	  to	  conceive	  of	   the	   processes	   of	   thinking	   and	   acting	   as	   a	   one-­‐dimensional	   sequence	   of	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discrete	   steps	   –	   a	   conception	   likely	   stemming	   from	   using	   language	   and	  rational	  instrumental	  problem	  solving	  –	  both	  involving	  (the	  production	  of)	  a	  highly	   focused,	   readily	   graspable	   sequence	  of	   discrete	   events	   -­‐	   as	   a	  model	  for	   thinking	   and	   acting	   in	   general.	   Consequently	   the	   challenge	   of	   co-­‐ordination	  mostly	  boils	  down	  to	  singling	  out	  and	  selecting	  the	  correct	  action	  unit	  from	  of	  an	  ever	  larger	  repertoire	  –	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  integrating	  multiple	  targets	   –	   and	   sequentially	   chaining	   them	   together	   into	   longer	   and	   longer	  stacks.	  While	  this	  conception	  has	  led	  to	  important	  insights	  and	  not	  least	  the	  take	   off	   of	   computers,	   to	   better	   understand	   the	   development	   of	   triadic	  interaction,	  what	  its	  challenges	  are	  and	  what	  it	  achieves	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  activities	   associated	   with	   it,	   such	   as	   language/symbol	   use,	   we	   need	   to	  extend	  this	  view:	  we	  need	  to	  reconsider	  the	  challenges	  and	   investigate	  the	  accomplishments	  of	  co-­‐ordination	  as	  a	  continuous	  dynamic	  orchestrating	  of	  multiple	  modalities	  and	  strands	  of	  action,	  distributing	  and	  integrating	  them	  flexibly,	  intra-­‐	  as	  well	  as	  interpersonally	  (see	  chapters	  6-­‐7).	  	  
2.8.3 Empirical	  evidence	  base	  and	  ecological	  validity	  The	   empirical	   evidence	   most	   studies	   draw	   upon	   to	   account	   for	   the	  development	   of	   triadic	   interactions	   are	   actually	   based	   on	   a	   very	   small	  number	  of	  specific	  interaction	  contexts:	  Dyadic	  proto-­‐conversation	  for	  early	  interactions,	  and	  (staged)	  object	  play	  for	  later	  ones	  (toys	  often	  provided	  by	  the	  researchers:	  Bakeman	  &	  Adamson,	  1984;	  de	  Barbaro,	   Johnson,	  &	  Deák,	  2013,	  Moro	  &	  Rodriguez	  2004,	  Hubley	  1983),	  with	  the	  latter	  also	  often	  part	  of	  explicitly	  pedagogical	  situations	  or	  at	  least	  guided	  by	  normative	  goals,	  i.e.	  word	   learning	   or	   imitation	   with	   objects	   (Sugarman,	   Zukow-­‐Goldring,	   see	  sections	  2.2.3	  and	  2.5.3).	  	  While	  these	  activities	  are	  lend	  themselves	  for	  investigation	  as	  they	  can	  be	  easily	   re-­‐created	   with	   minimal	   context	   in	   a	   lab	   and	   turned	   into	   a	  standardized	   procedure,	   and	   some	   of	   them	  might	   be	   particularly	   relevant	  for	   practical	   questions	   of	   education,	   they	   most	   probably	   constitute,	  however,	   only	   a	   specific	   small	   fraction	   of	   and	   hence	   may	   not	   be	  representative	   for	   the	   wide	   range	   of	   activities	   infants	   and	   their	   families	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engage	   in	   together.	  These	  activities	  might	  have	  very	  different	   settings	  and	  activity	   structures,	   enabling	   and	   constraining	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  interactions	  in	  different	  ways,	  giving	  rise	  to	  different	  forms	  of	  co-­‐ordination	  and	  hence	  need	  to	  be	  looked	  into	  in	  more	  detail.	  
2.8.3.1 Outlook:	  how	  the	  theoretical	  frameworks	  can	  guide	  empirical	  studies	  Thus,	  in	  order	  to	  better	  understand	  the	  early	  development	  of	  joint	  object	  practice	  (how	  it	  is	  established,	  sustained,	  and	  organised),	  and	  how	  triadicity	  develops,	  that	  is	  how	  infants	  participating	  in	  these	  interactions	  increasingly	  come	   to	  share	  and	  collaboratively	  co-­‐create	  a	  world,	  we	  suggest	   to	  extend	  the	  existing	  research	  by:	  	  1. Rather	  than	  focussing	  exclusively	  on	  (lab	  suited)	  staged	  object	  play	  or	  explicitly	  pedagogical	  situations,	  compare	  different	  ecological	  
activities	  of	  everyday	  life	  and	  (analyse)	  how	  these	  different	  
ecological	  activity	  contexts	  enable	  and	  constrain	  specific	  
actions.	  	  2. Rather	  than	  analysing	  infants’	  actions	  with	  regard	  to	  a	  presupposed	  normative	  goal,	  differentiate	  and	  characterize	  different	  goal	  
characteristics	  of	  activities	  (e.g.	  goal-­‐oriented	  task	  or	  open	  exploratory	  social	  play),	  and	  generally	  look	  at	  how	  the	  interaction	  
unfolds,	  how	  it	  is	  established,	  and	  sustained	  and	  ended.	  
3. Rather	  than	  focussing	  on	  either	  infant	  or	  caregiver,	  look	  at	  the	  
functional	  roles	  and	  contributions	  of	  all	  3	  poles	  of	  the	  
interaction,	  their	  interrelatedness	  and	  how	  they	  change	  over	  
time.	  4. Rather	  than	  focussing	  exclusively	  on	  (visual)	  joint	  attention	  and	  conceiving	  of	  interactions	  as	  a	  one	  dimensional	  serial	  sequence,	  
investigate	  in	  detail	  how	  interaction	  partners	  jointly	  co-­‐ordinate	  
complex	  multi-­‐modal	  multi-­‐strand	  interactions	  as	  they	  unfold,	  and	  how	  they	  jointly	  structure	  shared	  spaces	  of	  meaning	  and	  
action,	  within	  which	  they	  orient	  each	  other	  towards	  common	  
points	  of	  reference.	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Part	   II	  An	  Empirical	  investigation	  into	  infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  interactions	  
over	  the	  first	  year	  of	  life:	  a	  naturalistic,	  longitudinal	  study	  	  Based	   on	   the	   results	   and	   implications	   of	   the	   conceptual	   analysis	  summarized	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  we	  designed	  and	  conducted	  a	  longitudinal	  study	  accompanying	  infants	  and	  caregivers	  in	  their	  everyday	  life	   between	   3	   and	   12	   months.	   Chapters	   3	   and	   4	   represent	   examples	   of	  different	   forms	   of	   analysis:	   first	   looking	   at	   co-­‐ordination	   in	   one	   model-­‐activity	   “book	   sharing”	   in	   detail,	   and	   then	   extending	   the	   analysis	   to	   and	  comparing	  co-­‐ordination	  across	  different	  activity	  contexts.	  
3 Jointly	  structuring	  triadic	  spaces	  of	  meaning	  and	  action:	  
book	  sharing	  from	  3	  months	  on	  Nicole	  Rossmanith,	   Alan	   Costall,	   Andreas	   F.	   Reichelt,	   Beatriz	   López	   and	  Vasudevi	  Reddy13	  
Abstract	  This	   study	   explores	   the	   emergence	   of	   triadic	   interactions	   through	   the	  example	   of	   book	   sharing.	   As	   part	   of	   a	   naturalistic	   study,	   10	   infants	   were	  visited	  in	  their	  homes	  from	  3–12	  months.	  We	  report	  that	  (1)	  book	  sharing	  as	  a	   form	   of	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	   interaction	   occurred	   from	   as	   early	   as	   3	  months.	   Using	   qualitative	   video	   analysis	   at	   a	   micro-­‐level	   adapting	  methodologies	  from	  conversation	  and	  interaction	  analysis,	  we	  demonstrate	  that	  caregivers	  and	  infants	  practiced	  book	  sharing	  in	  a	  highly	  co-­‐ordinated	  way,	  with	  caregivers	  carving	  out	   interaction	  units	  and	  shaping	  actions	  into	  action	   arcs	   and	   infants	   actively	   participating	   and	   co-­‐ordinating	   their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  published	   as:	   Rossmanith,	   N.,	   Costall,	   A.,	   Reichelt,	   A.	   F.,	   López,	   B.,	   &	  Reddy,	  V.	   (2014).	   Jointly	   structuring	   triadic	   spaces	  of	  meaning	   and	  action:	  book	  sharing	  from	  3	  months	  on.	  Frontiers	  in	  Psychology,	  5,	  p.	  1390.	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attention	  between	  mother	  and	  object	  from	  the	  beginning.	  We	  also	  (2)	  sketch	  a	  developmental	  trajectory	  of	  book	  sharing	  over	  the	  first	  year	  and	  show	  that	  the	   quality	   and	   dynamics	   of	   book	   sharing	   interactions	   underwent	  considerable	  change	  as	  the	  ecological	  situation	  was	  transformed	  in	  parallel	  with	   the	   infants’	   development	   of	   attention	   and	   motor	   skills.	   Social	   book	  sharing	   interactions	   reached	   an	   early	   peak	   at	   6	   months	   with	   the	   infants	  becoming	  more	   active	   in	   the	   coordination	   of	   attention	   between	   caregiver	  and	  book.	   From	  7	   to	  9	  months,	   the	   infants	   shifted	   their	   interest	   largely	   to	  solitary	   object	   exploration,	   in	   parallel	   with	   newly	   emerging	   postural	   and	  object	   manipulation	   skills,	   disrupting	   the	   social	   coordination	   and	   the	  cultural	   frame	   of	   book	   sharing.	   In	   the	   period	   from	   9	   to	   12	  months,	   social	  book	   interactions	   resurfaced,	   as	   infants	   began	   to	   effectively	   integrate	  manual	   object	   actions	  within	   the	   socially	   shared	   activity.	   In	   conclusion,	   to	  fully	  understand	  the	  development	  and	  qualities	  of	  triadic	  cultural	  activities	  such	  as	  book	  sharing,	  we	  need	  to	  look	  especially	  at	  the	  hitherto	  overlooked	  early	   period	   from	   4	   to	   6	   months,	   and	   investigate	   how	   shared	   spaces	   of	  meaning	   and	   action	   are	   structured	   together	   in	   and	   through	   interaction,	  creating	  the	  substrate	  for	  continuing	  cooperation	  and	  cultural	  learning.	  
3.1 INTRODUCTION	  How	   do	   we	   arrive	   at	   a	   shared	   world?	   We	   jointly	   act	   in,	   communicate	  about,	   transform	   and	   co-­‐create	   our	   world.	   In	   the	   process,	   we	   smoothly	  navigate	  and	  build	  complex	  networks	  of	  meaning-­‐making	  involving	  persons,	  objects,	   and	   symbols.	   How	   do	   children	   grow	   in	   and	   into	   culture?	   How	   do	  they	   become	   competent	   participants	   in	   cultural	   practices,	   in	   networks	   of	  meaning-­‐making	  including	  people	  and	  artifacts?	  Researchers	   interested	   in	   cultural	   and	   social	   learning	   mostly	   start	  looking	   from	   the	   end	   of	   the	   first	   year,	   a	   period	   often	   characterized	   as	   a	  major	   shift,	   even	   revolution	   (“secondary	   intersubjectivity”	   Trevarthen	   &	  Hubley,	  1978;	  “9	  month	  revolution”	  Tomasello,	  1999)	  in	  development,	  when	  infants	  engage	  in	  a	  number	  of	  qualitatively	  new	  ways	  of	  interacting	  such	  as	  jointly	   labeling	   things,	   following	   instructions,	   imitating	   acts	   on	   objects,	   or	  frequent	  gaze	  checking	  with	  their	  parents.	  At	  this	  point	  infants	  are	  credited	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with	   engaging	   in	   true	   triadic	   interactions,	   and	   are	   considered	   capable	   of	  coordinating	   for	   the	   first	   time	   their	   engagements	   with	   objects	   and	   their	  engagement	  with	  people.	  The	  transition	  is	  often	  seen	  as	  the	  convergence	  of	  two	  lines	  of	  development	  considered	  to	  be	  separate	  before	  this	  point:	  dyadic	  infant-­‐caregiver	   communication	   and	   infant-­‐object	   interaction.	   This	  convergence	   is	   supposedly	   mediated	   by	   a	   newly	   emerging	   capacity	   for	  visual	   joint	   attention	   only	   then	   giving	   rise	   to	   conventional	   labeling	   and	  language	   use,	   conventional	   object	   use	   and	   symbolic	   activities	   in	   general,	  often	   associated	   with	   cultural	   learning.	   Interestingly,	   the	   seminal	   studies	  which	   constitute	   much	   of	   the	   empirical	   basis	   of	   this	   developmental	  narrative	   (Trevarthen	   &	   Hubley,	   1978;	   Hubley	   &	   Trevarthen,	   1979;	  Bakeman	  &	  Adamson,	  1984),	  document	  early	  modes	  of	  combined	  social	  and	  object	   engagement	   termed	   joint	   praxis	   and	   passive	   joint	   engagement,	  respectively.	   Looking	   at	   the	   data	   reported,	   the	   studies	   actually	   show	   a	  gradual	  rather	  than	  revolutionary	  shift	  toward	  active	  triadic	  engagement	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  infant.	  Hubley	  and	  Trevarthen	  describe	  how	  caregivers	  first	  introduce	  their	  own	  body	  (games	  of	  the	  person)	  and	  later	  objects	  (marking	  and	  animating	  them)	  as	  a	  third	  pole	  into	  their	  social	  engagement	  with	  their	  infants.	   Adamson	   and	   Bakeman	   (1984)	   document	   how	   caregivers	   change	  their	   marking	   of	   objects	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   first	   year	   toward	   more	  conventional	   forms.	   These	   data	   have	   begun	   to	   be	   picked	   up	   on	   only	   very	  recently	  (De	  Barbaro	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Nomikou,	  Rohlfing,	  &	  Szufnarowska,	  2013;	  see	   also	   Moro	   &	   Rodríguez,	   2004;	   Zukow-­‐Goldring,	   2012).	   The	   standard	  narrative	   has	   also	   recently	   been	   challenged	   by	   experimental	   studies	  documenting	  aspects	  of	   labeling,	  and	   joint	  attention	   in	   infants	  already	  at	  6	  months	  (Bergelson	  &	  Swingley,	  2012;	  Striano	  &	  Reid,	  2009).	  Here	   we	   take	   book	   sharing	   as	   a	   model	   activity	   to	   explore	   the	  development	  of	  triadic	  infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  interactions.	  In	  a	  longitudinal	  study	   looking	   at	   infants’	   everyday	   life	   activities	   from	  3	   to	   12	  months,	   this	  activity	   turned	  out	   to	   be	   one	  of	   the	   earliest	   social	   interactions	   involving	   a	  complex	  object,	  occurring	  from	  as	  early	  as	  3	  months.	  This	   early	   occurrence	   raises	   the	   question:	   how	   can	   infants	   who	   are	  preverbal,	  do	  not	  yet	  understand	  the	  referential	  character	  of	  pictures,	  and—
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supposedly—do	   not	   have	   command	   of	   joint	   attention,	   meaningfully	  participate	  in	  a	  book	  sharing	  activity?	  As	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  jointly	  practiced	  cultural	   object	   routines,	   book	   sharing	   provides	   an	   excellent	   model	   for	  exploring	  (1)	  how	  a	  joint	  object	  activity	  is	  practiced	  and	  sustained	  between	  asymmetric	   interaction	   partners;	   (2)	   as	   an	   inherently	   semiotic	   activity14,	  involving	   the	   guiding	   and	   mutually	   orienting	   of	   attention,	   and	   shared	  meaning,	   it	   allows	  us	   to	   explore	  how	   triadic	   interactions	   involving	  mutual	  coordination	   and	   orientation	   toward	   common	   points	   of	   reference	   develop	  over	   the	   first	   year	  of	   life.	  While	   there	   is	   an	  extensive	   literature	  on	  picture	  book	   sharing,	   most	   studies	   start	   looking	   toward	   the	   end	   of	   the	   first	   year	  (Ninio,	  1980;	  Fletcher	  &	  Reese,	  2005;	  but	  see	  van	  Kleeck,	  Alexander,	  Vigil,	  &	  Templeton,	   1996),	   and	   primarily	   focus	   on	   educational	   achievements	  associated	  with	  the	  cultural	  technology	  of	  book	  reading	  such	  as	  labeling	  and	  word	  learning,	  picture	  understanding,	  and	  literacy	  skill.	  Here	  we	  focus	  on	  how	  the	  activity	  of	  book	  sharing	  unfolds,	  how	  caregiver,	  infant,	   and	   book	   respectively	   guide,	   sustain,	   and	   constrain	   the	   unfolding	  interaction.	   Taking	   the	   interaction	   as	   our	   level	   of	   analysis,	   we	   draw—in	  addition	  to	  approaches	  from	  developmental	  psychology—on	  concepts	  from	  embodied,	  situated,	  dynamical	  and	  enactive	  cognitive	  science	  (Fogel,	  1993;	  Thelen	  &	  Smith,	   1994;	  De	   Jaegher	  &	  Di	  Paolo,	   2008),	   adapt	  methods	   from	  ethnography,	   conversation	   and	   interaction	   analysis	   (e.g.	   Goodwin,	   2000;	  Alač,	   2005;	   Streeck,	   Goodwin,	   &	   LeBaron,	   2011;	   Deppermann,	   2013),	   and	  use	  qualitative	  micro-­‐analysis	  to	  explore	  how,	  from	  the	  interplay	  of	  multiple	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  The	   ability	   to	   engage	   with	   books	   is	   typically	   considered	   a	   complex	  cultural	  achievement	  based	  on	  the	  mastery	  of	  complex	  semiotic,	  that	  is,	  sign	  
processes:	   pictures	   referring	   to	   “things”	   in	   the	   world,	   words	   referring	   to	  pictures	   and	   “things”,	   or	   “processes”	   in	   the	   world	   etc.	   Young	   infants’	  meaningful	   participation	   in	   book	   sharing,	   long	   before	   they	   have	  mastered	  these	  complex	  semiotic	  skills,	  invites	  us	  to	  view	  them	  in	  a	  different	  way	  and	  investigate	   how	   they	   might	   be	   understood	   as	   gradually	   developing	  processes	  of	  increasingly	  complex	  mutual	  co-­‐ordination.	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modalities,	  shared	  spaces	  of	  meaning	  and	  action	  are	  created	  around	  objects	  and	  change	  over	  time.	  
3.2 MATERIALS	  AND	  METHODS	  The	  book	  sharing	  activities	  documented	  in	  this	  paper	  have	  been	  collected	  as	  part	  of	  a	  naturalistic	  longitudinal	  study	  investigating	  the	  development	  of	  triadic	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	   interactions	   over	   the	   first	   year	   of	   life	  especially	  focusing	  on	  conventional	  practices	  and	  encounters	  with	  everyday	  objects.	  Ten	   infants	  were	  visited	   in	   their	  homes	  once	  a	  month	   from	  3	   to	  9	  months	   of	   age	   and	   7	   of	   them	   up	   to	   the	   age	   of	   12	  months.	   A	   smaller	   pilot	  study	  with	  6	  infants	  at	  3,	  4,	  5	  as	  well	  as	  9	  months	  of	  age	  (3	  located	  in	  Vienna,	  3	  in	  the	  UK,	  4	  girls,	  4	  first	  ones,	  2	  of	  them	  girls)	  was	  conducted	  in	  advance	  of	  the	  main	  study.	  
3.2.1 PARTICIPANTS	  Of	   the	  10	   families	  participating	   in	   the	   study,	  7	  were	   from	   the	  UK	  and	  3	  from	  Austria.	  They	  were	  recruited	  from	  a	  wider	  circle	  of	  friends	  and	  family	  acquaintances,	   from	  mother	  and	   infant	  groups,	  as	  well	  as	   through	  word	  of	  mouth	   and	   flyers.	   All	   infants	   were	   living	   in	  middle	   class	   households	  with	  two	   caregivers	   and	   were	   raised	   in	   a	   monolingual	   (English	   or	   German)	  environment	  except	  one	  boy	  raised	  bilingually	  in	  German	  and	  Russian.	  The	  primary	  caregivers	  (mothers	  in	  all	  cases)	  all	  had	  tertiary	  education	  and	  took	  an	  active	  interest	  in	  supporting	  the	  infant’s	  education.	  Six	  of	  them	  (all	  in	  the	  UK)	  returned	  to	  either	  part	  time	  or	  full	  time	  work	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  study.	  Of	  the	  10	   infants	  5	  were	  female	  and	  3	  (2	  boys	  and	  1	  girl)	  were	  first	  born.	  None	  of	  them	  had	  medical	  or	  cognitive	  problems.	  
3.2.2 HOME	  VISIT	  OBSERVATION	  PROCEDURE	  AND	  DATA	  COLLECTION	  A	  typical	  home	  visit	   lasted	  3–4	  h,	  spanning	  1–2	  sleep-­‐wake	  cycles	  of	  the	  infants.	   One	   to	   two	   observers	   accompanied	   infants	   and	   caregivers	   with	   a	  video	   camera	   (Panasonic	   HC-­‐V500	   in	   iframe	   format:	   960	   ×	   540	   pixels	  resolution,	  25	  frames	  per	  second)	  documenting	  their	  everyday	  activities	  as	  they	  unfolded.	  For	  static	  situations	  a	  tripod	  camera	  mount	  was	  used,	  though	  for	  a	  large	  number	  of	  cases	  we	  switched	  to	  a	  handheld	  camera	  approach	  to	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capture	   dynamic	   scenes	   especially	   after	   infants	   became	  mobile.	   Also,	   field	  notes	   were	   taken	   detailing	   the	   behavior	   of	   the	   infants,	   caregivers	   and	  siblings,	   including	   object	   and	   socially	   directed	   behavior,	   layout	   of	   the	  environment,	  and	  availability	  of	  objects	  such	  as	  toys	  and	  tools.	   In	  addition,	  reports	   from	   parents	   were	   collected	   giving	   additional	   background	  information	   on	   object	   use.	   The	   study	   was	   approved	   by	   the	   Psychology	  Research	   Ethics	   Committee	   of	   the	   University	   of	   Portsmouth,	   and	   was	  conducted	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  1964	  Declaration	  of	  Helsinki	  and	  the	  Code	  of	   Human	   Research	   Ethics	   of	   the	   BPS.	   Parents	   provided	  written	   informed	  consent	  for	  the	  study.	  
3.2.3 DATA	  MANAGEMENT	  AND	  ANALYSIS	  From	  these	  raw	  data,	  300+	  hours	  of	  video	  recordings,	  a	  video	  library	  was	  constructed	   in	   Final	   Cut	   Pro	  X	   (Apple	  Corporation).	   Episodes	  were	   tagged	  with	  keywords	  organizing	  activities	  into	  basic	  ecological	  activity	  categories,	  including	   (breast)	   feeding,	   diaper	   change,	   “witnessing,”	   soothing,	   social	  and/or	   object	   play,	   book	   sharing,	   sibling	   interaction,	   watching	   TV.	   In	  addition,	  infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  interactions	  as	  well	  as	  mutual	  coordination	  and	   orientation	   episodes	   were	   marked.	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   paper,	  “book	   sharing”	   was	   selected	   as	   a	   model	   activity	   for	   investigating	   the	  development	  of	  participation	  in	  joint	  cultural	  activities	  and	  coordination	  of	  triadic	  engagements.	  In	   total	   124	   book	   interaction	   episodes	   (excluding	   15	   infant-­‐researcher	  interactions)	  were	  identified	  and	  described.	  For	  an	  episode	  to	  be	  counted	  as	  a	  book	  interaction	  infants	  needed	  to	  be	  engaged	  with	  a	  book	  for	  at	  least	  30	  s.	  If	   after	   a	   period	   of	   disengagement—seen	   here	   as	   an	   integral	   part	   of	  (especially	   joint)	   activities	   (Stern,	   1971;	   Brazelton	   et	   al.,	   1974;	   Tronick,	  1989;	  De	  Jaegher	  &	  Di	  Paolo,	  2007)—re-­‐engagement	  did	  not	  occur	  within	  30	  s,	   the	   book	   interaction	   was	   considered	   to	   have	   ended	   at	   the	   point	   of	  disengagement.	   For	   all	   episodes,	   the	   actors	   (infant,	  mother,	   father,	   sibling,	  ...),	  actions	  and	  objects	  used	  (types	  of	  books),	  as	  well	  as	  spatial	  configuration	  were	   cataloged.	   We	   distinguished	   between	   2	   different	   types	   of	   book	  interactions:	   (1)	   social	   book	   sharing	   (72	   episodes),	   and	   (2)	   solitary	   book	  exploration	   (52	   episodes).	   For	   a	   book	   interaction	   to	   count	   as	   social	   book	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sharing	  the	  participants	  each	  had	  to	  be	  engaged	  with	  the	  book	  (via	  gaze	  or	  other	   book	   oriented	   actions,	   e.g.,	   grasping,	   pointing	   to,	   or	   verbally	  referencing	   a	   page)	   and	   to	   coordinate	   their	   engagement,	   that	   is,	   to	   adjust	  their	  behavior	   in	   response	   to	  and	   in	  anticipation	  of	   each	  other’s—book	  or	  partner	  directed—actions	  (Bühler,	  1927/2000;	  Fogel,	  1993;	  De	  Jaegher	  &	  Di	  Paolo,	  2007).	  For	  each	  type	  of	  book	  interaction,	  the	  number	  of	  occurrences	  and	  duration	  of	  the	  episodes	  was	  determined	  across	  ages	  and	  families,	  and	  basic	  analysis	  and	  visualization	  was	  performed	  using	  Python	  (numpy,	  scipy,	  and	  matplotlib	  packages,	  free	  software).	  
3.2.4 QUALITATIVE	  MICRO-­‐ANALYSIS	  OF	  SELECTED	  EPISODES	  Of	   the	   72	   social	   book	   sharing	   episodes,	   20	   episodes	   were	   selected	   for	  further	  qualitative	  analysis	  using	   the	   following	  criteria:	   (a)	  only	  caregiver-­‐infant	   interactions	   without	   siblings	   to	   reduce	   complexity,	   (b)	   sampling	   of	  interactions	  from	  every	  age	  group,	  and	  (c)	  richness	  of	  interactions	  including	  attention	   and	   action	   coordination	   and	   communication.	   These	   selected	  episodes	   were	   transcribed	   and	   analyzed	   drawing	   on	   methods	   from	  conversation	   analysis	   and	   interaction	   analysis,	   adapted	   to	   the	   study	   of	  preverbal	   infants,	   with	   a	   special	   focus	   on	   embodiment	   and	  multimodality	  (Goodwin,	   2000;	   Alač,	   2005;	   Demuth,	   2012;	   Deppermann,	   2013).	   The	  analysis	  was	  performed	  in	  ELAN	  (free	  software,	  The	  Language	  Archive,	  Max-­‐Planck-­‐Institute	   for	   Psycholinguistics,	   Nijmegen,	   Brugman,	   Russel,	   &	  Nijmegen,	   2004)	   with	   audio	   pitch	   and	   intensity	   extraction	   performed	   in	  Praat	   (free	   software,	   by	   Paul	   Boersma	   and	   David	   Weenink,	   University	   of	  Amsterdam).	  The	  videos	  were	  repeatedly	  viewed	  and	  described	  in	  an	  iterative	  process	  looping	   back	   and	   forth	   between	   video	   and	   transcript	   (using	   ELAN),	  including	  gross	  description,	  and	  particular	  tiers	  for	  vocalization,	  audio	  pitch	  and	   intensity,	   action	  and	  gaze	  of	   caregiver	  and	   infant.	  Thus	  a	  multi-­‐tiered,	  parallel	   record	   of	   the	   episode	  was	   constructed	   and	   visualized	   similar	   to	   a	  music	  score	  sheet,	  mapping	  a	  range	  of	  descriptors	  to	  the	  video	  stream	  and	  relating	  them	  to	  each	  other	  in	  time.	  Using	  these	  visualizations,	  we	  analyzed	  the	  sequential	  organization	  of	  the	  actions	  and	  how	  the	  various	  strands	  of	  an	  action,	  spanning	  multiple	  modalities,	  relate	  to	  each	  other	  and	  play	  together	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in	  the	  coordination	  of	  action.	  Transcripts	  were	  compared	  across	  infants	  and	  ages.	   Some	   transcription	   and	   video	   stills	   from	   ELAN	   are	   also	   used	   for	  purposes	  of	  illustration.	  
3.3 RESULTS	  AND	  DISCUSSION	  
3.3.1 GENERAL	   RESULTS:	   POPULATION	   LEVEL	   RESULTS,	   THE	   “UMWELT”	   OF	  
THE	  INFANTS	  AND	  THREE	  BOOK	  SHARING	  EXAMPLES	  
3.3.1.1 Population	  level	  results	  Book	  sharing	  was	  practiced	  in	  all	  10	  participating	  families	  (ranging	  from	  2	  to	  20	  episodes	  per	  infant).	  We	  documented	  the	  activity	  from	  as	  early	  3	  as	  months	  (4	  families)	  right	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  observation	  period,	  and	  no	  later	  than	  by	  6	  months	  for	  all	  families.	  To	  our	  knowledge,	  this	  is	  the	  first	  time	  book	  sharing	  interactions	  at	  this	  early	  age	  have	  been	  described	  in	  the	  literature.	   Social	   book	   sharing	   provided	   the	   context	   for	   infants’	   first	  encounters	  with	  books.	  Later,	   in	   the	  second	  half	  of	   the	   first	  year,	   they	  also	  began	   to	   approach	   and	   interact	  with	   books	   on	   their	   own	   in	   solitary	   book	  exploration.	   Figure	   3.1	   (top)	   shows	   the	   number	   of	   occurrences	   of	   book	  interaction	  episodes	  for	  all	  infants	  observed	  in	  the	  longitudinal	  study,	  by	  age	  group	  and	  type	  (social	  or	  solitary).	  Note	  that	  we	  include	  these	  data	  to	  give	  an	   overview	   of	   the	   distribution	   of	   episodes	   forming	   the	   basis	   for	   the	  qualitative	   study.	   Also	   note	   the	   overall	   small	   sample	   size	   and	   that	   key	  variables	   such	   as	   the	   frequency	   of	   book	   sharing	   offers,	   and	   presence	   and	  comparability	   of	   books	   in	   the	   environment	  were	   not	   controlled	   for	   in	   the	  naturalistic	   study	   as	   would	   have	   been	   the	   case	   in	   an	   experimental	   study.	  Throughout	   we	   focus	   on	   two	   relatively	   robust	   measures	   to	   complement	  insights	   about	   the	   changing	   nature	   of	   book	   interactions	   gained	   from	  qualitative	   analysis:	   (1)	   the	   relative	   prevalence	   of	   social	   vs.	   solitary	   book	  interactions,	  and	  (2)	  the	  changes	  in	  mean	  episode	  duration	  over	  the	  course	  of	   the	   first	   year.	   While	   social	   book	   sharing	   interaction	   occurred	   from	   as	  early	   as	   3	   months,	   solitary	   book	   exploration	   episodes	   started	   to	   occur	   at	  around	   6	  months,	   displacing	   social	   book	   sharing	   as	   the	   dominant	   type	   of	  interaction	  at	  8–9	  months.	  From	  around	  10	  months	  on,	  social	  book	  sharing	  interactions	   became	   dominant	   again	   until	   a	   balance	   was	   reached	   at	   12	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months.	  Figure	  3.1	  (middle)	  shows	  the	  mean	  durations	  (in	  seconds)	  of	  book	  sharing	   episodes	   for	   all	   infants,	   by	   age	   group	   and	   type.	   Starting	   from	  durations	   of	   around	   2	   and	   a	   half	   minutes	   at	   3	   months,	   mean	   durations	  increased	   considerably	   from	  4	  months	   reaching	   a	  peak	  of	   over	  6	  min	  at	  6	  months.	   From	   7	  months	   on,	  mean	   durations	   showed	   a	   sharp	   decrease,	   as	  book	   sharing	   interactions	   dropped	   by	   more	   than	   half	   to	   around	   3	   min	  duration	   and	   then	   stayed	   relatively	   constant.	   Social	   and	   solitary	   book	  interactions	  accounted	  for	  from	  around	  1%	  (at	  3	  months)	  to	  around	  5%	  (at	  6	  months)	  of	  the	  total	  recorded	  time	  that	  infants	  were	  awake	  on	  average	  at	  each	   month	   as	   shown	   in	   Figure	   3.1	   (bottom),	   with	   their	   distributions	  largely	  reflecting	  the	  overall	   trend	  from	  social	   to	  solitary	  to	  balanced	  book	  interaction	  and	  the	  reduction	  in	  mean	  episode	  duration	  after	  6	  months.	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3.3.1.2 The	  “Umwelt”15	  of	  infants	  at	  3–4	  months	  of	  age	  Before	   turning	   to	   the	   book	   sharing	   interactions	   in	   detail,	   we	   provide	   a	  sketch	  of	  the	  larger	  context	  of	  everyday	  life	  with	  a	  3–4	  month	  old	  infant	  as	  it	  presented	   itself	   in	   the	   study	   and	   is	   described	   in	   the	   literature.	   How	   do	  infants	  engage	  with	  their	  world	  at	  3–	  4	  months	  and	  what	  does	  their	  world	  look	  like	  at	  this	  age?	  At	  3	  months	  of	  age,	  infants	  are	  getting	  more	  and	  more	  interested	   in	   their	   surroundings.	   They	   have	   good	   control	   over	   their	   gaze	  (with	   a	   well	   developed	   oculomotor	   system)	   and	   increasingly	   look	   at	   and	  track	  objects	  in	  their	  environment	  (von	  Hofsten	  &	  Rosander,	  1997).	  At	   3–4	   months	   infants	   are,	   however,	   already	   fluent	   conversation	  partners:	   by	   then,	   they	  have	   already	   actively	  participated	   in	  dyadic	  proto-­‐conversations	   with	   their	   caregivers	   for	   several	   weeks,	   fully	   utilizing	   and	  practicing	   all	   their	   capacities	   including	   gaze	   and	   facial	   expressions,	  vocalizations,	   and	   rhythmic	   coordinated	   whole	   body	   movements	  (Trevarthen,	   1974;	   Bateson,	   1975,	   1979;	   Snow,	   1977;	   Bullowa,	   1979;	  Masataka,	  2003).	  Not	  only	  are	  they	  aware	  of	  the	  dialogical,	  mutual	  give-­‐and	  take	   character	   of	   the	   interaction—getting	   upset	   when	   the	   mother’s	   face	  became	  unresponsive	   (Tronick,	  Als,	  Adamson,	  Wise,	  &	  Brazelton,	  1978)	  or	  when	   confronted	   with	   a	   friendly	   but	   non-­‐contingent	   (playback)	   response	  (Murray	  &	  Trevarthen,	  1985)—but	  they	  are	  able	  to	  regulate	  their	  own	  state	  of	  arousal	  as	  well	  as	  the	  course	  of	  the	  interaction	  by	  turning	  their	  gaze	  and	  head	   toward	   or	   away	   from	   the	   caregiver	   (Stern,	   1971)(Stern,	   1971)	   and	  even	  seem	  to	  be	  able	  to	  place	  their	  own	  vocalization	  exactly	  at	  the	  right	  time	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	   	  Notion	   by	   Jakob	   von	   Uexküll	   (Uexküll,	   1921;	   Uexküll,	   Kriszat,	   &	  Portmann,	  1956).	  An	  interpretation	   in	  contemporary	  terms:	  Umwelt	  refers	  to	   those	   aspects	   of	   the	   environment	   an	   organism	   can	   interact	   with—i.e.,	  effectively	   perceive,	   distinguish	   and	   act	   on	   (=	   the	   sum	   of	   prospective	  functional	   action-­‐perception	   cycles)—and	   which	   hence	   constitute	   the	  organism‘s	   meaningful	   world.	   This	   world	   is	   subjective,	   different	  organisms/subjects	   who	   have	   different	   histories	   and	   possibilities	   of	  interaction	  live	  in/enact	  different	  worlds.	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and	  place	  at	   the	   right	  pitch	   in	   jointly	   created	  vocal	  phrases	   (S.	  N.	  Malloch,	  2000;	  S.	  Malloch	  &	  Trevarthen,	  2009).	  As	  infants	  now	  take	  a	  wider	  interest	  in	  their	  surroundings	  (Trevarthen	  &	  Hubley,	   1978)—in	   tandem	   with	   their	   increased	   waking	   and	   attentional	  periods—,	  while	   still	   lacking	   the	  means	   to	  pursue	   their	  active	   interests,	   to	  explore	   or	   manipulate	   the	   world	   on	   their	   own—they	   pose	   a	   new	   set	   of	  challenges	  and	  opportunities	   to	   caregivers.	  Therefore,	   at	   this	   stage	  a	   large	  part	  of	  caregiving	  activities	  observed	  in	  the	  longitudinal	  study—apart	  from	  feeding,	   diaper	   change	   and	   putting	   them	   to	   bed—was	   to	   keep	   infants	  content	   and	   “entertained”:	   the	   caregivers	   in	   the	   study	   responded	   to	   this	  challenge	  both	  by	  taking	  the	  infant	  to	  the	  world	  and	  by	  bringing	  the	  world	  to	  the	  infant.	  They	  did	  the	  former	  by	  taking	  the	  infants	  along	  with	  them,	  when	  doing	   their	  daily	   chores,	   e.g.,	   placing	   them	   in	  a	  baby	   rocker,	   so	   they	  had	  a	  good	   view	   of	   the	   activities,	   regularly	   addressing	   them	   and	   bringing	  household	  objects	  or	  food	  items	  to	  their	  attention	  (e.g.,	  rhythmically	  moving	  and	   labeling	   them)	   and	   occasionally	   also	  within	   their	   reach.	   They	   did	   the	  latter	   through	   presenting,	   looming	   and	   animating	   everyday	   life	   objects	   as	  well	  as	  specifically	  designed	  toys.	  Caregivers	  also	  placed	  them	  in	  specifically	  designed	   environments	   such	   as	   activity	   mats	   and	   baby-­‐gyms	   where	   they	  were	  able	  to	  interact	  with	  objects	  dangling	  from	  toy	  bars.	  In	  contrast	  to	  their	  previous	  exposure	  to	  only	  a	  small	  range	  of	  objects,	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  new	  and	  manipulable	  objects	  now	  enter	  the	  infant’s	  world.	  Thus	  infants	  were	  introduced	  to	  objects	  very	  early	  at	  3–4	  months	  in	  the	  context	  of	  social	  interactions.	  This	  was	  also	  the	  context	  in	  which	  infants	  first	  encountered	  picture	  books	  and	  book	  sharing,	  which	  took	  2	  different	  forms:	  (1)	   Their	   caregivers	   directly	   engaged	   them	   with	   books,	   often	   specifically	  designed	   for	  young	   infants.	   (2)	  They	   took	  part	   in	   the	  picture	  book	  reading	  activities	  of	  older	  siblings	  and	  caregivers.	  
3.3.1.3 Three	  examples	  of	  early	  book	  sharing	  interactions	  
Figure	   3.2	   shows	   three	   instances	   of	   very	   early	   book	   sharing	   with	   3-­‐month-­‐olds.	  Example	  A	  shows	  a	  3-­‐month-­‐old	  boy	  vocalizing	  toward	  a	  black	  and	   white	   high	   contrast	   face	   pattern	   in	   a	   book	   specifically	   designed	   to	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engage	   very	   young	   infants,	   even	   newborns,	   to	  meet	   their	   particular	   skills,	  needs,	   and	   interests.	   In	   the	   second	   example,	   B,	   a	   mother	   is	   rustling	   the	  crinkly	  pages	  of	   a	   brightly	   colored	  book	   to	   soothe	  her	   crying	  3-­‐month-­‐old	  daughter.	   As	   the	   infant	   abruptly	   stops	   crying,	   she	   begins	   to	   engage	   her	  daughter	  in	  more	  conventional	  book	  sharing,	  drawing	  attention	  to	  pictures,	  turning	  pages,	  and	   inviting	  participation.	  The	   infant	  now	  and	  again	  grasps,	  holds	  onto,	  and	  crumples	  the	  soft	  pages	  producing	  more	  crinkling	  noise.	  In	  example	  C,	   after	  demonstrating	  page	   turning	  as	  an	  action	  of	   suspense	  and	  release—when	  a	  new	  page	   is	   revealed—the	  book	   is	  presented	  and	  held	   in	  place	  within	   the	   reach	   of	   the	   infant.	   The	   book	  with	   its	   rigid	   pages,	   solidly	  bound	  together	  at	  one	  end,	  provides	  a	  stable	  structure	  to	  interact	  with	  that	  is	   still	   highly	   flexible	   with	   easily	   movable	   parts	   along	   a	   single	   degree	   of	  freedom.	  This	  allows	   the	   infant	  not	  yet	  able	   to	  properly	  grasp	  an	  object	   to	  nevertheless	   effectively	   turn	   pages,	   thus	   exerting	   control	   over	   his	   sensory	  stimulation.	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Figure	   3.2:	   Three	   examples	   of	   book	   sharing	   with	   books	   specifically	   designed	   for	   young	  infants.	  (A)	  Visually	  engaging	  a	  3-­‐month-­‐old	  with	  high	  contrast	  patterns.	  (B)	  Soothing	  a	  3-­‐month-­‐old	   with	   crinkly	   pages.	   (C)	   Scaffolding	   a	   3.5-­‐month-­‐old’s	   motor	   skills	   with	   rigid	  pages	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These	   three	   book	   sharing	   episodes	   are	   examples	   of	   early	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  interactions	  in	  everyday	  life,	  where	  the	  object	  –	  the	  book	  –	  plays	   a	   central	   role	   in	   the	   interaction.	   These	   books	   have	   been	   specifically	  designed	  to	  meet	  the	  infants’	  needs:	  their	  physical	  properties	  are	  adapted	  to	  the	  infants’	  perceptual	  capacities	  (high	  contrast	  patterns,	  crinkly	  pages),	  and	  serve	   as	   a	   scaffold	   for	   their	   rudimentary	   motor	   skills	   (rigid	   pages).	   In	  contrast	   to	   conventional	   books,	   this	   design	   emphasizes	   the	   effective	  interaction	   with	   the	   medium,	   the	   physical	   properties	   of	   the	   book	   and	  pragmatic	  actions	  performed	  on	  them.	  The	  specifically	  designed	  books	  serve	  as	  a	  bridge	  between	  the	  capacities	  and	  needs	  of	  infant	  and	  caregiver,	  as	  well	  as	   between	   caregiving	   and	   the	   cultural	   practice	   of	   reading.	   Indeed,	   in	   all	  three	   examples	   specific	  material	   aspects	   present	   in	   the	   book	   also	   capture	  and	   afford	   some	   of	   the	   general,	  mainly	   pragmatic	   aspects	   of	   conventional	  book	  reading:	  the	  format	  of	  the	  book	  itself	  is	  present,	  as	  is	  the	  format	  of	  the	  activity	   that	   has	   a	   definite	   beginning	   and	   end	   corresponding	   to	   working	  through	  a	  book	  from	  cover	  to	  cover,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  activity	  of	  page	  turning.	  Even	  more,	   already	  at	  3–4	  months,	   infants	   regularly	   experienced	  episodes	  involving	  the	  full	  range	  of	  book	  sharing	  typical	  for	  older	  children	  including	  more	  conventional,	  complex,	  and	  semiotic	  aspects	  such	  as	  pointing,	  content	  labeling,	  as	  well	  as	  reading	  and	  narration	  (Fletcher	  &	  Reese,	  2005)	  as	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
3.3.2 EARLY	   OCCURRENCE	   OF	   SMOOTHLY	   COORDINATED	   BOOK	   SHARING	  
INTERACTIONS	  AT	  3–4	  MONTHS	  OF	  AGE	  Given	  young	  infants’	  inability	  to	  interact	  with	  objects	  on	  their	  own	  yet	  –	  in	  contrast	  to	  their	  active	  role	  in	  proto-­‐conversations	  –	  and	  the	  widely	  held	  theoretical	  view	  that	  they	  are	  not	  yet	  able	  to	  co-­‐ordinate	  their	  engagement	  between	   people	   and	   objects	   (Hubley	   &	   Trevarthen,	   1979;	   Bakeman	   &	  Adamson,	  1984;	  Carpenter	  et	  al.,	  1998;	  Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005)	  the	  question	  now	  arises:	  How	  do	  book	  sharing	  interactions	  work	  at	  a	  micro-­‐level,	  how	  do	  they	  unfold	  over	  time?	  How	  are	  they	  initiated	  and	  sustained,	  and	  what	  are	  the	  respective	  roles	  of	  the	  participants?	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Figure	  3.3:	  Mother	  multimodally	  presenting	  a	  book,	  holding	  it	  within	  reach	  of	  her	  infant:	  Introducing	  the	  book	  to	  the	  infant	  (A),	  marking	  the	  animals	  on	  the	   title	  page	  by	  dynamical	  pointing	  and	  vocal	   labeling	  (B–D),	  opening	   the	  book	  with	   the	   infant	  attending	  (E,F),	  more	  dynamical	  pointing	  drawing	   the	  infant’s	  attention	  (G,H),	  who	  subsequently	  acts	  on	  the	  book	  (I,J).	  Below	  the	  camera	  stills,	  an	  ELAN	  analysis	  detail	  documents,	  from	  top	  to	  bottom:	  audio	  traces	  (pitch	  in	  red	  and	  intensity	   in	  green),	  and	  annotation	  tiers.	  Tier	   label	  abbreviations	  used	  (from	  top	  to	  bottom):	  mothervoc:	  mother	  vocalizations,	  motheract:	  mother	  (manual)	  actions,	  babyact:	  infant	  actions,	  babygaze:	  infant	  gaze,	  and	  babyvoc:	  infant	  vocalizations.	  r:	  right,	  l:	  left.	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3.3.2.1 The	   contribution	  of	   the	   caregivers:	   establishing	   contact,	   carving	  out	  
interaction	  building	  blocks,	  patterning	  and	  shaping	  actions	  
Establishing	  contact.	  As	  shown	  above,	   caregivers	  were	   instrumental	   in	  introducing	   objects	   to	   very	   young	   infants	   who	   thus	   far	   are	   unable	   to	  approach	  or	  handle	  them	  on	  their	  own.	  Often	  caregivers	  took	  their	  cue	  from	  the	  infants’	  behavior:	  either	  following	  up	  on	  infants’	  gaze	  or	  action	  impulses,	  or,	  conversely,	   in	  trying	  to	  divert	  them	  out	  of	  their	  current	  state	  (e.g.	  pain)	  caregivers	  moved	   to	  establish	   contact	  between	   the	   infant	   and	  an	  object	   to	  engage	  with	  and	  build	  up	  a	  shared	  activity	  around	  it.	  In	  the	  example	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3.3	  the	  mother	  visually	  presents	  a	  book	  to	  her	  4-­‐month-­‐old	  son,	  who	  is	  sitting	  between	  her	  legs	  leaning	  against	  her,	  and	  puts	   it	   in	  his	  reach.	  She	  starts	  with	  a	  sharp	   intake	  of	  breath	   indicating	  surprise	  (“.h”)	  (Zukow,	  1982),	  then,	  pointing	  dynamically	  by	  moving	  her	  left	  index	   finger	  up	  and	  down	  over	  the	  pictures	  of	   the	  book	  cover,	   follows	  this	  up	   with	   “Look	   at	   the	   cats,”	   while	   the	   infant	   is	   looking	   at	   the	   book	  continuously.	  (For	  transcription	  conventions	  see	  glossary).	  As	  shown	  in	  this	  example,	  establishing	  contact	  between	  infant	  and	  object	  often	  involved	  visual	  presentation,	  ranging	  from	  static	  “offering,”	  placing	  an	  object	   into	   the	   infant’s	  view	  and	  reach,	   to	  more	  dynamic	  actions	   including	  “animating”	   the	  object,	   such	  as	  moving	   it	   to	  and	   fro,	   looming,	  or	   acting	  on	  the	  object.	   In	   the	  case	  of	  books,	  which	  were	  seldom	  animated	  by	  mothers,	  this	  prominently	  included	  performing	  dynamical	  pointing	  gestures,	  as	  in	  the	  example	   above.	   In	   addition,	   caregivers	   produced	   a	   number	   of	   different	  vocalizations	  ranging	  from	  general	  and	  unspecific	  exclamations	  of	  surprise	  (“.h”),	  via	  imperatives	  (“Look!”),	  questions	  (“What’s	  that?”)	  to	  specific	  labels	  for	   objects	   or	   object	   parts	   (“a	   book!”),	   and	   content	   such	   as	   pictures	   (“an	  elephant!”).	   Among	   these,	   the	   most	   frequently	   used	   in	   the	   dataset	   was	   a	  sharp	   intake	  of	   breath	   indicating	   surprise	   (“.h”)	   combined	  with	   raised	  eye	  brows,	  wide	  eyes	  and	  open	  mouth.	  Functionally	  speaking,	  caregivers	  are	  doing	  two	  things	  at	  once.	  First,	  they	  are	  capturing	  and	  directing	  the	  infant’s	  attention,	  often	  utilizing	  the	  auditory	  domain	  to	  highlight	  and	  mark	  the	  visual	  presentation	  of	  an	  object.	  Second,	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they	   are	   making	   an	   object	   available	   to	   the	   infants	   to	   interact	   with	   “as	   a	  unit”—in	   this	   case	   the	  book	   itself	  or	  one	  of	   its	  parts.	   Such	  actions	  actively	  foreground—or	  even	  create—the	  object	  for	  the	  infant	  to	  interact	  with	  “as	  a	  unit”	  by	  “carving	   it	  out”	  against	  the	  background	  and	  various	  other	  ways	  to	  parse	   a	   scene,	   compare	   Zukow-­‐Goldring’s	   notion	   of	   “educating	   attention”	  (Zukow-­‐Goldring,	  1997,	  2006,	  2012).	  Thus	   guiding	   the	   infant’s	   attention	   and	   foregrounding	   or	   “carving	   out”	  “building	   blocks”	   to	   interact	   with,	   are	   two	   partly	   overlapping	   processes.	  They	   often	   involve	   performing	   a	   variety	   of	   activities	   composed	   of	   various	  strands	  of	  actions,	  which	  appeal	  to	  one	  or	  another	  of	  the	  infant’s	  modalities	  and	  which	  can	  either	  be	  used	  (a)	  in	  close	  succession	  or	  (b)	  simultaneously,	  adding	  one	  on	  top	  of	  each	  other	  combining	  them	  into	  a	  complex	  multimodal	  action.	  It	  is	  especially	  this	  multimodal	  structure	  of	  the	  activity,	  in	  particular	  invariant	   relations	   across	   modalities,	   which	   provides	   infants	   with	  opportunities	   to	   extract	   coherent	   perception	   and	   action	   units	   (Zukow-­‐Goldring,	  1997;	  Bahrick	  &	  Lickliter,	  2012).	  
Carving	   out	   interaction	   building	   blocks	   and	   embodying	   meaning.	  Book	   sharing,	   with	   its	   wide	   range	   of	   semiotically	   rich	   materials,	   physical	  spine-­‐and-­‐page-­‐structure,	   pictures,	   spoken	   words,	   printed	   text,	   rhymes,	  narratives	  and	  referential	  acts	   is	  mostly	  about	   learning	  about,	  sharing,	  and	  negotiating	   “units”	   or	   “building	   blocks”	   to	   interact	   with,	   which	   form	   the	  public	  cultural	  interaction	  space.	  That	  is,	  these	  book	  related	  actions	  are	  very	  similar	   to	   “guiding	   attention	   and	  making	   objects	   available	   for	   interaction”	  described	  above;	  only	  many	  of	   the	   “units”	   forming	   the	   cultural	   interaction	  space	   are	   more	   abstract	   and	   are	   not	   directly	   graspable.	   Children	   become	  familiar	   with	   those	   “units,”	   how	   they	   relate	   to	   each	   other	   (pictures	   to	  pictures,	   words	   to	   words,	   pictures	   to	   words),	   and	   how	   all	   of	   these	  potentially	  map	  onto	  actions	  and	  relations	  in	  the	  world	  outside,	  and	  above	  all	  how	  to	  jointly	  manipulate	  and	  act	  upon	  them.	  So	  how	  is	  book	  sharing	  practiced	  with	  an	   infant,	  who	   is	  preverbal,	  does	  not	   yet	   understand	   the	   referential	   character	   of	   pictures	   (DeLoache,	  Pierroutsakos,	  &	  Uttal,	  2003)	  and	  –	  supposedly	  –	  does	  not	  have	  command	  of	  joint	   attention	   either?	   While,	   as	   described	   above,	   the	   books	   designed	   for	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infants	   highlight	   particular	   physical	   properties	   adapted	   to	   their	  sensorimotor	  needs	  and	  interests,	  book	  sharing	  even	  at	  an	  early	  age	  is	  not	  at	  all	   restricted	   to	   interacting	   with	   an	   “interesting	   stimulus”	   or	   “object	   for	  manipulation.”	  Instead,	  young	  infants	  already	  encounter	  the	  whole	  range	  of	  book	  sharing	  actions.	  In	  Figure	  3.3	  the	  mother	  is	  sitting	  on	  the	  floor	  supporting	  her	  4-­‐month-­‐old	   infant	   boy	   between	   her	   outstretched	   legs.	   Throughout,	   she	   is	   closely	  following	  the	  prototypical	  book	  sharing	  protocol:	  reading	  out	  rhymed	  text,	  accompanied	   by	   additional	   pointing	   and	   labeling,	   as	   well	   as	   making	  comments	   relating	   the	   story	   to	   the	   infant’s	   life.	   On	   his	   part,	   the	   infant	   is	  intently	  looking	  at	  the	  pictures,	  his	  gaze	  drawn	  through	  dynamical	  pointing,	  and	   from	  time	   to	   time	  acts	  on	   the	  book,	  either	  by	  banging	  or	  grasping	   the	  pages,	   which	   gets	   transformed	   into	   page	   turning	   with	   the	   support	   of	   his	  mother.	  Neither	  is	  the	  infant	  in	  this	  interaction	  merely	  exposed	  to	  an	  arbitrary	  set	  of	   interesting	   stimuli	   and	   action	   affordances,	   nor	   does	   the	  mother	   blindly	  follow	   the	   cultural	   conventions.	   Rather,	   at	   key	   points	   in	   the	   activity,	   the	  mother	  is	  making	  selected	  parts	  and	  aspects	  of	  content	  and	  the	  overarching	  narrative	  accessible	   to	   the	   infant,	  making	  them	  meaningful	   to	  him	  through	  embodying	  and	  enacting	  them	  and	  giving	  them	  patterns	  of	  affective	  salience	  and	  arousal.	  
Figure	  3.4	  shows	  the	  mother	  making	  characteristic	  animal	  actions	  “come	  alive”	  and	  accessible	  to	  her	  4	  month	  old	  son	  through	  enacting	  the	  essence	  of	  “leaping”	   and	   “jumping”	   –	   a	   rising	   motion	   –	   through	   a	   rising	   intonation	  contour	  “This	  is	  the	  speedy	  kangaroo,	  she	  jumps	  and	  she	  LEAPS,”	  “here’s	  a	  smooth	  gray	  dolphin	  jumping	  in	  the	  Air.”	  Whereas	   in	   the	   above	   example	   the	   enactment	   takes	   place	   solely	  within	  the	   action	  medium	  of	   speech—typically	   utilized	   in	   picture	   book	   sharing—there	  are	  also	  much	  more	  extensive	  and	  thorough	  forms	  of	  enactment	  and	  embodiment.	  In	  Figure	   3.5	   the	  mother	   tells	  her	  by	  now	  5-­‐month-­‐old	  son	  about	  baby	  Humphrey	  having	  “a	  BI::g	  YA:::wn	  and	  a	  STREtch,	  going	  ‘UAAAHHH.”’	  First,	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she	   utilizes	   prosody	   again,	   drawing	   out	   the	   words	   “BI::g	   YA:::wn,”	   thus	  temporally	   expressing	   the	   extension	   of	   “bigness”	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	  already	   enacting	   the	   yawn.	   But	   then,	   as	   the	   text	   itself	   goes	   on	   to	  onomatopoetically	   illustrate	  the	  yawn	  “going	  UAAAHHH”	  she	  adds	  another	  layer:	  turning	  to	  the	  infant,	  grasping	  first	  one	  hand	  and	  then	  the	  other	  and	  gently	   pulling	   them	   into	   a	   stretch	   while	   performing	   the	   yawn,	   she	   is	  embodying	  and	  enacting	  the	  meaning	  directly	  with	  the	  baby’s	  body.	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Figure	   3.4:	   ELAN	   analysis	   detail	   showing	   pitch	   (red)	   and	   intensity	   (green)	   curves.	   The	  mother	  is	  reading	  a	  picture	  book	  about	  animal	  actions	  to	  her	  4-­‐month-­‐old	  son	  enacting	  the	  essence	   of	   “leaping”	   and	   “jumping”	   (a	   rising	  motion)	   through	   a	   rising	   intonation	   contour	  (highlighted).	  	  
	  
Figure	  3.5:	  ELAN	  analysis	  detail	  showing	  pitch	  (red)	  and	  intensity	  (green)	  curves.	  Mother	  enacting	  and	  embodying	  a	  “BI::g	  YA:::wn	  and	  a	  STREtch”	  vocally	  and	  through	  acting	  on	  the	  5-­‐month-­‐old	   infant’s	  body	  (highlighted).	  Upper	  case	   letters	  (A–D)	  map	  upper	  row	  stills	   to	  ELAN	  time	  line.	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In	   this	   case	   expressing	   “meaning”	   is	   no	   longer	   simply	   “talking	   about”	  something	  or	  “depicting”	  something	  but	  rather	  encompasses	   fully	  realizing	  the	   action	   itself.	   Only	   that	   in	   this	   special	   case	   the	   action	   of	   yawning	   and	  stretching,	   referenced	   in	   the	  book,	   is	  now	  happening	   in	  a	  different	  context	  than	   it	   usually	   would,	   i.e.,	   when	   the	   infant	   is	   tired	   or	   being	   put	   to	   bed.	  Rather,	  this	  context	  is	  created	  and	  defined	  by	  the	  book.	  And	  as	  the	  mother	  is	  gently	   acting	   on	   her	   infant’s	   body,	   taking	   him	   through	   the	   motions	   of	  stretching	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   performing	   the	   yawn,	  mother	   and	   infant	  closely	  share	  the	  meaning	  and	  the	  action	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  taking	  part	  in	  and	  realizing	   it	   together	   (Alač,	   2005;	   Zukow-­‐Goldring,	   2006,	   2012;	   Zukow-­‐Goldring	  &	  Arbib,	  2007).	  
Patterning	   actions	   and	   shaping	   actions	   into	   action	   arcs.	   Describing	  how	   objects	   or	   rather	   “units	   for	   interaction”	   are	   carved	   out	   to	   form	   the	  building	  blocks	  of	  a	  shared	  meaning	  and	  action	  space	  covers	  only	  one	  aspect	  of	  how	  such	  a	  space	  is	  created.	  This	  section	  will	  explore	  how	  the	  actions	  the	  partners	   perform	   are	   themselves	   structured	   in	   the	   course	   of	   interaction,	  highlighting	  the	  dynamic	  form	  of	  the	  jointly	  structured	  interaction	  space.	  Two	  aspects	  of	  “structuring	  of	  actions”	  can	  be	  distinguished:	  The	  first	   is	  the	   temporal	   patterning,	   punctuation,	   and	   “chunking”	   of	   actions,	   also	  leading	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  “events”	  in	  the	  flow	  of	  action	  (Nomikou	  &	  Rohlfing,	  2011).	   Examples	   include:	   the	   rhythmic	   multimodal	   performance	   of	   a	  monkey	   noise	   (“OohOoh-­‐Ooh-­‐Ooh-­‐Ooh”),	   the	   marking	   and	   highlighting	   of	  action	   parts	   by	   exclamations	   (“.h!,”	   “Look!”),	   the	   labeling	   of	   action	   parts	  (“now	   we	   TURN	   the	   page”),	   and	   direct	   invitations	   (“Can	   you	   turn	   the	  page?”).	   Second,	   beyond	   patterning	   and	   chunking,	   caregivers	   structure	  actions	   by	   continually	   shaping	   parts	   of	   activities	   into	   bigger	   or	   smaller	  dynamic	   “action	   arcs”	   with	   a	   beginning,	   build	   up,	   climax,	   and	   resolution	  (compare	  Brazelton	  et	  al.,	  1974;	  and	  notions	  of	  ‘vitality	  contour’	  Stern,	  2010;	  ‘narrative’	   or	   ‘shared	   project’	   Delafield-­‐Butt	   &	   Gangopadhyay,	   2013;	  Trevarthen	  &	  Delafield-­‐Butt,	  2013).	  To	  illustrate	  this	  we	  will	  look	  at	  the	  example	  of	  page	  turning	  (Figure	  3.6).	  The	   mother	   sets	   the	   stage	   by	   drawing	   attention	   through	   the	   surprise	  exclamation	   “.h!”	   and	   announcing	   the	   action	   of	   page	   turning	   with	   the	  
	   172	  
question:	  “What’s	  on	  the	  next	  page?”	  Then	  she	  starts	  developing	  the	  action	  arc:	   leaning	   forward,	   repeating	   the	   question	   followed	   by	   two	   more	   “.h!”	  surprise	   exclamations	   of	   increasing	   intensity	   and	   pitch,	   she	   builds	   up	  tension	  which	  is	  mirrored	  in	  the	  growing	  arousal	  of	  the	  infant,	  indicated	  by	  her	   increasing	  movement,	  body	   tension,	  and	   facial	  expression,	   culminating	  in	   her	  mouth	   dropping	   open	   and	   a	   sharp	   intake	   of	   breath	   just	   before	   the	  climax.	  After	  a	  short	  hesitation	  –	  drawing	  forth	  the	  tension	  still	   further	  –	  a	  sudden	  quick	  page	  turn	  releases	  the	  tension	  and	  the	  arc	  levels	  off	  and	  comes	  to	   a	   close	   in	   a	   soft,	   whispered	   “There	   we	   go,”	   coinciding	   with	   the	   infant	  relaxing	  and	  closing	  her	  mouth	  again.	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Figure	  3.6:	  ELAN	  analysis	  detail	  showing	  pitch	  (red)	  and	  intensity	  (green)	  curves.	  The	  mother	  is	  building	  up	  an	  action	  arc	  through	  surprise	  exclamations	  of	   increasing	   intensity	   and	   pitch	   before	   releasing	   the	   tension	   through	   a	   quick	   page	   turn.	   Her	   3.5-­‐month-­‐old	   infant	   is	   responding	   with	   increased	  movement,	  body	  tension,	  mouth	  dropping	  open	  and	  sharp	  intake	  of	  breath	  before	  relaxing	  again.	  Upper	  case	  letters	  (A–E)	  map	  upper	  row	  stills	  to	  ELAN	  time	   line.
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This	   shaping	   of	   action	   arcs	   is	   found	   across	   all	   kinds	   of	   actions	   and	   at	  different	   levels	   and	  multiple	   timescales	  within	   an	  activity,	   nested	   into	  one	  another.	   At	   a	   high	   level,	   the	   activity	   of	   book	   sharing	   as	   a	   whole	   can	   be	  considered	  as	  an	  “overarching”	  action	  arc	  structure	  defined	  by	  the	  physical	  arrangements	  of	   the	  pages	  to	  be	  turned	  from	  cover	  to	  cover	  as	  well	  as	   the	  organization	  of	   the	  narrative.	  A	  smaller	   scale	  action	  arc	   is	  defined	  by	  each	  double	   page,	   the	   unit	   visible	   at	   a	   given	   time,	   and	   often	   structured	   by	   a	  (rhyming)	   pair	   of	   lines,	   the	   first	   ending	   in	   a	   slight	   rise	   continued	   in	   one	  breath	  (enjambement)	  to	  the	  second	  one,	  and	  coming	  to	  a	  close	   in	  a	   fall	   in	  pitch	   and	   intensity.	   At	   the	   basic	   level,	   action	   arcs	   re-­‐occur	   with	   any	  interaction	   unit,	   be	   it	   the	   turning	   of	   the	   page	   itself	   a	   literal	   rise	   and	   fall,	  labeling	  of	  a	  picture,	  posing	  of	  a	  question,	  etc.	  Relevant	  words	  were	  typically	  placed	   at	   the	   peak	   of	   an	   action	   arc,	   and	   infants	   often	   looked	   at	   the	  caregiver’s	   face	  at	   the	  peak	  of	  an	  action	  arc,	   as	  well	   as	   in	  a	  pause	  after	  an	  action	  arc’s	  closure.	  
3.3.2.2 What	  about	  the	  role	  of	  the	  infant?	  To	   what	   extent	   do	   infants	   actively	   participate	   in	   early	   book	   sharing	  interactions?	  As	  briefly	  discussed	  above,	   it	  was	  often	  the	   infants’	  behavior	  which	  was	  prompting	  the	  caregiver	  to	  introduce	  an	  object	  into	  the	  interaction,	  which	  –	  in	  case	  the	  infant	  let	  him	  or	  herself	  be	  engaged	  –	  then	  led	  to	  a	  shared	  object	  activity.	   Such	   “active	   interest,”	   that	   is,	   staying	   content	   and	   maintaining	  attention	   on	   the	   activity	  might	   already	   be	   considered	   as	   a	   form	   of	   “active	  participation.”	  Though	  at	  this	  age	  attention	  could	  easily	  be	  drawn	  especially	  by	  moving	  stimuli	  and	  also	  easily	  wandered	  away	  from	  time	  to	  time,	  infants	  were	   already	   able	   to	   some	   extent	   to	   actively	   control	   their	   gaze	   and	  hence	  their	   engagements.	   That	   the	   shared	   activity	   indeed	   requires	   an	   active	  contribution	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  infant	  became	  evident	  from	  cases	  when	  they	  withhold	  participation	  –	  which	  did	  not	  only	  happen	  when	  they	  got	  fussy,	  but	  also	  when	  they	  lost	  interest	  and	  kept	  looking	  away	  –	  and	  then	  there	  simply	  would	  not	  be	  any	  shared	  activity.	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When	   successfully	   engaged,	   infants	   typically	   were	   alert	   and	   showed	  “serious	   intent”	   with	   knit	   brows	   and	   widely	   opened	   eyes,	   the	   type	   of	  engagement	   Piaget	   (1962)	   described	   for	   the	   adaptive	   mode	   of	   being	  absorbed	  in	  –	  and	  letting	  oneself	  be	  “informed”	  –	  in	  object	  exploration.	  Thus	  –	  at	  least	  for	  the	  youngest	  infants	  in	  the	  study	  –	  this	  shared	  activity	  looked	  somewhat	  different	  from	  other	  social	  interactions	  (e.g.,	  social	  games)	  of	  the	  same	  infants	  at	  the	  same	  age,	  where	  more	  explicit	  expressions	  of	  joy	  such	  as	  laughter	  were	  observed.	  However,	  even	  though	  not	  a	  single	  case	  of	  laughter	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  book	  was	   observed	   before	   6	   months,	   there	   was	   some	   affective	   communication	  going	   on	   in	   book	   sharing	   at	   this	   age:	   besides	   serious	   intent,	   a	   neutral	  expression,	   and	   occasional	   cases	   of	   overall	   fussiness,	   there	   were	   several	  instances	  of	  infants	  and	  caregivers	  engaging	  in	  a	  mutually	  attuned	  build-­‐up	  of	   arousal	   in	  which	   infants	   showed	   great	   excitement	   through	   their	   bodily	  movements	   (e.g.,	   the	  example	  of	  page	   turning	  discussed	  above,	   see	  Figure	  
3.6).	   Later,	   from	   around	   6	   months,	   laughter	   and	   a	   whole	   range	   of	   facial	  expressions	   were	   observed	   in	   an	   intricate	   emotional	   interplay	   going	   on	  between	   book	   or	   story,	   mother	   and	   infant	   (see	   Section	   “Ecologies	   in	  transformation”).	  While	   caregivers	   significantly	   shape	   book	   sharing	   activities	   with	   3–4	  month	   old	   infants	   by	   guiding	   attention,	   inviting	   and	   scaffolding	   actions,	  infants	   actively	   participate	   by	   showing	   “active	   interest”	   and	   being	  responsive,	   amenable	   to	   their	   caregivers	   lead,	   letting	   their	   attention	   and	  actions	  be	  guided,	  and	  readily	  accepting	  the	  caregivers’	  invitations	  to	  engage	  with	  objects	  offered	  (compare	  De	  Barbaro	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  Young	   infants	   also	   showed	   active	   participation	   in	   a	   more	   conventional	  sense	   in	   their	  active	  movements,	  especially	  manual	  object	  manipulation	  as	  far	  as	  it	  lay	  within	  their	  range	  of	  action.	  Whenever	  possible,	  such	  actions—e.g.,	  getting	  hold	  of	  the	  edge	  of	  a	  page—were	  interpreted	  by	  the	  caregiver	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  culturally	  established	  book	  sharing	  framework	  (“Do	  you	  want	  to	  hold	  the	  book?,”	  “Can	  you	  turn	  the	  page?”),	  and	  shaped	  it	  into	  the	  frame	  of	  the	   book	   sharing	   activity	   as	   far	   as	   possible.	   These	   actions,	   however,	   also	  sometimes	  got	  in	  the	  way	  of	  the	  activity,	  especially	  when	  they	  could	  not	  be	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made	   to	   fit	   the	  book	   sharing	   frame,	   as	  when	   infants	  would	  not	   let	   go	  of	   a	  page	   and	   their	   own	   actions	   became	   their	   primary	   focus	   of	   attention	   (see	  Section	  “Ecologies	  in	  transformation”).	  
3.3.2.3 The	   interaction	  unfolding	   in	   the	   interplay	  between	   infant,	   caregiver,	  
and	  object	  After	  discussing	  the	  roles	  of	  mother	  and	  infant	  separately	  let	  us	  now	  look	  at	   one	   example	   in	   more	   detail	   in	   order	   to	   see	   how	   infant,	   caregiver,	   and	  artifact	  come	  together	  and	  how	  –	  out	  of	  this	  interplay	  –	  an	  interaction	  arises.	  In	  this	  13	  s	  sequence	  (see	  Figure	  3.7)	  the	  mother	  is	  sitting	  on	  the	  couch	  with	  her	  4-­‐month-­‐old	  boy	   sitting	  on	  her	  knee,	   facing	   away	   from	  her.	  Both	  are	   looking	  at	  an	  open	  picture	  book	   featuring	  brightly	  colored	  cat	  pictures	  and	   “touchy-­‐feely”	   textures,	   which	   the	   mother	   is	   holding	   in	   front	   of	   the	  infant.	  The	  sequence	  begins	  with	  the	  mother	  rhythmically	  reading	  out	  a	  line	  in	   verse:	   “I	   love	   THIS	   friendly	   kitten	  with	   the	   VE:::Lvety	   so::ft	   NO::::::::se.”	  thus	   turning	   it	   into	   a	   two	   arc	   structure:	   the	   first	   arc	   is	   dominated	   by	   the	  deictic	   “THIS”	   which—with	   a	   sudden	   increase	   in	   intensity	   and	   a	   slight	  ascend	  in	  pitch—stands	  out	  as	  a	  single	  accentuated	  peak	  (accompanied	  by	  a	  slight	   movement	   of	   the	   left	   thumb).	   Thereupon	   the	   infant	   focuses	   more	  closely	  on	  the	   left	  page	  of	   the	  book.	  The	  second	  arc	   is	  a	  more	  pronounced,	  with	  a	  gradual	  rise	  in	  pitch	  peaking	  in	  “VEL-­‐vety”	  followed	  by	  a	  slow	  fall	  in	  pitch	   and	   a	   gradual	   decrease	   in	   the	   intensity	   of	   the	   mother’s	   vocalizing,	  during	  which	  she	  turns	  her	  head	  toward	  the	  infant.	  After	  his	  mother’s	  turn	  toward	   his	   face,	   just	   as	   she	   arrives	   at	   the	   end	   of	   an	   elongated,	   soft	  “NO::::::::se”	  forming	  the	  coda	  of	  the	  action	  arc,	  the	  infant	  turns	  his	  head	  and	  elevates	   his	   gaze	   toward	  his	  mother’s	   face.	   As	   his	   gaze	   arrives	   at	   her	   face	  with	  a	  slight	  delay,	  her	  gaze	  has	  already	  moved	  on	  to	  the	  next	  page,	  where	  her	  right	  index	  finger	  is	  now	  performing	  a	  dynamic	  pointing	  gesture	  moving	  up	  and	  down	  on	  the	  velvety	  textured	  nose,	  and	  the	  infant’s	  eyes	  follow	  there	  soon	  after.	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Figure	  3.7:	  ELAN	  analysis	  detail	  showing	  pitch	  (red)	  and	  intensity	  (green)	  curves.	  This	  book	  sharing	  interaction	  at	  4	  months	  unfolds	  as	  smooth	  interplay	  between	  the	  actions	  of	  caregiver	  and	  infant:	  the	  infant’s	  attention	  is	  drawn	  by	  pitch	  (“THIS,”	  arrow	  on	  the	  left),	  and	  after	  moving	  through	  an	  action	  arc	  looking	  up	  at	  mother’s	  face,	  the	  infant’s	  gaze	  is	  drawn	  back	  to	  book	  through	  dynamical	  pointing	  (arrow	  on	  the	  right).	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There	   is	   a	   sustained	   social	   interaction	   going	   on	   revolving	   around	   an	  object.	  Both	  mother	  and	  infant	  –	  acting	  as	  autonomous	  agents	  –	  co-­‐regulate	  each	  other	  and	  the	  activity	  –	  at	  the	  same	  time	  also	  shaped	  by	  the	  object	  and	  the	  cultural	  activity	  frame	  –	  in	  ways	  that	  sustain	  the	  interaction	  itself	  (in	  the	  sense	  of	  De	   Jaegher	  &	  Di	  Paolo,	  2007).	  The	   interaction	   is	  asymmetric	  with	  the	   infant’s	   attention	   and	   gaze	   responding	   to	   and	   following	   the	   mother’s	  (object	   related)	   actions	   and	   the	   mother	   guiding	   the	   interaction,	   checking	  back	  with	  the	   infant	  and	  adapting	  her	  actions	  to	  the	   infant’s	  response.	  The	  interplay	  of	  actions	  has	  an	  overall	  smooth	  and	  orderly	  quality,	  even	  though	  the	   infant	   is	  slightly	   lagging	  behind	   in	   time;	  still	   the	  order	  of	  events	   in	   the	  activity	   is	   retained	   and	   meaningful	   for	   the	   participants,	   as	   the	   actions	   of	  each	   of	   them	   effectively	   serve	   as	   an	   affordance	   to	   the	   other’s	   next	   action	  (Zukow-­‐Goldring,	   2006,	   2012;	   Rączaszek-­‐Leonardi,	   Nomikou,	   &	   Rohlfing,	  2013).	  The	   infant’s	  actions	  are	  also	  recognizable	   to	   the	  mother	  as	   turns	   in	  the	  context	  of	  a	   (culturally	  structured)	  conversation	   (Schegloff,	  2007).	  The	  mother	  interprets	  and	  shapes	  the	  spontaneous	  behaviors	  of	  the	  infant	  to	  fit	  the	  cultural	  frame.	  Like	   the	   earlier	   example	   interaction	   involving	  page	   turning	   (see	  Figure	  
3.6),	   this	   interaction	   is	   organized	   into	   action	  arcs,	   again	   clearly	   illustrated	  by	  the	  intonation	  curve	  (pitch	  and	  intensity).	  The	  relevant	  deictic	  “THIS”	  is	  placed	  at	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  arc;	  the	  infant	  shifts	  his	  gaze	  at	  that	  peak,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  pause	  after	  the	  closure	  of	  the	  arc	  after	  “NO:::::::::se.”	  It	  is	  well	  known	  from	   the	   literature	   on	   infant	   directed	   speech	   that	   the	   rise	   in	   pitch	   –	  approaching	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  arc	  –	  makes	  it	  more	  likely	  that	  infants	  shift	  their	  gaze	  and	   is	  often	  used	  as	  an	   invitation	   for	   turn-­‐taking.	   (Ryan,	  1978;	  Stern,	  Spieker,	  &	  MacKain,	   1982;	   Ferrier,	   1985;	   Papoušek,	   Papoušek,	  &	   Symmes,	  1991).	   As	   infants	   and	   caregivers	   repeatedly	   move	   through	   action	   arcs	  together,	   they	  co-­‐regulate	  and	  share	  arousal	  and	  excitement,	  as	  well	  as	  act	  out	  and	  experience	  the	  structure,	  shape,	  and	  dynamics	  of	  actions	  together.	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3.4 ECOLOGIES	  IN	  TRANSFORMATION:	  SKETCHING	  A	  DEVELOPMENTAL	  
TRAJECTORY	  OF	  BOOK	  SHARING	  OVER	  THE	  FIRST	  YEAR	  Over	  the	  first	  year,	  the	  quality	  and	  dynamics	  of	  book	  sharing	  interactions	  underwent	   considerable	   change	   in	   tandem	   with	   motor	   development,	  amounting	   to	   transformations	   of	   the	   whole	   ecological	   setting	   including	  spatial	  configurations	   the	  strategies	  and	  behavior	  of	   the	  caregivers	  as	  well	  as	   the	   objects	   used.	   Some	   aspects	   of	   these	   changes	   have	   already	   been	  described	   in	   the	   first	   section,	   as	   they	   became	   manifest	   in	   gross	  measurements	   on	   the	   population	   level:	   book	   sharing	   episode	   durations	  slightly	   increased	  until	  6	  months,	   then	  sharply	  declined	  at	  7	  months.	  From	  around	   6	   months	   on,	   solitary	   interactions	   emerged	   and	   became	   the	  dominant	   type	   of	   book	   interactions	   at	   8	  months	   until	   social	   book	   sharing	  took	  over	  again	  at	  10	  months	   finally	  reaching	  a	  balance	  at	  12	  months	  (see	  
Figure	   3.1).	   These	   results	   closely	   match	   a	   series	   of	   qualitative	   changes	  observed	   in	   the	  course	  of	   the	   longitudinal	  study.	  This	  section	  will	  sketch	  a	  developmental	  trajectory	  of	  book	  sharing	  over	  the	  first	  year	  based	  on	  these	  changes.	  For	  this	  purpose,	  the	  data	  samples	  are	  pooled	  into	  four	  age	  groups	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  newly	  observed	  interaction	  qualities	  in	  each	  period:	  (1) 3–4	   months:	   early	   coordinated	   interactions	   with	   infants	   actively	  engaged	  but	   following	  mothers’	   lead	  cued	  by	   local	  dynamical	  events	  (described	  in	  previous	  parts).	  (2) 5–6	   months:	   richer	   interactions	   with	   increased	   infant	   participation	  and	  more	  fluent	  attention	  coordination,	   including	  (a)	   infants	  shifting	  their	  gaze	  back	  to	  the	  book	  without	  being	  cued,	  and	  (b)	  interspersed	  affective	  communicative	  exchanges	  related	  to	  the	  book.	  (3) 6–9	   months:	   social	   book	   sharing	   interactions	   turning	   largely	   into	  solitary	   book	   exploration	   with	   attention	   to	   own	   object	   actions,	  paralleling	   infants’	   new	   autonomous	   object	   manipulation,	   posture,	  and	  locomotion.	  (4) 9–12	   months:	   reconstituted	   social	   book	   sharing:	   infants	   effectively	  integrate	   autonomous	   object	   actions	   –	   which	   become	   increasingly	  conventional	  –	  with	  the	  socially	  shared	  activity.	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Each	   sub-­‐section	   begins	   with	   a	   description	   of	   the	   newly	   observed	  interaction	  qualities	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  infant’s	  activities	  as	  well	  as	  the	  overall	  ecological	   setting.	   Selected	   example	   episodes	   are	   then	   described	   and	  analyzed	   in	   more	   detail	   to	   explore	   and	   discuss	   attention	   and	   action	  coordination	  processes.	  For	  an	  overview	  of	   the	   changing	   characteristics	  of	  book	  sharing	  over	  the	  first	  year	  of	  life	  see	  Figure	  3.12.	  
3.4.1.1 5–6	  months:	  an	  early	  peak	  at	  social	  book	  sharing	  interactions	  	  From	  5–6	  months,	   the	  2	  months	   immediately	   following	   the	   early	  phase	  described	   in	   the	   previous	   sections,	   book	   sharing	   activities	   became	   richer,	  smoother,	   and	  more	   sophisticated	   in	   parallel	   with	   the	   infants’	   developing	  motor	   and	   attention	   skills	   and	   the	   increasing	   routine	   and	   attunement	  between	   the	   partners.	   During	   active	   participation	   infants	   used	   manual	  manipulation	  more	  extensively,	  showed	  improved	  aim	  when	  grasping	  pages,	  and	   their	   page	   flipping	   became	   more	   fluent.	   The	   repertoire	   of	   book	  interactions	  was	  extended	  by	  the	  addition	  of	  newly	  emerging	  actions,	  motor	  schemes	   such	   as	   banging,	   rapid	   opening	   and	   closing	   of	   the	   fingers	  (“scratching”)	  on	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  pages,	  and	  mouthing	  objects	  (which	  also	  began	   to	   have	   slightly	   disruptive	   effects	   on	   the	   otherwise	   smooth	  interaction).	  Still,	  these	  actions	  were	  largely	  shaped	  into	  the	  cultural	  frame	  by	   caregivers.	   Coordinating	   and	   switching	   attention	   between	   object	   and	  caregiver	  was	  performed	  more	  easily	  and	  effortlessly:	  infants	  now	  followed	  the	  caregiver’s	  lead	  more	  fluently,	  with	  faster,	  better	  aimed	  gaze	  shifts	  from	  the	  object	  to	  the	  caregiver’s	  hands	  or	  face	  –	  following	  his	  or	  her	  voice	  –	  and	  then	   looking	   back	   to	   the	   book	   again	   spontaneously,	   without	   necessarily	  being	   prompted	   by	   local,	   dynamical	   events	   created	   by	   the	   caregiver	   (see	  
Figures	  3.8-­‐9	  below).	  In	  accordance	  with	  infants’	  improving	  postural	  control	  and	  new	  ability	  to	  maintain	   a	   sitting	   position	  with	   only	   slight	   support,	   spatial	   configurations	  with	  the	  interaction	  partners	  facing	  each	  other	  at	  a	  90°	  angle	  became	  more	  frequent.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   mothers	   less	   frequently	   acted	   on	   the	   infants’	  body	   (putting	   them	   through	   the	   motions	   of	   a	   specific	   action);	   rather,	  mothers	   used	   their	   own	   body	   and	   voice,	   especially	   their	   hands,	   to	   enact	  meaning	  and	  perform	  lively	  visual	  demonstrations	  (including	  the	  beginning	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use	  of	  baby	  signs).	  In	  line	  with	  the	  increasing	  frequency	  and	  skill	  of	  infants’	  object	   manipulations,	   books	   with	   touchy-­‐feely	   textures	   and	   attached	  graspable	  objects	  became	  prominent,	  as	  did	  books	  made	  of	  real	  paper	  with	  audio-­‐haptic	  crinkle.	  
Figures	   3.8-­‐9	   illustrate	   the	   new	   quality	   and	   range	   of	   book	   sharing	  interactions	  at	  5,	  and	  especially	  6	  months	  with	  a	   focus	  on	  co-­‐ordination	  of	  attention	  and	  of	  action.	  In	   the	   first	  example	   (see	  Figure	   3.8)	   the	  mother	   is	   sitting	  on	   the	  couch	  cross-­‐legged	   with	   her	   6-­‐month-­‐old	   daughter	   placed	   at	   a	   90°	   angle	   in	   the	  hollow	   formed	   by	   the	   mother’s	   left	   leg	   with	   her	   back	   supported	   by	   the	  mother’s	   left	   thigh	  and	  a	  sofa	  cushion.	  They	  are	  both	  facing	  a	  small	  square	  paperback	  “Mr.	  Men	  and	  Miss	  Little”	  book	  with	  thin	  paper	  pages,	  which	  the	  mother	  is	  holding.	  Immediately	  after	  a	  sharp	  rise	  in	  the	  intonation	  curve	  (“er	  ist	  SO::stark”	  [“he	  is	  SO::strong”]),	  the	  infant	  turns	  her	  gaze	  upwards	  toward	  her	  mother’s	   face,	  who	   in	   turn	   responds	  with	   an	   eye-­‐greeting	   and	   a	  more	  pronounced	   facial	   expression	   and	   affective	   intonation.	   They	   share	   and	  reinforce	   each	  other’s	   expression	  of	   surprise	   and	   amazement	   in	   voice	   and	  facial	  expression	  before	  first	  the	  infant	  and	  then	  the	  mother	  turn	  their	  gaze	  back	  to	  the	  book	  again.	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Figure	  3.8:	  ELAN	  analysis	  detail	  of	  book	  sharing	  interaction	  with	  6-­‐month-­‐old	  infant	  sitting	  at	  a	  90°	  angle	  on	  the	  mother’s	  lap.	  Infant	  and	  mother	  looking	  at	  book	  together	  (A).	   Infant	   looking	  up	  at	  mother’s	   face	   in	  conjunction	  with	  salient	  vocal	  event	  at	   (B).	  Affective	  communicative	  exchange	  with	  mutual	  reinforcement	  (C,D).	  The	  infant’s	  gaze	  spontaneously	  returns	  the	  book	  (E),	  before	  mother’s	  gaze	  returns	  there	  as	  well	  (F).	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In	  the	  second	  example	  (see	  Figure	  3.9),	  the	  mother	  and	  her	  6-­‐month-­‐old	  son	  sitting	  on	  her	  lap	  at	  a	  90°	  angle	  are	  sharing	  a	  book	  about	  animal	  noises	  and	  have	  just	  arrived	  at	  the	  last	  page.	  After	  setting	  the	  scene	  by	  “Who’s	  your	  favorite?”	   the	   mother	   starts	   curving	   her	   right	   hand	   with	   the	   fingertips	  pressed	   together	   through	   the	   air	   toward	   the	   infant	   –	   accompanied	   by	   “a	  bzzzzzz	   bzzzzy	   bee”	   –	   with	   her	   eyes	   fixated	   on	   the	   infant,	   who	   is	   still	  involved	  with	   the	  book,	  his	   left	  hand	  reaching	   for	  and	  touching	   the	  animal	  picture	  on	  the	  upper	  right	  corner	  of	  the	  right	  page.	  When	  the	  mother’s	  hand	  finally	  touches	  the	  infant’s	  belly,	  he	  turns	  his	  gaze	  and	  head	  to	  her	  hand	  and	  begins	  tracking	  her	  hand	  as	  she	  starts	  moving	  it	  with	  her	  fingers	  joined	  side	  by	   side	   in	   up	   and	   down	   waves	   acting	   out	   “.	   .	   .	   or	   a	  ssSSSSSSSSSssssssssssssnake.”	   As	   the	   mother	   concludes	   her	   enactment	   of	  the	   snake,	   the	   infant	   looks	  up	   first	   at	   the	  mother’s	  mouth	   and	   then	   at	   her	  eyes,	  beginning	  to	  smile.	  He	  then	  turns	  his	  gaze	  to	  the	  book	  again,	  his	  smile	  broadening,	  shortly	  after	  being	  followed	  by	  the	  mother	  returning	  her	  gaze	  to	  the	  book.	  
Infants’	  attention	   coordination	  becoming	  more	   fluent	  and	  guided	  by	  
routine.	   In	   both	   examples	   the	   infant	   is	   responding	   to	   an	   aspect	   of	   the	  mother’s	  behavior	  related	  to	  the	  book,	  e.g.,	  the	  intonation	  curve	  going	  up	  as	  part	   of	   the	  mother’s	   interpretation	   conjunction	  with	   salient	   vocal	   event	   at	  (B).	   Affective	   communicative	   exchange	   with	   mutual	   reinforcement	   (C,D).	  The	  infant’s	  gaze	  spontaneously	  returns	  the	  book	  (E),	  before	  mother’s	  gaze	  returns	  there	  as	  well	  (F).	  of	  the	  narrative.	  In	  a	  previous	  example	  at	  4	  months	  (Figure	   3.7),	   the	   infant	   was	   responding	   to	   and	   following	   the	   mother’s	  salient	  actions	  but	  kept	  lagging	  slightly	  behind	  and	  so	  the	  mother’s	  gaze	  had	  already	  moved	  back	  to	  the	  book	  by	  the	  time	  the	  infant	  had	  shifted	  his	  gaze	  to	   his	   mother’s	   face.	   In	   contrast,	   this	   time	   the	   eyes	   of	   mother	   and	   infant	  meet,	   facilitated	   by	   the	   90°	   configuration	   and	   the	   infant’s	   more	   fluent	  movement.	   The	   infant	   thus	   elicits	   a	   communicative	   exchange	   of	   affect,	  including	  mutual	   acknowledgement	   and	   reinforcement.	  Also	   in	   contrast	   to	  the	  previous	   interactions,	   in	  both	  these	  cases	   it	   is	  now	  the	   infant	  who	  first	  turns	  his/her	  gaze	  back	  to	  the	  book	  again,	  before	  the	  mother	  does....	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While	   infants,	   despite	   their	   growing	   motor	   skills,	   are	   still	   unable	   to	  autonomously	   move	   in	   and	   explore	   the	   world	   of	   objects,	   they	   are	   now	  turning	  their	  gaze	  and	  head	  more	  fluently	  from	  book	  to	  the	  caregiver’s	  hand	  or	  face	  and	  back	  again.	  They	  do	  so	  spontaneously,	  without	  necessarily	  being	  cued	   by	   dynamical	   movements,	   but	   arguably	   guided	   by	   routine,	   at	   times	  even	   arriving	   back	   at	   the	   book	   first,	   taking	   the	   lead	   in	   coordinating	  attention.	   Thus,	   within	   these	   interactions,	   infants	   demonstrate	   a	   basic	  understanding	  of	  the	  activity	  as	  shared	  and	  of	  the	  spatiotemporal	  structure	  and	  format	  of	  the	  book	  sharing	  activity	  at	  hand.	  The	  examples	  at	  6	  months	  also	  invite	  us	  to	  consider	  how	  small	  changes	  in	  the	  temporal	  dynamics	  of	  the	  interaction	   can	   lead	   to	   profound	   qualitative	   shifts	   as	   infants’	   more	   fluent	  gaze	   coordination	   enables	   episodes	   of	   affective	   communicative	   emotional	  exchanges,	   and	   thus	   increase	   the	   infants’	   ability	   to	   effectively	   shape	   the	  interaction	  dynamics	  of	  the	  book	  sharing	  activity.	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Figure	  3.9:	  ELAN	  analysis	  detail	  of	  book	  sharing	  interaction	  with	  6-­‐month-­‐old	  infant	  sitting	  at	  a	  90°	  angle	  on	  mother’s	  lap.	  Mother	  using	  extensive	  voice	  and	  hand	  acting	   to	   illustrate	   animals	   and	  animal	   sounds	   (“a	  bzzzzzz	  bzzzzy	  bee,”	   “a	   ssSSSSSSSSSssssssssssssnake,”	  A–C).	   Infant	   gaze	  alternating	  between	  book,	  hand,	  mouth,	  and	  eyes	  (gaze	  targets	  inscribed	  on	  still	  images).	  After	  communicative	  affective	  exchange	  (D,E)	  spontaneously	  looking	  back	  to	  the	  book	  (F)	  before	  mother	  shifts	  her	  gaze	  back	  there	  (G).	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Interspersed	  affective	  communicative	  exchanges	  related	   to	   the	  book.	  Whereas	  at	  3–4	  months,	   infants	  showed	  “serious	   intent”	  when	  engaging	   in	  book	  sharing	  interactions,	  along	  with	  these	  novel	  communicative	  exchanges,	  infants	  now	  show	  pronounced	  affective	  exchanges.	  While	  the	  mother	  narrates	  the	  story,	  in	  the	  short	  span	  of	  5	  min	  the	  infant	  displays	  and	  moves	  through	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  emotions	  in	  rapid	  succession,	  in	   concordance	   with	   the	   mother’s	   tone	   of	   voice,	   her	   gestures	   and	  movements:	   from	  surprise	  and	  amazement	   to	  amusement,	   and	   from	  being	  “staggered”	   to	  concern	  and	  sadness	  (see	  Figure	  3.10).	  The	  emotions	  build	  up	  and	  develop	   in	   the	   flow	  of	   the	   interaction.	   In	   response	   to	   the	  mother’s	  voice	   and	   actions	   the	   infant	   looks	   up	   to	   her	   face	   with	   an	   expression	   of	  surprise,	   for	   example	   after	   an	   abrupt	   rise	   in	  pitch	   contour	   in	   “SO::strong,”	  the	   mother	   takes	   up	   her	   daughter’s	   expression	   and	   responds	   to	   it	   with	  widely	   opened	   eyes,	   raised	   eye-­‐brows,	   and	   a	   sharp	   intake	   of	   breath	  indicating	   surprise	   (.h).	   She	   then	   repeats	   the	   passage	   that	   drew	   her	  daughter’s	   attention	   to	   her	   “SO::strong,”	   again	   with	   exaggerated	   pitch	  contour,	   reinforcing	   and	   further	   shaping	   her	   daughter’s	   emotion,	   thus	  acknowledging	   and	   reinforcing	   each	   other	   (compare	   Stern,	   1985;	   Jensen,	  2014	  this	  issue).	  So	   they	   were	   moving	   through	   the	   emotions	   together	   without	   however	  seeming	   to	   be	   seriously	   upset	   or	   sad.	   Importantly,	   these	   communicative	  exchanges	  are	   situated	   in	   the	  book	   sharing	   context,	   immediately	   following	  and	   leading	   back	   into	   attentional	   engagement	   with	   the	   book.	   Thus,	   the	  exchanging	   of	   emotions	   appears	   clearly	   linked	   to	   the	   book,	   and	   even	   to	  constitute	  a	  jointly	  relating	  to	  and	  negotiating	  “about”	  the	  book	  (see	  general	  discussion	  below).	  
3.4.1.2 6–9	  months:	  shifting	  attention	  to	  object	  exploration	  During	   the	  next	   few	  months,	  however,	   roughly	   in	   the	  period	  between	  6	  and	   9	   months	   of	   age,	   the	   interaction	   dynamics	   of	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  interactions	   underwent	   a	   significant	   transformation	   and	   the	   course	   of	   the	  developmental	   trajectory	   took	   a	   sharp	   turn:	   infant-­‐object-­‐caregiver	  interactions	  decreased	  in	  number	  relative	  to	  solitary	  book	  exploration,	  and	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book	  sharing	   interactions	  showed	  a	  considerable	  decrease	   in	  duration	  and	  appeared	  generally	   less	   smooth	  compared	   to	   the	  period	  before,	   in	   spite	  of	  the	   infants	   further	   developing	   their	   capacity	   to	   sustain	   attention	   (see	  
Figures	  3.11B,E).	  These	  changes	  occurred	  in	  a	  period	  when	  the	  infants’	  developing	  strength	  and	   postural	   control	   allowed	   them	   to	   adopt	   and	  maintain	   a	   stable	   sitting	  position	   for	   longer	  periods	  of	   time,	   enabling	   them	   to	   reach	   and	  grasp	   and	  bimanually	   manipulate	   objects	   without	   falling	   over.	   Also,	   many	   infants	   at	  this	   age	   started	   locomoting	   by	   rolling	   and	   (“army”)	   crawling,	   and	   actively	  initiated	  interactions	  in	  a	  clearly	  visible	  way.	  The	  7-­‐month-­‐old	  girl	  in	  Figure	  
3.11A	  for	  example,	  noticing	  a	  book	  sharing	  interaction	  taking	  place	  between	  her	  mother	   and	   sister,	   glances	   over	   her	   shoulder,	   rolls	   over	   from	   back	   to	  belly,	  and	  crawls	  across	  the	  room	  toward	  the	  book	  (still	  held	  by	  her	  mother	  but	  abandoned	  by	  now	  by	  her	  older	  sibling),	  thereby	  prompting	  her	  mother	  –	  albeit	  without	  explicit	  social	  signals	  –	  to	  start	  a	  book	  sharing	  interaction.	  Infants	  were	  also	  better	  able	  to	  focus	  and	  maintain	  their	  attention	  –	  see	  the	  6-­‐month-­‐old	  boy	  in	  Figure	  3.11B	  intently	  watching	  his	  mother’s	  stroking	  a	  texture	  and	  closing	  in	  to	  see	  better.	  However,	  they	  were	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  quickly	  terminate	  interactions	  as	  their	  newly	  developed	  autonomous	  object	  exploration	   and	   locomotion	   activities	   drew	   them	   into	   new	   attentional	  engagements.	   In	  Figure	   3.11C	   the	  same	  6-­‐month-­‐old,	  after	  sitting	  back	  up	  again,	  accidentally	  touches	  a	  toy	  ring,	  subsequently	  grasps	  it	  and	  –	  with	  his	  eyes	   still	   on	   the	   book	   –	   brings	   it	   to	   his	  mouth,	   at	  which	   point	   his	   gaze	   is	  finally	   distracted	   away	   from	   the	   book	   and	   he	   becomes	   pre-­‐occupied	  with	  exploring	  the	  ring,	  bringing	  the	  book	  sharing	  activity	  to	  a	  halt.	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Figure	  3.10:	  Book	  sharing	  interaction	  with	  6-­‐month-­‐old	  infant	  sitting	  at	  a	  90°	  angle	  on	  mother’s	  lap	  including	  extensive	  voice	  and	  hand	  acting.	  Still	  images	  showing	  sequence	  of	  emotional	  exchanges:	  going	  in	  rapid	  succession	  and	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  the	  mother’s	  tone	  of	  voice	  and	  movement	  when	  narrating	  the	  story,	  the	  infant	  moves	  from	  surprise,	  amazement,	  to	  amusement,	  and	  from	  being	  staggered	  to	  concern	  and	  sadness.	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In	  this	  period,	  facilitated	  by	  the	  now	  stable	  sitting	  posture,	  infants	  got	  at	  times	   deeply	   involved	   with	   objects,	   e.g.,	   banging,	   mouthing	   and	  manipulating	   books	   or	   other	   objects	   in	   solitary	   play	   to	   the	   extent	   of	  seemingly	  ignoring	  people:	  having	  escaped	  from	  a	  book	  sharing	  interaction	  after	  barely	  2	  min	  the	  boy	  in	  Figure	  3.11E	  engages	  in	  manipulating	  a	  single	  object	   for	   nearly	   6	   min	   without	   interruption	   immediately	   afterwards.	  Infants	  did,	  however,	  from	  time	  to	  time	  look	  up	  at	  people’s	  faces,	  e.g.,	  when	  introduced	   to	   an	   object,	   or	   in	   what	  might	   be	   early	   forms	   of	   instrumental	  looking:	  after	  having	  pushed	  a	  book	  out	  of	  reach,	  a	  6-­‐month-­‐old	  girl	  lying	  on	  her	  belly	  turned	  her	  head	  up	  to	  her	  mother’s	  face	  and	  vocalized.	  These	  changes	  were	  also	  reflected	  in	  the	  caregiver’s	  behavior:	  they	  were	  now	  often	  content	  to	  leave	  the	  infants	  to	  their	  solitary	  play.	  When	  they	  did	  try	   to	   engage	   them	   in	   book	   sharing,	   their	   efforts	   of	   directing	   attention	  became	   more	   vigorous:	   for	   example,	   they	   called	   their	   infant’s	   name	  repeatedly	   with	   increasing	   intensity	   to	   get	   the	   infant’s	   attention	   and	  resorted	   to	   acting	   on	   the	   infant’s	   body	   again,	   but	   now	   in	   an	   exaggerated	  fashion	  to	  keep	  the	  infant	  entertained.	  Caregivers	  also	  adapted	  by	  changing	  the	   situational	   context:	   for	   example,	   they	   tried	   to	   engage	   infants	   in	   book	  sharing	   interactions	   before	   bedtime,	   when	   infants	   are	   already	   tired,	   or	  changed	   the	   spatial	   configuration	   by	   placing	   infants	   on	   their	   lap,	   thereby	  actively	  constraining	  their	  action	  possibilities.	  Books	   chosen	   by	   caregivers	   during	   this	   period	   had	   more	   interactive	  elements:	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  touchy-­‐feely	  textures,	  flaps,	  and	  small	  graspable	  objects,	   they	   now	   included	   buttons	   producing	   various	   animal	   noises	   and	  moveable	   parts	   set	   on	   massive	   plastic	   pages	   eliciting	   blinking	   lights	   and	  nursery	   rhymes	  when	  operated	  correctly	   (Figure	   3.11D).	  Thus,	  books	  are	  designed	  to	  invite	  manual	  exploration	  and	  multimodal	  interaction,	  drawing	  in	   infants	   now	   able	   to	   approach	   and	   engage	  with	   books	   on	   their	   own.	   On	  their	   part,	   caregivers	   included	   these	   highly	   salient	   object	   interaction	  opportunities	   in	   their	   social	   interactions	   to	   make	   them	   more	   interesting	  again	  to	  their	  infants	  with	  mixed	  results	  (Figure	  3.11E).	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3.4.1.3 9–12	  months:	  putting	  books,	  caregivers	  and	  world	  back	  together	  At	   9–12	   months,	   infants	   continued	   to	   engage	   in	   many	   solitary	   book	  interactions,	   but	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   previous	   months,	   when	   they	   had	  primarily	   been	   exercising	   various	   motor	   schemes,	   banging,	   scratching,	  mouthing	  the	  book,	  as	  well	  as	  bimanually	  exploring	  books,	  they	  now	  started	  showing	   many	   more	   behaviors	   associated	   with	   conventional	   book	  interactions	   such	  as	   sitting	   still	   and	   looking	  at	   the	  pictures,	   turning	  pages,	  opening	  flaps,	  pointing	  at	  pictures,	  touching	  textures,	  and	  vocalizing.	  Also	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   previous	   period,	   the	   proportion	   of	   social	   book	  sharing	  episodes	   in	   relation	   to	   solitary	  ones	   increased	  again.	  Both	   solitary	  and	   social	   book	   interactions	   showed	   considerable	   variations	   in	   duration.	  Although	   the	   majority	   of	   the	   interactions	   were	   short,	   at	   times	   infants	  engaged	   in	   book	   interactions	   for	   extended	   periods	   lasting	   up	   to	   7	  min,	   as	  well	   as	   chained	   several	   episodes	   together	   into	   much	   longer	   lasting	   book	  activities.	   For	   example,	   they	   would	   ask	   for	   another	   round	   of	   looking	   at	   a	  specific	  book	  several	   times	   in	  a	  row,	  or,	  according	  to	  the	  mothers’	  reports,	  entertain	   themselves	  during	   car	   journeys	  by	   looking	   at	   books	   and	   turning	  pages	  for	  extended	  periods	  of	  time.	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Figure	  3.11:	  (A)	  7-­‐month-­‐old	  infant	  initiating	  book	  sharing	  by	  crawling	  toward	  the	  book.	  
(B)	  6-­‐month-­‐old,	  sitting	  freely,	  focusing	  on	  mother’s	  dynamical	  pointing	  and	  further	  closing	  in.	   (C)	   the	   6-­‐month-­‐old	   in	   the	   same	   interaction	   getting	   distracted	   after	   accidentally	  touching	  and	  subsequently	  grasping	  and	  mouthing	  a	  toy	  ring.	  (D)	  7-­‐month-­‐old	  absorbed	  in	  solitary	  play:	  correctly	  operating	  interaction	  device	  resulting	  in	  music	  and	  blinking.	  (E)	  7-­‐month-­‐old	  and	  9-­‐month-­‐old	  escaping	  from	  the	  book	  sharing	  activity	  despite	  their	  mother’s	  attempts	  to	  engage	  them.	  (F)	  11-­‐month-­‐old	  proactively	  performing	  appropriate	  actions	  for	  “Pat	   the	  bunny”:	  putting	  his	   finger	   through	   the	   ring,	   sharing	  affect	  with	  his	  mother	  while	  making	   dolly’s	   ball	   squeak	   by	   banging	   on	   it,	   and	   “waving	   bye-­‐bye”	   directed	   at	   the	  researcher,	   thus	  connecting	  the	  book	  sharing	  context	  with	  the	  visitor	  context.	  (G)	  Mother	  naming,	  pointing	  at,	  and	  signing	  “bird,”	  12-­‐month-­‐old	  infant	  turning	  head	  looking	  out	  of	  the	  window	   while	   mother	   is	   still	   involved	   with	   the	   book,	   before	   mother	   turns	   her	   head	  recounting	  how	  they	  saw	  a	  bird	  out	  there	  the	  day	  before.	  	  
	   	  	  
	   192	  
Book	   sharing	   episodes,	   even	   short	   ones,	   encompassed	   an	   increased	  number	   of	   action	   turns	   and	   showed	   a	   new	   quality	   and	   a	   larger	   degree	   of	  integration	   between	   interactions	   with	   the	   caregiver	   and	   with	   objects,	  between	   book	   and	   world	   and	   across	   time	   and	   space.	   Infants	   now	   more	  actively	  integrated	  manual	  object	  actions	  into	  their	  social	  engagements	  (e.g.,	  approaching	   the	   mother	   with	   a	   book,	   laughing)	   and,	   when	   engaged	   with	  objects,	  now	  integrated	  social	  interactions	  (pointers,	  requests...),	  which	  may	  or	   may	   not	   include	   gaze	   alternations.	   Moreover,	   they	   were	   now	   actively	  bidding	  for	  and	  directing	  others’	  attention.	  Infants	   now	   moved	   pro-­‐actively	   in	   the	   spatiotemporal	   attention-­‐action	  framework	  of	  an	  activity:	  spontaneously	  performing	  appropriate	  actions	  in	  a	  specific	  context	  independent	  of	  temporal	  order,	  e.g.	  performing	  an	  action	  corresponding	   to	   a	   specific	   book	   page	   (“pat	   the	   bunny,”	   “put	   the	   finger	  through	  mommy’s	  ring,”	  “wave	  goodbye”	  –	  see	  Figure	  3.11F),	  and	  were	  also	  able	   to	   anticipate	   what	   came	   next.	   The	   infants’	   actions	   extended	   much	  further	   over	   space	   and	   time,	   between	   the	   book	   and	   the	  world,	   while	   still	  being	   part	   of	   and	   coming	   back	   to	   the	   shared	   activity.	   For	   example,	   a	   12-­‐month-­‐old	  boy	  interrupted	  his	  immediate	  engagement	  with	  the	  book,	  ran	  off	  and	   found	   the	  object	  depicted	   in	   the	  picture	  book	  and	  returned	   to	  mother	  and	  book.	  Or	  when	  the	  mother	  in	  Figure	  3.11G	  is	  pointing	  out	  and	  signing	  “bird”	  referring	  to	  the	  picture	  in	  the	  book	  the	  12-­‐month-­‐old	  infant	  is	  turning	  and	   looking	  out	  of	   the	  window.	  Not	  realizing	  this,	   the	  mother	   first	   finishes	  her	   signing,	   and	   then	  herself	   turns	   to	   look	   to	   the	  window	   recounting	  how	  they	  had	  encountered	  a	  bird	  there	  on	  the	  previous	  day.	  
3.5 CONCLUSIONS,	  GENERAL	  DISCUSSION,	  AND	  OUTLOOK	  Our	  3	  main	  findings	  were:	  (1) Infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	   interactions	   occurred	   from	   as	   early	   as	   3	  months.	   They	   unfolded	   as	   joint,	   mutually	   coordinated	   activities	  depending	  on	  the	  active	  contribution	  of	  all	  participants,	  and	  involved	  different	   kinds	   and	   degrees	   of	   attention	   as	   well	   as	   action	   co-­‐ordination	  between	  co-­‐participants	  and	  object.	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(2) Over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   first	   year	   the	   quality	   and	   dynamics	   of	   book	  sharing	  interactions	  underwent	  considerable	  change	  in	  tandem	  with	  motor	   development,	   amounting	   to	   transformations	   of	   the	   whole	  ecological	   setting:	   book	   sharing	   episodes	   became	   more	   fluent	   and	  sophisticated	   until	   6	   months,	   after	   which	   there	   was	   a	   marked	  decrease	  in	  duration	  whereas	  solitary	  interactions	  became	  dominant,	  as	   infants	   developed	   novel	   postural,	   manipulation	   and	   locomotion	  skills	  and	  their	  attention	  shifted	  to	   learning	  to	  effectively	  act	  on	  the	  object	   world.	   Subsequently,	   social	   book	   sharing	   interactions	  resurfaced	  in	  the	  period	  from	  9	  to	  12	  month,	  showing	  novel	  qualities,	  as	   infants	   began	   to	   effectively	   integrate	   manual	   object	   actions	   –	  which	   also	   became	   increasingly	   conventional	   –	   within	   the	   socially	  shared	  activity.	  (3) Our	   understanding	   of	   the	   emergence	   and	   development	   of	   triadic	  interactions	   and	   co-­‐ordination	   and	   sharing	   of	   attention	   and	   action	  can	   be	   enhanced	   by	   looking	   at	   the	   larger	   ecological	   context,	  especially	  at	  the	  hitherto	  overlooked	  early	  period	  from	  3	  to	  6	  months	  and	   how	   shared	   spaces	   of	   meaning	   and	   action	   are	   structured	  together	   in	   and	   through	   interaction,	   creating	   the	   foundation	   for	  cooperation	  and	  cultural	  learning.	  
3.5.1.1 Development	  of	  triadic	  interactions	  With	  regard	  to	  various	  theoretical	  accounts	  concerning	  the	  development	  of	  triadic	  interactions	  our	  observations	  suggest	  that:	  Interactions	  with	  objects	  and	  interactions	  with	  people	  are	  not	  separated	  during	   the	   first	   year	   as	   often	   suggested	   in	   the	   literature	   (Bakeman	   &	  Adamson,	   1984;	   Tomasello	   et	   al.,	   2005).	   On	   the	   contrary,	   at	   around	   3	  months	  when	  infants’	  interests	  start	  to	  reach	  beyond	  the	  dyad	  but	  they	  lack	  the	  means	  to	  effectively	   interact	  with	  the	  material	  world	  on	  their	  own	  yet,	  objects	   are	   introduced	   by	   their	   caregivers	   in	   the	   context	   of	   social	  interactions.	  Instead	  of	  a	  late,	  sudden	  appearance	  of	  triadic	  interactions	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	   first	   year,	   we	   report	   a	   much	   more	   gradual	   development	   (compare	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Striano	  &	  Reid,	  2009;	  De	  Barbaro	  et	  al.,	  2013)	  albeit	  following	  a	  non-­‐linear	  trajectory,	  characterized	  by	  an	  apparent	  dip	  after	  around	  6	  months	  followed	  by	   a	   recovery	   starting	   from	   9	   months;	   this	   would	   also	   explain	   why	   the	  earlier	  interactions	  have	  been	  largely	  overlooked	  in	  the	  literature.	  The	  qualitative	  changes	   in	   the	  period	  between	  9	  and	  12	  months	  need	  a	  more	   differentiated	   conceptual	   framework	   as	   many	   of	   the	   criteria	   for	  triadicity	   –	   active	   contribution	   of	   the	   infant,	   coordination	   of	   attention	   and	  action	  between	  caregiver	  and	  object,	  etc.	  –	  already	  seem	  to	  be	  met	  by	  earlier	  interactions.	   Key	   notions	   need	   to	   be	   clarified	   and	   re-­‐conceptualized,	  including:	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  infant’s	  active	  contribution,	  infants’	  coordination	  of	  attention/orientation	  actions	   in	  relation	  to	  their	  coordination	  of	  manual	  actions	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  concept	  of	  joint	  attention.	  
3–4	   months.	   At	   3–4	   months	   the	   infants	   showed	   active	   interest	   in	   the	  activity.	   They	  were	   responsive,	   amenable	   to	   and	   following	   the	   caregiver’s	  lead,	   effectively	   co-­‐ordinating	   their	   engagement	   between	   caregiver	   and	  object,	   their	  attention	  being	  drawn	  by	   local	  dynamical	   cues	  created	  by	   the	  caregiver	   (though	   following	   with	   slight	   delay)	   and	   their	   (rudimentary)	  manual	  actions	  were	  shaped	  into	  cultural	  frames	  by	  the	  caregiver.	  Thus	  the	  interaction	   was	   coordinated	   but	   asymmetric,	   smooth	   and	   orderly	   but	  slightly	  off-­‐set	  (see	  Figure	  3.12).	  Accounts	   of	   infants’	   (lack	   of)	   triadic	   behavior	   at	   this	   early	   age	   do	   not	  begin	   to	   capture	   these	   intricacies	   revealed	   through	   the	   qualitative	  micro-­‐analysis.	  For	  example,	  in	  Bakeman	  and	  Adamson’s	  (1984)	  notion	  of	  passive	  joint	   engagement,	   the	   caregiver	   establishes	   and	   sustains	   the	   (passive)	  triadic	   interaction	   essentially	   all	   by	   herself.	   By	   turning	   to	   whatever	   the	  infant	  is	  engaged	  with	  or	  directing	  the	  infant’s	  attention	  to	  a	  specific	  target,	  she	   ensures	   that	   infant	   and	   caregiver	   are	   “actively	   involved	   in	   the	   same	  object,	  but	  the	  baby	  evidences	  little	  awareness	  of	  the	  other’s	  involvement	  or	  even	  presence.”	  (p.	  1281)	  In	  early	  book	  sharing,	  however,	  the	  infants	  were	  clearly	  not	  oblivious	  to	  the	  caregivers’	  presence,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  e.g.,	   their	  regular	  gaze	  shifts	  between	  caregiver	  and	  object,	  drawn	  by	   the	  caregiver’s	  voice	   and	   movements.	   Rather,	   early	   book	   sharing	   already	   comes	   close	   to	  their	   description	   of	   coordinated	   joint	   engagement	   characterized	   by	   the	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infant	  being	  “actively	  involved	  with	  and	  coordinating	  his	  or	  her	  attention	  to	  both	  another	  person	  and	  the	  object	  that	  person	  is	  involved	  with.”	  While	   it	   is	   arguable	   whether	   the	   responsive	   nature	   of	   the	   3–4	   month	  infant’s	   engagement	   completely	   matches	   this	   set	   of	   criteria	   introduced	   to	  describe	  the	  behavior	  of	  infants	  9	  months	  and	  older,	  by	  5–6	  months,	  infants’	  active	   involvement	   was	   pronounced,	   especially	   with	   respect	   to	   their	  attention	  coordination.	  
5–6	  months.	  At	  5–6	  months	   infants	  now	  coordinated	   their	  engagement	  between	  caregiver	  and	  object	  more	   fluently,	  and	  shifted	   their	  gaze	  back	   to	  the	  book	  by	  themselves	  without	  the	  need	  for	  a	  prompt	  arguably	  guided	  by	  routine.	  Their	  gaze	  often	  arrived	  back	  at	  the	  book	  first,	  thus	  at	  times	  leading	  the	   interaction.	   As	   faster	   gaze	   shifts	   led	   to	   meeting	   the	   caregiver’s	   eyes,	  infants	  now	  entered	   into	  affective	   exchanges	  and	   sequentially	   coordinated	  these	   exchanges	   with	   periods	   of	   shared	   object	   involvement.	   Despite	   their	  improved	  motor	  skills,	  infants	  were	  still	  unable	  to	  move	  in	  and	  explore	  the	  world	   of	   objects	   on	   their	   own.	   In	   book	   sharing,	   their	   range	   of	   manual	  contributions	  has	   expanded,	   including	  both	  helpful	   and	  disruptive	   actions,	  which	  were	  still	  mostly	  shaped	   into	   the	  cultural	   frame	  by	   their	  caregivers.	  Thus	   the	   interaction	   is	   co-­‐ordinated	   and	   more	   symmetric	   with	   regard	   to	  attention,	  but	  asymmetric	  in	  terms	  of	  action,	  and	  overall	  orderly	  and	  fluent	  (see	  Figure	  3.12).	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Figure	  3.12:	  Ecologies	  in	  transformation.	  The	  table	  gives	  an	  overview	  of	  book	  sharing	  as	  it	  changes	   over	   the	   first	   year.	   The	   columns	   list	   relevant	   characteristics	   for	   the	   respective	  participants:	   infant	   (inf):	   motor	   skills	   and	   book	   sharing	   actions	   sorted	   in	   attentional,	  manual	   and	   affective;	   caregiver	   (cg):	   book	   sharing	   actions	   in	   terms	   of	   function	   and	  modalities	  they	  are	  implemented	  in;	  books:	  type	  of	  book	  used;	  and	  for	  the	  interaction	  as	  a	  whole:	   the	   spatial	   configuration	   of	   the	   participants	   and	   the	   quality	   of	   the	   resulting	  interaction.	  The	  rows	  list	  the	  pooled	  age	  groups	  (3–4,	  5–6,	  6–9,	  9–12	  months).	  	   	  Due	   to	   the	   interspersed	   affective	   exchanges,	   the	   interaction	   already	  resembles	  Hubley	  and	  Trevarthen’s	  concept	  of	  secondary	   intersubjectivity,	  characterized	   by	   integrating	   “acts	   of	   joint	   praxis”	   around	   objects	   with	  “interpersonal	  communicative	  acts”	  (Hubley	  and	  Trevarthen,	  1979).	  On	  the	  other	   hand,	   infants	  may	   not	   show	   enough	  manual	   object	   actions	   yet,	   and	  alternating	   back	   and	   forth	   between	   shared	   book	   involvement	   and	  communicative	   affective	   exchanges	   sequentially	   (see	  Figure	   3.9)	  may	   not	  be	   “integrated”	   enough	   to	   match	   the	   criteria	   again	   set	   to	   describe	   the	  behavior	  of	  infants	  around	  9	  month	  and	  above.	  Whatever	   the	   verdict	   on	   its	   “triadic”	   status,	   this	   alternation	   between	  engagements	   may	   constitute	   a	   basic	   form	   of	   “joint	   aboutness”—jointly	  communicating	   about	   something—which	   plays	   an	   important	   role	   in	  secondary	   intersubjectivity.	   It	   is	   also	   reminiscent	   of	   a	   crucial	   notion	   in	  Liebal	  and	  Carpenter’s	  account	  of	  joint	  attention:	  one	  of	  its	  central	  features,	  “knowledge	  of	  knowing	  together,”	  is	  held	  to	  be	  established	  via	  what	  they	  call	  “sharing	  looks.”	  These	  looks	  close	  the	  triangle	  of	  the	  triad,	  turning	  “not-­‐yet-­‐shared	  attention	  into	  truly	  joint,	  shared	  attention,”	  confirming	  that	  attention	  is	   shared,	   with	   the	   goal	   of	   bringing	   about	   “an	   alignment	   of	   attitudes”	  (Carpenter	  and	  Liebal,	  2011;	   compare	  Hobson,	  2005).	  Their	  account	  again	  refers	   to	   infants	   at	   around	   9	   months	   and	   older	   and	   was	   not	   intended	   to	  capture	   the	   behavior	   of	   younger	   infants.	   Notably,	   social	   book	   sharing	  interactions	   at	   6	   months	   seem	   to	   already	   constitute	   a	   basic	   comment	  structure,	   in	  Bruner’s	   terms	   (1975),	   in	   that	   infant	   and	   caregiver	   exchange	  affect	   in	   relation	   to,	   or	   even	   “jointly	   negotiate	   about”	   the	   book.	   Thus	   the	  affective	  exchanges	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  joint	  involvement	  with	  the	  book,	  its	  pictures,	   and	  vocal	  narrative	  might	   constitute	  a	  basic	   form	  of	   “content”	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and	   the	   succession	   of	   emotional	   exchanges	   may	   build	   up	   toward	   a	   basic	  form	  of	  “emotional	  narrative.”	  
6–9	   months.	   At	   6–9	   months,	   infants	   were	   actively	   seeking	   out	   and	  autonomously	   manipulating	   books,	   mostly	   engaging	   in	   solitary	   book	  exploration,	   with	   their	   attention	   primarily	   drawn	   to	   their	   own	   manual	  object	  actions,	  only	  at	   times	   looking	  up	  at	   their	  caregivers.	  Thus	   the	  social	  book	   sharing	   episodes	  were	   shorter,	   as	   the	   infants	   failed	   to	   keep	  up	   their	  engagement	   with	   the	   caregiver	   long	   enough	   to	   sustain	   the	   interaction.	  Though	  the	  interactions	  were	  now	  more	  symmetric,	  due	  to	  the	  infants’	  more	  autonomous	  object	  manipulation,	  they	  were	  also	  less	  coordinated,	  at	  times	  dis-­‐coordinated:	   when	   their	   caregivers	   attempted	   to	   guide	   them,	   infants	  were	   frequently	   already	   involved	   in	   an	   action,	   putting	   them	   at	   cross	  purposes	  (compare	  De	  Barbaro	  et	  al.,	  2013),	  and	  their	  manual	  actions	  could	  no	   longer	   easily	   be	   shaped	   into	   the	   cultural	   frame	   of	   book	   sharing	   (see	  
Figure	  3.12).	  Looking	   at	   the	   period	   between	   6	   and	   9	   months	   revealed	   that	   the	  configuration	  commonly	  described	  in	  the	  literature	  for	  most	  of	  the	  first	  year	  does	   indeed	   occur:	   there	  was	   little	   joint	   or	   shared	   action	   as	   infants	  were	  drawn	   into	   deep	   object	   involvement	   to	   the	   point	   of	   seemingly	   “ignoring	  people”	   (e.g.	   Tomasello,	   1999).	   	  However,	  when	   looked	   at	  more	   closely	   in	  the	  bigger	  ecological	  context,	  the	  apparent	  dip	  in	  triadic	  interactions	  at	  this	  point	   is	   not	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   story	   but	   rather	   is	   only	   temporary,	  following	   a	   period	   of	   already	   well	   coordinated	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  interactions.	  Rather	   than	   reflecting	   an	   enduring	   lack	   of	   cognitive	   capacities,	   the	  relative	   paucity	   of	   triadic	   interactions	   compared	   to	   solitary	   book	   sharing	  interactions	  between	  6	  and	  9	  months	  can	  hence	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  change	  of	   interaction	   dynamics	   due	   to	   new	   achievements	   (developing	   object	  manipulation,	  posture	  and	  mobility)	  and	  accordingly	  shifting	  interests.	  This	  shift	   of	   interest	   toward	   objects	   has	   long	   been	   known	   in	   the	   literature	  (Trevarthen	  &	  Hubley,	  1978;	  Bakeman	  &	  Adamson,	  1984).	  To	  characterize	  it	  (beyond	   noting	   basic	   correlations	   with	   infant	   postural	   and	   motor	  development)	   further	   investigations	   are	   required	   at	   the	   micro-­‐
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developmental	  level	  (see	  De	  Barbaro	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  The	  primary	  focus	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  development	  of	  triadic	  interactions	  in	  terms	  of	  underlying	  cognitive	   capacities	   “coming	   on	   line”	   only	   later	   on	   explains	   why	   the	  diminished	   and	   discoordinated	   social	   object	   interactions	   at	   this	   age	   range	  are	  ignored	  and	  why	  the	  significance	  of	  early	  triadic	  interactions	  has	  been	  so	  often	  neglected	  and	  even	  overlooked	  (Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  compare	  Reid	  and	  Striano,	  2007).	  
9–12	  months.	  At	  9–12	  months	  infants’	  attention	  and	  action	  were	  guided	  not	   only	   through	   dynamical	   cues	   and	   routines	   but	   also	   by	   indirect	   and	  conventional	   means	   (words,	   instructions,	   demonstrations).	   Infants’	   fluent	  coordination	   at	   this	   age	   incorporated	   manual	   object	   actions	   into	   social	  actions	   and	   social	   actions	   into	   manual	   object	   actions	   across	   different	  cultural	   activity	   frameworks,	   across	   time	   and	   space.	   Infants	   increasingly	  shaped	  and	  adapted	  their	  now	  versatile	  locomotion	  and	  object	  manipulation	  actions	   according	   to	   the	   conventional	   frame	   and	   to	   communicative	  exchanges,	   and	   were	   themselves	   actively	   directing	   others’	   attention	   and	  action.	   The	   episodes	   were	   of	   varying	   duration,	   with	   a	   high	   frequency	   of	  action	   turns,	   and	   often	   chained	   together.	   The	   interactions	   were	   mostly	  coordinated	  and	  symmetric,	  orderly	  and	  fluent	  (see	  Figure	  3.12).	  This	   period	   clearly	   encompasses	   significant	   qualitative	   changes	   in	   the	  interactions.	   Rather	   than	   appearing	   suddenly	   supposedly	   mediated	   by	   a	  newly	   emerging	   capacity	   of	   joint	   attention,	   these	   changes	   can	   be	   seen	   as	  part	  of	  a	  gradual	  development	  (compare	  De	  Barbaro	  et	  al.,	  2013)	  coming	  out	  of	   the	   interplay	  of	  multiple	  strands	  of	  development	   in	   interaction	  with	   the	  social	  and	  cultural	  environment	  and	  the	  entire	  ecology	  of	  the	  activity.	  In	  order	  to	   further	  explore	  and	  better	  understand	  the	   interplay	  of	  these	  multiples	   strands	   of	   development	  we	   need	   to	   reframe,	   refine,	   and	   expand	  key	  notions	  such	  as	  (visual)	  joint	  attention	  to	  create	  conceptual	  frameworks,	  which	   likewise	   allow	   for	   an	   interplay	   of	   multiple	   concepts	   capturing	  different	  aspects	  of	   the	   interactions,	   cultural	  activities,	  and	   their	  ecologies.	  For	  example,	  whereas	  the	  concept	  of	  joint	  attention,	  which	  developed	  in	  the	  context	   of	   experiments	   on	   gaze	   following	   and	   gaze	   checking	   (Scaife	   &	  Bruner,	  1975),	  is	  primarily	  focused	  on	  the	  visual	  domain,	  processes	  such	  as	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sharing	  of	  experience,	  attention	  coordination,	  mutual	  orienting	  can	  rely	  on	  multiple	  modalities	  bound	   together	   in	   structured	  actions.	  The	   role	  of	   gaze	  within	  this	  interplay	  of	  modalities	  is	  only	  beginning	  to	  be	  explored	  in	  more	  detail	   (e.g.,	   social	   gaze	   to	   eye-­‐hand-­‐coordination	   in	   caregiver-­‐infant-­‐object	  interactions,	  Yu	  &	  Smith,	  2013).	  
3.5.1.2 Jointly	  structuring	  shared	  spaces	  of	  meaning	  and	  action	  The	   richness	   of	   early	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	   interactions	   in	   naturalistic	  contexts	   invites	   an	   expansion	   of	   focus	   from	   the	   supposedly	   late	   emerging	  triadic	   interactions	   primarily	   associated	   with	   visual	   (joint)	   attention	   to	  studying	   how	   shared	   spaces	   of	   meaning	   and	   action	   are	   multi-­‐modally	  structured	  together	  from	  early	  on.	  The	   infants’	   situation	   at	   3–6	   months	   (showing	   interest	   in	   their	  surroundings	   but	   not	   yet	   being	   able	   to	   explore	   the	   object	   world	   on	   their	  own)	  makes	   this	   age	  window	   particularly	   interesting	   for	   learning	   socially	  (including	   learning	   “about	   objects	   and	   the	   world”),	   as	   the	   infants	   readily	  engage	   in	   the	   highly	   structured	   and	   experientially	   rich	   joint	   activities	  offered	  by	  their	  caregivers.	  Book	  sharing	  is	  such	  an	  activity.	  It	  serves	  as	  a	  “container”	  holding	  infant,	  caregiver,	   and	   world	   together	   in	   a	   small	   confined	   space	   opening	   up	  possibilities	  for	  shared	  experience	  and	  action	  and	  fostering	  learning	  (Wood,	  Bruner,	   &	   Ross,	   1976;	   Vygotsky,	   1978a).	   In	   pointing	   actions,	   for	   example,	  rather	   than	  having	   to	   follow	  a	  pointing	   finger	   to	  a	  distant	   target,	   the	  close	  encounters	   of	   early	   book	   sharing	   allow	   the	   finger	   pointing	   and	   the	   object	  pointed	  at	  to	  meet	  in	  immediate	  vicinity	  and	  within	  the	  infant’s	  reach,	  often	  accompanied	   by	   salient,	   dynamical	   gestures	   and	   actual,	   audible	   contact	  events.	  The	  container	  offers	  a	  rich	  reservoir	  of	  –	  and	  substrate	  for	  creating	  –interaction	  structures	  which	  are	  easily	  accessible	  to	  learn	  from	  and	  act	  upon	  together	   (Shotter,	   1983;	   Goodwin,	   2013).	   Part	   of	   this	   (spatial	   as	   well	   as	  temporal)	   structuring	   is	  provided	  by	   the	   cultural	  book	   sharing	   framework	  created	  around	  and	  manifested	  in	  the	  artifact	  book.	  Not	  only	  does	  the	  book	  invite	   the	   infants	   to	   physically	   engage	   with	   it	   (scaffolding	   their	   manual	  actions),	  it	  also	  embodies	  and	  reliably	  reproduces	  a	  stable,	  recognizable	  and	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predictable	   sequence	  of	  actions.	  What	  makes	   the	  activity	  come	  alive	   is	   the	  caregivers’	  active	  moment-­‐to-­‐moment	  structuring	  as	  they	  dynamically	  enact	  and	   carve	   out	   “building	   blocks”	   of	   interaction,	   pattern	   actions,	   and	   shape	  actions	  into	  action	  arcs	  in	  dialog	  with	  the	  infants.	  The	  wealth	  of	  information	  available	  in	  infants’	  natural	  environments	  has	  been	   emphasized	   by	   computational	   approaches	   in	   order	   to	   explain	   the	  impressive	  early	  achievements	  of	  infant	  learners,	  focusing	  primarily	  on	  the	  problem	  of	  word-­‐reference	  learning	  (L.	  B.	  Smith,	  Suanda,	  &	  Yu,	  2014).	  Also	  the	  statistical	  validity	  of	  social	  cues	  (caregivers’	  action	  and	  gaze	  directions)	  for	  finding	  and	  disambiguating	  meaning	  in	  the	  complex	  cluttered	  streams	  of	  objects,	   actions,	   events	   –	   and	   words	   –	   has	   been	   shown	   using	   statistical	  learning	  models	   (Frank,	   Tenenbaum,	   &	   Fernald,	   2012).	   Caregivers	   in	   real	  world	   activities	   actively	   select	   and	   structure	   their	   infant-­‐directed	   speech,	  performing	   “auditory	   packaging”	   closely	   coupled	   to	   the	   relevant	   actions,	  creating	   crossmodal	   invariances,	   thus	   simplifying	   learning	   by	   highlighting	  relevant	  aspects	  within	  the	  interaction	  (Nomikou	  &	  Rohlfing,	  2011;	  Bahrick	  &	  Lickliter,	  2012;	  see	  also	  Leavens	  et	  al.,	  2014,	  this	  issue).	  The	   present	   study	   invites	   us	   to	   take	   a	   step	   beyond	   the	   structuring	   of	  “perceptual	  input,”	  and	  consider	  the	  infant’s	  active,	  embodied	  participation	  and	  engagement	  in	  joint	  practices.	  Infants	  experience	  the	  activity	  first	  hand,	  actively	   seeking	   out	   and	   probing	   their	   environment	   through	   active	   vision	  and	   active	   touch.	   They	   are	   fully	   immersed	   and	   emotionally	   invested	   in	  coordinated	   interactions	   with	   their	   caregivers	   and	   the	   book,	   actively	  structuring	  shared	  spaces	  of	  meaning	  and	  action	  together.	  To	  describe	  this	  structuring	  in	  more	  detail	  we	  used	  the	  notion	  of	  “action	  arcs.”	  The	  basic	  arc	  structure	  with	  a	  beginning,	  build	  up,	  climax,	  and	  resolution	  is	  ubiquitous	  in	  physiological	   processes,	   e.g.,	   breathing,	   and	   is	   fundamental	   to	   action,	  with	  different	   actions	   following	   different	   dynamic	   trajectories	   (compare	   Stern,	  2010;	  Trevarthen	  &	  Delafield-­‐Butt,	  2013).	  As	  infants	  and	  caregivers	  repeatedly	  move	  through	  action	  arcs	  together,	  they	   co-­‐regulate	   and	   share	   arousal	   and	   excitement,	   as	  well	   as	   act	   out	   and	  experience	   the	   structure,	   shape,	   and	   dynamics	   of	   actions	   together.	   These	  types	  of	  co-­‐regulation	  could	  be	  regarded	  as	  merely	  coordination	  of	  behavior	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with	  sharing	  of	  affect	  (Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  However,	  in	  moving	  through	  these	   arcs	   together,	   sharing	   of	   affect	   goes	   hand	   in	   hand	   with,	   and	   is	  inseparable	  from,	  learning	  about	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  action:	  infants	  become	  familiar	  with	  the	  dynamic	  trajectories	  as	  they	  are	  led	  through	  the	  motions,	  providing	  an	  opportunity	  to	  learn	  about	  structure	  and	  dynamics	  of	  actions,	  about	   themselves,	   their	   partner,	   the	   object	   involved,	   and	   their	   relation.	  Moreover,	   they	   get	   to	   experience	   and	   learn	   about	   the	   effects	   their	   own	  actions	  have	  on	  the	  partner	  and	  the	  unfolding	  of	  the	  activity.	  Through	   such	   immersion	   in	   participation,	   infants	   are	   able	   to	   learn	  specific	   routines	   and	   practices,	   and	  more	   generally,	   “ways	   of	   interacting,”	  following	  the	  implicit	  norms	  of	  their	  culture	  (Mauss,	  1973;	  Rietveld,	  2008).	  It	  also	  provides	  the	  opportunity	  to	  learn	  about	  other	  people	  as	  social	  agents,	  whose	   actions	   significantly	   shape	   the	   unfolding	   of	   the	   activity.	   Through	  being	  drawn	  repeatedly	  by	  cues	  and	  movements	  to	  the	  relevant	  locations	  –	  	  hands,	   faces,	   objects	   –	   “where	   the	   action	   takes	   place”	   –	   infants	   become	  accustomed	   to	   and	   learn	   to	   anticipate	   the	   specific	   sequences	   of	   action	  trajectories	   (e.g.,	   Hunnius	   &	   Bekkering,	   2010),	   and	   the	   interplay	   of	   gaze,	  hand	  actions,	  and	  object	  use	  –	  in	  short	  how	  people	  act.	  Crucially,	   infants	   are	   learning	  how	   to	   learn:	  when	   to	   look,	  where	   to	   get	  important	  information,	  and	  when	  to	  join	  in	  with	  an	  appropriate	  action	  (e.g.,	  after	   a	   rising	   action	   at	   the	   peak	   of	   an	   action	   arc).	   Once	   established	   as	  interpersonal	  routines,	  action	  structures	  lend	  themselves	  to	  be	  played	  with,	  e.g.,	  introducing	  temporal	  variations	  that	  violate	  expectations	  (as	  in	  teasing),	  thus	   highlighting	   and	   making	   explicit	   mutual	   coupling	   and	   coregulation,	  potentially	   helping	   to	   develop	   action	   coordination	   skills	   and	   cooperation	  (Reddy,	  2008;	  Reddy,	  Liebal,	  Hicks,	  Jonnalagadda,	  &	  Chintalapuri,	  2013).	  As	  active	  participants	  even	   in	  early	   interactions,	   infants	  become	   familiar	  with	  how	  to	   jointly	  structure	  activities	  and	  begin	   to	   learn	  how	  to	  negotiate	  and	  modify	   this	   shared	   structuring	   of	   activities.	   This	   skill,	   developed	   further,	  may	  be	  characteristic	  of	  how	  infants	  coordinate	  triadic	  interactions	  at	  9–12	  months,	  and	  crucial	  for	  cultural	  learning	  and	  culture	  creation.	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3.7 GLOSSARY	  In	   the	   micro-­‐analytic	   descriptions	   and	   ELAN	   illustrations	   some	  transcription	   conventions	   from	   conversation	   analysis	   were	   used	   where	  appropriate.	  (See	  Zukow,	  1982;	  Jefferson,	  2004)	  ?	  Question	  mark:	  rising	  intonation	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.	  Full	  stop/period:	  falling	  intonation	  ,	  Comma:	  continuing	  intonation	  !	  Exclamation	  mark:	  animated	  tone	  AIr	  Upper	  case:	  increased	  loudness	  relative	  to	  surrounding	  sound	  .h	   Period	   preceding	   h:	   audible	   inhalation,	   in	   particular:	   sharp	   intake	   of	  breath	  	  	   indicating	  surprise	  BI::g	  Colons:	  lengthening	  of	  preceding	  sound,	  the	  more	  colons,	  the	  longer.	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4 Varieties	  of	  triads:	  different	  patterns	  of	  joint	  attention-­‐
and-­‐action-­‐coordination	   in	   different	   ecological	   infant-­‐
caregiver-­‐object	   activity	   contexts	   and	   their	  
development	  over	  the	  first	  year	  
4.1 Introduction	  
4.1.1 Background	  As	   laid	   out	   in	   the	   introduction	   and	   the	   first	   chapter,	   the	   standard	  
narrative	  –	  that	  infants	  begin	  to	  properly	  participate	  in	  joint	  activities	  and	  cultural	  learning	  (e.g.	  language	  and	  tool	  use)	  only	  from	  9-­‐12	  months	  on	  –	  
largely	  rests	  on	  1)	  a	  rather	  narrow,	  rational	  conception	  of	  participation	  
and	  co-­‐ordination	  with	  2)	  an	  exclusive	  focus	  on	  (visual)	   joint	  attention	  conceived	   of	   as	   the	   single	   crucial	   form	   of	   co-­‐ordination	   newly	   emerging	  around	   9	  months,	   and	   is	   based	   on	  3)	   only	   a	   small	   number	   of	   research	  
settings:	  mostly	  a)	  proto-­‐conversation	  for	  early	  interactions	  and	  b)	  (staged)	  object	  play	  and	  labelling	  for	  later	  ones,	  also	  often	  guided	  by	  normative	  goals,	  i.e.	   word	   learning	   or	   imitation	   with	   objects.	   In	   everyday	   life,	   however,	  infants	  are	  from	  early	  on	  involved	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  social	  activities,	  which	  differ	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  settings	  and	  activity	  structures,	  and	  hence	  may	  afford	  different	  forms	  of	  attention-­‐and-­‐action-­‐co-­‐ordination.	  In	  this	  chapter	  we	  particularly	  focus	  on	  the	  final,	  third	  point	  stated	  above	  and	   from	   there	   work	   our	   way	   up	   to	   revisit	   and	   re-­‐evaluate	   the	   other	  assumptions.	  The	   range	   and	   richness	   of	   social	   activities	   infants	   are	   involved	   in	   from	  early	   on	   was	   well-­‐reflected	   in	   the	   300h+	   video	   material	   of	   3-­‐12	   month	  infant-­‐caregiver	   everyday	   activities	   collected	   in	   the	   course	   of	   our	  longitudinal	   study.	   	   Sampling	   the	   video	  material	  which	  had	  been	   collected	  into	  a	  video	   library	  we	  preliminarily	   tagged	   the	   interaction	  episodes	  using	  culturally	  established	  activity	  categories	  as	  far	  as	  available,	  such	  as	  feeding,	  
nappy	  change,	  soothing,	  (social/object)	  play,	  book	  sharing,	  sibling	  interaction,	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etc.,	   and	   coming	   up	   with	   new	   working	   categories	   where	   necessary,	   e.g.	  
“witnessing”	  other	  people’s	  activities.	  In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  we	  reported	  how,	  as	  a	   first	  step,	  we	  singled	  out	  one	  of	  them:	  book	  sharing	  (due	  to	  its	  prototypically	  cultural	  characteristics	  and	  early	  widespread	  occurrence)	  as	   a	   first	  model	  activity	   for	   culturally	  shaped	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	   interactions	   to	   be	   explored	   in	   more	   detail.	  Now	  we	   seek	   to	  extend	   the	  analysis	   from	   the	   example	  of	   book-­‐sharing	   –	  testing,	   generalizing	   and	   adapting	   the	   concepts,	   methods,	   results	   and	  hypotheses	  (e.g.	  whether	   there	  generally	   is	  a	  dip	   in	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  interactions	  around	  7-­‐9	  months)	  –	  to	  a	  wider	  range	  of	   infants’	  everyday	  
social	  object	  interactions.	  	  
4.1.2 Aims	  for	  the	  next	  steps	  For	  the	  next	  steps	  we	  aim	  to:	  1)	  describe	  and	  compare	  different	  forms	  of	  co-­‐ordination	   and	   sense-­‐making	   between	   infants,	   caregivers,	   and	   objects	  across	  different	  ecological	   activity	   contexts,	   and	  2)	  document	   their	  variety	  (this	  chapter)	  and	  3)	  sketch	  their	  development	  over	  infants’	  first	  year	  of	  life	  (in	  chapter	  5).	  To	   do	   so	   we	   first	   need	   to	   develop	   a	   tentative	   conceptual	   framework,	  method,	   and	   vocabulary	   allowing	   us	   to	   address	   and	   distinctively	  characterize:	  a)	  different	  ecological	  activity	  contexts,	  as	  well	  as	  b)	  different	  forms	  of	  co-­‐ordination.	  	  	  
4.1.3 Relevance	  and	  applications	   	  Extending	   our	   knowledge	   about	   early	   social	   co-­‐ordination	   beyond	  (visual)	  joint	  attention	  and	  beyond	  the	  small	  number	  of	  known	  contexts	  by	  a	  broader	   sampling	   and	   comparative	   analysis	   of	   social	   co-­‐ordination	   in	  different	  ecological	  activity	  settings	  will	  contribute	  to	  both	  1)	  basic	  research	  as	  well	  as	  2)	  practical	  applications.	  	  
1)	   Basic	   research:	   Analysis	   across	   contexts	   may	   contribute	   to	   a)	   an	  ecologically	  more	  valid	  estimation	  of	  the	  range	  of	  everyday	  object	  activities	  which	   infants	   participate	   in,	   helping	   us	   to	   better	   situate	   and	   evaluate	  existing	   research	   as	  well	   as	   inform	   future	   research,	   as	  well	   as	   b)	   a	   better,	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activity-­‐context-­‐specific	   understanding	   of	   different	   forms	   of	   social	   co-­‐ordination,	  how	  multiple	  modalities	  and	  strands	  of	  actions	  play	  together	  in	  co-­‐ordination	   and	   how	   particular	   forms	   of	   co-­‐ordination	   are	   linked	   to	  particular	  contexts,	  i.e.	  how	  contexts	  “shape”	  interaction.	  
2)	   Practical	   applications:	   Here,	   a)	   a	   better	   understanding	   of	   what	  different	  contexts	  afford,	  and,	  conversely,	  which	  kinds	  of	  co-­‐ordination	  work	  well	  in	  a	  particular	  context	  with	  its	  particular	  affordances,	  may	  help	  to	  both	  recognize	  specific	  communication	  and	  interaction	  difficulties	  and	  to	  provide	  support	   e.g.	   through	   developing	   individual	   and	   situation	   tailored	   training	  (e.g.	   for	  children	  on	  the	  autism	  spectrum	  or	   infants	  at	  risk).	   In	  addition,	  b)	  investigating	   in	  more	   detail,	   how	   learning	   is	   shaped	   by	   and	   how	   it	   differs	  across	  different	  contexts,	  may	  help	  us	  to	  be	  more	  aware	  and	  make	  diligent	  use	  of	  (already	  existing)	   learning	  opportunities,	  as	  well	  as	   to	  design	  (new)	  learning	  environments,	  particularly	  beneficial	  for	  specific	  forms	  of	  learning.	  
4.1.4 Chapter	  overview:	  	  As	  the	  steps	  sketched	  above	  constitute	  a	  larger	  ongoing	  research	  project	  exceeding	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  current	  thesis,	  we	  here	  will	  focus	  on:	  1) Sketching	  the	  development	  of	  a	  tentative	  prototype	  of	  a	  
methodology	  for	  analysing	  co-­‐ordination	  across	  different	  
activity	  contexts	  building	  on	  video	  analysis	  at	  both	  a	  macro-­‐	  and	  micro-­‐level	  2) Introducing	  a	  tentative	  framework	  of	  different	  ecological	  activity	  
contexts	  based	  on	  the	  general	  results	  of	  macro-­‐analysis	  and	  summarizing	  those	  general	  results	  by	  giving	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  activity	  contexts’	  respective	  distinctive	  structural	  characteristics.	  	  3) Documenting	  the	  process	  and	  results	  of	  macro-­‐analysis	  in	  more	  
detail	  for	  one	  examplar	  ecological	  activity	  context:	  infant-­‐directed	  caregiving	  tasks	  involving	  objects	  4) Conducting	  a	  detailed	  micro-­‐analysis	  for	  nappy	  change	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  particularly	  rich	  type	  of	  infant-­‐directed	  caregiving	  task,	  analysing	  and	  illustrating	  the	  complex	  dynamic	  patterns	  of	  multi-­‐
modal,	  multi-­‐strand	  co-­‐ordination	  with	  distinctive	  functional	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infant	  participation,	  which	  is	  already	  seen	  in	  specific	  joint	  object	  routines	  from	  3	  months.	  5) Briefly	  discussing	  some	  of	  the	  implications	  from	  macro-­‐	  and	  microanalysis:	  how	  particular	  activity-­‐specific	  characteristics	  
challenge	  currently	  established	  theory	  and	  conceptions.	  
4.2 Developing	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  and	  methodology:	  1)	  A	  macro-­‐
level	  perspective	  
4.2.1 Developing	  a	  macro-­‐level	  analysis	  Proceeding	   from	   the	   youngest	   ages	   we	   now	   more	   systematically	  compared	   interactions	  within	   and	  across	   the	   culturally	  predefined	  activity	  categories	   they	   had	   preliminarily	   been	   assigned	   to.	   We	   approached	   each	  new	  video	  episode	  first	  looking	  at	  the	  situation	  as	  it	  presented	  itself	  to	  us	  as	  a	  whole	  searching	  for	  basic	  similarities	  and	  differences	  which	  –	  already	  at	  a	  global,	  macro-­‐level	  -­‐	  prove	  helpful	  to	  distinguish	  and	  distinctly	  characterize	  different	   activity	   contexts.	   Systematizing	   our	   observation	   notes	   about	  particular	   distinguishing	   features,	   we	   came	   up	   with	   the	   following	   macro-­‐level	   factors	   to	   look	   at,	   which	   allow	   us	   to	   carve	   out	   general,	   distinctive	  structural	  characteristics	  of	  an	  activity	  as	  a	  whole:	  In	  macro-­‐analysis	  we	  specify:	  1)	  more	  stable,	  slower	  changing	  structures	  of	  an	  ecological	  activity	  context:	  a)	  material	  ones:	  people	  and	  objects	  present,	  
and	  their	  spatial	  configurations,	   and	  b)“ideal”,	   ”procedural”	  ones:	  culturally	  
shaped	   (normative)	   activity	   structures,	   less	   tangible	   yet	   recognizable	   to	  researchers	  as	  members	  of	  the	  target	  culture.	  To	  further	  differentiate	  within	  these	   activity	   structures,	   we	   look	   at	   what	   we	   tentatively	   called	  
structuredness,	  governedness,	  directedness,	  and	  social	  framing.	  
Structuredness	   is	   used	   to	   describe	   the	   degree	   to	   which	   an	   activity	   is	  structured	   into	   more	   or	   less	   invariant	   subparts,	   and	   the	   extent	   to	   which	  variability	  is	  allowed	  or	  constrained.	  We	  further	  differentiate	  two	  aspects	  of	  structuredness:	  First,	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  outcome	  of	  an	  activity,	  i.e.	  to	  what	  extent	   the	   activity	   is	   a	   task,	   i.e.	   completion	   oriented,	   aimed	   at	   a	   specific	  endpoint	  and	  second,	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  process	  itself,	  to	  what	  extent	  there	  is	   a	   fixed	   sequence	   of	   events.	   Either	   or	   both	   of	   these	   two	   aspects	   may	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display	   structuredness,	   with	   both	   of	   them	   contributing	   to	   the	   general	  “degree	   of	   structuredness”,	   which	   we	   conceived	   of	   as	   a	   gradient	   along	  which	  we	   distinguish	   3	   points:	   open,	   semi-­‐structured,	   or	  highly	   structured	  activities.	  	  
Governedness	  seeks	  to	  capture	  what	  (primarily)	  shapes	  the	  process,	  the	  unfolding	   of	   the	   activity	   overall.	   Factors	   which	   regulate	   the	   interactions	  may	   include	   a)	   persons,	   i.e.	   needs,	   interests,	   inclinations	   of	   one	   or	   both	  participants,	  b)	  the	  object,	  whose	  structure	  may	  suggest	  a	  specific	  sequence	  of	   events,	   as	  well	   as	   c)	   practicalities	   of	   the	   activity,	   and	   cultural	   routines,	  norms,	  and	  rituals	  (e.g.	  “conversation”	  format	  or	  a	  specific	  nursery	  rhyme).	  
Directedness	   &	   mediation:	   who	   or	   what	   is	   an	   activity	   –	   or	   specific	  actions	   within	   an	   activity	   –	   functionally	   directed	   at,	   and,	   who	   or	   what	   is	  actually	   (directly)	   acted	   on	   (potentially	   serving	   as	   a	   mediator	   or	  instrument),	  thus	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  affected	  by	  the	  participants'	  actions	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  activity.	  
	  Social	   framing:	   here	   this	   is	  meant	   to	   refer	   specifically	   to	   the	  way	   an	  activity	   is	  conceived	  of	  (both	  normatively	   in	  the	  respective	  culture	  and/or	  by	  the	  caregivers	  as	  revealed	  by	  their	  utterances	  and	  actions)	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  social	   structure:	   the	   designated	   participants	   and	   roles	   and	   relations	   (see	  nodes	   and	   targets	   of	   action	   next	   section),	   the	   appropriate	   degree	   of	  respective	  participation,	  specific	  contributions	  etc.	  
	  In	   this	   macro	   analysis	   we	   also	   specify	   2)	   the	   more	   variable,	   faster	  changing	  functional	  roles	  and	  relations	  of	  the	  above	  structures	  with	  regard	  to	   the	  co-­‐ordination	  of	   interaction	   in	   terms	  of	  a	  network	  of	  relating:	  nodes	  involved	   in	   interaction	   (sources	   and	   targets	   of	   action),	   their	   relations	   and	  
modes	  of	  relating/engagement.	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Nodes	   of	   interaction/engagement:	   what	  are	  the	  sources	  and	  targets	  of	  action	  involved	  in	  a	  particular	  interaction	  and	  how	  many	  nodes	  are	   there	   (dimensionality)?	   Typically	   the	  main	  
sources	   from	   which	   actions	   originate	   are	  
people	  participating	  in	  an	  interaction,	  	  occasionally	  however,	  objects	  too	  can	  act	  as	  sources	  of	  action,	  in	  particular	  automata	  such	  as	  “wind-­‐up-­‐toys”,	   or	   when	   they	   are	   mediated	   by	  people	  as	  e.g.	  in	  the	  case	  of	  soft	  toys	  in	  a	  soft-­‐toy	  conversation.	   Targets	   of	   action	   are	   people	  and/or	   objects,	   which	   the	   sources	   of	   action	  engage	  with	  in	  a	  particular	  activity,	  be	  it	  in	  an	  attentive-­‐communicative	  way	  (e.g.	   looked	  at	   as	   a	   focus	   of	   attention,	   verbally	   addressed	  as	   a	   conversation	  
partner,	  spoken	  about	  as	  a	  topic	  of	  an	  utterance)	  or	  in	  a	  physically-­‐effective	  way	   (e.g.	   grasped	   as	   a	   target	   of	   a	   manual	   action,	   tickled,	   wiped,	   kicked,	  
kissed,	   etc.).	   These	   roles	   are	   not	   mutually	   exclusive	   and	   can	   also	   change	  during	  an	  interaction.	  	  
Connections	  between	  nodes:	  	   	  Which	  sources	  and	   targets	  of	  action	  enter	  into	   in	   a	   relation,	   that	   is,	   co-­‐regulate,	   affect	  and/or	  are	  affected	  by	  the	  other	  node	  during	  a	   particular	   interaction	   or	   activity?	   What	   is	  the	   direction	   of	   engagement	   in	   these	  relations,	   and	   are	   they	   uni-­‐	   or	   bilateral?	   Are	  there	   relations	   that	   are	   particularly	  
emphasised	   and	   predominant	   in	  a	  particular	  interaction	  or	  activity?	  	  Examples:	   While	   e.g.	   peekaboo	   is	   all	   about	  the	  relation	  between	   infant	  and	  caregiver	  with	  objects	  mediating	  and	  modulating	  it,	  placing	  an	  
infant	  in	  a	  baby-­‐gym	  puts	   the	   relation	  between	  infant	   and	   object	   centre	   stage;	   whereas	   in	  
Figure	   4.2	   Active	   relations	   in	   a	   particular	  activity	   are	   indicated	   by	   connections	  between	   the	   respective	   engaged	   nodes.	  Taking	  the	  form	  of	  arrows	  they	  also	  indicate	  the	   direction	   of	   engagement,	   as	   well	   as	  whether	   it	   is	   uni-­‐	   or	   bilateral.	   Relations	  particularly	  emphasised	  (“predominant”)	  in	  a	  particular	  activity	  are	  encircled.	  
	  
Figure	   4.1	   Sources	   and	   targets	   of	  action	   are	   depicted	   as	   nodes	   in	  form	   of	   blobs	   marked	   with	   M	   for	  mother,	   I	   for	   infant	   and	   O	   for	  object	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witnessing	   a	   caregiver	   cook,	   the	   intrinsically	   predominant	   relation	   is	   that	  between	  caregiver,	  foods	  and	  kitchen	  utensils.	  	  	  
Modes	  of	  engagement	  	  Further	   zooming	   in	   on	   the	   relations	  
between	  particular	  nodes:	  how	  do	   they	  
engage	   with	   each	   other,	   in	   particular	  
which	   modalities	   and	   action	   strands	  
are	  utilized	  and	  in	  which	  combination?	  	  The	   following	   macro	   level	   distinction	  has	  proved	  useful	  to	  roughly	  capture	  and	  distinguish	   key	   differences	   of	   co-­‐ordination	   in	   different	   activity	   contexts	   and	  over	   the	   course	   of	   development:	  a)	   attentive-­‐
communicative	   engagement,	   and	   b)	  
physically-­‐effective	  engagement:	  
a)	   Attentive-­‐communicative	   engagement	  (indicated	  by	  dashed	  green	  arrows,	   sound	  by	  grey	  waves),	  used	  primarily	  for	   (distal)	  orienting,	   control	   and	  monitoring	   of	   actions,	   as	  well	   as	   for	  
communicating,	   involving	   gaze,	   vocalizations,	   facial	   expressions,	   and	   to	  some	  extent	  whole-­‐body	  movements.	  	  b)	   Physically-­‐effective	   engagement	   (indicated	   by	   solid	   red	   arrows),	  used	  to	  bring	  about	   changes	   in	   the	  material	  world,	   involving	  body	  and	  limb	   movements,	   up	   to	   fine	   manual	   manipulation,	   whether	   concerning	  objects	  and/or	  people.	  This	   distinction	   runs	   perpendicular	   or	   even	   askew	   to	   the	   usual	   target	  based	  distinction	  between	  people-­‐	  vs.	  object	  engagement	  (e.g.	  Trevarthen):	  Objects	  are	  indeed	  often	  addressed	  in	  an	  attentive-­‐communicative	  way,	  just	  as	   people	   were	   found	   to	   be	   engaged	   in	   a	   physically-­‐effective	   way,	   too.	  Therefore	   our	   distinction	   instead	   picks	   up	   on	   the	   different	   effector	  
systems	   and	   ways	   of	   relating	   and	   co-­‐ordination	   involved,	   thus	   also	  
reflecting	   different	   functional	   roles	   in	   co-­‐ordination	   (also	   showing	  aspects	   of	   but	   not	   being	   congruent	   with	   Kirsh’s	   distinction	   between	  
epistemic	  and	  pragmatic	  action	  (Kirsh	  &	  Maglio,	  1994)	  or,	  perhaps	  more	  so,	  the	   distinction	   between	   acquisitory	   vs.	   effective	   action	   (Mallot,	   1997).	   As	  
	  Figure	  4.3	  Green	  dashed	  arrows	  indicate	  attentive-­‐communicative	  engagement.	  Grey	  waves	  are	  used	  additionally	  to	  indicate	  omni-­‐directional	  sound.	  Red	  solid	  arrows	  indicate	  physically-­‐effective	  engagement.	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these	   forms	   require	   different	   sensorimotor	   and	   co-­‐ordination	   skills	  which	   develop	   at	   different	   points	   in	   time,	   this	   distinction	   is	   particularly	  useful	  to	  capture	  key	  changes	  in	  co-­‐ordination	  over	  development	  (see	  
in	  particular	  chapter	  6).	  
4.2.2 Macro	   analysis	   general	   results:	   towards	   a	   framework	   characterizing	  
activity	  contexts	  Based	  on	  similarities	  and	  differences	  of	  interactions	  as	  assessed	  through	  macro	   analysis,	   3	   clusters	   of	   ecological	   activity	   contexts	   emerged	   for	   the	  earliest	   months:	   1)	   infant	   directed	   caregiving	   tasks,	   2)	   engaged	  
witnessing	   of	   other	   people’s	   object	   interactions,	   and	   3)	   establishing	  
contact	   between	   infants	   and	   objects.	   Over	   time	   activity	   context	   3)	  developed	  and	  spread	  into	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  social	  object-­‐interactions,	  which	  we	  channelled	  into	  the	  categories:	  4)	  object-­‐mediated	  social	  activities,	  5)	  
socially-­‐accompanied	  object	   activities,	  and	  6)	   supported	  participation	  
in	  cultural	  (object)	  practices.	  See	  figure	  4.4	  for	  illustration.	  The	  following	  paragraphs	   give	   a	   short	   overview	   of	   the	   activity	   contexts’	   respective	  
distinctive	  structural	  characteristics	  and	  sketch	  how	  particular	  activity-­‐
specific	   characteristics	   made	   visible	   by	   macro	   and	   micro	   analyses	  
challenge	  currently	  established	  theory	  and	  conceptions.	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4.2.2.1 Infant-­‐directed	   primary	   caregiving	   tasks	   (Figure	   4.4(1),	   see	   also	  
section	  4.2.3)	  	  Not	   yet	   being	   able	   to	   tend	   to	   their	   basic	   bodily	   needs	   on	   their	   own,	  infants	   were	   from	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   study	   involved	   in	   infant-­‐directed	  
primary	   caregiving	   tasks	   (such	  as	  nappy	  change,	  feeding,	  bathing),	  where	  they	  were	  acted	  on	  with	  objects	  by	  the	  caregivers.	  However,	  even	  in	  these	  
completion	   oriented	   tasks	   mostly	   governed	   by	   the	   requirements	  necessary	  for	  completion,	  infants,	  when	  circumstances	  allowed	  it,	  were	  also	  invited	   to	   and	   indeed	   did	  actively	   participate	   in	   and	   even	   functionally	  
contribute	  to	  the	  task	  with	  anticipatory	  whole	  body	  
movements	   adapted	   to	   the	   particular	   context	   co-­‐
defined	   by	   the	   object,	   in	   particular	   to	   the	   mother’s	  actions	   on	   them	  and	   the	   object	   (“helpful”	  bottom	  lift	   in	  
nappy	  change).	  See	  section	  4.3	  for	  more	  details.	  
Figure	  4.4:	  Ecological	  activity	  contexts	  throughout	  the	  first	  year.	  Details	  see	  text.	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Implications	   from	   macro/micro	   analyses	   challenging	   current	  
conceptions:	  	  With	   extensive	   infant-­‐caregiver	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   engagement	   these	   infant-­‐directed	   caregiving	   tasks	   do	   resemble	   dyadic	   interactions	   in	   some	  
aspects,	  but	  through	  the	  object	  as	  a	  third	  pole	  new	  forms	  of	  coordination	  
dynamics	  emerge	  which	  are	  not	  yet	  captured	  by	  -­‐	  and	  not	  quite	  fitting	  into	  -­‐	  current	  conceptions	  of	  the	  development	  of	  triadic	  interaction.	  In	  particular,	  the	   examples	   from	   the	   caregiving	   activity	   context,	   in	   particular	   nappy	  
change,	   invite	   us	   a)	   to	   recognize/consider	   the	   crucial	   roles	   and	  
interplay	  of	  multiple	  modalities	  and	  strands	  of	  action	  to	  create	  a	  “joint	  
activity”.	   They	   also	   invite	   us	   b)	   to	   revisit	   established	   notions	   of	  
participation,	   joint	   action	   and	   cooperation,	   most	   of	   which	   require	  complex	  object-­‐related	  object	  acts	  (e.g.	  inserting	  wooden	  figures	  in	  a	  truck)	  and	   rework	   them	  into	  a	  range	  of	  concise,	  more	  differentiated	  notions	  
suitable	   for	   addressing	   development	   (e.g.	   including	   whole-­‐body	  move-­‐ments	  appropriately	  placed	  in	  a	  complex	  context	  as	  forms	  of	  participation).	  	  
4.2.2.2 Involved	  witnessing	  of	  other	  people’s	  object	  actions	  (figure	  4.4(2))	  Given	  that	  1)	  there	  were	  numerous	  family	  activities	  not	  directed	  at	  or	  
directly	  concerning	  infants,	  and	  2)	  infants	  -­‐	  now	  awake	  for	  longer	  periods	  of	  time	  and	  increasingly	  interested	  in	  their	  surroundings	  -­‐	  were	  not	  able	  to	  stay	   on	   their	   own	   and	   “entertain”	   themselves	   yet,	   infants	   often	   came	   to	  
“witness”,	   that	   is,	   observe	   and	   experience	   other	   people’s	   (object)	  
activities	  (e.g.	  household	  chores,	  family	  meals,	  or	  games	  and	  play	  activities	  of	  
older	   siblings),	   which	   they	   were	   taken	   along	   to.	   While	   persistently	  
pursuing	   the	   activity	   at	   hand,	   the	   requirements	   of	   which	   primarily	  governed	  the	  interactions,	  the	  caregivers	  actively	  
maintained	  contact	  with	  the	   infants	   throughout	  the	   activity	   and	   (to	   varying	   degrees)	   adapted	  
their	  object-­‐actions	  to	  the	  infant’s	  presence	  (e.g.	  
commenting	   their	   actions	   in	   strongly	   modulated	  
infant-­‐directed	  speech,	  showing	  objects,	  etc.).	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Implications	   from	   macro/micro	   analyses	   challenging	   current	  
conceptions:	  	  What	  is	  interesting	  about	  this	  activity	  context	  is	  that	  infants	  in	  their	  early	  months	   spent	   considerable	   amounts	   of	   time	   in	   a	   social	   activity	   which	  
differed	   significantly	   from	   dyadic	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   interaction	   typically	  associated	  with	   early	   social	   interactions.	  With	   regard	   to	   its	   configuration	  infant	  “witnessing”	  rather	  resembled	  “3rd	  person	  distanced	  observation”,	  except	   that,	   in	   contrast	   to	   how	   observing	   others	   from	   some	   distance	   is	  usually	  conceived	  of,	  it	  showed	  high	  degrees	  of	  involvement.	  	  The	  witnessing	  context	  invites	  discussing:	  a)	  How	  even	  an	  activity,	  which	  does	   not	   seem	   particularly	   “joint”	   at	   first	   sight,	   is	   turned	   into	   a	   shared	  activity	  and	  jointly	  co-­‐ordinated,	  and	  b)	  What	  learning	  opportunities	  such	  an	   –	   yet	   largely	   overlooked	   –	   activity	   context	   provides	   for	   infants,	   and,	   in	  turn,	  what	  role	  it	  might	  play	  in	  their	  learning	  to	  understand	  people,	  their	  
actions,	   as	  well	  as	  objects,	   including	   their	   functions	  and	  names.	  This	  may	  happen	  through	  salient	  events	  inherent	  in	  the	  activity	  itself	  –	  object	  contact	  events	  or	  communicative	  events	  between	  other	  people	  –	  as	  well	  as	  through	  caregivers’	  active	  patterning	  for	  the	  infant.	  	  	  
4.2.2.3 Establishing	  contact	  between	  infants	  and	  objects	  (figure	  4.4(3))	  Three	  to	  four	  month-­‐old	  infants,	  getting	  interested	  in,	  but	  not	  yet	  able	  to	  effectively	  act	  on	  the	  material	  world,	  not	  only	  1)	  were	  acted	  on	  with	  objects	  and	  actively	  participated	  in	  infant-­‐directed	  primary	  caregiving	  tasks,	  and	  2)	  engaged	   in	   witnessing	   other	   people’s	   (object)	   actions,	   but	   also	   3)	  experienced	   a	   substantial	   number	   of	   interactions	  which	   primarily	   centred	  on	  establishing	  contact	  between	  infants	  and	  objects	  (toys	  and	  everyday	  objects),	  actively	  and	  persistently	  pursued	  by	  caregivers without	  any	  other	  visible	  goal.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  first	  two	  activity	  contexts,	  this	  one	  is	  largely	  
open,	  governed	   primarily	   by	   the	   infant’s	   interest	   and	   affect	   (+	  motor	  skills),	   as	   well	   as	   the	   characteristics	   of	   the	   material	   structures:	   the	  
properties	   of	   the	   object(s)	   of	   interest	   and	   the	   form	   of	   scaffolding	  provided,	   constituting	   a	   specific	   spatial	   configuration	   affording	   specific	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modes	  of	  engagement	  (distal,	  proximal),	  as	  well	  as	  going	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  the	  social	  framing	  (here	  in	  particular	  the	  degree	  of	  caregiver	  involvement).	  These	   parameters	   of	   the	   setting	   showed	   substantial	   variation,	   mostly	  clustered	   in	   three	   sub-­‐types	   each	   illustrated	   here	  with	  one	  example:	  	  a) jointly	  observing	  a	  mobile:	  	  distal	  object	  engagement	  with	  bodily+mechanical	  scaffold,	  and	  medium	  social	  involvement,	  indirectly	  affecting	  the	  infant	  via	  directly	  acting	  on	  object.	  b) (socially	  accompanied)	  object	  engagement	  in	  
baby-­‐gym:	  	  mechanically	  scaffolded,	  transient	  object	  engagement	  at	  hitting	  distance,	  autonomous	  but	  socially	  accompanied	  (low	  physical	  involvement	  by	  caregivers	  but:	  affect	  &	  action	  attunement	  responding	  -­‐	  and	  structurally	  corresponding	  -­‐	  to	  the	  infant’s	  actions)	  c) embodying	  the	  (conventional)	  use	  of	  a	  rattle:	  bodily	  scaffolded	  sustained	  proximal	  object	  engagement	  with	  high	  social	  involvement,	  where	  the	  mother	  acts	  on	  the	  infants	  arm	  holding	  the	  rattle	  moving	  it	  in	  synchrony	  with	  the	  culturally	  scripted	  utterance	  “shake,	  shake,	  shake.”	  	  
Implications	   from	   macro/micro	   analyses	   challenging	   current	  
conceptions:	  	  While	   the	   narrative	   assumes	   that	   infants’	   interactions	   before	   9	  months	  are	  exclusively	  dyadic,	  or,	  even	  more	  stringently,	  that	  “objects”	  start	  to	  enter	  social	  interactions	  only	  from	  6	  months	  on	  (Bakeman	  &	  Adamson,	  1984),	  and	  that	   true	   “sharing”	   of	   aspects	   of	   the	  world	   only	   starts	   from	  9	  months,	   the	  interactions	   reported	  here	   show	  that	   infants	   already	   from	   3	  months	   on	  
were	  actively	  introduced	  to	  objects	  by	  caregivers	  in	  socially	  scaffolded	  
interactions.	  	  A	  particularly	   interesting	  aspect	  of	   this	  context	   inviting	  a	  more	  detailed	  look	  and	  discussion	  is	  that	  the	  modes	  and	  patterns	  of	  engagement	  within	  this	  activity	   contexts	  differ	  widely,	   depending	   on	   the	   respective	  setting,	  which	   might	   be	   particularly	   relevant	   for	   (investigating)	   learning	  
processes,	   as	   well	   as	   for	   supporting,	   and	   designing	   environments	   for,	  learning	   processes.	   Notably	   these	   differences	   also	   include	   social	   framing	  (e.g.	   mothers	   regarded	   infants’	   baby-­‐gym	   object-­‐engagements	   as	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autonomous,	   physically	   interfered	   little,	   but	   did	   a	   large	   amount	   of	   affect-­‐and-­‐action	   attunement,	   whereas	   when	   introducing	   a	   single	   object	   they	  physically	  acted	  on	  and	  guided	  the	  infant	  frequently.)	  Furthermore,	  even	  a	  very	  calm,	  rather	  passive	  example	  such	  as	  observing	  
a	  mobile	   together	   –	  which	   does	   not	   seem	   very	   “joint”,	   “participatory”,	   nor	  active	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  infant	  when	  applying	  the	  classic	  criterion	  of	  visual	  joint	   attention	   (as	   gaze	   remains	   on	   the	   mobile)	   –	   demonstrates	   that	   we	  
need	   to	   take	   into	   account	   other,	   in	   this	  case	  more	   proximal	  modes	   of	  
engagement	   (grasping,	   touch)	   as	   well,	   to	   get	   a	   more	   complete	  understanding	   of	   engagement,	   co-­‐ordination,	   and	   creating	   a	   “shared	  situation”.	  
4-­‐5	  months	  –	  objects	  getting	  into	  reach	  to	  be	  explored	  	  Over	   the	   next	   weeks,	   as	   infants’	   motor	   (reaching	   and	   grasping)	   and	  attention	   skills	   rapidly	   increased,	   activity	   context	   3)	   “Establishing	   context	  between	  infants	  and	  objects”	  developed	  and	  spread	  out	  into	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  social	   object-­‐interactions	   which	   then	   constituted	   a	   large	   part	   of	   the	   daily	  activities.	  Again	  based	  on	  macro	  analysis,	   in	  particular	   (depending	  on)	   the	  different	   role	   distributions	   among	   the	   nodes	   –	   which	   nodes/relations	  seemed	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  gravity,	  which	  nodes/relations	  were	  mediating	  –	  we	  further	  differentiated	  these	  activities	  channelling	  them	  into	  3	  categories:	  4)	  
object-­‐mediated	   social	   activities,	   5)	   socially-­‐accompanied	   object	  
activities,	  and	  6)	  supported	  participation	  in	  cultural	  (object)	  practices.	  See	  figure	  4.4	  for	  illustration.	  
4.2.2.4 Object-­‐mediated	  social	  interactions	  (figure	  4.4(4))	  In	   this	   new	   form	   of	   social	   object	   activity	   –	   starting	   from	   3	  months	   but	  emerging	  as	  a	  qualitatively	  new	  form	  from	  4	  month	  –	  the	  interaction	  itself	  
and	   the	   relatedness	   of	   the	   participants	   form	   the	   “topic”	   and	  primary	  
concern	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   the	   activity.	   In	   this	   they	   are	   similar	   to	   dyadic	  interactions,	  however,	   as	   in	   “establishing	   contact”,	  caregivers	   introduced	  
objects	   (dolls,	  soft	   toys,	  as	  well	  as	  everyday	  objects	  such	  as	  cloth	  napkins,	  blankets,	   strings	   or	   paper	   rolls)	   into	   the	   interactions,	   and	   these	   objects	  
were	   acted	   on	   by	   the	   participants	   in	   such	   a	  way	   that	   the	  quality	   of	   the	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interaction	  and	   the	   relatedness	  of	   the	  participants	  was	  modified.	  The	  activities	  were	  governed	  by	  the	  participants	  (including	  objects,	  e.g.	  serving	  as	  participant	  in	  soft	  toy	  conversation)	  and	   to	  varying	  degrees	  by	  cultural	  
scripts.	   Accordingly	   their	   structure(dness)	   ranged	   from	   largely	   open	  
activities,	  where	  the	  participants	  playfully	  acted	  towards	  each	  other	  via	  the	  object	  (e.g.	  peeking	  and	  speaking	  through	  a	  paper	  roll)	  and	  let	  themselves	  be	  surprised	   by	   -­‐	   and	   adaptively	   responded	   to	   –	   the	   novel	   quality	   of	   object	  mediated	  actions,	   to	  more	  or	   less	   	   structured	  ones,	   such	  as	  multi-­‐person	  
conversation,	   body	   part	   games,	   or	   peekaboo	   following	   and	   practicing	  
cultural	  scripts.	  	  
Implications	   from	   macro/micro	   analyses	   challenging	   current	  
conceptions:	  	  
Objects	   did	   play	   a	   prominent	   role	   in	   primarily	   social	   interactions	  from	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   study	   and	   particularly	   from	   4	   months	   on,	  modifying	  and	  mediating	   them.	   In	  some	   cases	  objects	  were	  undermining	  
the	  usual	   strict	  people-­‐object	  distinction	  (e.g.	  soft-­‐toys	  and	  body	  parts).	  The	  more	  structured	  interactions	  again	  invite	  to	  discuss	  how	  caregivers	  set	  
up	   training	   containers	  which	   factually	   “embody”	   the	  essential	  normative	  features	  of	  the	  activity	  to	  be	  learned,	  naturally	  constraining	  and	  channelling	  infants’	   actions	   towards	   normatively	   “correct”	   contributions,	   facilitating	  
learning	   through	   participation:	   e.g.	   as	   the	  mother	   turned	  away	   from	  her	  
infant	   entering	   into	   exclusive	   engagement	  with	   the	   soft-­‐toy,	   the	   infant	   –	  not	  
being	  responded	  to	  -­‐	  “holds”	  her	  phrase,	  turns	  to	  the	  soft-­‐toy,	  and,	  after	  “being	  
attended	  to”	  by	  the	  soft-­‐toy,	  finished	  her	  phrase	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  soft-­‐toy.	  	  With	   infants’	   participation	   now	   including	   new	   forms	   of	   object	  
involvement	  this	  activity	  context	  also	  contributes	  to	  further	  differentiating	  the	   notions	   of	   infant	   action,	   in	   particular	   object	   engagement,	   and	  participation:	   in	   peekaboo	   the	   infant	  moves	   the	   blanket	   in	   relation	   to	   her	  own	   body,	   modifying	   visual	   engagement	   with	   her	  mother	   (body	   relative	  
object	   act).	   The	   alternating	   division	   of	   labour	   between	   the	   participants	  shows	  how	  turn	  taking	  can	  gradually	  develop	  into	  role	  taking.	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4.2.2.5 Socially-­‐accompanied	  object	  interactions	  (figure	  4.4(5))	  As	  the	  most	  direct	  extension	  and	  further	  development	  of	  3)	  “establishing	  contact”	  and	  in	  clear	  contrast	  to	  4)	  object-­‐mediated	  social	  interactions,	  this	  activity	   entirely	   revolves	   around	   infant-­‐object	   engagement.	   While	  previously	   infants’	   object	   interest	   crucially	   depended	  on	   caregivers’	   active	  “establishing	  and	  sustaining	  contact”	  to	  become	  effective,	  now	  infant-­‐object	  
engagement	   –	   e.g.	   hitting	   and	   manipulating	   objects	   suspended	   in	   a	   baby-­‐
gym,	   handling	   and	   mouthing	   detached	   objects	   lying	   on	   the	   ground	   –	   has	  become	  more	   pronounced	   and	   autonomous	   with	   infants’	   motor	   skills	  increasing	   and	   caregivers’	   (physically	   effective)	   contributions	   mostly	  winding	  down	  to	  establishing	  initial	  contact	  or	  re-­‐establishing	  lost	  contact;	  but	   even	   in	   such	   cases,	   we	   now	   observed	   infants	   actively	   showing	  
pronounced	  object	  bids.	  Infants’	  object	  interactions	  constituted	  a	  very	  open	  
activity,	  primarily	   governed	   by	   their	  own	   interest	   and	  motor	   skills	   as	  well	  as	  the	  material	  properties	  of	   the	  objects	  which	  infants	  encountered	  and	   adapted	   to	   in	   their	   increasingly	   persistent	   and	   patterned	   object-­‐directed	   actions.	   Yet	  most	   of	   the	   time	   this	   was	   not	   a	   solitary	   activity	   but	  
socially	   accompanied	   with	   attentive-­‐communicative	   engagement:	  caregivers,	   letting	   themselves	   be	   “informed”	   by	   the	   infant’s	   actions,	  responded	   with	   a	   similarly	   structured	   action	   in	   a	   different	   modality,	  reflecting	  back	   infants’	  actions	  with	  slight	  variation	   in	  “affect	   and	   action”	  
attunement.	  	  
Implications	   from	   macro/micro	   analyses	   challenging	   current	  
conceptions:	  	  Notable	   here	   is	   that	   even	   infants’	   autonomous	   object	   explorations	  were	   in	   the	   early	   months	   to	   a	   large	   extent	   socially	   accompanied	   by	  caregivers.	  And	  here	  the	  infants’	  exclusive	  visual	  focus	  on	  the	  object	  does	  not	   automatically	   render	   this	   into	   a	   solitary	   activity	  with	   infants	   not	   even	  being	  aware	  of	  other	  people,	  as	  it	  has	  often	  been	  raised	  as	  an	  argument	  for	  infants’s	   inability	   to	   co-­‐ordinate	   engagement	   between	   people	   and	   objects	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before	   9	  months	   (Bakeman	   &	   Adamson,	   1984;	   Tomasello,	   1999).	   Instead,	  caregivers’	   verbally	   attuning	   to	   and	   reflecting-­‐back	   infants’	   affect	   and	  
action	   signals	   connection	   without	   the	   need	   for	   visual	   checking,	   thus	  leaving	  the	  infant’s	  visual	  modality	  free	  for	  object	  exploration	  –	  powerfully	  demonstrating	   the	   value	   of	   division	   of	   labour	   between	   different	  
modalities	  with	  their	  respective	  functional	  characteristics.	  That	  infants	  –	   while	   seemingly	   ignoring	   people	   –	   instead	   are	   indeed	   aware	   of	   their	  
companions	   is	   indicated	   by	   examples	   such	   as	   a	   5	   month	   old	   crying	   in	  protest	  upon	   the	   “seemingly	   ignored”	  mother	   leaving	   the	   room.	  Moreover,	  the	  caregiver’s	  affect	  and	  action	  attunement	  and	  varied	  mirroring	  also	  marks	   and	   consolidates	   particular	   actions	   of	   the	   infant	   as	   shared	   action	  structures,	   thus	  creating	  and	  structuring	  a	  shared	  action	  space.	  This	  opens	  up	   the	   question	   of	  what	   this	   affect	   and	   action	   attunement	   contributes	   to	  
infants’	   development	   and	   learning	   of	   actions,	   self,	   relating,	   action-­‐coordination,	  shared	  experience	  and	  knowledge.	  
4.2.2.6 Participating	  in	  cultural	  (object)	  practices	  (figure	  4.4(6))	  While	   all	   activities	   infants	   are	   involved	   in	   are	   of	   course	  part	   of	   culture,	  the	  practices	  described	  here	  e.g.	  book	  sharing,	  building	  a	  tower	  together	  and	  
not	   merely	   feeding	   but	   enacting	   a	   shared	   meal	   with	   distributed	   roles,	   go	  beyond	  infancy	  in	  their	  relevance,	  as	  they	  were	  forms	  of	   cultural	  activity	  
practiced	   by	   more	   mature	   members	   of	   a	   culture	   worthwhile	   to	   be	  
trained	  in.	  Object	  and	  people	  engagement	  seemed	  to	  be	  balanced	  and	  of	  equal	   importance	   in	   this	   semi-­‐open	   activities	   and	   subsumed	   under	   and	  
governed	  by	   larger	  general	  cultural	  scripts,	  which	  included	  both	  social	  
as	  well	  as	  object	  engagement	  as	  integral	  parts	  of	  the	  script.	  	  
	  
Implications	   from	   macro/micro	   analysis	   challenging	   current	  
conceptions:	  	  Notably	  infants	  were	  immersed	  in	  and	  hence	  experienced	  the	  rich,	  full-­‐
fledged	   forms	   of	   these	  complex	   cultural	   activities.	   Fully	   enacting	   those	  activities	  went	  well	   beyond	   the	   current	   understanding	   and	   abilities	   of	   the	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infant	  and	  far	  beyond	  what	  was	  needed	  for	  the	  interaction	  to	  function	  on	  a	  basic	  level.	  	  Crucially,	   the	  other	  participants	  explicitly	  dedicated	   an	  active	   role	   to	  
the	  infant:	  e.g.	  inventing	  a	  simple	  role	  fitted	  to	  the	  abilities	  of	  the	  infant	  e.g.	  throwing	   over	   the	   tower	   after	   building	   it,	   or	   helping	   the	   infant	   to	   “fill”	   an	  advanced	   role	   by	   scaffolding	   and/or	   enacting	   those	   parts	   of	   the	   activity,	  which	  the	  infant	  is	  not	  able	  to	  do	  yet	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  infant	  (e.g.	  a	  mother	  role-­‐playing	  her	  infant	  and	  adding	  to	  the	  infant’s	  actions	  additional	  layers	  of	  conventional	   talk	   and	   action	  when	  having	   a	  meal	   together	  with	   the	   father	  
(“hmm,	  that’s	  good,	  mummy,	  you’re	  a	  great	  cook.”)	  Being	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  and	  fully	  immersed	  in	  these	  meaningful	  activities	  provides	  a	  rich	  source	  of	  information	  and	  a	  dense	  scaffold,	  enabling	  e.g.	  a	  5	   month	   old	   to	   intently	   monitor	   her	   sisters’	   tower	   building	   including	  following	   the	   mother’s	   pointing	   across	   a	   distance	   far	   beyond	   the	   infants’	  action	  space.	  	  	  
Outlook:	  6-­‐7	  months	  –	  infants	  getting	  more	  autonomous,	  sitting,	  and	  
starting	  to	  locomote	  The	   developments	   during	   the	   next	   weeks	   resembled	   the	   “dip”	   we	   had	  noticed	   in	   social	   book	   sharing	   and	   can	   help	   to	   put	   this	   “dip”	   into	   a	   larger	  context:	   we	   now	   observed	   a	   “split”	   between	   infants	   enjoying	   exuberant	  
social	   play	   (including	   object-­‐mediated	   social	   interactions)	   whereas	  
object	  interactions	  seemed	  to	  become	  increasingly	  solitary:	  Infants	  now	  
initiated	   or	   re-­‐elicited	   object-­‐mediated	   social	   interactions	   (such	   as	  
peekaboo	  and	  body-­‐part	  games)	  on	  their	  own	  (even	  with	  relative	  strangers	  such	   as	   the	   researcher)	   demonstrating	   bigger	   independence	   from	   their	  immediate	  context	  and	  caregiver	  cues.	  Conversely,	  by	  the	  time	  they	  could	  sit	  on	   their	  own,	   infants’	  autonomous	   object	   interactions	   –	  while	  still	  often	  socially	   accompanied,	   have	   increasingly	   gained	   the	   character	   of	   “solitary	  
interactions”	  with	  a	  pronounced	  exclusive	  visual	  focus	  on	  the	  infant’s	  own	  bi-­‐manual	   object	   exploration,	   apparently	   “ignoring”	   people.	   Yet	   instances	  such	   as	   the	   beginnings	   of	   instrumental	   looking	   when	   an	   object	   fell	   out	   of	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reach,	  or	  a	  7	  month-­‐old’s	  checking	  a	  stranger’s	  reaction	  to	  her	  object	  actions	  showed	   that	   infants	   did	   take	   into	   account	   other	   people	   besides	   their	  
object	   interactions.	   Moreover	   –	   moving	   to	   participation	   in	   cultural	  
object	   practices	   –	   infants	   did	   enjoy	   being	   introduced	   to	   and	   practicing	  particular	   more	   complex	   conventional	   object	   actions	   (albeit	   not	  understanding	   them	   as	   conventional	   in	   the	   full	   meaning	   of	   the	   term,	   of	  course)	  such	  as	  turning	  and	  removing	  a	  key	  from	  a	  cupboard,	  opening	  a	  door	  
and	  checking	  who’s	  behind	  it,	  or	  assisting	  in	  watering	  the	  flowers.	   In	  general,	  infants	   were	   by	   now	   well	   oriented	   within	   the	   respective	   spatio-­‐temporal	  structures	  of	  the	  different	  activity	  contexts	  as	  indicated	  by	  their	  anticipatory	  gaze	  and	  actions.	  	  	  
4.2.3 Macro	   analysis:	   more	   detailed	   results	   illustrated	   by	   the	   example	   of	  
infant-­‐directed	  caregiving	  routines	  involving	  objects	  
4.2.3.1 Introducing	  joint	  infant-­‐directed	  caregiving	  routines	  involving	  objects	  From	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  study	  infants	  experienced	  (as	  they	  likely	  have	  from	   birth	   on	   a	   daily	   basis)	   being	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   caregiving	   activities	  
involving	   objects:	   such	   as	   for	   example,	   changing	   the	   nappy,	   feeding,	  
bathing,	   and	   dressing	   the	   infant.	   These	   activities	   are	   similar	   to	   dyadic	  interactions	   in	   that	   they	   were	   primarily	   directed	   at	   infants,	   but	   with	  objects	   entering	   in	   the	   interaction,	   at	   least	  one	   additional	   third	   pole	   or	  
centre	   of	   interaction	   is	   introduced,	   opening	   up	   quite	   different	   forms	   of	  coordination	  dynamics.	  Caregivers	  used	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  objects	   -­‐	  ranging	  from	  cloth	  napkins,	  
bottles,	   sponges,	   nappies,	   clothes	   to	   changing	   mats	   and	   cushions,	   to	  
mobiles,	   soft	   toys	   and	  music	   boxes	   -­‐	  as	   instruments	   to	   help	   tending	   to	  infants’	  basic	  bodily	  needs	  which	  they	  could	  not	  yet	  take	  care	  of	  themselves.	  Infants	   often	   encountered	   these	   objects	   through	   being	   acted	   upon	   with	  
them:	   [e.g.]	   having	   dribble	  wiped	   off	  with	   a	   napkin,	   being	   gently	   brushed	  with	  a	  sponge	  or	  rubbed	  dry	  with	  a	  towel,	  having	  a	  bottle	  or	  spoon	  touching	  their	   lips	   or	   put	   into	   their	   mouth,	   having	   nappies	   or	   clothes	   attached	   to	  them,	  being	  put	  into	  sacks,	  swaddling	  cloths,	  or	  under	  blankets,	  etc…	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As	   these	   activities	   were	   performed	   in	   service	   of	   meeting	   infants’	   basic	  needs,	   they	   typically	   took	   the	   form	  of	  a	  completion	   oriented	   task	  with	  a	  
specific	  functional	  goal,	  often	  reflected	  in	  a	  more	  or	  less	  invariant	  activity	  
structure,	   such	   as	   a	   sequence	   of	   steps	   necessary	   to	   achieve	   the	   goal.	  However,	   neither	   needs	   nor	   goals	   were	   necessarily	   always	   clear,	  transparent,	   or	   stable	   for	   the	   participants.	   Caregiving	   routinely	   included	  figuring	   out	   why	   an	   infant	   was	   fussy	   and	   initiating	   caregiving	   activities	  based	   only	   at	   a	   guess	   of	   infants’	   needs.	   Conversely,	   neither	   goals	   nor	   the	  structure	   of	   the	   activity	  were	  necessarily	   clear	   and	   transparent	   to	   infants,	  who	  still	  may	  engage	  in	  these	  activities	  for	  their	  own	  motivations.	  	  Infants’	   active	   participation	   in	   shared	   activities	   has	   been	   documented	  from	  an	  early	  age	  for	  dyadic	  interactions,	  where	  –	  utilizing	  their	  already	  well	  established	  vocalization,	  facial	  expression	  and	  whole-­‐body-­‐movement	  skills	  –	   they	   coordinate	   their	   actions	   with	   an	   interaction	   partner	   appropriately	  adjusting	   their	   actions	   in	   response	   to	   or	   anticipation	   of	   their	   partner’s	  actions.	  The	  examples	  in	  the	  literature	  can	  be	  subsumed	  under	  two	  different	  forms	   of	   co-­‐ordination:	   1)	   responding	   with	   complementary	   actions	   or	  generally	   performing	   specific	   context	   appropriate	   actions	   (turn	   taking	   in	  proto-­‐conversation	  (Bateson,	  1975,	  1979;	  Tiffany	  Field	  &	  Fogel,	  1982;	  Stern,	  1971;	  Trevarthen,	  1977),	  or	  adjusting	  to	  being	  picked	  up	  (Reddy,	  Markova,	  &	  Wallot,	  2013;	  Negayama	  et	  al.,	  2015)	  and	  2)	  responding	  with	  identical	  or	  similar	   actions	   (imitation,	   such	   as	   shaping	   (one’s)	   vocalizations,	   facial	   or	  manual	  actions	  in	  accordance	  to	  a	  model)	  	  However	  relatively	  little	  is	  known	  yet	  about	  young	  infants’	  participation	  
in	   early	   joint	   activities	   involving	   objects	   including	   such	   common	  activities	  as	  infants’	  and	  caregivers’	  shared	  caregiving	  routines	  even	  though	  these	   constitute	   a	   substantial	   part	   of	   everyday	   living	   (but	   see	   Newson	   &	  Newson,	  1975;	  Rączaszek-­‐Leonardi	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Valsiner,	  1987).	  Given	   infants’	   still	   limited	   knowledge	   of	   goals	   and	   activity	   structures,	  limited	   postural	   and	   (fine)	   motor	   capabilities	   –	   let	   alone	   their	   supposed	  inability	   to	   co-­‐ordinate	  engagement	  between	  people	  and	  objects	  –	  how	  do	  these	   caregiving	   activities	   unfold,	   how	   is	   joint	   praxis	   around	   objects	   co-­‐
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ordinated,	   and	   to	  what	   extent	   do	   infants	   actively	   participate,	   engage	  with	  the	  objects	  involved,	  and	  co-­‐ordinate	  their	  engagement?	  	   Working	  definition:	  joint	  infant-­‐directed	  object	  routines	  	  	  
For this chapter we consider all activities where caregivers perform actions 
1) concerning and directed at infants and 2) in which objects are a) 
functionally involved as instruments to help tending to infants’ (bodily) 
needs, and b) typically used to act on the infant.  	  We	   will	   investigate	   to	   what	   degree	   these	   activities	   can	   be	   regarded	   as	  
joint,	  which	   requires	  active	  participation	   on	   the	  part	   of	   the	   infant	   (beyond	  being	   acted	   on	   and	   engaging	   in	   dyadic	   communication),	   that	   is,	   adjusting	  their	  actions	  in	  response	  to	  or	  anticipation	  of	  their	  partner’s	  actions	  as	  well	  as	  to	  the	  object.	  Also,	  to	  what	  extent	  do	  infants	  effectively	  contribute	  to	  the	  activity?	  	  
4.2.4 The	   common	   characteristics	   across	   caregiving	   routines	   in	   terms	   of	  
sources	  and	  targets	  of	  action,	  their	  relations,	  spatial	  configuration,	  and	  
modes	  of	  engagement	  What	   these	   activities	   had	   in	   common	   was	   that	   infants	   typically	  experienced	   them	   on	   a	   one-­‐on-­‐one	   basis	   with	   their	   mothers	   (sometimes	  fathers,	   occasionally	   grandmothers,	   aunts	   or	   family	   friends)	   as	   primary	  actors	   and	   interaction	   partners.	   At	   times	   a	   second	   caregiver	   or	   an	   older	  sibling	   was	   present	   as	   well.	   	   Being	   directed	   at	   the	   infants	   these	   joint	  practices	   took	   place	   at	   a	   close	   (intimate)	   range,	   with	   the	   interaction	  partners	  in	  (direct)	  proximal	  contact	  with	  each	  other,	  as	  well	  as	  with	  most	  the	   objects	   involved.	   These	   included:	   1)	   large	   objects	   used	   for	   postural	  support	   (and	   containment)	   providing	   infants	   with	   particular,	   context-­‐specific	  experiences	  of	  large	  area	  surface	  contact	  and	  a	  supportive	  “ground”	  to	  act	  from	  such	  as	  soft	  (“hugging”)	  breast	  feeding	  cushions,	  smooth	  elastic	  changing	   mats,	   swinging	   baby	   rockers,	   smooth	   plastic	   bathing	   tubs	   filled	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with	   water	   providing	   buoyancy	   but	   resisting	   movement,	   yielding	   bed	  mattresses,	   etc.,	   2)	   small	   detached	   movable	   objects,	   which	   infants	   were	  primarily	   acted	  on	  with,	   such	  as	   cloth	  napkins	   for	  wiping	   away	  dribble	  or	  playing	   peekaboo	   with,	   sponges,	   wet	   wipes,	   towels,	   nappies	   and	   clothes,	  blankets,	   bottles	   and	   spoons,	   and	   teething	   rings.	   Some	   of	   these	  were	   also	  among	  the	  first	  objects	  infants	  actively	  engaged	  with,	  either	  in	  a)	  individual	  engagement	   in	   parallel	   to	   an	   on-­‐going	   caregiving	   activity	   (ranging	   from	  task-­‐preserving	   distraction	   to	   task-­‐disrupting	   interference),	   where	  particularly	  objects	  with	  a	  large	  soft	  surface	  area	  that	  are	  easy	  to	  get	  hold	  of	  were	   used,	   such	   as	   cloth	   napkins,	   clothes,	   towels	   and	   blankets;	   b)	   in	   joint	  engagement	   in	   between	   or	   after	   the	   main	   caregiving	   task	   (e.g.	   playing	  peekaboo	  with	  a	  napkin),	  or	  c)	   functionally	  contributing	  to	   the	  task,	  either	  by	   indirect	   engagement	   using	   whole	   body	   movements	   (e.g.	   bottom	   lift	   in	  nappy	   change)	   or,	   in	   rare	   cases,	   even	   manual	   engagement	   (e.g.	   engaging	  with	   teething	   ring	   after	   the	   mother	   has	   put	   it	   in	   the	   infant’s	   mouth,	  autonomously	   holding	   	   drinking	   bottle	   at	   three	   months,	   later,	   from	   5	  months,	   spoons,	   etc.),	   in	   particular	   using	   objects	   functionally	   designed	   for	  infant	  handling	  such	  as	  special	  drinking	  bottles.	  In	  addition,	  a	  third	  group	  of	  objects	  was	  utilized:	  3)	  movable	  objects	  used	  for	   distraction	   (mobiles,	   paper	   lanterns,	   music	   box,	   soft	   toy,	   radio,	   etc.),	  which	   formed	  a	  partial	   exception	  as	   they	  were	  mostly	   experienced	   from	  a	  distance,	  particularly	  in	  the	  early	  ages	  up	  to	  5	  months.	  
4.2.5 Differences	  within	  the	  context	  of	  caregiving	  in	  terms	  of	  settings/spatial	  
configuration,	  task	  characteristics,	  and	  modes	  of	  engagement	  Analysing	   and	   comparing	   the	   interactions	   within	   the	   main	   category	   of	  infant-­‐directed	  object	   routines,	  we	  distinguished	  and	  pooled	   episodes	   into	  distinct	   caregiving	   contexts	   illustrated	   in	   figure	   4.5:	   feeding	   and	   winding	  
[row	   1];	   bathing,	   wiping	   dry	   and	   skincare	   [row	   2];	   soothing	   and	   putting	  
infants	  to	  bed	  [row	  3],	  nappy	  change	  and	  dressing	  [row	  4].	  Below	  we	  briefly	  describe	  these	  contexts	  in	  terms	  of	  a)	  setting	  and	  b)	  task	  characteristics,	  and	  c)	  ways	  of	  engagement	  between	  the	  sources	  and	  targets	  of	  action.	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Figure	  4.5:	  Illustrations	  of	  caregiving	  activities	  in	  (from	  top):	  feeding,	  bathing,	  soothing,	  and	  nappy	  change.	  Details	  see	  text.	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Figure	  4.5:	  extended	  caption:	  
Row	   1:	   feeding,	   from	   left	   to	   right:	   breast,	   bottle,	   weaning	   (spoon,	  
bottle)	  
1a:	  breastfeeding:	  mother	  and	  infant	  lying	  on	  the	  bed	  on	  their	  sides	  facing	  each	   other,	   the	   infant	   is	   drinking	   and	   pressing	   his	   hands	   against	   the	  mother’s	   breast,	   while	   his	   posture	   is	   supported	   by	   the	   mattress	   and	   the	  mother’s	   hands,	   1b:	   breastfeeding:	   sitting	   cross-­‐legged,	   the	   mother	   has	  placed	  the	  infant	  on	  her	  slanted	  right	  thigh,	  slightly	  elevating	  it	  and	  using	  an	  additional	  cushion	   to	  further	  support	  the	  infant’s	  back.	  While	  drinking	  the	  infant’s	   right	   hand	   alternatingly	   engages	   with	   the	   breast	   and	   the	   present	  cloth	  napkin.	  	  
1c:	  bottle	  feeding:	  the	  girl	  resting	  reclined	  on	  her	  mother’s	  lap,	  touches	  and	  grasps	  the	  bottle	  during	  bottle-­‐feeding,	  while	  a	  is	  close	  by,	  which	  is	  used	  for	  wiping	  off	  dribble,	  sometimes	  manually	  engaged	  with,	  and	  occasionally	  used	  for	  a	  round	  of	  peekaboo.	  
1d:	   bottle	   feeding:	   rare	   case	   of	   3	   month	   old	   autonomously	   holding	   the	  bottle	  between	  her	  hands,	  as	  mother	  holds	  her	  supine	  on	  her	  lap.	  	  
1e:	  winding:	  infant	  engages	  with	  cloth	  napkin	  during	  winding	  1f:	   spoon	   feeding	   reminiscent	   of	   dyadic	   interaction:	   4	   month	   old	   infant	  opens	  mouth	   in	  response	  to	   the	  mother’s	  exaggerated,	  affectionate	  mouth-­‐opening-­‐demonstrations,	   at	   which	   point	   the	   mother	   while	   gently	   holding	  down	   the	   infants	   hands,	   carefully	   directs	   the	   spoon	   into	   his	   mouth,	   thus	  together	   managing	   feeding	   with	   the	   infant	   staying	   primarily	   attentive-­‐communicatively	  engaged	  with	  the	  mother,	  hardly	  looking	  at	  the	  spoon.	  
1g:	  weaning:	  a	  5	  month	  old	  girl	  presented	  with	  water	  in	  a	  bottle	  responds	  (in	   contrast	   to	  previous	  undifferentiated	  expressions	  of	  discontent)	  with	  a	  specific	   (when	   presented	   with	   water	   not	   milk)	   and	   persistent	   gesture	   of	  disgust	   and	   rejection	   (averting	   her	   face,	   frowning	   in	   disgust,	   crying,	   and	  pushing	  the	  bottle	  away	  with	  her	  arm).	  
1h:	  cultural	  activity	  of	  eating:	  the	  5	  month	  old	  infant	  is	  participating	  in	  the	  complex	   cultural	   activity	   of	   eating,	   staged	   as	   a	   role	   play	   by	   the	   parents,	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where	   the	  mother	   enacts	   the	   infant’s	   role,	   translating	   her	   daughter’s	   non-­‐verbal	  behaviour	  into	  possible	  verbal	  comments	  about	  the	  interaction.	  	  
	  
Row	  2:	  bathing,	  wiping	  dry,	  skincare:	  2a-­‐b,	  caregivers’	  manual	  resources	  invested	   in	   balancing	   their	   3	   month	   old	   sons	   in	   bathing	   tub	   (body	  submersed	   in,	   head	   above	  water)	   and	  washing	   infant’s	   body,	  while	   at	   the	  same	  time	  in	  a)	  communicating	  (vocals	  +	  facial	  expression)	  with	  the	  infant,	  who	  stays	  engaged	  in	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  communication	  throughout	  the	  activity,	  in	  
b)	   monitoring	   and	   communicating	   with	   the	   infant,	   who	   keeps	   visually	  oriented	  straight	  ahead,	  as	  well	  as	  communicating	  with	  the	  older	  sibling	  and	  restraining	  his	  interference;	  2c:	  Rare	  case	  of	  infant	  observing	  sponge	  actions	  in	   situation	   where	   both	   parents	   are	   present,	   hence	   more	   resources	   are	  available:	  while	   the	  mother	   is	   supporting	   the	   5	  month	   old	   infant	   (already	  sitting	  more	  upright,	  needing	  less	  support),	  the	  father	  is	  explicitly	  displaying	  the	  sponge,	  squeezing	  out	  water	  etc.,	  drawing	  the	  infant’s	  gaze.	  	  
2d:	   3	  month	   old	   infant	   in	   sparsely	  water	   filled	   adult	   bathing	   tub	   gleefully	  thrashing	  arms	  and	   legs,	   laughing	   towards	   the	  mother	  who	  gives	  her	   time	  and	  space	  for	  thrashing	  before	  gently	  washing	  her	  
2e-­‐h:	   wiping	   dry/skin	   care:	   as	   5	   min	   later	   the	   same	   infant	   from	   d),	   now	  supine	  on	  a	  changing	  mat	  on	  the	  floor,	  is	  wrapped	  in	  towels,	  rubbed	  dry,	  and	  wriggled,	   she	   is	   e)	   engaging	   in	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   communications	   with	   her	  mother,	   exchanging	   laughs,	   f)	   grasping	  and	  mouthing	   the	   towel,	  g)	   getting	  involved	   in	   and	   responding	   with	   laughter	   to	   a	   round	   of	   peekaboo.	   This	  illustrates	  how	  a	  relaxed	  situation	  after	  a	  task	  is	  often	  used	  as	  opportunity	  for	  social	  games,	  e.g.	  –	  in	  presence	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  cloth	  such	  as	  here	  –	  for	  a	  round	  of	  peekaboo.	  	  
Row	  3:	  soothing,	  putting	   infants	   to	  bed	  –	  changing	  or	  reducing	  highly	  
involved	  engagement	  
3a:	   soothing:	   the	   mother	   successfully	   uses	   a	   book	   with	   crinkly	   pages	   to	  distract	   her	   3	   month	   old	   daughter	   out	   of	   crying,	   after	   which	   the	   mother	  immediately	  starts	  to	  engage	  her	  in	  the	  cultural	  activity	  of	  book	  sharing.	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3b:	  soothing:	  a	  teddy	  bear	  is	  animated	  to	  distract	  the	  3	  month	  old	  boy	  out	  of	  crying.	  
3e-­‐f:	   going	   to	   bed:	  using	  mobiles,	  dim	   light,	  white	  noise	  and	  a	  movement	  restricting	   swaddling	   cloth	   (f)	   to	   change	   the	   3	   month	   old	   infants’	   more	  intense	  ways	  of	  engaging	  with	  the	  world	  into	  calmer	  ones,	  facilitating	  falling	  asleep.	  
3g-­‐h,	  3	  month	  old	  infant	  is	  covered	  with	  a	  blanket	  by	  the	  mother	  for	  going	  to	  sleep	  lying	  under	  the	  baby	  gym	  she	  had	  been	  engaged	  with	  before,	  the	  4	  month	  old	  infant	  autonomously	  pulls	  up	  the	  blanket	  over	  her	  face	  	  
	  
Row	   4:	   nappy	   changing	   strategies:	   4a-­‐b:	  engaging	   infants	   in	   parallel	  
distraction	  activities:	  using	  musical	  toys	  (including	  light	  effects)	  for	  distal	  audio-­‐visual	   engagement,	   in	   addition	   infants	   manually	   engage	   with	   the	  towel	  (a)	  and	  the	  musical	  sheep	  toy	  (b)	  respectively.	  
4c-­‐d:	   sequential,	   intermittent	   engagement	   in	   play	   breaks:	   mothers	  pause	  during	  nappy	  change	  to	  engage	  in	  play	  with	  their	  infants:	  animating	  a	  soft	  toy	  and	  touching	  her	  3	  month	  old	  daughter	  with	  it	  (c)	  or	  in	  case	  of	  the	  older	  5	  month	  old	  infant:	  the	  mother	  offers	  her	  own	  face	  for	  body	  part	  play.	  
4e-­‐f:	  Task	  relevant	  person	  &	  object	  engagement:	  the	  mother	  invites	  the	  infants	   to	   actively	   contribute,	   leading	   to	   infants	   lifting	   their	   bottom	   in	   “a	  helpful	  way”.	  
4.2.5.1 Feeding	  and	  winding	  –	  close	  vicinity	  and/or	  coinciding	  of	  sources	  and	  
targets	  of	  action,	  attentive-­‐communicative	  and	  physical	  engagement	  
coincide.	  Functionally,	  the	  task	  of	  feeding	  primarily	  consists	  in	  enabling	  the	  infant	  (who	   is	   yet	   unable	   to	   do	   so	   autonomously)	   to	   engage	   in	   the	   fundamental	  life-­‐sustaining	  activity	  of	  feeding	  by	  (1)	  providing	  digestible	  food	  (for	  the	  yet	  immature	  digestive	   tract),	   (2)	  establishing	  and	  sustaining	  contact	  between	  the	   infant	   and	   a	   food-­‐source	   (with	   the	   infant’s	   postural,	   reaching,	   and	  locomotion	   skills	   for	   acquiring	   food	   still	   in	   statu	   nascendi),	   as	  well	   as	   (3)	  (mechanically)	   assisting	   with	   digestion	   afterwards	   (winding).	   Crucially,	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feeding	   at	   the	   same	   time	   constituted	   a	   highly	   intimate	   social	   interaction	  (tending	   to	   the	   partners’	   social	   and	   psychological	   needs	   and	  wellbeing)	   –	  especially	   in	   the	   early	   months	   –	   and	   over	   time,	   as	   the	   infant’s	   actions	  became	   more	   autonomous	   and	   their	   action	   repertoire	   grew,	   this	   activity	  increasingly	  became	  a	  container	  for	  transmitting	  cultural	  norms,	  as	  well.	  In	   the	   first	  months	  of	   the	  study	   feeding	  was	  practiced	  as	  breast	   feeding	  (figure	   4.5,	   row	   1,	   a,	   b)	   or	   bottle	   feeding	   (figure	   4.5,	   row	   1,	   c-­‐e).	   What	  characterised	   both	   forms	   and	   made	   feeding	   in	   the	   early	   months	   a	   very	  special	   interaction	   context	   is	   the	   closeness	   of	   the	   sources	   and	   targets	   of	  interaction,	   the	   proximal	   engagement	   through	   direct	   bodily	   contact	   and	  tight	  coupling	  via	  multiple	  channels	  and	  modalities:	  smell	  and	  touch,	  as	  well	  as	  sound	  and	  vision.	  The	   infant	   was	   held	   on,	   or	   close	   to,	   the	   caregiver’s	   body	   in	   a	   stable	  position,	  reclined	  or	  lying	  on	  the	  side,	  supported	  by	  the	  caregiver’s	  body	  and	  sometimes	  by	  breastfeeding	  cushions	  or	  by	  a	  mattress	  (figure	  4.5,	  row	  1,	  a).	  Either	  the	  infant	  was	  placed	  and	  stabilized	  near	  the	  breast	  (figure	  4.5,	  row	  1,	  a,	  b)	  or	  a	  bottle	  was	  steadily	  held	  near	  the	  infant’s	  mouth	  (figure	  4.5,	  row	  1,	  c-­‐e).	  While	  orally	  engaging	  with	  the	  food	  source,	  infants	  frequently	  brought	  their	  hands	   to	   it	   as	  well,	   touching	  and	  pushing	   the	  breast,	   or	   touching	   the	  bottle	  and/or	  the	  caregiver’s	  hands	  (figure	  4.5,	  row	  1,	  c,d)	  in	  rare	  cases	  even	  from	   3	   months	   on	   autonomously	   holding	   the	   bottle	   between	   their	   hands	  (figure	  4.5,	  row	  1,	  e),	  thus	  functionally	  contributing	  to	  the	  task.	  	  Infants	   also	   frequently	   engaged	   with	   the	   ubiquitous	   cloth	   napkin,	   kept	  around	  to	  wipe	  off	  dribble	  and	  protect	  caregivers’	  clothing	  during	  winding,	  grasping	   and	   mouthing	   it,	   caregivers	   also	   occasionally	   used	   it	   to	   engage	  infants	  in	  a	  round	  of	  peekaboo.	  In	   the	   case	   of	   breastfeeding,	   engaging	   with	   the	  partner	   and	   engaging	  with	   the	   “object”	   (the	   source	  of	   food)	   coincided	   –	   and	   so	   did	   attentive-­‐communicative	   and	   physically	   effective	  (bodily/manual)	   engagement	   to	   an	   extent:	  compared	   to	   the	   typical,	   distal	   visuo-­‐audio-­‐movement	   based	   forms	   of	   attentive-­‐communicative	   engagement	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characteristic	  of	  other	  activities	  such	  as	  proto-­‐conversation,	  here	  proximal	  forms	  of	  engagement	  involving	  touch,	  close	  range	  smell	  etc.,	  were	  prevalent.	  The	  breast16	  was	  among	  the	  first	  targets	  of	  action	  infants	  engaged	  with	  –	  via	  mouth	   and	   hands	   –	   in	   a	   not	   only	   communicative	   but	   directly	   physically	  effective	  way,	  experiencing	  the	  result	  in	  receiving	  milk.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  infants’	   actions	  were	   communicative	  as	  well,	   as	   the	  mothers	  were	  directly	  feeling	  and	  responding	  to	  them,	  verbally	  and	  by	  touch.	  (1971)	  With	  the	  participants	  close	  and	  tightly	  coupled	  by	  proximal	  engagement,	  and	   the	   sources	   and	   targets	   of	   attentional-­‐communicative	   and	   physically	  effective	  acting	  (at	  least	  partially)	  coinciding,	  the	  situation	  comes	  very	  close	  to	  Werner	  and	  Kaplan’s	  “primordial	  sharing	  situation”	  (1963).	  Thus	  to	  study	  how	   the	   partners	   co-­‐ordinate	   and	   attune	   to	   each	   other	   in	   this	   situation	  would	  be	  of	   great	   interest	   in	   itself	   as	  well	   as	  with	   regard	   to	  development,	  however	   would	   require	   additional	   physiological	   measurements	   beyond	  camera	  recordings.	  Of	   all	   caregiving	   situations	   tending	   to	   the	   infants’	   bodily	   needs,	   feeding	  was	   arguably	   the	   situation	   where	   infants’	   and	   caregivers’	   interests	   and	  “goals”	   converged	   and	   overlapped	   the	   most,	   and	   where	   the	   situation	   is	  relatively	   transparent	   to	   the	   infant.	  And	   in	   this	   special	   situation	   the	   infant	  was	  able	  –	  by	  acting	  on	  the	  breast	  –	  to	  directly	  and	  autonomously	  (with	  just	  a	  little	  postural	  support)	  control	  and	  fulfil	  their	  need.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time	  in	  the	  feeding	  situation	  (particularly	  later	  when	  feeding	  solid	  foods),	  conflicting	  forces	  and	  actions	  of	  resistance	  and	  refusal	  became	  particularly	  apparent,	  indicating	  differences	  and	  discrepancies	  in	  immediate	  interests,	   motives,	   and	   overarching	   functional	   goals	   between	   infant	   and	  mother,	   also	   partially	   related	   to	   conflicts	   with	   practical	   constraints	   and	  cultural	  norms.	  	  (Winnicott,	  1971)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  For	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	   the	  special	  role	  and	  potential	  significance	  of	   the	   breast	   as	   a	   “transitory	   object”	   for	   the	   self-­‐other	   differentiation	   and	  regulation	  see	  Winnicott	  (1971)	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In	   the	   feeding	   situation	   it	   becomes	   visible	   how	   the	   infant’s	   particular	  wants	   and	   not-­‐wants	   become	   more	   focused,	   specific,	   and	   persistent	   over	  time,	   as	   illustrated	   in	   figure	   4.5.r1g,	   where	   at	   5	   months	   the	   girl’s	  undifferentiated	  expression	  of	  discontent	  from	  previous	  months	  has	  turned	  into	  a	  specific	  and	  persistent	  gesture	  of	  disgust	  and	  rejection	  whenever	  and	  only	  if	  presented	  with	  water	  (averting	  her	  face,	  frowning	  in	  disgust,	  crying,	  and	  pushing	  the	  bottle	  away	  with	  her	  arm).	  	  As	  infants’	  motor	  actions	  grew	  more	  autonomous,	  caregivers	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  increasingly	  constrained	  the	  infant’s	  actions	  to	  prevent	  disrupting	  interference	  (see	  the	  mother	  in	  figure	  4.5.r1f	   gently	   holding	   down	   the	   4	  month	   old’s	   hands	   under	   the	   bib)	   (also	  compare	   Valsiner,	   1987),	   and	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   actively	   shaped	   feeding	  interactions	   into	   collaborative	   activities	   of	   mutual	   co-­‐ordination,	   with	  different	   configurations	   of	   engagement:	   The	   4	   month	   old	   infant	   in	   figure	  4.5.r1f	   joyously	   opens	   his	  mouth	   in	   response	   to	   his	  mother’s	   exaggerated,	  affective	  mouth	  opening	  demonstrations,	  at	  which	  point	   the	  mother,	  while	  gently	  holding	  down	  his	  hands,	   carefully	  directs	   the	  spoon	   into	  his	  mouth,	  thus	  successfully	  managing	  (the	  first	  spoon	  )	  feeding	  (interactions)	  together	  in	   a	   manner	   reminiscent	   of	   and	   sharing	   many	   features	   with	   dyadic	  interaction,	   particular	   in	   that	   the	   infant	   keeps	   primarily	   focused	   on	   and	  affectively	   communicating	   with	   the	   mother,	   hardly	   ever	   looking	   at	   the	  spoon.	  	  With	   the	   slightly	   older	   5	   month	   old	   infant	   in	   figure	   4.5.r1h	   the	  engagement	  configuration	  and	  dynamics	  is	  a	  different	  one:	  the	  infant	  mostly	  keeps	  her	  gaze	  steadily	  fixed	  on	  the	  spoon,	  which	  the	  father	  moves	  through	  the	  air	  in	  large	  swiping	  movements	  varying	  in	  speed,	  keeping	  his	  daughter’s	  attention	   and	   highlighting	   and	   training	   the	   co-­‐ordinative	   aspects	   of	   the	  interaction.	  While	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  parents	  stage	  a	  role	  play	  enacting	  the	  cultural	   activity	   of	   eating,	   with	   the	   mother	   playing	   the	   infant’s	   part	   and	  “translating”	   her	   non-­‐verbal	   behaviour	   into	   verbal	   comments	   about	   the	  situation.	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4.2.5.2 Bathing,	   wiping	   dry,	   skincare	   –	   Near-­‐absence	   of	   infant-­‐object	  
engagement	   in	  a	  delicate	  situation	  while	   room	  for	   social	  and	  object	  
engagement	  afterwards	  The	  task	  of	  washing	  the	  baby	  was	  typically	  tended	  to	  by	  caregivers	  -­‐	  bent	  over	   a	   baby	   bathing	   tub	   –	   carefully	   holding	   and	   stabilizing	   their	   infant’s	  head	  above	  the	  water	  with	  one	  hand	  and	  gently	  acting	  on	  the	  infant’s	  body	  with	   a	   sponge	   with	   the	   other,	   thus	   engaging	   simultaneously	   with	   and	  effectively	   bringing	   together	   infant	   and	   object.	  With	  most	   of	   their	  manual	  action	   resources	   invested	   in	   this	   delicate	   process,	   the	   mothers	   were	  additionally	  verbally	  inquiring	  into	  and	  commenting	  on	  the	  infant’s	  general	  experience	  or	  comforting	  and	  soothing	  the	  infant	  when	  needed,	  but	  did	  not	  particularly	  mark	  or	  point	  out	  the	  objects	  to	  the	  infants,	  keeping	  their	  object	  actions	  low-­‐profile	  and	  close	  to	  the	  infant’s	  body	  (figure	  4.5,	  row	  2,	  a,	  b,	  d).	  The	   infants	   –	   floating	   in	   the	   water	   with	   their	  heads	  stabilized	  –	  mostly	  looked	  straight	  ahead	  (figure	  4.5,	  row	  2,	  b)	  or	  at	  their	  caregiver’s	  face	  (figure	   4.5,	   row	   2,	   a,	   d)	   while	   receiving	   the	  gentle	   touches	   of	   hands	   and	   sponges,	   but	   –	  apart	   from	   thrashing	   their	   legs	   in	   the	   water	  (figure	  4.5,	  row	  2,	  d)	  –	  hardly	  engaged	  with	  the	  objects	   involved,	   looking	   at	   the	   sponge	   only	   rarely	   (mostly	   when	   two	  caregivers	  were	  around)	  but	  not	  attempting	  to	  grasp	  it	  (figure	  4.5,	  row	  2,	  c).	  When	  laid	  down	  wrapped	  in	  and	  wiped	  dry	  with	  towels,	  however,	  they	  were	  communicating	  with	   their	   caregivers	   (figure	  4.5,	   row	  2,	   e)	   at	   times	   letting	  themselves	  be	  drawn	  into	  in	  a	  round	  of	  towel-­‐peekaboo	  (figure	  4.5,	  row	  2,	  g-­‐h),	  and	  readily	  grasped	  and	  mouthed	  (the	  corners	  of)	  towels,	  which	  together	  with	  napkins	  were	  among	  the	  earliest	  objects	  encountered	  by	  infants	  which	  they	   actively	   could	   get	   hold	   of.	   However,	   in	   doing	   so,	   infants	   were	   not	  functionally	  contributing	  to	  the	  core	  task.	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4.2.5.3 Soothing	   and	   putting	   infants	   to	   bed	   –	   reducing	   highly	   involved	  
engagement	  The	  functional	  task	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  soothing	  and	  putting	  an	  infant	  to	  bed	  	  may	  be	  summarized	  as	  “disengagement”,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  a	  change	  or	  reduction	  of	  engagement,	   respectively.	  While	   in	  soothing	  caregivers	  seek	   to	  calm	  the	  infant	  and	  direct	  attention	  away	  from	  (engagement	  with)	  discomfort,	  when	  putting	  an	  infant	  to	  bed	  they	  reduce	  the	  infant’s	  active	  and	  highly	  involved	  world	  engagements	  of	  being	  wide	  awake	  to	  a	  more	  passive	  and	  less	  involved	  state	   receptive	   for	   sleep.	   In	   addition	   to	   (dyadic)	   direct	   bodily	   regulation	  lowering	   arousal,	   such	   as	   holding,	   rocking,	   gently	   stroking	   and	   verbally	  soothing	   the	   infant,	   a	   range	   of	   objects	   is	   utilized	   in	   various	   different	  functional	  roles:	  for	  soothing	  small	  detached,	  movable	  objects	  are	  presented	  in	  a	  salient	  manner	  –	  rustling	  a	  book	  with	  crinkly	  pages	  (figure	  4.5,	  row	  3,	  a-­‐c),	  vividly	  animating	  a	  soft-­‐toy	  in	  large	  swiping	  movements	  (figure	  4.5,	  row	  3,	  d),	  or	  touching,	  tickling	  the	  infant	  with	  it	  –	  capturing	  the	  infant’s	  attention	  and	  directing	  it	  away	  from	  discomfort,	  instead	  often	  encouraging	  sustained	  engagement	  with	  the	  object.	  In	  order	  to	  reduce	  infant’s	  intense	  engagements	  to	   a	  more	   passive	   state	   receptive	   for	   sleep	   when	   bringing	   infants	   to	   bed,	  objects	   are	   used	   to	   substitute	   highly	   involved	   intense	   engagement	  considered	   non	   beneficial	  with	   engagement	   of	   a	   slower,	   less	   intense	   kind,	  presenting	   the	   infant	  with	   a	   slow	  moving	  mobile	   (figure	   4.5,	   row	   3,	   e-­‐f,	   a	  radio	  or	  musical	  toy	  playing	  soothing	  music,	  white	  noise	  (figure	  4.5,	  row	  3,	  f),	   or	   simulating	   heartbeat.	   Blankets	   and	   swaddling	   cloths	   were	   used	   to	  provide	  warmth	   and	   sustained	   touch	   and	   pressure,	   supposedly	   recreating	  the	  atmosphere	  in	  the	  womb	  (figure	  4.5,	  row	  3,	  f).	  The	  4	  month	  old	  infant	  in	  figure	  4.5,	   row	  3,	   g-­‐h	  had	  even	   learned	   to	   cover	  herself	  with	  a	  blanket	   for	  going	  to	  sleep	  (after	  having	  been	  covered	  by	  the	  mother	  during	  the	  previous	  months,	   figure	   4.5,	   row	   3,	   g-­‐h	   ),	   pulling	   it	   over	   her	   head	   (body-­‐relative-­‐object-­‐translation),	   thus	   autonomously	   regulating	   her	   level	   of	   “input”	   and	  engagement.	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4.2.5.4 Nappy	   change	   and	   dressing	   –	   a	   variety	   of	   configurations	   and	  
dynamics	  of	  engagement:	  from	  constraining	  and	  engaging	  the	  infant	  
in	   parallel	   distraction	   activity	   to	   active	   functional	   contribution	  
through	  whole	  body	  movements.	  	  Pursuing	   the	   task	   of	   cleaning	   the	   infant	   and	  providing	   him/her	   with	   a	   clean	   nappy,	   the	  caregivers	   are	   challenged	  by	   a	   number	   of	   further	  practical	   constraints:	   i.e.	   to	   prevent	   injury	   and	  contamination,	  that	  is,	  not	  having	  the	  infant	  roll	  off	  the	   changing	   table	   and	   not	   having	   the	   content	   of	  the	  nappy	  contaminating	  clothes	  or	  surroundings.	  These	  task	  characteristics	  and	  constraints	  were	  also	  reflected	  on	  a	  cultural-­‐material	   level	   in	   the	   situational	   setting,	   in	  particular	   as	   they	  were	   literally	  “built	   into”	   a	   number	   of	   artifacts	   especially	   designed	   to	   facilitate	   the	  process:	  Infants	  were	  placed	  (in	  a	  180°	  or	  90°	  orientation)	  on	  changing	  mats	  with	  soft,	  easily	  wipeable	  surfaces	  and	  elevated	  rims	  on	  washing	  machines	  (figure	   4.5,	   row	   4,	   a,	   f)	   or	   changing	   tables	   (figure	   4.5,	   row	   4,	   b,	   c)	   	   (with	  ready-­‐for-­‐use	  moist	   cleaning	   tissues	   close	   by),	   and	   often	   under	   or	   next	   to	  mobiles,	   lampions,	  musical	   toys	  (figure	  4.5,	   row	  4,	  a,	  b)	   (used	  to	  “keep	  the	  infant’s	   attention	   occupied”	   and	   contribute	   to	   creating	   a	   “recognizable	  nappy-­‐changing	  context”	  -­‐	  as	  explicitly	  stated	  by	  several	  parents.	  	  	  Alternatively,	  infants	  were	  flexibly	  placed	  (at	  an	  180°	  angle)	  on	  changing	  mats	  or	  mobile	  foldable	  changing	  bags	  laid	  out	  on	  the	  carpeted	  or	  tiled	  floor	  (figure	  4.5,	  row	  4,	  e,	  g)	  bed	  or	  couch,	  adjusted	  to	  situational	  need	  and	  spatial	  availability.	  The	  caregivers	  in	  the	  study	  met	  the	  challenge	  of	  smoothly	  completing	  the	  task	   of	   nappy	   change	  with	   its	   specific	   constraints	   together	  with	   an	   infant	  who	  was	  active	  and	  mobile,	  but	  whose	  knowledge	  and	  motor	  skills	  are	  very	  limited	   and	   who	   is	   largely	   unaware	   of	   the	   task	   and	   its	   constraints,	  minimizing	   complications	   by	   employing	   different	   strategies	   of	   setting	   up	  and	  co-­‐ordinating	  strands	  of	  engagement.	  These	  different	  strategies	  varied	  with	  particular	  circumstances	  –	  time	  available,	  location,	  mood	  of	  the	  infant,	  inclination	   and	   interaction	   history	   of	   the	   dyad,	   etc.	   –	   	   and	   resulted	   in	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different	   configurations	   and	   modes	   of	   engagement,	   as	   well	   as	   different	  patterns	  and	  dynamics	  of	  co-­‐ordination:	  0)	  First	  of	  all,	  what	  caregivers	  did	  NOT	  do	  was	   focussing	  exclusively	  on	  the	   functional	   aspect	   of	   the	   task	   and	   acting	   on	   objects	   and	   infants	  exclusively	   instrumentally	   to	   quickly	   get	   the	   job	   done,	   rather	   caregivers	  acknowledged	   and	   engaged	   with	   the	   infants	   during	   the	   task	   as	  communication	  (and	  sometimes	  action)	  partners.	  The	  question	  is,	  however,	  how	  (exactly)	  these	  two	  or	  more	  strands	  of	  engagement	  were	  co-­‐ordinated.	  	  1)	  Engagement	   in	   parallel	   distraction	   activity:	   the	   caregiver	   takes	  
over	  sole	  control	  and	  handling	  of	  the	  task	  by	  acting	  on	  infant	  and	  nappy,	  while	  preventing	  the	  infant	  from	  engaging	  and	  interfering	  with	  the	  task	  and	  its	   objects	   (nappy,	   clothes)	   by	   gently	   constraining	   his/her	   actions	   (e.g.	  holding	   the	   feet	   up	   and	   together)	   while	   engaging	   the	   infant	   in	   a	  parallel	  
distraction	   activity	   through	   attentional-­‐communicative	   or	   physically-­‐effective	   (manual)	   engagement	   with	   an	   object	   and/or	   in	   pronounced	  distracting	  communication	  (figure	  4.5,	  row	  4,	  a,	  b).	  2)	  Sequential,	  intermittent	  engagement	  in	  play	  breaks:	  the	  caregiver	  
intermittently	   takes	   over	   control	   and	   handling	   of	   the	   task	   for	   large	  
stretches	   of	   time,	  acting	  on	   infant	  and	  object,	  and	  gently	  constraining	  the	  infant’s	  action,	  while	  giving	  space	  at	  interspersed	  intervals	  for	  the	  infant	  
to	   actively	   and	   freely	   engage	   in	   dyadic	   face	   to	   face	   and	   whole	   body	  communication,	   tickling,	  and	  body-­‐part	  or	  object	  play	  (figure	  4.5,	   row	  4,	  c,	  d).	  3)	   Task	   relevant	   person	   and	   (indirect)	   object	   engagement.	   The	  caregiver	   partially	   shares	   control	   and	   task	   by	   inviting	   the	   infant	   to	  
actively	  contribute	  in	  a	  functional	  way	  to	  the	  nappy	  changing	  activity,	  by	   letting	   the	   infant	   engage	   actively	  with	   the	   caregiver,	   her	   actions,	   and	   –	  indirectly	  –	  the	  objects	  involved	  in	  nappy	  change	  (figure	  4.5,	  row	  4,	  e,	  f).	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Context	   box:	   infant	   &	   caregiver’s	   everyday	   caregiving	   activities,	  
culture	  society	  and	  economics	  Concerning,	   in	  principle,	   all	   everyday	   infant	   caregiver	  activities,	  we	  will	  use	  the	  example	  of	  nappy	  change	  to	  once	  briefly	  illustrate	  1)	  how	  aspects	  of	  culture	   permeate	   and	   impact	   on	   a	   young	   infant’s	   everyday	   life	   experience	  down	  to	  his/her	  physiological	  processes	   like	  the	  cycle	  of	  digestion,	  2)	  how	  they	   shape,	   channel	   and	   mold	   infants’	   and	   parent’s	   actions	   and	   activities	  into	   a	   cultural	   frame	   and	   3)	   how	   vice	   versa	   the	   infant’s	   everyday	   life	  activities	   impact	   (back)	  on	   the	   larger	   society,	   global	   economical	  networks,	  and	  ecology.	  	  The	  practice	  of	  nappy	  change	  indeed	  closely	  reflects	  the	  western	  way	  of	  living	   with	   its	   specific	   constraints:	   homes	   with	   carpeted	   floors,	   highly	  structured	  timetables	  etc.	  Through	  the	  disposable	  nappy,	  the	  infant’s	  needs	  are	  managed	  from	  the	  outside	  and	  subsumed	  under	  these	  constraints,	  at	  the	  same	   time	   illustrating	  a	   certain	  predilection	   for	   technological	   solutions,	   as	  the	  nappy	  with	  its	  absorbent	  polymer	  fabric	  is	  a	  relatively	  recent,	  and	  costly,	  high-­‐tech	  design	  product.	  With	  between	  3000	  and	  4000	  nappies	  per	  child,	  disposable	   nappy	   sales	   are	   a	   considerable	   economic	   factor,	   and	   are	   even	  used	  as	  an	  indicator	  for	  the	  overall	  health	  of	  a	  country’s	  economy.	  Also	  they	  represent	  a	  considerable	  consumption	  of	  resources	  and	  result	  in	  3.8	  million	  tons	  (7.6	  billion	  pounds)	  of	  nappy	  waste	  per	  year	  in	  the	  US	  alone,	  making	  up	  2-­‐30	   percent	   of	   the	   landfill	   in	   Europe	   (Environmental	   Protection	   Agency	  (Ireland),	  2009).	  Thus	  the	  product	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  nappy-­‐change	  activity	  is	   increasingly	  becoming	  a	   topic	  of	  growing	  ecological	   concern,	   illustrating	  the	  close	   interpenetration	  of	  global	   technological,	  economic,	  and	  ecological	  dynamics,	  cultural	  ways	  of	  living,	  and	  the	  everyday	  routines	  a	  young	  infant	  is	  involved	  in.	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4.3 Micro	   Analysis:	   Bottom	   lift	   in	   nappy	   changing	   as	   an	   example	   for	  
infants’	  active	  participation	  in	  caregiving	  tasks	  We	  chose	  nappy	  change	  as	  a	  model	  activity	  to	  explore	  in	  more	  detail	  how	  caregivers	   and	   infants	   organize	   and	   co-­‐ordinate	   their	   early	   shared	  caregiving	  routines	   involving	  objects,	  as	   infants	  experienced	  nappy	  change	  from	   birth	   several	   times	   a	   day	   as	   a	   highly	   structured	   routine	   (see	   also	  Nomikou	  &	  Rohlfing	  2011),	  also	  often	  used	  as	  a	  context	  for	  intimate	  dyadic	  interaction	   such	   as	   proto-­‐conversation	   or	   social	   play	   (compare	   Bateson	  1975).	   We	   selected	   the	   following	   bottom-­‐lift	   episode	   -­‐	   where	   an	   only	   3	  month-­‐old	   infant	  shows	  a	  high	   level	  of	  active	  participation	  -­‐	   to	  explore	  the	  range	   of	   and	   capabilities	   and	   opportunities	   for	   participation	   even	   of	   very	  young	   infants.	  However,	   bottom	   lift	   in	   nappy	   change	  was	   by	  no	  means	   an	  exceptional	  case,	  but	  was	  observed	  in	  5	  out	  of	  16	  infant-­‐caregiver	  pairs.	  
4.3.1 Description	  and	  transcripts	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Figure	  4.6:	  Nappy	  changing	  activity,	  details	  see	  text.	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The	  mother	  is	  kneeling	  on	  the	  floor	  in	  front	  of	  her	  3-­‐month-­‐old	  daughter	  lying	  supine	  on	  a	  mobile,	  foldable	  changing	  mat	  (on	  the	  floor)	  and	  looking	  at	  her	  mother	  (see	  figure	  4.6).	  Marking	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  action	  with	  a	  sharp	  intake	   of	   breath	   “.h!”	   the	  mother	   opens	   the	   left	   nappy	   strap	   (to	   her	   right)	  with	   a	   loud	   tearing	   noise.	   As	   the	   infant	   keeps	   banging	   her	   right	   leg	  rhythmically	  on	   the	   floor	   she	  pauses,	  drawing	  back	  her	   left	  hand,	   (briefly)	  looking	  at	  the	  infant’s	  leg	  before	  facing	  the	  baby	  again,	  and	  asks:	  “What	  are	  you	   DOing?”	   (while	   reestablishing	   eye	   contact	   and	   looking	   at	   the	   infant’s	  face	  again).	  The	  mother	  then	  goes	  on	  -­‐	  briefly	  glancing	  at	  the	  nappy	  -­‐	  to	  open	  the	  second,	  right	  strap,	  before	  pausing	  again,	  making	  eye	  contact	  with	  and	  addressing	  the	  infant:	  “You’re	  ready?	  Are	  you	  REAdy?”,	  twice	  repeating	  the	  phrase	  with	  a	  rising	  intonation	  contour	  and	  with	  growing	  intensity.	  Now,	  as	  the	  mother	  is	  folding	  down	  the	  front	  part	  of	  the	  nappy	  with	  her	  right	  hand	  -­‐	  marking	  the	  action	  with	  another	  “.h!”	  -­‐	  the	  infant	  tucks	  up	  her	  legs	  sideways	  (with	   her	   head	   being	   pulled	   back,	   chin	   moving	   up	   a	   little	   as	   the	   legs	   are	  lifted),	  and	  then	  pulls	  them	  closer	  to	  her	  chest	  -­‐	  right	  hand	  on	  her	  right	  knee	  -­‐	   thus	   lifting	  her	  bottom	  off	   the	  mat.	  The	  mother	  pulls	  out	   the	  nappy	   from	  under	  the	   infant	  with	  her	  right	  hand	  while	  placing	  her	   left	  hand	  under	  the	  infant’s	   tucked	  up	   feet	   as	   a	  precaution,	  before	  beginning	   to	   fold	   the	   soiled	  nappy	   with	   both	   hands.	   Again	   looking	   into	   the	   infant’s	   eyes	   and	   holding	  mutual	   gaze	   she	   emphatically	   responds:	   “thank	   you!	   thank	   you!”	  accompanied	  by	   two	  pronounced	  nods	  with	   their	   “(up)-­‐down-­‐up”	  motions	  matching	   the	   intonation	   contours	   of	   the	   “thank	   you”s,	   while	   folding	   and	  putting	  away	  the	  nappy.	  The	  infant,	  meanwhile,	  has	  lowered	  her	  feet	  again,	  smiling.	  	  	  This	   “bottom	   lift”	   as	   a	   convenient,	   “helpful”	   action	   coordination	  facilitating	  nappy	  change	  was	  observed	  in	  at	  least	  4	  different	  mother-­‐infant-­‐pairs	   from	  3	  months	   on,	  who	   had	   each	   developed	   their	   own	   idiosyncratic	  interaction	   patterns:	   not	   only	   did	   the	   mothers	   use	   different	   ways	   of	  structuring	  and	  vocally	  marking	  actions	   (from	   labeling	   the	  object	   about	   to	  be	  used	  “ein	  Windi	  [a	  nappy]”,	  to	  asking	  the	  infant	  for	  readiness	  or	  counting	  in	   “one,	   two	   three	   -­‐	   <pause>	   -­‐!”),	   also	   different	   styles	   and	   techniques	   of	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bottom	  lifts	  were	  employed	  by	  the	  infants:	  e.g.	  the	  3	  month	  old	  boy	  in	  figure	  4.5.r4f	   pushed	   his	   heels	   into	   the	  mat	   and	   arched	   his	   back	   thus	   effectively	  lifting	   his	   bottom	   from	   the	   mat.	   The	   same	   technique	   was	   observed	   in	  another	   4	  month-­‐old	   girl,	  whose	   heel	   however	   came	   to	   rest	   on	   the	   nappy	  sliding	  away	  with	  it	  pulling	  it	  out	  under	  her	  again	  -­‐	  this	  instance	  of	  a	  bottom	  lift	  thus	  ending	  up	  being	  disruptive	  to	  the	  activity	  rather	  than	  helpful.	  
Later	  development	  At	  4	  months	  –	  despite	  being	  distracted	  by	  and	  continuously	  looking	  at	  the	  camera	  –	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  mother	  had	  opened	  the	  tapes	  with	  a	  tearing	  noise	  and	  folded	  down	  the	  middle	  part	  of	  the	  nappy	  the	  infant	  pulled	  up	  legs	  and	  bottom	   in	   one	   swift	   sweeping	  movement	   –	   apparently	   guided	  by	   auditory	  and	  tactile	  stimuli	  alone	  –	  again	  being	  immediately	  thanked	  by	  the	  mother.	  At	  6	  months	  the	  same	  infant,	  in	  the	  meanwhile	  grown	  considerably,	  was	  again	   looking	   away,	   her	   gaze	   following	   the	   trajectory	   of	   her	   older	   brother	  running	  around.	  With	  the	  front	  part	  of	  the	  nappy	  already	  completely	  folded	  back	  and	  down,	  it	  was	  only	  upon	  her	  mother’s	  “ta”,	  by	  now	  established	  as	  a	  general	   cue	   in	  many	   situations,	   that	   the	   infant	   tucked	   up	   her	   legs	   (which	  also	   had	   considerably	   changed	   in	   proportion)	   by	   90	   degrees,	   however	  leaving	  the	  final	  bottom	  lift	  to	  her	  mother.	  	  	  Moreover,	  by	  6	  months	  the	  nappy	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  closing	  straps	  for	  some	   babies	   had	   turned	   into	   something	   “graspable”	   and	   “openable”:	   one	  mother-­‐infant	  pair,	  for	  example,	  developed	  a	  pattern	  in	  which	  the	  mother’s	  efforts	  to	  close	  the	  straps	  were	  repeatedly	  responded	  to	  by	  the	  infant‘s	  re-­‐opening	   them	  with	   a	   chuckle	   -­‐	   despite	   the	  mother’s	   emphatic,	   though	   not	  quite	  serious,	  “no”s	  -­‐	  considerably	  impeding	  nappy	  change	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  turning	  into	  a	  game	  of	  its	  own	  (see	  figure	  4.5.r4g).	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4.3.2 Microanalysis	  results:	  modes	  of	  engagement	  and	  dynamic	  patterns	  of	  
multi-­‐modal	  multi-­‐strand	  co-­‐ordination	  
4.3.2.1 The	  role	  and	  contributions	  of	  the	  caregiver	  In	  line	  with	  the	  functional	  goal	  of	  the	  task	  (nappy	  change)	  centred	  on	  the	  relationship	   between	   object	   and	   infant,	   the	   mother	   regulates	   this	  relationship	   by	   manually	   acting	   directly	   on	   the	   nappy	   and	   on	   the	   infant,	  while	  the	  infant	  does	  not	  directly	  engage	  with	  the	  object	  herself	  (see	  figure	  4.6).	   Also,	   the	   interaction	   shows	   many	   features	   typical	   of	   dyadic	  interactions:	  the	  partners	  are	  oriented	  to	  each	  other,	  and	  engage	  with	  each	  other	  through	  mutual	  gaze,	  vocalization,	  facial	  expressions,	  and	  whole	  body	  movements.	  The	  mother	  thus	  engages	  in	  multiple	  strands	  of	  action	  towards	  the	   infant	  and	  the	  object,	  requiring	  considerable	  amounts	  of	  co-­‐ordination,	  which	   is	   also	   clearly	   reflected	   in	   her	   gaze	   behaviour:	   performing	   8	   rapid	  gaze	  shifts	  in	  this	  13	  sec	  excerpt,	  monitoring,	  acknowledging	  connection	  and	  communicating	   with	   her	   infant,	   as	   well	   as	   guiding	   her	   own	   instrumental	  actions,	   (which)	   she	   performs	   on	   the	   nappy,	   thus	   on	   her	   part	   displaying	  typical	  hallmark	  features	  of	  triadic	  engagement.	  	  These	   surface	   characteristics	   already	   reflect	   how	   caregivers	   dealt	   with	  the	  challenge	  of	  performing	  a	  delicate	  task	  with	  specific	  constrains	  with	  an	  infant	  who	  is	  active	  but	  has	  limited	  motor	  skills,	  knowledge	  and	  awareness	  of	   the	   task.	   As	  mentioned	   above,	   rather	   than	   focussing	   exclusively	   on	   the	  functional	   aspect	   of	   the	   task	   and	   acting	   on	   objects	   and	   infants	  instrumentally	   to	   quickly	   get	   the	   job	   done,	   caregivers	   acknowledged	   and	  engaged	  with	  the	  infants	  during	  the	  task	  as	  interaction	  partners.	  	  But	   how	   does	   the	   mother	   in	   this	   case	   co-­‐ordinate	   these	   strands	   of	  engagement	  and	  set	  up	  the	  activity	  for	  the	  infant?	  And	  to	  what	  extent	  does	  the	  infant	  actively	  participate	  and/or	  engage	  in	  triadic	  co-­‐ordination?	  	  In	  this	  example	  the	  mother	  does	  not	  take	  over	  full	  control	  and	  handling	  of	  the	   task,	   rendering	   the	   infant	   rather	   passive	   (as	   the	   constraints	   and	  practicalities	  of	  the	  task	  in	  combination	  with	  the	  asymmetry	  in	  knowledge,	  skill	   and	   motivation	   might	   suggest,	   see	   strategies	   1-­‐2),	   but	   rather	   enacts	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strategy	  3	  stated	  above:	  partially	  sharing	  the	  control	  and	  performance	  sub-­‐actions	  of	  the	  task.	  	  She	   explicitly	   acts	   to	   co-­‐ordinate	   her	   own	   actions	  with	   her	   daughter	   as	  she	  would	  with	  an	  active	  co-­‐participant	  –	  thus	  acknowledging	  her	  daughter	  as	  one	  –	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  competent	  (adult)	  members	  of	  her	  culture	  readily	  recognize	   as	   a	   cultural	   script/format	   of	   a	   co-­‐operative	   interchange:	   while	  performing	  actions	  on	  the	  nappy	  herself,	  she	  is	  taking	  her	  daughter’s	  actions	  (e.g.	  her	  kicking)	  into	  account,	  acknowledging	  them	  by	  vocally	  marking	  and	  inquiring	  about	  them	  “What	  are	  you	  doing?”,	  waiting	  for	  her	  daughter	  until	  she	   is	   ready,	   inviting	   her	   “Are	   you	   REAdy?”	   and	   giving	   her	   space	   to	  participate,	  and	  thanking	  her	  after	  her	  contribution.	  	  What,	  however,	  is	  the	  situation	  like	  for	  the	  infant?	  What	  can	  the	  3	  months	  old	  unfamiliar	  with	   language	  as	  well	  as	  specific	  cultural	  pragmatic	   formats	  draw	  from	  all	   this?	  How	  can	  she	  understand	  any	  of	   this	  and	  what	  can	   this	  possibly	  mean	  to	  her?	  	  Crucially,	   there	   are	   additional	   features	   inherent	   in	   the	  mother’s	   actions	  that	  go	  beyond	  what	  we	  readily	  perceive	  as	   the	  verbal	  surface	  (and	  action	  script)	   layer	   discussed	   above,	   which	   make	   the	   situation	   accessible	   to	   the	  infant	  as	  a	  structured	  shared	  activity	  she	  is	  part	  of	  and	  can	  actively	  take	  part	  in.	  Indeed	  the	  mother	  creates	  a	  shared	  container	  or	  action	   landscape	   for	  participation	  using	  multimodal,	  analogue,	  affective	  means,	  helping	  the	  infant	  to	   orient	   and	   channeling	   the	   infant’s	   actions	   towards	   performing	  contextually	  beneficial	  actions:	  
First,	   she	   further	  highlights	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   activity,	  making	   it	  
easier	   to	   parse	   and	  participate	   in	   (see	  also	  Nomikou	  &	  Rohlfing,	  2011):	  she	   enhances	   the	   patterning	   already	   inherent	   in	   her	  manual	   actions	   by	   a)	  pausing	   and	   making	   eye	   contact	   in	   between	   steps	   and	   b)	   by	   verbally	  marking	   sub-­‐actions,	   e.g.	   through	   adding	   an	   exclamation	   of	   surprise	   “.h!”.	  The	   latter	  not	  only	   increases	   the	   salience	  of	   the	   respective	   sub-­‐action,	  but	  also	  –	  by	  introducing	  an	  additional	  strand	  of	  action	  and	  letting	  the	  resulting	  multiple	   strands	   of	   action	   spanning	   different	   modalities	   rhythmically	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coincide	   –	   makes	   each	   sub-­‐action	   stand	   out	   as	   a	   separately	   perceivable	  multimodal	   invariance.	   Recurring	   across	   episodes	   of	   nappy	   change,	   these	  can	  over	  time	  be	  recognized	  and	  learned.	  	  	  
Second,	   the	  mother	  not	  only	  patterns	   the	  actions	   locally	  making	  events	  stand	  out,	  but	  also	  makes	  the	  course	  and	  dynamics	  of	  the	  actions,	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  global	  structure	  of	  the	  task,	  perceivable	  by	  shaping	  the	  actions	  
into	  dynamic	  action	  arcs	  (both	  at	  the	  level	  of	  sub-­‐actions	  as	  well	  as	  that	  of	  the	  overarching	  activity)	  with	  beginning,	  build	  up,	  climax,	  and	  resolution	  (as	  first	   described	   for	   book-­‐sharing	   activities	   by	   Rossmanith	   et	   al.,	   2014,	  chapter	  3,	  see	  figures	  3.6.	  and	  4.7)	  The	  mother	  opens	  the	  arc	  by	  undoing	  the	  first	  strap	  of	  the	  nappy	  with	  a	  tearing	  noise	  vocally	  marked	  by	  a	  sharp	  intake	  of	  breath	  “.h!”.	  After	  a	  short	  detour	   “What	  are	  you	  doing?”,	   she	   starts	  building	   up	   the	  arc	  undoing	   the	  second	   strap,	   inviting	   the	   infant	   in	   a	   whisper	   “you’re	   REAdy?”,	   then	  repeating	   the	   invitation	   a	   second	   time	   with	   increased	   intensity	   “Are	   you	  REAdy?”,	  further	  creating	  tension	  with	  its	  flat	  drawn	  out	  pitch	  contour	  and	  a	   sudden	   slight	   increase	   in	   pitch	   at	   the	   end.	  At	   this	   point	   of	   heightened	  
tension	  the	  infant	  joins	  in:	  their	  co-­‐ordinated	  actions	  –	  the	  infant	  lifting	  
her	  bottom	  and	   the	  mother	   folding	  down	   the	  nappy	  and	  marking	   the	  
co-­‐ordinated	   action	   with	   another	   “.h!”	   –	   occur	   at	   and	   constitute	   the	  
peak	  of	   the	   action	   arc.	  After	  that,	   the	  mother	  responds	  to	  and	  marks	  the	  successful	  completion	  of	  the	  infant’s	  part	  in	  the	  activity	  with	  two	  emphatic	  “Thank	  you!”s	  with	  pitch	  contours	   initially	   falling,	  as	  would	  be	  expected	  at	  the	  closure	  of	  an	  action	  arc,	  but	  then	  the	  contours	  rebound	  and	  move	  all	  the	  way	  to	  a	  high	  pitched	  “you”,	  each	  matching	  the	  “down-­‐up”	  movement	  of	  the	  two	   exaggerated	   accompanying	   nods,	   to	  which	   the	   infant	   responds	  with	   a	  smile.	  	  These	   particular	   glissando-­‐like	   wide-­‐range	   pitch	   movements,	  embodying	   excitement,	   in	   concert	   with	   the	   exaggerated	   nods,	   seem	   to	   1)	  
mark	   the	   “you”,	   that	   is,	   highlight	   the	   infant’s	   contribution	  with	   particular	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saliency	   specifically	   attuned	   to	   a	   very	   young	   infant17,	   and	   2)	   reflect	   the	  
temporary	  closure	  of	   the	  current	  action	  while	  already	  segueing	   into	   the	  
next	   phases	   of	   the	  multi-­‐step	   nappy-­‐change	   activity,	   i.e.	   the	   infant	  still	  will	  be	  cleaned,	  provided	  with	  a	  new	  nappy	  and	  dressed	  again.	  Only	  then	  the	  mother	  will	  finally	  conclude	  the	  overarching	  action	  arc	  running	  through	  the	  activity	  with	  an	  emphatic	  “ALL	  done”,	  spoken	  twice	  while	  maintaining	  eye-­‐contact	  with	   the	   infant,	   each	  with	   a	  marked	   fall	   across	   the	  whole	   pitch	  
range,	  and	  accompanied	  by	  two	  synchronous	  gentle	  chest	  rubs	  –	  thus	  again	  creating	   specific	   cross-­‐modal	   invariances	   with	   a	   specific	   contour	   and	  specific	  dynamic	  characteristics	  constituting	  a	  memorable	  “closure	  event”.	  Thus	  moving	  together	  through	  this	  action	  arc,	  the	  format	  “nappy	  change”	  (itself	   an	   instance	   of	   a	   more	   general	   “co-­‐operative	   exchange”)	   does	   not	  simply	  appear	  as	  a	  sequence	  of	  distinct	  events,	  but	  rather	  as	  an	  co-­‐created	  arc,	   a	   specific	   trajectory	   of	   shared	   arousal,	   affect	   and	   action,	   jointly	  
enacted,	   which	   hence	   becomes	   predictable	   (to	   some	   extent)	   and	  
meaningful	  and	  over	  time	  gets	  established	  as	  a	  part	  of	  a	  shared	  action	  
landscape.	  	  This	  sharedness	  of	  action	  arcs	  is	  also	  already	  hinting	  at	  the	  third	  aspect	  of	  the	  mother’s	  active	  shaping	  of	  the	  interaction:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 	  For	   the	   nappy	   change	   activities	   of	   this	   mother-­‐infant	   dyad	   these	  extreme	  wide-­‐range	  pitch	  contours	  were	  only	  observed	  at	  3	  months,	  while	  from	   4	   months	   on	   the	   mother’s	   “thank	   you”-­‐contours	   matched	   the	  conventional	  ones	  much	  more	  closely.	  Similar	  exaggerated	  wide-­‐range	  pitch	  contours	   were	   observed	   for	   other	   activities,	   other	   caregivers,	   even	   other	  languages	  (German),	  when	  acting	  with	  very	  young	  infants.	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Figure	  4.7	  :	  The	  mother	  shapes	  nappy	  change	  into	  an	  action	  arc.	  	  	  
Third	  –	  while	   first	  patterning	  the	  activity	   through	  actions,	  vocalisations	  and	  eye-­‐contact	  and	  second	  dynamically	  creating	  action	  arcs	  –	  she	  not	  only	  structures	  the	  activity	  so	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  parse	  and	  understand,	  but	  does	  it	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  lets	  the	  infant	  experience	  that	  the	  action	  concerns	  her,	  
that	  she	  is	  involved	  in	  a	  shared	  activity	  she	  can	  actively	  participate	  in,	  
addressing	   her	   verbally	   and	   by	   gaze	   and	   orchestrating	   various	  
modalities	   and	   strands	  of	   action	   to	  binding	  herself,	   infant	   and	  object	  
together	  in	  a	  shared	  stream	  of	  experience:	  (By)	   manually	   acting	   on	   the	   object,	   visually	   alternating	   sequentially	  between	  object	  and	  infant,	  and	  vocally	  marking	  and	  patterning	  both	  her	  own	  actions	  on	  infant	  and	  object,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  infant’s	  actions,	  the	  mother	  splits	  up	   various	   modalities	   and	   strands	   of	   action	   and	   distributes	   them	   among	  different	   targets,	   but	   combines	   them	   into	   one	   rhythmical	   stream	  of	   action	  which	   effectively	   binds	   together	   infant,	   object,	   and	   herself	   into	   what	   the	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infant	  can	  experience	  as	  one	  coherently	  patterned	  shared	  action	  process,	  so	  that	  the	  infant	  can	  experience	  herself	  as	  actively	  part	  of	  this	  shared	  process	  and	  -­‐	  recurring	  across	  nappy	  changes	  over	  time	  -­‐	  	  learn	  to	  understand	  being	  addressed	  and	  drawn	  into	  actions	  arcs	  at	  specific	  points	  as	   invitations	  and	  cues	  to	  participate	  with	  specific	  actions.	  	  Moving	  through	  action	  arcs	  together	  might	  contribute	  to	  the	  “sharedness”	  of	  the	  activity	  and	  hence	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	  infant	  as	  a	  participant	  by	  1)	  creating	   not	   only	   a	   similar	   experience	   of	   performing	   the	   action	   itself,	   but	  also	   similar	   arousal	   and	   affect	   in	   both	   partners	   in	   parallel	   through	   the	  dynamics	   of	   the	   action	   itself	   (changes	   in	   speed	   (action,	   sound),	   intensity	  (action	  impact	  and	  volume)	  and	  elevation	  (motion	  height	  and	  pitch),	  which	  is	  2)	  probably	  mutually	  reflected	  and	  reinforced	  by	  the	  partners.	  	  
4.3.2.2 The	  role	  and	  contributions	  of	  the	  infant	  But	   what	   about	   the	   infant?	   To	   what	   extent	   is	   she	   co-­‐ordinating	   her	  engagement	   with	   the	   mother	   and	   the	   object?	   Or	   should	   we	   interpret	   the	  infant’s	  actions,	  who	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  manually	  engage	  with	  the	  object,	  as	  engaging	  in	  a	  dyadic	  interaction	  with	  the	  mother,	  the	  minimal	  requirement	  of	  which	  would	  be	  reciprocity,	  that	  is	  each	  one	  responding	  to	  the	  actions	  of	  the	   other?	   To	   what	   extent	   is	   the	   infant	   actively	   participating	   in	   or	  contributing	  to	  the	  task?	  The	   infant	   is	   active	   from	   the	   beginning:	   she	   is	   (and	   throughout	   the	  activity	  primarily	  stays)	  visually	  engaged	  and	  in	  communicative	  connection	  with	   her	   mother,	   and	   (at	   the	   same	   time)	   performs	   unilateral	   kicking	  movements.	  As	  the	  kicking	  -­‐	  waited	  out	  and	  commented	  on	  by	  the	  mother	  as	  not	   being	   part	   of	   the	   nappy	   change	   repertoire	   -­‐	   recedes,	   the	   mother	  proceeds	   with	   the	   nappy	   change,	   and	   the	   infant	   -­‐	   in	   response	   to	   her	  mother’s	   cues	   -­‐	  moves	   into	   performing	   a	  whole-­‐body-­‐coordinated	   bottom	  lift.	   Rather	   than	   performing	   an	   action	   on	   the	   object	   directly	   by	   physical	  contact,	  manipulating	  or	  translating	  it	  (which	  she	  is	  not	  able	  to	  do	  yet),	  the	  infant	  is	  interacting	  with	  the	  object	  indirectly	  by	  changing	  her	  body	  posture	  (moving,	  translating,	  shifting	  parts	  of	  her	  body	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  ground	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  parts	  of	  her	  body,	  (requiring	  whole-­‐body-­‐coordination)	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in	   response	   to	   cues	   provided	   by	   her	   mother	   acting	   on	   the	   object	   thus	  anticipating	   and	   enabling	   the	   next	   action	   performed	   on	   the	   object	   by	   the	  mother,	  and	  thus	  she	  actively	  contributes	  to	  the	  task.	  	  
4.3.2.3 The	  role	  and	  contributions	  of	  the	  objects:	  nappies,	  mobiles,	  etc.	  The	  nappy	  is	  an	  object	  which	  the	  infant	  is	  primarily	  acted	  on	  with,	  whose	  presence	   -­‐	   as	   something	   “worn”,	   closely	   attached	   to	   the	   infant’s	   body	   -­‐	   is	  experienced	  in	  terms	  of	  weight,	  temperature,	  texture,	  movement	  constraint	  etc.,	   but	   which	   the	   infant	   –	   at	   least	   in	   the	   early	   months	   –	   is	   not	   actively	  engaging	   with.	   However	   -­‐	   together	   with	   a	   number	   of	   other	   characteristic	  objects	   (e.g.	   the	   supporting	   soft	   surface	   lied	   upon,	   as	   well	   as	   distally	  (visually	  and/or	  auditory)	  perceived	  ones	  -­‐	  like	  a	  mobile,	  lampion	  or	  radio,	  used	   to	  keep	   infants	  occupied	  and	  still	   -­‐	   the	  nappy	  contributes	   to	  defining	  the	  specific	  “nappy-­‐changing-­‐context”	  and	  -­‐	  as	  it	  is	  handled	  by	  the	  caregiver	  -­‐	  provides	  cues	  (visual,	  haptic	  and	  auditory)	  for	  the	  infant’s	  actions.	  	  So	   while	   not	   directly	   grasping	   or	   manipulating	   the	   nappy	   herself	   the	  infant	  nevertheless	  “interacts”	  with	  the	  object	  by	  appropriately	  responding	  to	   the	   cues	   arising	   from	   -­‐	   and	   adapting	   his/her	   actions	   (whole	   body	  movements)	   to	   -­‐	   the	   caregiver’s	   actions	   on	   the	   nappy.	   Thus	   the	   infant	   is	  changing	  the	  situation	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  allows	  the	  mother	  to	  perform	  the	  next	   object	  manipulation	   thereby	  propelling	   forward	   the	   interaction	   along	  the	  typical	  sequence	  of	  events.	  As	   infants	   got	   older	   the	   nappy	   change	   context	   got	   enriched	   by	   more	  objects	  coming	  into	  reach	  as	  graspable	  ones,	  first	  and	  foremost	  body	  parts	  of	  the	  infants	  themselves,	  knees,	  hands,	  a	  little	  later	  feet	  that	  can	  be	  clasped,	  as	  well	   as	   the	   caregiver’s	   hands,	   face	   and	   hair,	   objects	   at	   hand	   (e.g.	   a	   shiny	  crinkling	  packet	  of	  wiping	  clothes	  or	  a	  spare	  nappy	  to	  be	  manipulated,	  often	  handed	  to	  infants	  to	  entertain	  them	  and	  keep	  them	  occupied),	  or	  nappies	  or	  clothes	  themselves	  (the	  latter	  sometimes	  with	  disruptive	  effects,	  see	  above).	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Part	  III:	  	  Integration	  of	  empirical	  and	  theoretical	  parts	  	  This	   part	   of	   the	   thesis	   seeks	   to	   integrate	   results	   from	   conceptual	   and	  empricial	   analyses	   and	   reconceptualize	   the	   problems	   and	   challenges	  considered	  at	  the	  heart	  triadic	  interactions	  and	  their	  development	  in	  terms	  of	  co-­‐ordination.	  Chapters	  5	  and	  6	  explore	  through	  two	  examples	  how	  this	  approach	   can	   be	   applied	   longitunadinally,	   what	   it	   can	   contribute	   to	   our	  understanding	   of	   the	   development	   of	   “self”	   and	   “other”,	   and	   participation,	  respectively.	  
5 Structure	  and	  Openness	   in	   the	  Development	  of	  Self	   in	  
Infancy	  Nicole	  Rossmanith	  and	  Vasudevi	  Reddy18	  
Abstract: From early infancy, structures are created in engaging with the 
world. Increasingly complex forms of self, other, and world emerge with 
shared rhythms, affective patterns and interpersonal routines, cultural 
norms, concepts and symbols, and so on. These open up an increasing 
number of possibilities for new kinds and levels of engagement and for 
further developing a world together. However, these same structures, 
becoming more rigid, salient, and perhaps reified with time, may obscure or 
obstruct engagement and constrain development. We explore this 
paradoxical relationship between structure and openness to engagement 
and attempt to understand the process of formation and change of structures 
in self and its relations to the world. 	  This	  paper	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  what	  we	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and	  developing	  as	  a	  self.	  Thinking	  about	  self	  in	  preverbal	  infants	  challenges	  us.	   It	   immediately	   invites	   us	   to	   explore	   nonconceptual	   aspects	   of	   self	   (in	  infants	  as	  well	  as	  adults)	  and	  offers	  connections	  to	  Buddhist	  notions	  about	  relation,	  process,	  and	  the	  self	  as	  an	  illusion.	  We	  take	  a	  relational	  and	  process	  view	  of	  self	  and	  explore	  how	  aspects	  of	  self	  arise	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  world	  and	  to	  others	  in	  the	  process	  of	  living,	  interacting,	  and	  separating.	  In	  such	  a	  view,	  self	  appears	  at	  times	  more	  pronounced	  and	  solid,	  at	  times	  more	  fleeting	  and	  permeable,	  having	  different	  boundaries	  or	  facets	  in	  different	  relations	  while	  becoming	   increasingly	   differentiated	   over	   time.	  We	   focus	   in	   particular	   on	  the	  intriguing	  tension	  between	  structure	  and	  openness	  in	  development:	  how	  patterns	   and	   structures	   are	   created	   in	   engagement	   and	   foster	   further	  engagement	  and	  change,	  but	  through	  becoming	  entrenched	  may	  also	  get	  in	  the	  way	  of	  engagement	  and	  change.	  
5.1 Patterns,	  Structure,	  and	  Openness	  Patterns	   of	   action	   and	   interaction	   from	   everyday	   life	   may	   become	  established	   over	   time	   –	   even	   reified	   –	   as	   stable	   and	   relatively	   invariant	  ‘structures’.	  We	  use	  the	  notion	  of	  structure	  here	  because	  it	  vividly	  suggests	  a	  certain	  palpability:	  while	  patterns	   come	  and	  go,	   change,	   cancel	   each	  other	  out,	  and	  vanish,	  structure	  suggests	  something	  more	  stable.	  It	  carries	  with	  it	  a	   higher	  degree	  of	   persistence,	   of	   continued	   existence	  beyond	   the	  original	  interaction	   context,	   and	   a	   more	   perceivable	   effect	   on	   its	   surroundings:	  obstructing,	  guiding,	  and	  channelling	  processes.	  Importantly,	  the	  word	  also	  suggests	   that	   it	   can	  be	  an	   ‘object’	   in	   itself	   to	  be	  engaged	  with	  and	   inviting	  further	  exploration	  and	  change	  (see	  also	  Goodwin,	  2013;	  Shotter,	  1983).	  Structures	  might	  become	   incorporated	  as	  habits	  or	  skills	  or,	  on	  a	   larger	  scale,	   as	   personalities.	   They	  might	   become	   established	   as	   shared	   routines	  which	   are	  publicly	   accessible	   or	   exist	   as	   implicit	   norms	  only	  noticed	   from	  the	   reactions	   to	   breaking	   them.	   They	  might	   exist	   as	  material	   artefacts,	   as	  systems	   of	   patterns	   scaffolding	   each	   other	   such	   as	   concepts,	   language,	  beliefs,	  theories,	  and	  value	  systems,	  or	  as	  explicit	  conventionally	  established	  laws	   and	   institutions	   (Deacon,	   1998).	   Although	   differing	   widely	   in	   kind,	  complexity,	   and	   composition,	  what	   all	   these	   structures	  have	   in	   common	   is	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that	   they	   regulate	   the	  activities	  of	   everyday	   living	   (be	   it	   cooking,	  washing,	  working,	   playing,	   sleeping,	   having	   conversations,	   or	   moving	   in	   public	  spaces),	  they	  channel	  and	  constrain	  our	  acting	  and	  sense-­‐making	  in	  specific	  ways	  and,	  as	  we	  enact	  them,	  they	  also	  contribute	  to	  constituting	  our	  selves	  and	  our	  multiple	  identities.	  
5.2 Methodological	   Challenges	   and	   Theoretical	   Stances	   on	   Self	   in	  
Infancy	  Enquiring	  into	  the	   ‘self’	   in	  preverbal	  infants	  and	  trying	  to	  relate	  such	  an	  enquiry	   to	   other	   approaches	   studying	   the	   self	   poses	   a	   challenge:	   not	   only	  has	  it	  often	  been	  questioned	  whether	  preverbal	  infants	  even	  have	  a	  self,	  but,	  if	   they	  do,	  whether	  we	  can	  understand	  what	   it	  might	  be	   like.	  Their	   lack	  of	  speech	  can	  constrain	  psychologists’	  and	  phenomenologists’	  explorations	  of	  infancy.	  Theories	  about	  the	  emergence	  of	  self-­‐awareness	  or	  self–other	  awareness	  vary	  enormously	  in	  their	  emphases,	  their	  methods,	  and	  their	  conceptions	  of	  selfhood.	  Some	  theoretical	  positions	  in	  developmental	  psychology	  posit	  that	  objective	  self-­‐awareness	  is	  necessary	  for	  an	  awareness	  of	  self	  as	  an	  object	  to	  others,	  and	  that	  this	  arises	  late	  in	  infancy	  (between	  the	  middle	  and	  the	  end	  of	  the	  second	  year).	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  prior	  to	  this	  awareness	  neither	  is	  the	   experience	   of	   being	   experienced	   as	   a	   self	   by	   another	   person	   possible,	  nor	   are	   the	   self-­‐conscious	   emotions	   such	   as	   embarrassment,	   shame,	   and	  pride	   possible.	   This	   objective	   self-­‐awareness	   is	   argued	   to	   depend	   on	   the	  prior	  emergence	  of	  a	  concept	  of	  self	  or	   ‘idea	  of	  me’	  (Lewis,	  1995),	  which	  is	  tested	  by	  infants’	  recognition	  of	  the	  visual	  self	  in	  the	  mirror	  self-­‐recognition	  task	  (Gallup	   Jr,	  1968;	  see	  also	  Amsterdam,	  1972).	  However,	  other	   theories	  argue	   for	   a	  multifaceted	   and	   relational	   approach	   to	   selfhood,	   positing,	   for	  example,	  that	  an	  initial	  ecological	  self	  emerges	  in	  the	  foetus’s	  and	  neonate’s	  interactions	   with	   the	  material	   world,	   followed	   by	   an	   interpersonal	   self	   in	  face-­‐to-­‐face	   interactions	   with	   people	   in	   the	   first	   months,	   then	   followed	  eventually	  by	  a	  conceptual	  self	  and	  a	  verbal	  and	  moral	  self	  (Neisser,	  1993)	  after	   infancy.	   Others	   argue	   that	   the	   self	   is	   largely	   an	   affective	   entity	  developing	  within	   emotional	   exchanges	   from	   the	   earliest	   days	   of	   life	   (e.g.	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Trevarthen,	   1993).	   The	   emphasis	   on	   affect	   as	   core	   to	   the	   self	   has	   been	  pursued	   by	   many	   theorists	   such	   as	   Daniel	   Stern	   (1985),	   challenging	   the	  dominant	   conceptual	   emphasis	   and	   arguing	   that	   self-­‐conscious	   affectivity	  emerges	  prior	  to	  concepts	  and	  is	  either	  independent	  of	  a	  concept	  of	  self	  or	  actually	  enables	  its	  development	  (Izard	  &	  Hyson,	  1986;	  R.	  P.	  Hobson,	  1990;	  P.	  R.	  Hobson,	  Chidambi,	  Lee,	  &	  Meyer,	  2006;	  Reddy,	  2003).	  A	   focus	  on	   the	  linguistic	  aspects	  of	  self	  —	  the	  use	  of	  the	  personal	  pronouns	  ‘I’	  and	  ‘You’	  in	  particular,	   and	   the	   difficulty	   which	   toddlers	   have	   in	   reversing	   them	  appropriately	  —	  has	  also	  led	  to	  links	  with	  the	  particular	  difficulty	  children	  with	   autism	   have	   both	   in	   relation	   to	   pronoun	   reversal	   and	  with	   a	   typical	  sense	  of	  self	  and	  other	  (R.	  P.	  Hobson,	  1990;	  R.	  P.	  Hobson	  &	  Meyer,	  2005).	  
5.3 The	  Emergence	  of	  Self	  in	  Infant	  Engagement	  
Self–non-­‐self	  differentiation:	  Although	  writers	   such	  as	  Freud,	  Piaget,	   and	  James	   proposed	   a	   process	   of	   selective	   differentiation	   of	   self,	   they	   largely	  operated	   under	   the	   assumption	   that	   infants	   initially	   have	   a	   completely	  undifferentiated	  sense	  of	  self.	  This	  assumption	  has	  since	  been	  challenged	  by	  a	  considerable	  number	  of	  empirical	  studies.	  For	  example,	  when	  touched	  on	  their	   cheek	   infants	   turn	   their	   head	   towards	   the	   touch	   (a	   rooting	   response	  facilitating	  breastfeeding),	  but,	  if	  the	  touch	  happens	  to	  come	  from	  their	  own	  moving	   hand,	   they	   turn	   their	   heads	   significantly	   less	   (Rochat	   &	   Hespos,	  1997),	   thus	   showing	   a	   differentiation	   between	   sensory	   events	   which	   are	  related	  to	  their	  own	  actions	  (in	  this	  case	  involving	  a	  coinciding	  double	  touch	  on	   face	   and	   hand)	   and	   those	   which	   are	   not.	   Indeed	   infants	   are	   intensely	  interested	   in	   the	  consequences	  of	   their	  own	  actions	  and	  strive	   to	  maintain	  closed	  action-­‐perception	  loops.	  When	  4-­‐week-­‐old	  infants,	   lying	  in	  the	  dark,	  encounter	  a	  narrow	  beam	  of	  light	  which	  the	  researchers	  have	  shone	  either	  above	   their	  chest	  or	   their	   face,	   infants	  move	   their	  arms	   in	   the	  appropriate	  area	   to	   keep	   their	   hands	   in	   the	   light,	   exploring	   the	   relationship	   between	  moving	  their	  hand	  and	  seeing	  their	  hand	  move	  (van	  der	  Meer,	  1997).	  Recent	  studies	   suggest	   that	   even	   foetuses	   not	   only	   anticipate	   the	   sensory	  consequences	  of	   their	  actions,	  but	  selectively	  guide	  their	  actions	  according	  to	  their	  particular	  expectations.	  4D	  ultrasound	  recordings	  of	  the	  kinematics	  of	  arm	  movements	  of	  twin	  foetuses	  have	  demonstrated	  prospective	  control	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of	  action	  from	  the	  fourteenth	  week	  of	  gestation.	  Not	  only	  were	  self-­‐directed	  movements	   of	   foetuses	   towards	   their	   sensitive	   eye	   region	   slower	   with	  longer	  spans	  of	  deceleration	  compared	  to	  movements	  towards	  their	  mouth,	  movements	   directed	   towards	   their	   twin	   –	   but	   not	   movements	   directed	  towards	   the	  uterine	  wall	   –	   showed	  equally	   long	  or	   even	   longer	  periods	  of	  deceleration	  before	  contact	  (Castiello	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  These	  examples	  show	  that	  engaging	  in	  prospective	  control	  of	  actions	  as	  a	  living,	  acting	  being	  is	  closely	  connected	  with	  a	  basic	  distinction	  between	  self	  and	  non-­‐self:	   infants	  come	  to	  respond	  differently	  to	  events	  estimated	  to	  be	  related	   to	   self-­‐generated	   actions	   and	   events	   which	   are	   not,	   and	   infants	  encountering	   the	   different	   consequences	   of	   actions	   directed	   towards	   self,	  world,	   or	   other	   come	   to	   anticipate	   these	   consequences	   and	   guide	   their	  actions	   appropriately.	   Thus	   they	   effectively	   enact	   a	   pattern	   of	   systematic	  distinctions	   between	   self	   vs.	   world	   or	   other.	   This	   basic	   ‘self–world	  distinction’	   is	   only	   one	   among	   many	   instances	   of	   the	   already	   highly	  structured	   organization	   exhibited	   by	   newborns,	   including	   a	   range	   of	  discriminatory	  abilities,	  sensitivities	  and	  preferences,	  and	  action	  tendencies	  enabling	  them	  to	  selectively	  engage	  with	  the	  world.	  
Neonatal	  preferences:	  Human	  neonates	  (and	  the	  neonates	  of	  some	  other	  species	  too)	  can	  be,	  within	  minutes	  of	  birth	  if	  not	  too	  stressed	  by	  the	  process	  or	  by	  maternal	  drugs,	  absurdly	   interested	   in	   the	  world	  around	  them.	  They	  look	  intently	  at	  faces	  and	  objects	  positioned	  roughly	  a	  foot	  or	  so	  away	  from	  them	  where	   their	   vision	   is	  most	   clear,	   and	   they	   turn	   their	  heads	   to	   follow	  things	  –	  especially	  faces,	  but	  also	  other	  objects	  and	  voices	  –	  which	  have	  got	  their	   attention.	   Controlled	   studies	   have	   demonstrated	   a	   range	   of	   sensory	  preferences:	  for	  face-­‐like	  patterns	  (Johnson,	  Posner,	  &	  Rothbart,	  1991)	  and	  especially	   for	   faces	   with	   eyes	   directed	   towards	   them	   (Farroni,	   Csibra,	  Simion,	  &	  Johnson,	  2002),	   for	  sounds	   in	  the	  human	  voice	  range,	   for	   female	  over	   male	   voices,	   and	   for	   sweet	   (milky)	   odours	   over	   others.	   For	   objects	  positioned	  within	  what	   is	  called	  their	   ‘reach	  space’,	   they	  tend	  to	  swipe	  out	  with	  their	  arms,	  with	  evident	  tension	  and	  orientation	  towards	  the	  object	  in	  their	   entire	   body	   (see	   von	   Hofsten,	   1984).	   In	   this	   responsiveness	   the	  neonate	   both	   reveals	   embodied	   structures	  —	   including	   a	   basic	   self–world	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distinction	  and	  selective	   interest	   in	  specific	  aspects	  of	   the	  world	  —	  and	  an	  enormous	  openness	  for	  engagement.	  
5.4 Infant	  Selves	  in	  Early	  Dialogues	  As	   young	   infants	   –	  whose	   perception	   and	   action	   is	   organized	   in	   such	   a	  way	   that	   it	   enables	   them	   to	   engage	  with	   the	  world	   –	  meet	   an	   interaction	  partner	   –	   who	   is	   orientated	   towards	   the	   infant,	   eager	   to	   interact,	   and	  experienced	  in	  interaction	  –	  infants	  will,	  from	  the	  very	  beginning,	  enter	  into	  sustained	   interactions	  and	  communicative	  exchanges.	  Whether	   in	  neonatal	  imitation,	   a	   little	   later	   in	   protoconversations,	   in	   smiling	   and	   coyness,	   in	  nappy	   change	   routines,	   or	   in	   responses	   to	   being	   picked	   up,	   they	   are	  addressed,	  respond,	  and	  are	  responded	  to,	  each	  partner	  taking	  turns	  and	  co-­‐regulating	  the	  engagement.	  These	  young	  infants	  –	  though	  they	  might	  show	  interest	   in	   and	   direct	   actions	   towards	   objects	   –	   are	   not	   very	   capable	   of	  effectively	  acting	  on	  the	  object	  world.	  Yet,	  in	  a	  social	  context	  –	  when	  they	  are	  attended	  to,	  addressed,	  and	  invited	  to	  act	  –	  even	  small	  or	  ‘fuzzy’	  actions	  on	  the	  part	   of	   the	   infants	  may	  be	   (affectively)	   responded	   to	  by	   an	   (attentive)	  partner	   and	   hence	   may	   have	   a	   big	   effect	   on	   their	   experience	   and	   their	  action-­‐perception	   loops.	   And,	   since	   actions	   successful	   in	   creating	   an	  interchange	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   repeated,	   this	   in	   turn	   may	   spur	   a	   process	   of	  jointly	  creating	  action	  patterns	  and	  structures.	  Although	  neonatal	   imitation	   is	   still	   a	   hotly	   debated	   phenomenon,	  many	  studies	   have	   shown	   that	   neonates	   respond	   to	   gestures	   such	   as	   tongue	  protrusion	   and	   mouth	   opening	   by	   an	   adult	   model	   by	   doing	   the	   same	  themselves.	  Exploring	  this	  phenomenon	  with	  your	  own	  newborn	  can	  be	  an	  exciting	   thing	   to	   do	   (as	   tried	   by	   one	   of	   us).	   Sometimes,	   if	   the	   tongue	  protruding	   engagement	   continues	   over	   the	   first	   days,	   the	   exchange	   can	  become	  a	  startlingly	  clear	  ‘game’	  or	  strong	  interactive	  structure.	  Newborns	  not	   only	   respond	   to	   these	   actions	   by	   the	   adult,	   but	   may	   also	   try	   to	   elicit	  them,	  initiating	  a	  round	  of	  actions	  themselves	  if	  the	  adult	  does	  not	  do	  it	  first	  (Meltzoff	  &	  Moore,	  1994;	  Nagy	  &	  Molnar,	  2004).	  The	  openness	  to	  engaging	  can	  thus	  lead	  very	  quickly	  to	  a	  structure	  of	  engagement	  and	  a	  desire	  for	  re-­‐experiencing	  that	  structure	  even	  shortly	  after	  birth.	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Proto-­‐conversations:	  Early	  interactions	  not	  only	  involve	  infant	  responses	  with	   actions	   similar	   to	   their	   partner’s	   but	   also	   complementary	   actions.	   In	  proto-­‐conversations	   (from	  around	   the	   second	  month)	   infant	  and	  caregiver	  engage	   in	   preverbal	   dialogue	   through	   rhythmical	   vocalizations	   and	  movements	   co-­‐regulating	   affect	   and	   arousal	   and	   taking	   turns	   in	   co-­‐producing	   complex	   phrase	   patterns	   (Bateson,	   1975;	   Snow,	   1977;	  Trevarthen,	   1977).	  They	   also	   jointly	  perform	   (culturally	   shaped)	   everyday	  routines	   (sometimes	   involving	   objects),	   with	   the	   infants	   actively	  participating,	   anticipating,	   and	   responding	   to	   actions	   directed	   to	   them	  including	  being	  picked	  up,	  having	  their	  nappy	  changed,	  playing	  peek-­‐a-­‐boo,	  or	  book-­‐sharing.	  What	  all	  these	  interactions	  have	  in	  common	  is	  that	  infant	  and	  partner	  are	  intimately	   engaged	   in	   second-­‐person	   I–You	   relations,	   where	   the	   partners	  directly	  address	  each	  other	  with	  their	  bodies	  and	  multiple	  modalities	  (gaze,	  vocalization,	   bodily	   movement,	   sometimes	   touch)	   and	   co-­‐regulate	   each	  other’s	  affect,	  arousal,	  and	  actions.	  Violations	  of	  this	  contingent	  coupling	  of	  address	  and	  response	  –	  	  as	  shown	  by	  ‘stillface’	  experiments	  or	  delayed	  video	  communication	   (Tronick	   et	   al.,	   1978;	   Cohn	   &	   Tronick,	   1983)	   –	   can	   be	  enormously	   upsetting	   to	   2month-­‐old	   infants,	   leading	   to	   frowning,	   closed	  mouth	  expressions,	  and	  actual	  crying.	  In	  the	  typical	  flow	  of	  interaction	  with	  its	   cycles	   of	   engagement	   and	   disengagement,	   infants	   and	   caregivers	  repeatedly	   move	   through	   and	   shape	   affect-­‐imbued	   action	   arcs	   together:	  starting	   a	   specific	   action,	   building	   it	   up	   to	   a	   climax	   before	   bringing	   it	   to	  conclusion	  in	  resolution.	  
Self–other	  awareness:	  ‘I–you	  and	  we’	  experienced	  in	  jointly	  created	  actions:	  How	  do	  the	  participants	  in	  these	  kinds	  of	  engagements	  experience	  self	  and	  other?	   Jointly	   enacted	   actions	   are	   and	   feel	   different	   from	   solitary	   actions.	  They	  cannot	  be	  experienced	  alone.	  They	  define	  social	  context,	  allowing	  each	  participant	   to	   distinguish	   the	   ‘I’	   from	   the	   ‘I-­‐with-­‐Other’	   (see	   Stern,	   1985),	  with	   the	   participants	   experiencing	   ‘being	   addressed’	   and	   a	   mutuality	   of	  ensuing	   actions.	   Being	   addressed	   could	   affect	   the	   infant	   through	   a	   wide	  range	   of	   sensory	   modalities:	   most	   prominently,	   feeling	   someone’s	   gaze	  directed	   to	   oneself,	   accompanied	   perhaps	   by	   a	   pronounced	   facial	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expression,	   rhythmical	   dynamically	   modulated	   vocalizations	   and	  movements,	  being	  touched,	  acted	  upon,	  or	  being	  moved.	  All	  these	  modalities	  and	  strands	  of	  action	  may	  contribute	  to	  the	  more	  global	  processes	  of	  living	  through	   waves	   of	   arousal	   and	   affect	   and	   moving	   through	   action	   arcs	  together:	  whether	  going	  through	  a	  wide-­‐ranging	  fast-­‐paced	  dynamic	  flow	  of	  excitement	   and	   joy	   in	   a	   co-­‐enacted	   tickling	   game,	   or	   being	   soothed	   and	  calmed	   faster	   and	  more	   easily	  with	   than	  without	   the	  other,	   or	   conversely,	  experiencing	   potential	   friction	   when	   being	   pulled	   through	   the	  motions	   of	  being	   dressed.	   Daniel	   Stern,	   focusing	   mostly	   on	   affective	   co-­‐regulation,	  talked	   about	   ‘I-­‐with-­‐self-­‐regulating-­‐other’,	   and	   ‘I-­‐resonating-­‐with-­‐other’	   in	  this	   context	   (ibid.).	   Taking	   a	   closer	   look	   at	   these	   situations	   might	   even	  provide	  the	  resources	  for	  a	  more	  differentiated	  experience	  of	  self–	  other	  and	  the	  experience	  of	  a	  basic	  form	  of	  ‘we’.	  
‘Me’:	  being	  the	  object	  of	  attention	  and	  the	  target	  of	  action:	   In	   the	   infant’s	  awareness	  and	  understanding	  of	  being	  addressed,	  we	  may	  already	  see	   the	  roots	   of	   ‘me’-­‐awareness	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   feeling	   oneself	   as	   the	   target	   or	  ‘object’	   of	   another’s	   attention	   and	   actions.	   Infants	   demonstrate	   an	  awareness	  that	  ‘they	  are	  meant’	  as	  well	  as	  an	  understanding	  of	  ‘what	  to	  do’	  by	  responding	  appropriately	  when	  being	  addressed,	  whether	  through	  vocal	  turn-­‐taking	   in	   proto-­‐conversations	   or	   through	   anticipatory	   adjustments	   in	  everyday	   activities	   such	   as	   nappy	   changing	   or	   being	   picked	   up	   (Reddy,	  Markova,	   et	   al.,	   2013;	   Rossmanith,	   Reichelt,	   Costall,	   López,	   &	   Reddy,	   in	  preparation	   see	   chapter	   4;	   Rączaszek-­‐Leonardi	   et	   al.,	   2013).	   When	  approached	  by	  their	  mother	  with	  her	  arms	  outstretched,	  the	  majority	  of	  2-­‐	  and	   3-­‐month-­‐olds,	   in	   anticipation	   of	   being	   picked	   up,	   start	   adjusting	   their	  bodies	   in	  ways	   that	   enhance	  a	   smoother	  and	   less	   risky	  pick-­‐up,	   stretching	  out	  and	  stiffening	  their	  legs	  or	  tucking	  them	  up	  tight,	  raising	  or	  opening	  out	  their	   arms,	   turning	   their	   heads	   sideways	   or	   raising	   their	   chins,	   while	  intently	   watching	   the	   mother’s	   face	   (Reddy,	   Markova,	   et	   al.,	   2013).	   In	   a	  simple	   self-­‐directed	   context	   they	   have	   learned	   about	   others’	   actions	   and	  intentions,	   and	   have	   developed	   structured	   responses	   appropriate	   to	   the	  impending	   physical	   change.	   Perhaps	   the	   most	   striking	   manifestation	   of	   a	  ‘me’-­‐self-­‐awareness	  and	  indeed	  of	  affective	  self-­‐consciousness	  is	  when	  2–3-­‐
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month-­‐old	  infants	  who	  have	  just	  started	  to	  respond	  to	  others	  with	  a	  smile	  in	  social	   communication	   (Wolff,	   1987)	   suddenly	   turn	   away	   from	   their	  communication	   partner	   with	   a	   coy	   smile.	   Like	   adults,	   who,	   when	   given	   a	  sudden	  or	   intimate	  compliment,	  briefly	  avert	  gaze	  or	  raise	  a	  hand	  to	  cover	  their	   smiles,	   infants	   too,	  when	   greeted	   or	   addressed	   smilingly	   by	   another,	  may	  smile	   intensely	  and	  avert	  gaze	  or	  head	  briefly,	  and	  may	  even	  raise	  an	  arm	  in	  a	  whole	  body	  coy	  reaction,	  revealing	  not	  only	  pleasure	  at	  the	  other’s	  greeting	  but	  a	  sense	  of	  being	  overwhelmed	  by	   the	  emotion	  (Reddy,	  2000).	  Such	   emotional	   reactions	   to	   direct	   gaze	   not	   only	   reveal	   (more)	   complex	  emotional	   structures	   in	   the	   infant,	   but	   suggest	   an	   early	   form	   of	   self-­‐conscious	  affectivity	  arising	  within	  a	  relation	  in	  which	  they	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  other’s	  awareness	  of	  them.	  These	  cases	  suggest	  that	  a	  basic	  form	  of	  the	  ‘me’-­‐aspect	  of	  the	  self	  (Mead,	  1934)	   is	   constituted	   here	   by	   multiple	   aspects	   coming	   together:	   first,	  emphasizing	   the	   infant’s	   body,	   there	   is	   a	   change	   of	   affective	   experience	  involving	  both	  proprio-­‐	  and	  intero-­‐ception:	  the	  ‘me’	  as	  affected	  by	  the	  other;	  second,	  emphasizing	  the	  other,	  there	  is	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  other’s	  actions	  via	  exteroception:	   the	   ‘me’	   as	  being	   the	  object	  of	   the	  other’s	   attention	  and	  actions.	  However,	  in	  these	  infant–caregiver	  dialogues	  the	  ‘me’-­‐aspect	  of	  self	  does	  not	  become	  completely	  objectified,	  the	  interactions	  do	  not	  move	  to	  an	  extreme	  ‘I–	  it-­‐pole’	  of	  relating	  (Buber,	  1923/1983),	  where	  the	  ‘me’	  is	  merely	  the	  object	  of	  a	  relation	  but	  does	  not	  take	  part	  in	  regulating	  that	  relation,	  nor	  in	  shaping	  this	  ‘me’-­‐structure.19	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	   That	   might,	   for	   example,	   be	   the	   case	   when	   the	   actions	   of	   one	  interaction	   partner	   are	   strongly	   constrained	   and	   his	   or	   her	   autonomy	   is	  significantly	   reduced	   resulting	   in	   a	   merely	   instrumental	   way	   of	   relating	  (compare	  De	  Jaegher,	  Di	  Paolo,	  &	  Gallagher,	  2010).	  Or	  when	  the	  ‘me’	  –	  as	  in	  older	  children	  and	  adults	  –	  becomes	  (to	  some	  degree)	  identified	  with	  ideal	  entities	  or	  loci	  within	  a	  larger	  system	  of	  ideas	  (e.g.	  a	  ‘role’)	  and	  is	  implicitly	  or	  explicitly	  judged	  against	  a	  larger	  framework	  of	  values	  or	  norms.	  Not	  only	  is	  this	  ‘me’	  objectified	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  looked	  at	  from	  some	  distance	  as	  an	  ‘entity’	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  entities,	  but	  also	  partially	  eludes	  the	  reach	  of	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‘I’:	   enacting	   agency	   	   -­‐	   being	   effective	   and	   being	   responded	   to:	   On	   the	  contrary,	   the	   dialogical	   I–You	   relation	   which	   infant	   and	   caregiver	   are	  engaged	  in	  is	  characterized	  by	  an	  interplay	  of	  being	  affected	  by	  and	  affecting	  another,	  where	   the	   ‘me’	  who	   is	   looked	   at	   is	   also	   acknowledged	   as	   a	   ‘you’	  (rather	   than	  merely	   being	   treated	   as	   an	   object)	   by	   the	   other.	   Invited	   and	  given	  space	  to	  act	   from	  early	  on	  (in	  proto-­‐conversations	  as	  well	  as	   in	   joint	  object	   routines)	   the	   infant	   can	   experience	   the	   ‘self’	   as	   agency,	   as	   an	   ‘I’,	  enacting	  itself	   into	  the	  available	  action	  structures.	  Also,	  when	  putting	  forth	  its	   own	   actions,	   the	   ‘I’	   can	   experience	   itself	   as	   having	   an	   effect,	   being	  responded	   to	   and	   thus	   being	   acknowledged.	   This	   occurs	   particularly	  through	   affect-­‐	   and	   action-­‐attunement,	  where	   the	  mother	   responds	   to	   the	  infant’s	   action	  by	  mirroring	  back	  an	  aspect	  of	   the	  action	  with	   cross-­‐modal	  variation	  (e.g.	  verbally	  commenting	  on	  an	  infant’s	  manual	  action,	  matching	  it	  in	  rhythm	  and	   level	  of	  arousal)	   thus	  carving	  out	  and	  reifying	   the	  action	  as	  well	   as	   acknowledging	   the	   actor	   in	   its	   current	   state	   of	   arousal	   and	   affect	  (Stern,	  1985).	  
Structure,	   openness,	   and	   self	   in	   early	   dialogue:	   In	   these	   early	   infant–caregiver	  dialogues,	  processes	  of	  self–other	  awareness	  arise	  in	  an	  interplay	  between	  jointly	  enacted	  action	  structures	  and	  openness	  to	  the	  other	  and	  to	  change.	  Co-­‐created	  structures	  provide	  a	  framework	  for	  actions	  in	  which	  and	  as	  which	  a	  ‘self’	  may	  experience	  itself.	  With	  the	  help	  of	  the	  adult	  and	  through	  the	   ensuing	   interaction	   dynamics	   and	   repetitions,	   stable	   patterns	   emerge	  providing	  a	  medium	  for	  stable	  and	  consistent	  experience	  of	  ‘self’	  and	  ‘other’.	  Conversely,	   in	   being	   open	   to	   and	   acknowledging	   the	   other’s	   presence,	   in	  responding,	  and	  letting	  oneself	  be	  affected	  and	  led	  by	  the	  other,	  the	  equally	  vital	   role	   of	   openness	   becomes	   manifest	   for	   interactions	   to	   continue	   and	  ‘self’	  and	  ‘other’	  to	  be	  experienced.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  its	  owner	  as	  norms	  and	  value	  systems	  are	  typically	  created	  collectively	  and	  exceed	  the	  control	  of	  an	  individual.	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5.5 Selves	   Enacted	   through	   Joint	   Participation	   in	   Shared	   Cultural	  
Routines	  Infants	   and	   caregivers	   jointly	   practise	   cultural	   routines	   from	   early	   on,	  which	   are	   not	   entirely	   dyadic	   (solely	   revolving	   around	   the	   interaction	  partners	  and	  their	  affective	  exchanges)	  but	  where	  ‘something	  else’,	  a	   ‘third	  thing’,	   plays	   a	   major	   role:	   an	   object,	   a	   specific	   cultural	   form	   of	   action,	   a	  specific	   goal	   to	   be	   reached,	   or	   a	   societal	   rule	   to	   be	   followed.	   Here	   the	  participants	  –	  though	  staying	  in	  contact	  with	  each	  other	  –	  are	  typically	  not	  completely	   (but	   are	   at	   least	   partially)	   focused	   on	   each	   other,	   with	   some	  modalities	  decoupled	  and	  involved	  with	  something	  else;	  the	  dyad	  is	  opening	  up	  to	  the	  world.	  
Joint	   structuring	   of	   actions	   involving	   objects:	   From	   early	   on	   infants	  actively	  participate	   in	   joint	  cultural	  practices	   involving	  objects,	  e.g.	   looking	  at	  a	  book	  together	  from	  3	  months	  on,	  ‘helpfully’	  lifting	  their	  bottom	  in	  nappy	  changing	  routines	  at	  3	  months,	  or	  covering	  and	  recovering	  their	  face	  with	  a	  blanket	   in	   peek-­‐a-­‐boo	   even	   at	   4	   months.	   Caregivers	   facilitate	   this	  participation	   by	   structuring	   the	   interaction	   in	   various	  ways:	  multimodally	  carving	  out	  objects	   to	  engage	  with,	  e.g.	  dynamically	  pointing	  up	  and	  down	  the	   picture	   of	   an	   elephant	   while	   rhythmically	   voicing	   ‘e-­‐le-­‐phant’,	   or	  creating	   multimodal	   invariances	   which	   stand	   out	   as	   a	   ‘unit’	   from	   a	  background	   and	   thus	   parse	   the	   scene.	   And	   they	   rhythmically	   pattern	  actions,	  ostensively	  shaping	  them	  into	  exciting	  action	  arcs	  with	  a	  beginning,	  build-­‐up,	   climax,	   and	   resolution.	   In	   this	  way	   they	   not	   only	   co-­‐regulate	   the	  infant’s	  arousal,	  for	  example	  by	  placing	  relevant	  action	  events	  or	  objects	  at	  prominent	   points	   in	   the	   arc	   and	  marking	   them	   verbally,	   but	   also	   create	   a	  practical	   and	   intuitive	   action	   framework	   helping	   the	   infant	   to	   orient	   and	  participate.	  Repeatedly	  moving	  together	  through	  these	  affect-­‐imbued	  action	  arcs	   provides	   the	   opportunity	   for	   infants	   to	   experience	   themselves	   acting	  into	   a	   space	   opened	   up	   by	   the	   caregiver,	   and,	   in	   relation	   with	   the	   other,	  enacting	  an	  activity	  which	  is	  bigger	  than	  that	  which	  could	  be	  accomplished	  alone	  (Rossmanith	  et	  al.,	  in	  preparation).	  At	  3–4	  months	  infants	  are	  mostly	  alert	  and	  responsive,	  and	  —	  with	  their	  attention	  drawn	  to	  relevant	  objects	  and	  events	  by	  the	  local	  cues	  provided	  by	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the	   caregiver	  —	   follow	   their	   caregiver’s	   lead	   through	   the	   activity,	   even	   if	  with	   slight	   delay.	   In	   some	   frequently	   practised	   and	   clearly	   structured	  routines,	  infants	  already	  show	  great	  fluency	  at	  3	  or	  4	  months.	  Over	  the	  next	  months,	  interaction	  with	  their	  caregivers	  becomes	  more	  finely	  attuned	  and	  subtle,	  some	  of	  the	  routines	  are	  ritualized:	  that	   is,	  a	  partially	  performed	  or	  subtly	   indicated	  action	  becomes	  sufficient	  for	  the	  well-­‐practised	  partner	  to	  respond	  appropriately.	   In	   the	  nappy	   change	   interactions	  of	   a	  well	   attuned	  mother–	   infant	   dyad	   at	   6	   months,	   for	   example,	   a	   ‘Ta!’	   (i.e.	   thank	   you)	  —	  which	  in	  previous	  months	  was	  used	  by	  the	  mother	  to	  thank	  the	  infant	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  interaction	  —	  now	  could	  be	  deliberately	  used	  at	  any	  time	  as	  a	  cue	  to	  prompt	  the	  infant	  to	  lift	  her	  bottom.	  
Directives	   and	   societal	   rules	   —	   being	   drawn	   into	   explicit	   cultural	  
structures:	   From	   around	   6	   or	   7	   months	   of	   age	   parents	   (differently	   in	  different	   societies)	   increasingly	   use	   directives	   as	   they	   draw	   infants	   into	  cultural	   practices	   and	  actions,	   by	   setting	  up	  playful	   as	  well	   as	   serious	   and	  repeated	  routines	  of	  engagement	  around	  them.	  They	  issue	  many	  directives	  to	   infants	   everyday	  —	   to	   look	   at	   something,	   to	   wave,	   to	   clap,	   to	   come	   to	  them,	  to	  go	  to	  someone,	  to	  fold	  their	  hands	  in	  prayer	  before	  an	  idol,	  to	  roll	  a	  ball	  to	  them,	  to	  give,	  to	  take,	  to	  not	  spit,	  to	  wait,	  to	  stand,	  to	  sit,	  and	  so	  on	  —	  before	   infants	   can	   quite	   understand	   the	   words	   involved,	   and	   they	   repeat	  these	   directives,	   turning	   them	   into	   routines.	   Tentative	   infant	   compliance	  with	   these	   routines	   enables	   the	   construction	  of	   structures	   at	   higher	   levels	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  participation	  itself	  (which	  is	  a	  different	  level	  of	  structure,	  a	  metastructural	  practice)	  (Reddy,	  Liebal,	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  
Self–other	  awareness	  between	  structure	  and	  openness	  in	  cultural	  routines:	  As	  a	  first	  repertoire	  of	  stable	  shared	  action	  routines	  is	  established,	  the	  infant	  may	   experience	   itself	   in	   and	   across	   specific	   routines	   as	   a	   co-­‐participant	  performing	  specific	  actions	  with	  another	  person’s	  specific	  action,	  the	  whole	  embedded	  within	   a	   larger	   framework.	   The	   I-­‐aspect	  might	   now	   arise	  more	  pronounced	   and	   determined	   within	   these	   routines	   and	   infants	   start	  initiating	  social	  actions	  on	  objects.	  The	  me-­‐aspect	  might	  be	  felt	  more	  defined	  as	   being	   the	   person	   of	   whom	   specific	   actions	   in	   specific	   contexts	   are	  expected.	  The	  possibilities	  for	  and	  instances	  of	  openness	  to	  engage	  become	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more	  differentiated	  as	  well	  as	  more	  specific:	  one	  partner	  can	  invite	  and	  wait	  for	   the	  other	   to	  participate	  with	  specific	  actions	  at	  a	  specific	  point	   in	   time.	  The	  other	  can	  be	  willing	  and	  choose	  to	  participate	  at	  a	  specific	  time	  with	  a	  specific	  action	  —	  or	  not.	  These	  kinds	  of	   interactions	  and	   the	  ways	   in	  which	   self	   and	  other	  might	  arise	  in	  them	  might	  indeed	  form	  a	  bridge	  between	  self–other	  awareness	  in	  dyadic	  interactions	  (with	  its	  potential	  I–You	  and	  We	  seeds),	  and	  full-­‐blown	  triadic	  interactions	  (with	  more	  ‘objectified’	  forms	  of	  self,	  where	  the	  self	  can	  see	   itself	  as	   seen	  by	  others,	  as	  an	   ‘entity’	   in	   relation	   to	  other	   ‘entities’).	  As	  interactions	  get	  known	  and	  established	  as	  stable	  routines	  —	  hence	  ‘reified’	  —	  the	  ‘I–You	  and	  We’	  from	  dyadic	  interactions	  find	  themselves	  not	  only	  in	  relation	  to	  each	  other	  but	   in	  relation	  to	   ‘something	  else’	  (to	  specific	  bigger	  action	  structures),	  which	  over	   time	  get	  elaborated	   into	  a	  highly	  structured	  shared	  action	  space,	  within	  which	  both	  participants	  can	  direct	  one	  another’s	  attention	  and	  actions.	  
5.6 Jointly	  Modifying	  and	  Negotiating	  Shared	  Routines	  
Social	   games:	   Once	   an	   interaction	   pattern	   is	   established	   it	   can	   also	   be	  modified,	  re-­‐combined,	  and	  played	  with,	  as	   is	  evident	   in	  social	  games	  from	  3–4	   months.	   In	   one	   example	   at	   7	   months,	   a	   playing	   mother–	   infant	   pair	  quickly	   move	   from	   ‘blowing-­‐belly-­‐button’	   to	   ‘peek-­‐a-­‐boo’	   to	   ‘smelly	   feet’	  with	  the	  mother	  briefly	  pausing	  at	  suspense	  and	  decision	  points	  from	  where	  she	   could	  move	   into	   a	   different	   game	   depending	   on	   the	   infant’s	   response	  (Rossmanith	  et	  al.,	  in	  preparation).	  
Clowning:	  Also	   from	  this	  age,	  around	  the	  middle	  of	   the	   first	  year	   infants	  play	  a	  much	  more	  obvious	  role	  in	  setting	  up	  new	  interactive	  structures	  and	  violating	   structures	   that	   they	   have	   just	  mastered	   or	   accepted.	   Sensitive	   to	  others’	  emotional	  reactions	  to	  things,	  from	  around	  7	  months	  infants	  start	  to	  play	  with	   these	   reactions	  —	  often	  performing	  extreme	  and	  absurd	  actions	  —	   in	   order	   to	   evoke	   and	   reelicit	   laughter	   and	   amusement	   in	   others.	   Such	  clowning	  might	  involve	  shaking	  the	  head	  repeatedly,	  making	  funny	  sounds,	  odd	   facial	   expressions,	  doing	  absurd	   things	  with	  objects,	  or	   fake	  coughing.	  The	  actions	  themselves	  rely	  clearly	  on	  the	  relation	  with	  the	  other	  —	  if	  they	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amuse	   they	   survive,	   if	   they	   receive	   no	   response	   they	   die	   out.	   These	  relational	  structures	  confirm	  not	  only	  the	  infant	  in	  a	  new	  role	  as	  clown,	  but	  also	  the	  relationship	  itself	  as	  one	  constituted	  by	  amusement.	  
Teasing:	  From	  around	  9	  months	  of	  age	  infants	  also	  start	  to	  provoke.	  They	  playfully	  violate	  established	  understandings	  and	  gestures	  or	  newly	  learned	  ‘rules’.	   Having	   just	   learned	   to	   give	   objects	   in	   response	   to	   open	   palm	  requests,	   they	   offer	   and	   cheekily	   withdraw	   the	   object	   before	   it	   is	   taken.	  Having	  grasped	  that	  the	  plug	  socket	   is	  a	  no-­‐go	  area,	   they	  reach	  out	  a	  hand	  and	   almost	   touch	   it,	   watching	   for	   reactions.	   They	   tease	   others	   by	  provocatively	  playing	  with	  newly	  established	  structures.	   In	  teasing,	   infants	  use	   structure	   (as	   do	   adults	   in	   even	   more	   complex	   ways)	   to	   take	   the	  relationship	   further;	   the	   violations	   cause	   surprise,	   alarm,	   amusement,	   and	  then	  a	  denouement,	  a	  coming	  together	  into	  a	  deeper	  level	  of	  resolution	  and	  intimacy.	  A	  new	  openness	  has	  been	  enabled	  between	  self	  and	  other	  (Reddy,	  1991;	  Reddy	  &	  Mireault,	  2015).	  
Self–other	   awareness	   between	   structure	   and	   openness:	   Here	   against	   the	  background	  of	  already	  established	  shared	  action	  structures,	  ‘self’	  and	  ‘other’	  can	   be	   felt	   acutely	   in	   varying,	   exaggerating,	   violating	   these	   structures.	  Deviating	   and	   breaking	   out	   of	   established	   patterns	   as	   well	   as	   profoundly	  affecting	   the	   other	   as	   a	   consequence	   may	   contribute	   to	   a	   new	   form	   of	  experiencing	  agency	  and	  ‘self’	  as	  the	  author	  of	  specific,	  original	  actions	  (the	  ‘I’-­‐aspect	   of	   self).	   At	   the	   same	   time	  being	   seen	  performing	   specific	   actions	  and	  being	  acknowledged	  and	  admired	   for	  particular	  ones	  affirms	   the	   ‘me’-­‐aspect	  of	   self.	  On	   the	   receiving	  end	  of	   such	  variations	   in	  action	   structures,	  when	  one’s	  expectations	  are	  playfully	  violated,	  the	  sense	  of	  ‘me’	  may	  deepen	  as	   one	   feels	   oneself	   addressed	   with	   intention,	   with	   a	   deliberate	   effort	   to	  affect	  ‘me’	  building	  on	  a	  history	  of	  such	  engagements.	  Thus,	  what	  is	  implicit	  in	   these	   playful	   variations	   is	   ‘I	   affect	   you	   in	   a	   way	   in	   which	   I	   am	  acknowledging	  our	  relationship’.	  These	   variations	   may	   contribute	   to	   further	   develop	   a	   sense	   of	   ‘we-­‐awareness’	   not	   only	   by	   adding	   to	   a	   unique	   shared	   history	   but	   also	   by	  inviting	  the	  participants	  —	  rather	  than	  to	  merely	  know	  and	  follow	  the	  steps	  of	   the	  routine	  —	  to	  pay	  close	  attention	  to	  the	  other’s	  (unexpected)	  actions	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and	   to	   diligently	   coordinate	   one’s	   own	   actions	  with	   them,	   thus	   enhancing	  mutual	   attunement	   and	   fostering	   cooperation.	   Across	   the	   repertoire	   of	  established	   action	   routines	   and	   their	   respective	   variations,	   a	   particular	  interaction	   structure	   comes	   to	   stand	   out	   even	   clearer	   and	   becomes	  increasingly	   graspable	   as	   an	   ‘object’	   which	   can	   be	   jointly	   related	   to,	  modified,	  and	  negotiated	  about.	  
5.7 Opening	  a	  Conversation	  with	  Spiritual	  Traditions	  So	  what	  can	  we	  learn	  from	  infants’	  engagements	  in	  their	  everyday	  worlds	  about	  the	  self?	  And	  how	  might	  this	  connect	  to	  Buddhist	  and	  other	  spiritual	  traditions?	  We	  identify	  here	  several	  points	  of	  linkage	  which	  may	  serve	  as	  the	  start	  of	  a	  conversation	  between	  these	  different	  traditions.	  First,	   very	   young	   infants	   do	   not	   have	   a	   concept	   of	   self	   and	   lack	   the	  linguistic	  and	  narrative	  wherewithal	  which	  for	  adults	   is	  a	  major	  source	  for	  maintaining	   a	   self	   as	   a	   reified,	   separate,	   and	   enduring	   entity.	   In	   Buddhist	  dharma,	  this	  reified	  self	  is	  pointed	  out	  as	  illusory	  and	  a	  source	  of	  suffering.	  However,	   contrary	   to	   earlier	   accounts	   about	   the	   lack	   of	   self–non-­‐self	  differentiation	   at	   birth,	   numerous	   studies	   now	   suggest	   that	   even	   before	  birth,	   and	   certainly	   immediately	   after	   birth,	   infants	   distinguish	   between	  consequences	  of	  actions	  generated	  by	  self	  and	  other,	  respectively,	  and	  guide	  their	  actions	  appropriately	  with	  respect	   to	  different	  targets	  (self,	  world,	  or	  other).	  This	   set	  of	  basic	   self–non-­‐self	  distinctions	  does	  not	  map	  onto	  adult	  conceptual	  and	  linguistic	  distinctions	  between	  self,	  other,	  and	  world.	  Rather,	  it	   can	  be	   seen	  as	  a	  basic	  pattern	  enacted	  by	   living	  beings,	   in	   the	   course	  of	  striving	   to	   sustain	   themselves	  –	  approaching	  pleasure	  and	  avoiding	  pain	  –	  relating	  to	  and	  participating	  in	  a	  world	  of	  things	  and	  others.	  This	  resonates	  with	  the	  Buddhist	  notion	  of	  co-­‐dependent	  arising	  or	  origination	  of	  self	  and	  world	  (compare	  Varela	  et	  al.,	  1991),	  and	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  the	  beginning	  of	   a	   gradual	   process	   of	   self-­‐reification,	   coming	   in	   different	   forms	   and	  degrees.	  Second,	   the	   interpersonal	   self	   emerges	   within	   interpersonal	  engagements,	   with	   each	   participant	   feeling	   the	   other	   through	   their	   own	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actions	   and	   emotional	   responses.	   In	   an	   infant’s	   coy	   smile	   to	   an	   adult	  greeting,	   for	   example,	   the	   expression	   of	   self–other	   awareness	   involves	   a	  dynamic	  changing	  shape	  (intensifying,	   turning	  away,	  returning),	  regulating	  the	   interaction	   and	   leaving	   both	   partners	   affected	   and	   changed.	   In	   such	  delicate	   encounters	   both	   ‘self’	   and	   ‘other’	   are	   structures,	   at	   times	   more	  pronounced	  and	  solid,	  at	  times	  more	  fleeting	  and	  permeable,	  with	  different	  boundaries	  or	  facets	  in	  different	  relations.	  This	  corresponds	  to	  images	  of	  the	  self	   as	   an	   ‘eddy	   in	   the	   social	   stream’	   (Mead,	   1934),	   drawing	   from	   James’s	  ‘stream	  of	  consciousness’	  (James,	  1892),	  which	  are	  strikingly	  similar	  to	  the	  Buddhist	   simile	   of	   the	   self	   as	   a	   wave	   in	   the	   ocean;	   each	   highlights	   the	  dynamic,	  fleeting	  character	  of	  a	  self	  embodied	  in	  a	  larger	  action	  or	  process	  that	  cannot	  be	  understood	  as	  an	  isolated	  entity.	  Third,	   we	   suggest	   that	   the	   self	   develops	   within	   and	   through	   jointly	  created	  structures:	  First,	   in	   very	   early	   dyadic	   interactions,	   interaction	   histories	   provide	  patterns	  or	  structures	  which	  serve	  as	  a	  medium	  within	  which	  engagements	  can	   occur	   and	   self	   and	   other	   can	   be	   consistently	   experienced	   in	   direct	  contact.	  The	  powerful	  effects	  of	  patterns	  of	  contingent	  relating	  between	  self	  and	  other	  can	  be	  seen	  both	  in	  infant	  coy	  smiles	  to	  greetings	  and	  in	  distress	  to	  its	  violation.	  This	  is	  shown	  in	  the	  still-­‐face	  studies	  (Cohn	  &	  Tronick,	  1983)	  where	  infant	  distress	  is	  very	  evident	  (and	  can	  affect	  the	  partner	  too),	  and	  in	  the	  studies	  of	   infants	  of	  depressed	  mothers	  (T.	  Field	  et	  al.,	  1988)	  who	  had	  adapted	   to	   the	   different	   response	   patterns	   of	   their	   mothers	   and	  subsequently	  affected	  new	  interaction	  partners	  with	  their	  adaptation.	  Second,	   structures	   can	   also	   act	   as	   containers	  within	  which	   infants	   can	  experience	   agency	   in	   particular	   contexts.	   For	   example,	   jointly	   performed	  routines	   such	   as	   nappy	   changing	   involve	   a	   series	   of	   steps	  —	   lying	   on	   the	  changing	  mat,	  feeling	  the	  nappy	  open,	  hearing	  the	  mother	  speak,	  feeling	  the	  nappy	   removed,	   etc.,	   with	   the	   infant	   herself	   performing	   some	   actions	   —	  such	  as	  lifting	  the	  bottom	  at	  the	  right	  moment.	  The	  infant’s	  participation	  is	  enabled	   by	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   routine.	   These	   repeated	   experiences,	  allowing	  action	  parsing	  and	  recognition	  of	  specific	  contingencies,	  may	   lead	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to	   an	   ‘objectified’	   understanding	   of	   self	   as	   a	   co-­‐participant	   in	   complex	  actions.	  With	  the	  establishment	  of	  these	  kinds	  of	  interactions,	  the	  basic	  processes	  that	  continually	  shape	  us	  as	   ‘personal	   and	   cultural	   selves’	  are	  already	  in	  place	  in	  the	  first	  year	  of	  life.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  we	  are	  what	  we	  do,	  our	  skills,	  habits,	   daily	   routines,	   interaction	   dynamics	   all	   constitute	   a	   ‘procedural	  
self’,	   a	   circumscribed	   space	   of	   actions	   and	   lived	   experience.	   Interpersonal	  and	   cultural	   interactions,	   customs	   and	   (implicit)	   norms	   sanction	   —	  encourage	   or	   impede	  —	   our	   actions,	   defining	   and	   delimiting	   this	   self-­‐in-­‐
social-­‐context.	  Third,	   structures	   can	   also	   be	   the	   stable	   background	   against	   which	  
infants	   can	   experience	   themselves	   in	   new	   ways.	   They	   can	   now	   be	  
‘owners’	  of	  actions	  as	  in	  ‘clowning’	  or	  ‘showing-­‐off’,	  showing	  pride	  at	  being	  acknowledged	  and	  recognized	  by	  others’	  responses	  to	  the	  actions,	  or	  shame	  at	   the	   absence	   of	   such	   recognition.	   They	   can	   be	   ‘authors’	   of	   new	   actions,	  varying	   and	  deliberately	  deviating	   from	  established	   routines	   as	   in	   teasing.	  These	  interactions	  may	  contribute	  to	  a	  solidifying	  sense	  of	  self	  extended	  
over	   longer	   periods	   of	   time	   which	   owns	   and	   	   performs	   a	   multitude	   of	  actions.	  Fourth,	  as	  structures	  (joint	  action	  patterns)	  become	  increasingly	  fluent	  and	   familiar	   they	  also	  become	   increasingly	   reified	   and	   thus	  available	   as	  
objects	   which	   can	   be	   jointly	   attended	   to,	   modified,	   or	   negotiated.	   Early	  forms	   of	   such	   reification	   are	   already	   evident	   at	   around	   6	   months,	   e.g.	   in	  book	  sharing,	  when	   infants	  and	  caregiver	  engage	   in	  affective	  exchanges	  as	  ‘comments’	  on	  the	  ongoing	  activity.	  Joint	  relating	  to	  such	  action	  routines	  as	  ‘objects’	   becomes	   more	   frequent	   over	   the	   next	   months	   as	   caregivers	   and	  infants	  jointly	  modify	  their	  games,	  particularly	  clear	  from	  around	  9	  months	  in	  deliberate	  teasing.	  This	  way	  of	   jointly	   relating	   to	  previously	   established	   action	  patterns	   as	  objects	  of	  shared	  concern	  could	  be	  argued	  to	  be	  a	  basic	  form	  of	  reflection,	  a	  
reflective	   movement	   directing	   attention	   (and	   actions)	   to	   the	   jointly	  
created	  action.	  By	  enhancing	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  action	  structure	  as	  well	   as	   the	   role	  of	   the	   self,	   this	  may	  over	   time	   lead	   to	  a	  more	   objectified	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sense	  of	  self,	  as	  being	  seen	  from	  a	  distance,	  from	  another’s	  perspective,	  
as	  one	  ‘entity’	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  ‘entities’.	  Re-­‐flection	  or	  reflexivity	  is	  perhaps	  the	  most	  characteristic,	  or	  at	  least	  the	  most	   frequently	   discussed,	   aspect	   of	   ‘self’.	   Mead	   defined	   the	   self	   as	   ‘that	  
which	   can	   be	   an	   object	   to	   itself’	   (Mead,	   1934,	   p.	   140).	   Adyashanti	  describes	  the	  self	  as	  a	  reflective	  movement	  of	   consciousness	   looking	  at	  
its	  own	  experiences	  (which	  e.g.	  might	  mean	  looking	  at	  the	  ‘ego’	  which	  itself	  is	  founded	  in	  reflection)	  (Adyashanti,	  this	  issue).	  The	  reflexive	  aspect	  of	  self-­‐awareness	   may	   have	   different	   forms	   and	   levels	   (Almaas,	   this	   issue).	  Inherent	  or	  pre-­‐reflective	  reflexivity	  may	  be	  distinguished	  from	  explicit	  re-­‐flection	  and	  finally	  the	  movement	  of	  reflection	  alone.	  Inherent	  reflexivity	  of	  consciousness	   is	   the	   awareness	   of	   being	   aware	   which	   accompanies	   every	  experience.	   Explicit	   reflection	   may	   be	   seen	   as	   the	   reflection	   that	   occurs	  through	  rational	  thought	  and	  language,	  and	  can	  be	  placed	  as	  occurring	  in	  the	  middle	  of	   the	   second	  year	  with	   the	  emergence	  of	   a	   concept	  of	   self	   (Lewis,	  1995).	   Finally,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   spiritual	   practice,	   when	   awareness	   is	  deliberately	   directed	   onto	   itself,	   the	   self	   may	   be	   experienced	   as	   this	  reflecting	  awareness	  witnessing	  experiences	  as	  they	  arise.	  Adyashanti	  (this	  issue)	   describes	   a	   point	   where	   there	   is	   the	   movement	   of	   reflection	   but	  nothing	   to	   reflect	   upon,	   no	   conflict,	   distinction,	   division	   (and	   hence	  experience)	  so	  all	  that	  remains	  is	  awareness	  aware	  of	  itself	  and	  the	  process	  of	  reflection	  and	  hence	  the	  self	  ceases	  altogether.	  Returning	  to	  self-­‐development	  in	  infancy,	  even	  the	  basic	  feedback	  loops	  
of	   prospective	   actions	   could	   already	  be	   conceived	  of	   as	   a	  basic	   form	   of	  
‘re-­‐flection’.	  In	  early	  dialogues,	  specific	  actions	  are	  reflected	  back	  to	  the	  
infant	   by	   the	   adult	   via	   affect	   attunement.	  When	   infants	   and	   caregivers	  finally	   start	   jointly	   relating	   to	   –	   that	   is	   reflecting	   on	   –	   shared	   actions,	  this	   may	   contribute	   to	   more	   complex	   ways	   of	   creating	   new	   structures	  together,	   including	   imitation	   and	   symbolic	   activities	   such	   as	   labelling.	   As	  infants	   over	   the	   next	   years	   come	   to	   participate	   and	   live	   in	   increasingly	  complex	   networks	   of	   structure	   and	   structure	   creation,	   they	   increasingly	  treat	  objects	  in	  conventional	  ways	  –	  but	  also	  engage	  in	  symbol	  play	  –	  and	  at	  around	  3	  years	  they	  participate	  in	  setting	  up	  explicit	  rules,	  and	  stick	  to	  and	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feel	   bound	   by	   established	   rules	   (Rakoczy	   et	   al.,	   2008).	   All	   this	   again	   goes	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  (ever)	  more	  complex	  ways	  of	  shaping	  and	  negotiating	  the	  self,	  in	  particular	  the	  ‘conceptual’	  and	   ‘narrative’	  self	  (Gallagher	  &	  Hutto,	  2008).	   Thus,	   for	   developmental	   psychology,	   the	   development	   of	   a	  conceptual	   self	   is	   seen	   as	   an	   important	   milestone	   on	   the	   road	   to	   a	   fully	  functioning	  self	  –	  while	  Buddhist	  dharma	  cautions	  us	  about	  self-­‐reification	  as	   an	   illusion	   and	   source	   of	   suffering.	   Exploring	   how	   these	   perspectives	  relate,	   we	   enquire	   into	   how	   the	   self	   and	   indeed	   jointly	   created	   action	  structures	   both	   inherently	   enhance	   engagement	   as	   well	   as	   lead	   to	  separation.	  
5.8 Structures	  Enhancing	  and	  Hindering	  Engagement	  Interaction	   patterns	   established	   as	   shared	   action	   routines	   provide	  opportunities	   for	   further	   engagement	   on	   a	   cultural	   as	   well	   as	   an	  interpersonal	   level.	   At	   the	   interpersonal	   level	   the	   establishment	   of	   shared	  action	   patterns	   by	   repeated	   performance	   of	   the	   same	   actions	   between	  interaction	   partners	   allows	   the	   patterns	   to	   become	   familiar	   and	   hence	  predictable.	  This	  not	  only	  fosters	  a	  feeling	  of	  security	  but	  also	  allows	  more	  active,	   meaningful	   (and	   anticipatory)	   participation	   by	   the	   infant,	   thus	  serving	  as	  a	  ‘container’	  for	  feeling	  self	  and	  other	  in	  engagement,	  joined	  in	  a	  larger	   activity.	   As	   the	   component	   actions	   become	   established	   and	   reified,	  they	   can	   serve	   as	   ‘objects’	   for	   further	   reference,	   modification,	   and	  expansion,	   that	   is,	   further	   engagement.	   Thus,	   structure	   seems	   to	   open	   the	  door	   for	   the	   emergence	   of	   further	   structures	   to	   engage	   with.	   In	   the	  interpersonal	  situation,	  these	  emerging	  and	  enlarging	  structures	  contribute	  to	   a	   unique	   history	   of	   the	   particular	   relationship,	   increasing	   intimacy	   and	  what	  might	  be	  called	  a	   ‘we-­‐ness’	  between	   them.	  The	   joint	   shaping	  of	  what	  might	  be	  seen	  as	   ‘an	  action	   landscape’	   inevitably	  excludes	  other	  paths	  and	  channels,	  with	  other	  potentials	  remaining	  unrealized.	  But	  this	  selectivity	  too	  maintains	  the	  structures	  and	  identity	  of	  the	  relationship.	  These	   consequences	   also	   hold	   at	   the	   cultural	   level.	   Neither	   caregivers	  nor	   infants	   are	   isolated	   agents,	   but	   are	   always	   participants	   in	   and	   co-­‐
creators	  of	  sociocultural	  niches.	  As	  illustrated	  in	  previous	  sections,	  infants	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participate	   in	   cultural	   practices	   from	   early	   on	   and	   are	   trained	   in	   the	  
implicit	   norms	   and	   conventions	   as	   well	   as	   the	  more	   explicit	   societal	  
rules	  of	   the	  respective	  social	  group.	  Practices	  and	  conventions	  range	   from	  differentiation	  of	  language-­‐specific	  phonemes	  and	  prosody	  (Werker	  &	  Tees,	  1984),	   as	   well	   as	   culture-­‐specific	   ways	   of	   moving,	   sitting,	   and	   walking	  (Adolph,	   Karasik,	   &	   Tamis-­‐LeMonda,	   2010;	   Mauss,	   1973),	   to	   cultural	  formats	  such	  as	  greetings,	  multi-­‐party	  conversations,	  book	  sharing,	  helping,	  or	   specific	   rules	   of	   etiquette.	   For	   example,	   infant	   burps	   and	   bowel	  movements,	  outside	  the	  immediate	  feeding	  context	  (within	  which	  they	  tend	  to	  be	  praised),	  may	  be	   responded	   to	  with	   a	   culturally	   appropriate	   ‘Excuse	  you!’,	   which	   might	   surprise	   foreign	   visitors,	   but	   is	   a	   common	   feature	   in	  British	   middle-­‐class	   households.	   Familiarity	   with	   and	   skills	   in	   these	  
practices	   allow	   the	   infant	   to	   interact	   and	   participate	   beyond	   the	  
interpersonal	   and	   to	   belong	   to	   a	   specific	   sociocultural	   group.	   The	  infant’s	   familiarity	  with	   the	   book	   as	   an	   artefact	   and	  with	   the	   sequence	   of	  activities	   in	   book	   sharing	   allows	   her	   to	   meaningfully	   interact	   beyond	   the	  close	  circle	  of	  daily	  interaction	  partners,	  with	  other	  members	  of	  the	  culture.	  On	  the	  flip-­‐side	  of	  the	  coin,	  however,	  the	  very	  same	  jointly	  practised	  
and	   ingrained	   action	   patterns	   which	   enable	   joint	   engagement,	  
intimacy,	   and	   belonging	   also	   lead	   to	   separation	   from	   others	   and	   the	  
world	  (and	  even	  to	  separation	  within	   the	  self).	  The	  7-­‐	  or	  8-­‐month	  old’s	  anxious	  withdrawal	  from	  the	  stranger	  who	  is	  unfamiliar	  with	  her	  games	  and	  action	  patterns	  (compare	  also	  Trevarthen,	  2004)	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  early	  example	   of	   separation	   and	   an	   incipient	   ‘us’	   and	   ‘them’	   divide.	   Sticking	   to	  established	   action	   patterns	   can	   also	   contribute	   to	   separations	   within	   the	  self.	   The	   caregiver’s	   interests,	   inclinations,	   and	   adherence	   to	   sociocultural	  norms	  might	   lead	  to	  some	  of	  the	  infants’	  actions	  being	  routinely	  picked	  up	  and	   ‘affirmed’	   while	   others	   remain	   unresponded	   to	   and	   dropped.	   Daniel	  Stern	   (1985)	   talks	   about	   ‘selective	   affect	   attunement’	   as	   a	   powerful	  contributor	   to	   the	   development	   of	   personality	   types	   or	   one-­‐sided	   coping	  strategies	   for	   interacting:	   think	   of	   the	   case	   of	   an	   infant	   only	   consistently	  attuned	  to	  by	  the	  caregivers	  when	  acting	  enthusiastically	  but	  not	  when	  in	  a	  sad	  mood.	  Learning	  that	  one	  of	   these	  states	   is	  shareable	  while	  the	  other	   is	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not,	   she	  will	   likely	   live	   and	   relate	   to	   these	   respective	   emotions	   differently	  (perhaps	   ignoring	   or	   denying	   one	   altogether),	   thus	   creating	   a	   line	   of	  separation	  within	  her	  life,	  experience,	  and	  self.	  
5.9 Structure	  and	  Openness	  The	  self	  along	  with	  other	  structures	  enhances	  engagement	  and	  at	   the	  
same	   time	   hinders	   it,	   creating	   both	   separation	   and	   connection,	  
stability	  and	  change.	  Even	  within	  each	  interaction,	  there	  is	  openness	  in	  the	  form	  of	  variability.	  The	  sources	  of	  this	  variability	  are	  multiple:	  they	  lie	  in	  the	  separate	   agency	   and	   spontaneity	   of	   the	   participants,	   in	   the	   encounter	  between	  present	  actions	  with	  previously	  established	  structures,	  and	   in	  the	  ability	   of	   the	   participants	   to	   be	   affected	   and	   to	   change	   in	   the	   present	  encounter	   between	   them.	   Each	   self	   meets	   the	   other	   as	   both	   familiar	   and	  surprising	  or	  transcendent,	  as	  a	  particular,	  bounded	  self	  as	  well	  as	  in	  ways	  in	   which	   these	   boundaries	   recede.	   This	   dialectic	   of	   knowing	   and	   not	  knowing	  the	  other,	  and	  knowing	  and	  not	  knowing	  what	  is	  going	  to	  happen	  in	  the	  encounter,	  is	  common	  to	  participants.	  Within	  this	  shared	  unknowing	  lies	  connection	  (see	  also	  Buber,	  1923/1983).	  And	  within	  this	  connection	  lies	  both	  form	  and	  emptiness.	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6 The	   development	   of	   participation	   in	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐
object	   practices:	   changes	   in	   attention-­‐and-­‐action	   co-­‐
ordination	  In	  this	  chapter,	  building	  on	  conceptual	  analysis	  and	  the	  results	  from	  our	  empirical	  analysis	  from	  chapters	  3	  and	  4,	  we	  seek	  to	  reframe	  the	  conception	  of	   participation,	   joint	   action,	   and	   co-­‐operation,	   usually	   conceived	   of	   in	  cognitive	  and	  rational	  terms,	  to	  a	  more	  embodied	  and	  situated	  version.	  We	  then	  explore	  how	  such	  a	  framework	  illustrated	  with	  empirical	  examples	  can	  be	  used	  to	  describe	  and	  account	  for	  development	  of	  participation.	  	  
6.1 Setting	  the	  stage	  
6.1.1 Challenges	  of	  joint	  action,	  participation,	  and	  cooperation	  How	   do	   joint	   acting,	   participation,	   and	   co-­‐operation	   in	   joint	   object	  activities	  develop	  over	  the	  first	  year	  of	  life?	  What	  does	  it	  take	  for	  an	  infant	  to	  meaningfully	   engage	   in	   these	   forms	   of	   interaction?	   Most	   definitions	   of	  participation,	  co-­‐operation	  and	  joint	  action	  typically	  involve	  jointly	  working	  towards	   a	   shared	   goal	   (Bratman,	   1992;	   Hubley,	   1983;	   Rohlfing,	   Wrede,	  Vollmer,	   &	   Oudeyer,	   2016;	   Sebanz	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   Tomasello	   &	   Carpenter,	  2007;	   but	   see	   Fantasia,	   De	   Jaegher,	   &	   Fasulo,	   2014),	   which	   constitutes	   a	  third	  pole	  of	   interaction	  to	  relate	  to.	  This	  makes	  joint	  actions	  –	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  objects	  –	  equivalent	  to	  triadic	  interactions,	  requiring	  the	  infant	  to	  simultaneously	   take	   into	  account	  and	  coordinate	  engagement	  between	   the	  partner	  and	  the	  shared	  goal.	  Following	  through	  with	  this	  frame,	  in	  order	  to	  properly	  participate	  the	  infant	  must	  have	  mastered	  triadic	  interaction.	  Thus	  the	   developmental	   challenges	   which	   need	   to	   be	   mastered	   in	   order	   to	  participate	   are	   the	   same	   ones	   which	   are	   typically	   considered	   crucial	   for	  triadic	  interaction:	  coordinating	  engagement	  between	  different	  nodes	  of	  the	  triad	   –	   as	   in	   (visual)	   joint	   attention,	   operating	   specific	   kinds	   of	   complex	  knowledge	   –	   i.e.	   being	   able	   to	   parse	   actions	   and	   understand	   their	  instrumentality	   (distinguishing	   between	   means	   and	   ends),	   as	   well	   as	   to	  understand	   other	   people	   as	   intentional	   agents	   (having	   specific	   goals,	  perceptions,	   selective	   attention	   and	   action	   strategies,	   see	   Trevarthen	   &	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Hubley	  1978,	  Tomasello,	  2005).	  Thus	  proper	  participation,	  cooperation,	  and	  joint	  action	  can	  only	  be	  expected	  from	  9	  months	  on.	  
6.1.2 Framing	  and	  analysing	  the	  challenges	  from	  an	  embodied	  and	  situated	  
cognitive	  science	  perspective	  However,	   adopting	  an	  embodied	  and	  situated	  perspective,	  we	  suggest	  a	  shift	   in	   framing	   joint	   acting,	   participation,	   and	   cooperation.	   From	   this	  perspective,	  the	  main	  challenges	  infants	  are	  facing	  present	  themselves	  as:	  1)	  Controlling	   their	   actions,	   2)	   contributing	   them	   at	   the	   right	   time	   in	   an	  appropriate	  way	  in	  a	  3)	  complex	  task,	  which	  they	  may	  need	  to	  understand,	  and,	   in	   addition,	   4)	   coordinating	   their	   actions	  with	   a	   partner	   and	   his/her	  own	  actions.	  	  Drawing	   from	   data	   from	   our	   naturalistic	   study	   (see	   part	   II)	   we	   will	  suggest	  a	  new	  framework	  briefly	  sketching	  the	  development	  of	  participation	  along	  the	  following	  lines:	  	  1)	  What	  were	  the	  modes	  and	   strands	  of	   engagement	   infants	  utilized?	  How	   did	   infants	   within	   a	   specific	   mode	   of	   engagement	   co-­‐ordinate	  
engagement	   and	   disengagement	   with	   one	   or	   multiple	   targets	   in	   the	  course	   of	   an	   unfolding	   activity?	   As	   modes	   of	   engagement	   we	   here	  differentiate	  –	  based	  on	  previous	  observation	  and	  analysis	   –	  a)	   attentive-­‐
communicative	  engagement,	  used	  primarily	  for	  (distal)	  orienting,	  control	  and	   monitoring	   of	   actions,	   as	   well	   as	   for	   communicating,	   involving	   gaze,	  vocalizations,	   facial	   expressions,	   and	   to	   some	   extent	   whole-­‐body	  movements;	  and	  b)	  physically-­‐effective	  engagement,	  used	  to	  bring	  about	  changes	   in	   the	  material	  world,	   involving	  body	  and	   limb	  movements,	   up	   to	  fine	  manual	  manipulation,	  whether	  concerning	  objects	  and/or	  people.	  2)	   How	   did	   infants	   co-­‐ordinate	   the	   different	   modes	   and	   strands	   of	  engagement	  with	  each	  other	  as	  an	  activity	  was	  unfolding?	  3)	   To	   what	   extent	   and	   how	   did	   infants	   participate,	   and	   in	   particular	  
functionally	  contribute,	  to	  the	  joint	  activity?	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  Figure	  6.1:	  The	  development	  of	  participation.	  Details	  see	  text.	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A	   tentative	   trajectory	   of	   the	   development	   of	   participation	   in	   terms	   of	  
coordination	  of	  attention	  and	  action	  over	  the	  first	  year	  of	  life	  
6.2 3-­‐4	   months:	   infants	   participate	   in	   co-­‐ordinated	   affect	   imbued	   arc-­‐	  
shaped	  social	  object	  routines.	  	   	  
6.2.1 Responsive	  co-­‐ordination	  of	  attentive-­‐communicative	  actions	  At	   3-­‐4	   months	   infants	   became	   increasingly	   interested	   in	   objects	   in	   their	  surroundings	  and	   thus,	  when	   in	  an	  alert	  and	  contented	  state,	  also	  attended	   to	  aspects	  of	   the	  object	  activities	  which	   they	  were	  directly	   involved	   in	  as	  well	  as	  those	   which	   they	   witnessed	   other	   people	   perform.	   	   Their	   co-­‐ordination	   of	  attentive-­‐communicative	   actions	   was	   responsive,	   that	   is,	   they	   tracked	   salient	  object	  actions	  with	   their	  eyes,	  and	  had	  their	  gaze	  drawn	  (with	  slight	  delay)	   to	  distinctively	  marked	  events	  such	  as	  excited	  vocal	   comments	  and	  exclamations	  of	  surprise,	  and	  to	  especially	  prominent	  multimodal	  events	  such	  as	  audio-­‐visual	  contact	   events	   created	   when	   objects	   made	   contact	   with	   the	   ground	   or	   each	  other	  as	  the	  caregiver	  handled	  them.	  Consequently,	   infants	   in	   this	   period	  were	   also	   easily	   distracted,	   frequently	  having	   their	   attention	   –	   while	   being	   engaged	   with	   one	   target	   or	   activity	   –	  abruptly	   drawn	   to	   something	   else.	   In	   one	   example	   (see	   Figure	   6.1.c1.b),	   the	  infant	  was	   lying	   in	   the	   baby	   gym	   focussing	   on	   and	   trying	   to	   touch	   and	   grasp	  objects	   hanging	   at	   middle	   height	   right	   in	   front	   of	   the	   infant’s	   face	   above	   his	  chest.	  The	   infant’s	  gaze,	  and	  the	   infant’s	  engagement	   in	  general,	  was	  drawn	  to	  and	   fro	  between	   the	  swinging	  object	  and	   the	  mother’s	  affect-­‐attuned	  cheering	  face,	   temporarily	   disrupting	   his	   efforts	   at	   autonomous	   object	   engagement.	  Sometimes,	   however,	   the	   infant	   became	   less	   distracted	   even	   within	   a	   single	  episode;	  as	  indeed	  in	  this	  example	  the	  infant	  looked	  less	  and	  less	  at	  his	  mother	  who,	   on	   her	   part,	   realizing	   the	   disruptive	   effect,	   reduced	   the	   intensity	   of	   her	  cheers).	  	  For	  most	  joint	  object	  activities,	  however,	  (both	  for	  guided	  ones	  as	  well	  as	  for	  witnessing	  situations)	  the	  infants’	  responsiveness	  made	  them	  amenable	  to	  and	  inclined	   to	   follow	   the	   caregiver’s	   lead.	   The	   latter,	   by	   multi-­‐modally	   marking	  particular	   events,	   carving	   out	   relevant	   aspects	   or	   building	   blocks	   of	   actions,	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patterning	  actions,	  as	  well	  as	  shaping	  them	  into	  affect-­‐imbued,	  arousing	  action	  arcs,	   guided	   infants’	   attention	   through	   the	   activity	   and	   towards	   its	   relevant	  aspects	  and	  shape.	  Generally,	   as	   a	   result	   of	   their	   responsiveness	   in	   this	   period,	   infants	   at	   this	  early	   age	   tended	   to	   end	   up	   looking	   at	   “where	   the	   action	   was”	   in	   their	  surroundings.	   They	   looked	   at	   crucial	   key	   events	   of	   an	   on-­‐going	   activity	  (whether	  they	  were	  specifically	  created	  for	  them	  by	  caregivers	  (figure	  6.1.c1.a),	  or	   occurred	   as	   an	   inherent	   part	   of	   the	   interactions	   unfolding	   around	   them	  (figure	  6.1.c1.c);	  that	  is,	  at	  points	  in	  space	  and	  time	  where	  potentially	  important	  information	  could	  be	  picked	  up,	  providing	  plenty	  of	  opportunity	  to	  learn	  about	  objects,	  people,	  and	  action	  structures.	  Witnessing	   her	   mother	   emptying	   the	   dishwasher,	   the	   girl	   in	   figure	   6.1.c1	  tracks	   her	  mother’s	   hand	   reaching	   for	   and	   grasping	   plates	   in	   the	   dishwasher	  and	   transporting	   them	   to	   the	   overhead	   cupboard.	   After	   a	   few	   iterations	   the	  infant’s	  attention	  gets	  drawn	  to	  her	  own	  hands,	  which	  have	  found	  and	  are	  now	  clasping	  each	  other.	  The	   cluttering	  noise	  of	   the	  plate	  making	   contact	  with	   the	  dishes	  in	  the	  cupboard,	  however,	  draws	  her	  gaze	  back	  to	  the	  plate,	  and	  –	  after	  her	   gaze	   dwells	   at	   the	   location	   of	   the	   noise	   a	   little	   longer	   -­‐	   she	   continues	  monitoring	  her	  mother	  transporting	  plates	  with	  her	  hands.	  
6.2.2 Co-­‐ordination	  of	  whole	  body	  and	  manual	  actions	  
6.2.2.1 Scaffolded	  manual	  physically	  effective	  object	  acts	  As	   the	   infants	   at	   3-­‐4	   months	   were	   not	   able	   to	   support	   their	   posture	   and	  properly	  perform	  visually	  guided	  reaching	  and	  grasping	  on	  their	  own	  yet,	  their	  manual	  object	  actions	  were	  still	  limited.	  	  They	   did,	   however,	   perform	   –	   and	   in	   particular	   answer	   action	   invitations	  with	  –	  simple	  manual	  object	  acts	  scaffolded	  by	  artefacts	  and/or	  caregivers	  in	  a	  co-­‐ordinated	  way,	  such	  as	  well-­‐aimed	  hitting	  of	  objects	  suspended	  from	  a	  toy	  bar	  after	  the	  mother	  had	  set	  it	  in	  motion	  by	  tilting	  the	  baby-­‐seat	  (see	  figure	  6.1.c1e).	   Often	   these	   early	   object	   acts	   even	   fit	   or	   were	  moulded	   into	   more	  
conventional	   cultural	   formats:	   autonomously	   holding	   their	   drinking	   bottle	  (see	   figure	  4.5.r1.d),	  or	   turning	   the	  page	  of	  a	  book	  held	  steady	  by	   the	  mother,	  whose	   rigid	   pages	   facilitate	   grasping	   and	   channel	   the	   infants	   into	   performing	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the	   conventionally	   “correct”	   action	   by	   reducing	   the	   degrees	   of	   freedom	   (see	  figure	  6.1,c1d,	  as	  well	  as	  book	  sharing:	  section	  3.3.1.3).	  	  
6.2.2.2 Early	   autonomous	   physically	   effective	   manual	   object	   engagement	  
frequently	  diverging	  from	  attentive-­‐communicative	  engagement	  When	   acting	   on	   objects	   autonomously	   (e.g.	   scaffolded	   by	   a	   baby	   gym	   or	  handling	   an	   easily	   graspable	   and	   manipulable	   object),	   infants’	   physically-­‐
effective	   manual	   engagement	   and	   their	   attentive-­‐communicative	  
engagement	   did	   not	   necessarily	   converge	   on	   the	   same	   target.	   Indeed,	   on	   the	  contrary,	  they	  frequently	  diverged,	  or	  were	  sequentially	  directed	  at	  the	  same	  
object.	   For	   example,	   manual	   object	   acts	   were	   often	   not	   performed	   under	  sustained	   focal	   visual	   control.	   This	   was	   probably	   -­‐	   at	   least	   in	   part	   -­‐	   due	   to	  postural	  challenges.	  When	   lying	   in	  a	  baby-­‐gym,	   infants	   typically	  (as	   illustrated	  in	   figure	   6.1.c1.e)	   –	   after	   first	   sequentially	   alternating	   their	   gaze	   between	   the	  objects	   suspended	   high	   above	   them	   and	   performing	   a	   series	   of	   whole	   body	  movements,	  waving	  hands	  and	  feet	   in	  a	  diagonally	  coupled	  way	  –	  turned	  their	  head	  to	  the	  side	  or	  centred	  it	  orienting	  towards	  a	  point	  between	  the	  suspended	  objects,	  before	  directing	  a	  smooth	  swiping	  movement	  unilaterally	  towards	  one	  or	  bilaterally	  towards	  two	  objects,	  often	  successfully	  hitting	  them	  with	  their	  fist	  or	   back	   of	   the	   hand.	  When,	   however,	   their	   posture	  was	   supported,	   e.g.	   when	  reaching	   for	   a	   low	  hanging	  object	  with	   their	   arm	   remaining	   supported	  by	   the	  floor,	  or	  sitting	  reclined	  in	  a	  baby	  rocker	  with	  their	  back	  supported	  and	  hitting	  an	  object	  suspending	  from	  the	  toy	  bar,	  which	  the	  mother	  has	  made	  prominent	  by	   setting	   it	   in	   motion	   through	   tilting	   the	   baby	   rocker	   (see	   figure	   6.1.c1.e),	  infants	  typically	  kept	  their	  visual	  focus	  on	  the	  object.	  	  Similarly,	  when	  engaged	  in	  grasping	  and	  sustained	  manipulation	  or	  mouthing	  a	   proximal	   readily	   and	   constantly	   available	   object,	   they	   often	   were	  simultaneously	   attentively-­‐communicatively	   involved	   with	   their	   caregivers,	  looking	  at	  them	  as	  well	  as	  communicating	  with	  them	  (via	  facial	  expression	  and	  vocalisation),	  again	  performing	  the	  manual	  actions	   largely	  without	   focal	  visual	  control.	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6.2.2.3 Anticipatory	   (and	   co-­‐operative?)	   whole	   body	   movements	   functionally	  
contributing	  to	  a	  shared	  task	  While	   1)	   infants’	   manual	   skills	   –	   in	   particular	   unilateral	   reaching	   and	  grasping	  movements	   especially	   under	   challenging	   postural	   conditions	   –	   were	  still	   limited	   but	   in	   this	   period	   undergoing	   intense	   practice	   (with	   artefact	   and	  caregiver	  support),	  and	  2)	  their	  manual	  object	  action	  and	  visual	  attention	  often	  diverged,	   infants	   at	   this	   age	   have	   already	   been	   performing	   whole	   body	  movements	   routinely	   for	   several	  weeks,	   communicatively	   engaging	  with	   their	  caregivers.	  By	  now,	   they	  were	  even	  able	   to	  perform	  whole	   body	  movements	  within	   a	   specific	   caregiving	   task	   such	   as	   nappy	   change	   at	   the	   appropriate	  
moment	  in	  an	  anticipatory	  way	  facilitated	  by	  object	  action	  cues,	  such	  as	  lifting	  their	  bottom	  in	  nappy	  change	  at	  the	  sight	  and	  sound	  of	  the	  nappy	  being	  opened,	  and	  the	  mothers’	  “Are	  you	  ready?”	  vocalizations,	  thereby	  actively	  contributing	  
to	   the	   task,	   allowing	   the	   mother	   to	   perform	   the	   next	   step	   in	   the	   routine	   to	  remove	  the	  nappy	  and	  thus	  arguably	  engaging	  in	  the	  first	  rudimentary	   forms	  
of	   object	   related	   co-­‐operation	   (see	   figure	   6.1.c1.f.,	   as	   well	   as	   section	   4,	   in	  particular	  figure	  4.6)	  
6.2.3 Summary:	  infants’	  participation	  at	  3-­‐4	  months	  	  Even	   at	   the	   early	   age	   of	   three	   to	   four	   months,	   when	   their	   “autonomous”	  object	   engagement	  was	   still	   very	   limited,	   required	   scaffolding,	   and	  was	   often	  performed	   with	   diverging	   attentive-­‐communicative	   engagement,	   infants	   were	  able	  to	  participate	   in	  joint	  object	  routines	  by	   following	   the	   caregivers’	   lead	  (thanks	   to	   their	   responsiveness)	   and	   letting	   their	   scaffolded	   object	   actions	  
be	   moulded	   into	   cultural	   forms.	   	   Further,	   they	   were	   already	   able	   to	  participate	   in	   an	   anticipatory	   and	   arguably	   cooperative	   way.	   	   This	  cooperation	   was	   possible	   as	   long	   as	   they	   could	   contribute	   with	   an	   action	  already	   in	   their	   repertoires	   such	   as	   whole	   body	   movements,	   which	   they	  
performed	  while	  staying	  engaged	  with	  the	  caregiver	  throughout	  the	  activity,	  timing	   and	   adapting	   their	   actions	   in	   response	   to	   and	   in	   anticipation	   of	   the	  caregivers’	   object	   actions.	   And	   as	   long	   as	   the	   actions	   needed	   were	   not	   as	  challenging	   as	   uni-­‐manually	   translating	   an	   object	   in	   relation	   to	   other	   objects	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under	   focal	   vision	   control	   as	   typically	  used	   in	   experimental	   cooperation	   tasks	  (see	  e.g.	  Hubley	  &	  Trevarthen,	  1979;	  Moro	  &	  Rodríguez,	  2004)	  
6.3 4-­‐6	  months:	  a	  range	  of	  social	  object	  routines	  was	  fluently	  established,	  
and	  their	  shapes,	  i.e.	  space-­‐time-­‐intensity	  contours,	  playfully	  varied	  In	  the	  period	  between	  4-­‐6	  months	  a	  number	  of	  joint	  object	  practices	  became	  established	   as	   shared	   routines	   with	   action	   structures	   which	   were	   by	   now	  familiar	   to	  both	   interaction	  partners.	  These	   included	  nappy	  change,	  peekaboo,	  book	   sharing,	   feeding,	   social	   body-­‐part	   games,	   soft-­‐toy	   conversations	   and	  shared	  conventional-­‐object-­‐action	  games	  e.g.,	   turning	  and	  pulling	  out	  a	  key,	  or	  supported	  opening	  and	  looking	  behind	  a	  door.	  
6.3.1 Pro-­‐active,	   fluent	   and	   co-­‐ordination	   of	   attentive-­‐communicative	  
engagement,	  including	  affective	  exchanges	  
While infants, despite their growing motor skills, were still unable to 
autonomously move in and explore the world of objects on their own, their 
co-ordination of attentive-communicative actions had become more fluent 
(they were now faster in alternating their gaze between caregiver and objects). 
They were more autonomous (that is less distractable and drawn by 
immediate cues) e.g., they were not distracted anymore during object 
engagement in the baby gym by the mother’s cheering and affect attunement 
vocalizations. They were also often anticipatory, in particular in familiar 
routines: e.g., after an emotional exchange with the mother during book 
sharing, the girl in figure 6.1.c2.a returns her gaze to the book on her own, 
without being dynamically cued, but arguably guided by routine (compare 
book sharing: section 3.4.1.1). 
Generally infants’ more pro-active and controlled co-ordination of 
attentive-communicative actions now clearly indicates what could be called 
“knowledge” of the activity structure, but what we would rather seek to 
characterize more precisely as infants’ now having established a stable 
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(spatiotemporal) orientation20 within several specific activity frameworks. 
Infants had also become more adept at getting oriented in a situation, as well 
as at controlled switching between engagements, that is, at disengaging and re-
engaging without losing track of an activity and its respective spatiotemporal 
framework. This held for switching between targets of engagement within a 
joint activity as well as for switching engagement between activities taking 
place in parallel, e.g. infants’ own increasing autonomous object engagement 
and someone else’s object engagement (figure 6.1.c2.b), or between their 
autonomous object engagement and attentive-communicative engagement 
with his mother accompanying him. The boy in figure 6.1.c2.b is sitting in his 
baby seat engaged with a mechanical toy. After his gaze had initially been 
drawn by noise and movement to his mother working at her laptop, as well as 
to the cup she is grasping, placed some distance away on the bookshelf – he 
now from time to time looks up from his toy to look at the mother – 
sometimes drawn by slight movement but more often spontaneously (without 
noticeable cues) – and then all the way to the cup on the shelf, as if to check 
whether they were still there or if there had been a change in the situation. His 
sequential switching and coordination of engaging in his own object activity 
and visually engaging with the mother working on the laptop and the cup on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 	  Karl	   Bühler,	   when	   taking	   a	   more	   general	   comparative	   view	   at	   living	  organisms	   in	   general,	   considered	   even	  more	   basic	   forms	   of	   “being	   oriented”,	  such	   as	   a	   cat	   turning	   to	   where	   a	   noise	   came	   from,	   as	   particularly	   important	  phenomena	  clearly	  qualifying	  for	  and	  marking	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  subject	  area	  of	  psychology,	  as	   for	  him	  such	  orientation	  was	  a	  hallmark	  of/marker	   for	  basic	  forms	   of	   cognition,	   for	   an	   essentially	   cognitive	   way	   of	   relating	   to	   the	   world,	  since	   they	   require	   some	   basic	   –	   and	   as	   we	   today	   would	   say	   “dynamically	  embodied	   and	   situated”	   –	   form	   of	   systemic	   “representation”.	   Interestingly	   he	  thus	  actually	  defined	  “cognition”	  in	  terms	  of	  “being	  oriented”,	  or	  to	  put	  it	  more	  actively	  and	  less	  statically:	  as	  “being	  able	  to	  act,	  or	  acting	  in	  an	  oriented	  way”.	  (e.g.	  Bühler	  1936)	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the shelf, indicates his awareness of and interest in the mother’s current and 
potential object engagements. 
The same boy, lying on the floor on his side in an episode of accompanied 
object play, is arching his body and stretching his arms overhead and back to 
reach his toy just out of reach and mostly out of sight. As the mother 
acknowledges his efforts and cheers him on with an affect and action-attuned 
“strE:::::::tch”, and pulls the toy a little closer to him, he briefly pauses his 
efforts, relaxes his body, and looks at the mother, before returning to his bent-
over-backward arms-over-head stretch, directly aiming for, and finally 
successfully retrieving, the overhead toy. 
6.3.1.1 Playful	  variation	  of	  space-­‐time-­‐intensity	  contours	  of	  action	  structures	  
When enacting (some of) the jointly established familiar action routines 
(e.g. in peekaboo, see figures 6.1.c1f, 6.2), caregivers and infants in this 
period frequently engaged in and visibly enjoyed variation of the respective 
action structure, in particular of the shape of the action arc, its space-time-
intensity contour, mostly led by the caregivers. For example, by playfully	  delaying	   or	   rushing	   particular	   sub-­‐actions	   and	   exaggerating	   actions	   in	   scope	  and	  intensity,	  tailored	  and	  responsive	  to	  the	  actions	  and	  affective	  expressions	  of	  the	  infant.	  Thus	  they	  were	  arguably	  not	  only	  playing	  with	  the	  jointly	  established	  structure	  –	  letting	  the	  fixed	  and	  the	  variable	  parts	  stand	  out	  even	  clearer	  –	  but	  also	   directing	   attention	   away	   from	   the	   fixed	   structure	   toward	   each	   other’s	  varying	  actions	  and	  mutual	  co-­‐ordination,	  thus	  refining	  co-­‐ordination	  itself,	  by	  making	   the	   partners	  more	   sensitive	   to	   each	   other’s	   actions	   and	  making	   each	  other’s	  actions,	  intentions,	  and	  expectations	  felt	  more	  distinctly.	  
6.3.2 Interspersed	   affective	   exchanges/comments	   and	   joint	   reflective	  
engagement	  
Another example of the fluent shifts of attention and controlled sequential 
co-ordination between different targets of attention are the newly observed 
affective exchanges interspersed within joint object activities with infants 
now oriented within jointly established routines. In peekaboo, an example of 
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object mediated social interaction where the partners move the object between 
their mutual lines of sight to modulate their attentive-communicative 
engagement, affective exchanges were already observed at 4 months, as the 
infant, upon her mother bursting forth from behind the blanket with a “boo!” 
and re-establishing eye-contact, briefly giggles towards her (see below, figure 
6.1.c2.d). Conversely, in book sharing - a joint cultural activity primarily 
oriented towards and focused on the object book - this was only observed from 
6 months on, when infants, upon the mother’s particularly emotional verbal 
enactments of the story in the book, turned their gaze to the mother’s face fast 
enough for their gaze to meet (also facilitated by infants now sitting more 
stable at a 90° configuration with shorter gaze-shift distance). This allowed 
them to exchange and mutually reinforce an expression of surprise, before first 
the infant – apparently oriented within this jointly established routine – and 
then the mother returned their gaze to the book (see figure 6.1.c2.a for an 
example, as well as section 3.4.1.1). 
This affective exchange is directly emerging out of a jointly established 
routine around an object, which the partners, disengaging from the object, 
briefly put on hold to engage with each other, and soon – not having lost track 
of the joint object activity – return to. Thus this affective exchange can be 
seen as a basic form of “comment” “about” notable parts of this jointly 
established routine or the object involved (compare Bruner’s comment 
structure, Bruner, 1975; also see book sharing: section 3.5.1.1). More 
generally, it can be regarded as a basic sequential form of joint reflective 
engagement with previously established shared action structures, 
explicitly marking a specific part of these now to some extent reified 
structures as a “shared focus”, a “topic of shared concern” 
Instances of joint reflective engagement highlighting a shared focus, 
arguably constitute instances of triadic engagement, and play an important 
role in the development of triadic engagement, as well as the development of 
joint reference, where the partners orient each other towards, and/or modify 
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each other’s relation to, a specific location within, a ”building block” of, an 
already established shared action framework (see below). 
6.3.3 Co-­‐ordination	  of	  physically	  effective	  manual	  object	  actions	  Along	   with	   their	   growing	   postural	   control,	   infants	   became	   increasingly	  
more	  fluent	  in	  simple	  manual	  object	  acts,	  reaching,	  grasping,	  mouthing,	  and	  manipulating	   objects.	   While	   they	   still	   at	   times	   manipulated	   and	   mouthed	   an	  object	   while	   simultaneously	   attentionally-­‐communicatively	   engaging	   with	   the	  caregiver	  (e.g.,	  intently	  observing	  their	  mothers)	  they	  increasingly	  manipulated	  objects	   under	   focal	   visual	   control	   and	   no	   longer	   let	   themselves	   be	   easily	  distracted.	  Their range of action contributions, in particular manual actions, 
to joint object routines expanded. These included actions facilitating as well 
disrupting the joint activity (e.g. opening the straps of the nappy). Infants’ 
actions generally still	  let	  themselves	  be	  shaped	  into	  a	  cultural	  frame.	  	  With	   slight	   initial	   support	   infants	  were	  now	  able	   to	  perform	  simple	   body-­‐
relative	  manual	  object	  acts,	  that	  is,	  actions	  in	  which	  the	  object	  is	  moved	  in	  a	  specific	   relation	   to	   the	  body	   (rather	   than	   in	   relation	   to	   another	  object),	   in	   an	  
anticipatory	  manner	  within	  a	  joint	  object	  routine:	  After	  having	  been	  invited	  by	   the	   mother	   “What’s	   this?	   Do	   you	   wanna	   play	   Peekaboo?”	   and	   offered	   a	  blanket	   right	   over	   her	   chest	  within	   reaching	   distance,	   the	   4	  month	   old	   girl	   in	  figure	  6.1.c2.d,	  pulls	  the	  blanket	  over	  her	  face,	  covering	  and	  then	  uncovering	  it	  again,	  thereby	  not	  only	  effectively	  enacting	  attentional-­‐communicative	  but	  also	  the	  manual	   steps	   of	   peekaboo,	   until	   she	   finally	   accidentally	   loses	   hold	   of	   the	  blanket.	  
6.3.4 Summary:	  participation	  at	  4-­‐6	  months	  With	  their	   increasing	  postural,	  motor,	  and	  attentive	  and	  cognitive	  skills,	   the	  infants’	  autonomous	  object	  engagement	  became	  more	  extensive	  (though	  still	  mostly	   scaffolded	   and	   socially	   accompanied	   by	   their	   caregivers)	   and	   was	  
increasingly	   performed	   under	   focal	   visual	   control.	   That	   is,	   there	   was	   an	  
increasing	  convergence	  between	  manual	  physically	  effective	  engagement	  
and	   attentive-­‐communicative	   engagement,	   along	   with	   a	   decreasing	  distractedness	  (prompted,	  e.g.,	  by	  the	  mother’s	  regular	  pronounced	  affect-­‐and-­‐
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action	   attunement),	   but	   an	   increasing	   controlled	   switching	   of	   attentive-­‐
communicative	  engagement	  between	  different	   targets	  within	  or	  between	  
activities.	   These	   involved	   sometimes	   continuing	   manual-­‐physically	   effective	  engagements	  not	  requiring	  visual	  focal	  control,	  such	  as	  mouthing,	  or	  putting	  on	  hold	  those	  engagements	  done	  under	  visual	  control	  –	  without	  completely	  losing	  track	  of	  the	  activity.	  Infants’	  participation	   also	  became	  more	   extensive	   and	   fluent.	  With	   their	  increased	   skills	   and	  with	   a	  number	   of	   joint	   object	   activities	   now	   robustly	  
established	   as	   shared	   routines,	   infants	   moved	   within	   this	   shared	   action	  structures	  flexibly:	  First,	   infants	   co-­‐ordinated	   their	   attentive-­‐communicative	   engagement	  
fluently,	  pro-­‐actively	  shifting	  back	  their	  gaze	  to	  the	  object	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  joint	  activity	  without	  necessarily	  being	  cued	  or	  guided.	  Second,	   regarding	   their	  physically	   effective	   manual	   engagement,	   infants	  were	   now	   able	   to	   functionally	   contribute	   to	   a	   (object	   mediated)	   joint	  
activity	  such	  as	  peekaboo	  with	  anticipatory	  body-­‐relative	  object	  acts,	  that	  is	  translating	   an	   object	   relative	   to	   their	   body	   (e.g.	   covering	   and	   uncovering	   the	  face	   with	   the	   blanket),	   co-­‐ordinated	   with	   and	   regulating	   their	   attentive-­‐communicative	  engagement	  with	   the	  mother,	  with	  the	   object	  mediating	   and	  
modifying	   their	   connection.	  Thus	   infants	  gradually	   increase	   the	  amount	  and	  complexity	   of	   object	   engagement	   –	   and	   hence	   the	   degree	   of	   triadicity	   –	   they	  bring	  to	  participation.	  This	  kind	  of	  body-­‐relative	  object	  act	  though	  may	  still	  be	  considered	  as	  relatively	  simple	  (at	  least	  once	  the	  infant	  has	  successfully	  got	  hold	  of	   the	   blanket	   with	   the	   support	   of	   the	   mother),	   using	   one’s	   own	   body	   as	   a	  reference	   system	   rather	   than	   precisely	   targeting	   some	   object-­‐relative	   goal	  under	  focal	  visual	  control.	  And	  from	  a	  Piagetian	  perspective	  they	  could	  still	  be	  regarded	   as	   holistic	   circular	   reactions,	   where	   the	   object	   is	   not	   necessarily	  separated	  out	  from	  the	  action	  as	  a	  unit	  moved	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  units.	  Last	  but	  not	   least	   infants	   start	  –	   together	  with	   their	   caregivers	  –	   to	   jointly	  
relate	   to,	   and	   reflectively	   engage	  with,	   the	   previously	   established	   object	  
routines.	   They	  mark	  parts	   of	   the	   jointly	   established	   structures	   as	   a	   currently	  “shared	   focus”	   of	   negotiation:	   	   mother	   and	   infant	   are	   now	   engaged	   in	  interspersed	  affective	  exchanges,	  which	  –	  originating	  from	  and	  leading	  back	  to	  a	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shared	  object	  routine	  –	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  basic	  forms	  of	  “commenting	  on”	  
or	   “communicating	   about”	   the	   activity.	   And	   they	   also	   enjoy	  modifying	   the	  space-­‐time-­‐intensity	  contours	  of	  these	  structures	  in	  joint	  play.	  	  Thus	  infants	  were	  engaging	  in	  a	  basic	   form	  of	  reflective	   joint	  negotiation	  and	   their	   gradual	   development	   reached	   qualitatively	   new	   levels	   of	   triadic	  engagement	   and	   participation	   as	   the	   participants	   now	   gradually	   started	   to	  
effectively	  mark	  and	  acknowledge	  joint	  action	  structures	  as	  a	  third	  pole	  in	  
the	  activity	  and	  actively	  negotiate	  them.	  
6.4 Intermission:	   Initiating	   and	   re-­‐eliciting	   established	   routines	   from	   6	  
months	  on	  From	   around	   6	   months	   on	   infants	   started	   to	   initiate	   and	   re-­‐elicit	  established	  social	  (object	  –mediated)	  routines,	  (as	  of	  yet)	  even	  with	  strangers,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  we	  observed	  the	  first	  forms	  of	  instrumental	  actions	  and	  
social	  instrumental	  actions.	  	  
Initiating	   social	   object-­‐mediated	   routines:	  While	   the	  mother	  had	   turned	  away	   to	   fetch	   the	   infant’s	   food,	   the	  by	  now	  6	  month	  old	   girl	   in	   figure	  6.1.i1.a,	  who	   had	   already	   actively	   participated	   in	   mother-­‐initiated	   peekaboo	   from	   4	  months	   on,	   looked	   at	   and	  made	   eye	   contact	   with	  me,	   smiling;	   she	   pulled	   the	  blanket	   over	   her	   head,	   pulled	   it	   down	   again	   and	   looked	   at	   me	   expectantly.	   I	  could	  not	   resist	   chiming	   in	  with	   “there	  she	   is	  again”	  albeit	   in	  a	   low	  voice,	   still	  somewhat	   reluctant	   to	  get	   involved	  while	   filming.	  She	  pulled	   the	  blanket	  over	  her	   head	   again	   and	  we	  went	   through	   two	  more	   rounds	   of	   smilingly	   covering	  “where/now	  she(’s)	  gone?	  “	  –	  and	  uncovering	  “THERE	  she	  is	  again!”.	  	  
Re-­‐eliciting	   social	   object(body-­‐part)-­‐mediated	   routines:	   After	   we	   had	  just	   finished	   playing	   a	   feet-­‐clapping	   game	   in	   the	   getting-­‐to-­‐know-­‐each-­‐other-­‐again	  phase	  before	  proper	  filming,	  the	  7	  month	  old	  girl	  in	  figure	  6.1.i1.b	  looked	  up	   to	  my	   face,	   raising	  her	  arms	  towards	  me,	  upon	  which	   I	   repeated	   the	  game.	  After	  finishing,	  she	  again	  looked	  up	  to	  my	  face,	  performed	  another	  arm	  raise	  –	  this	   time	   in	   reduced	   (already	   ritualized?)	   form	   –	   and	   looked	   back	   at	   her	   feet	  even	  before	  I	  started	  moving	  to	  grasp	  her	  feet	  and	  repeat	  the	  game	  once	  more.	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6.4.1 Summary:	  initiating	  joint	  object	  mediated	  routines	  from	  6	  months	  on.	  Infants’	   actions	   in	   these	   examples	   again	   demonstrate	   that	   a	   shared	   object	  mediated	  routine	  has	  indeed	  been	  established	  to	  some	  degree,	  either	  robustly,	  having	  been	  established	  over	  the	  course	  of	  many	  weeks,	  or	  loosely,	  within	  a	  few	  minutes	  over	  just	  a	  few	  iterations	  of	  a	  jointly	  performed	  body-­‐part	  game.	  They	  demonstrate	  that	  infants	  are	  oriented	  in	  these	  structures,	  moving	  within	  them,	  or	   at	   least	   relating	   to	   them,	   quite	   flexibly	   and	   proactively,	   less	   bound	   by	   or	  dependent	  on	  their	  immediate	  context	  to	  act:	  while	  the	  blanket	  is	  still	  around	  as	  an	  action	  opportunity	  and	  affordance,	   the	   infant	  does	  not	  depend	  anymore	  on	  the	   mother’s	   first	   move	   to	   activate,	   initiate,	   and	   enact	   the	   peekaboo	   routine,	  even	  with	  a	  stranger.	  Thus,	  initiating	  specific	  joint	  activities	  themselves,	  infants	  come	  to	  actively	  direct	  their	  partner’s	  attention	  and	  action	  via	  or	  towards	  
an	  object	  and	  gradually	  expand	  their	  abilities	  (having	  started	  early	  on	  with	  turn-­‐taking	   in	   proto-­‐conversation)	   to	   participate	   by	   enacting	   increasingly	  
differentiated	  reversible	  roles.	  	  	  
6.5 6-­‐9	  months:	   combinatorial	   variation	   of	   (object	  mediated)	   social	   play	  
routines	  versus	  solitary	  object	  play	  During	   this	   period	   a	   pronounced	   split	   became	   increasingly	   apparent	  between	  object-­‐mediated	  social	  games	  and	  solitary	  manual	  object	  engagement.	  	  
6.5.1 (Object	  mediated)	  social	  games	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  infants	  enjoyed	  engaging	  in	  extended	  exuberant	  social	  play	  interactions	   (at	   times	   mediated	   by	   objects),	   centred	   around	   and	   fostering	  mutual	   co-­‐ordination,	   (by)	   playing	   with	   each	   others’	   expectations	   and	  intentions.	   This	   not	   only	   involved	   time	   and	   intensity	   variation	   but	   also	  
combinatorial	   switching	  between	  different	  subroutines,	  where	  –	  while	  the	  mother	  would	  take	  the	  primary	  lead	  –	  the	  infant	  showed	  swift	  anticipatory	  and	  flexible	   co-­‐ordination	   of	   affective-­‐communicative	   as	   well	   as	   whole-­‐body	   and	  manual	   object	   actions.	   Infants	   not	   only	   showed	   anticipatory	   responses	   and	  laughter	  to	  temporarily	  varied	  actions,	  but	  also	  laughter	  and	  quick	  adaptation	  to	  unexpected	  switches	  to	  the	  move	  of	  a	  different	  game	  by,	  on	  her	  part,	  varying	  the	  response.	  These	  varying	  moves	  between	  mother	  and	   infant	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  an	  increasingly	  complex	  reflective	  joint	  engagement	  with	  already	  jointly	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established	   action	   structures.	   They	   took	   the	   form	  of	   affective	   comments	  on	  jointly	   created	   results	   in	   the	   form	   of	   laughter	   and	   vocalisations,	   as	  well	   as	   of	  interventions	   and	   modifications	   in	   the	   form	   of	   varying	   action	   responses	   to	  modify	  the	  jointly	  established	  routine.	  	  In	  the	  over	  7-­‐minute	  play	  sequence	  in	  figure	  6.1.c3.a,	  the	  mother	  –	  kneeling	  in	   front	   of	   her	   daughter	   in	   a	   ready-­‐to-­‐go	   position,	   continuously	   keeping	   eye-­‐contact	   –	   spontaneously	   moved	   into	   one	   or	   the	   other	   game	   inspired	   by	   the	  momentary	   situation	   and	   actions	   of	   the	   infant:	   as	   the	   infant	   removing	   her	  pacifier	   incidentally	   produces	   a	   loud	   plopping	   noise,	   the	  mother,	   imitating	   it,	  starts	  a	  wiggly-­‐approach	  lip-­‐smacking	  game,	  met	  by	  her	  daughter’s	  laughter	  as	  she	   delays	   and	   varies	   each	   new	   approach,	   (even)	   making	   ritualized	   intent	  movements	   and	   false	   starts,	   waiting	   for	   her	   daughter’s	   anticipatory	   laughter	  before	   approaching.	   As	   the	   infant’s	   belly	   incidentally	   gets	   uncovered	   she	  switches	   into	   a	   belly	   kissing/blowing	   game	   re-­‐initiated	   and	   reinforced	   by	   the	  infant	  pulling	  back	  her	  dress	  even	  more.	  As	  the	  infant	  pulls	  up	  her	  dress	  so	  high	  that	   it	   nearly	   blocks	   the	   line	   of	   sight,	   the	   mother	   hides	   her	   head	   behind	   the	  dress	  before	  swiftly	  rising	  up	  with	  a	  loud	  “boo!”,	  seamlessly	  switching	  into	  the	  peek-­‐a-­‐boo	  game.	  
6.5.2 Solitary	   manual	   object	   engagement	   and	   focal	   visual	   control	   –	   mostly	  
ignoring	  people	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  however,	  infants	  engaged	  less	  often	  for	  shorter	  periods	  of	  time,	  and	  instead	  frequently	  sought	  to	  escape	  previously	  enjoyed	  cultural	  object	  practices	   such	   as	   book	   sharing.	   Rather, facilitated by the now stable sitting 
posture, infants got deeply involved with objects, with their attention drawn 
to and largely bound by their own object acts. That is their attentive-
communicative and physically-effective manual engagements were 
convergent and tightly coupled with the object: e.g., banging, mouthing and 
manipulating one or more objects.  They were performing counter-resistance-
relative object acts under focal visual control (in solitary play) to the 
extent of seemingly ignoring people.  Having escaped from a book sharing 
interaction after barely 2 minutes, the 7 month old boy in figure 6.1.c3.b 
immediately afterwards engaged in manipulating a single object for nearly 6 
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minutes without interruption, throughout apparently “ignoring” his mother, 
that is, not once looking at or responding to her [see book sharing section 
3.4.1.3]. Even when involved with objects, infants did, however, from time 
to time look up at people’s faces, e.g. when there was unexpected noise or 
motion around, when the mother uttered attention directives such as “look!” 
even if addressing a sibling, when newly introduced to an object, when 
checking the adult’s reaction or attitude to their own actions.  These might be 
early forms of instrumental looking, for instance, after having pushed a book 
out of reach, a 6-month-old girl lying on her belly turned her head up to her 
mother’s face and vocalized (figure 6.1.i1.c).	  
6.5.3 Summary:	  participation	  at	  6-­‐9m	  The	   trends	   of	   the	   previous	   months’	   gradual	   development	   continued,	   with	  
object	   engagement	   getting	   more	   autonomous	   and	   focused,	   and	   joint	  
activities	  emphasising	  social	  engagement	  increasingly	  tuning	  in	  to	  the	  co-­‐
ordination	   of	  widely	   varied	   action	   structures,	  now	  however	   leading	   to	   a	  
qualitative	   change	   in	   global	   engagement	   patterns:	   an	   apparent	   split	  
between	  social	  and	  object	  engagement.	  Along	   with	   improved	   postural	   control	   allowing	   free	   and	   stable	   sitting	   and	  with	   beginning	   locomotion,	   infants’	   object	   engagement	   became	   more	  
autonomous,	   e.g.	   less	   dependent	   on	   adults	   with	   regard	   to	   acquiring	   and	  keeping	  objects,	  and	  their	  attention	  was	  largely	  drawn	  to	  and	  bound	  by	  their	  
own	  object	  actions:	  They	  now	  performed	  extended	  bimanual	  manipulations	  of	  one	  or	  more	  objects	  under	  focal	  visual	  control	  and	  with	  serious	  intent,	  and	  their	  
attentive-­‐communicative	   and	   physically-­‐effective	   manual	   engagement	  
converged	  and	  were	  strongly	  coupled	  around	  the	  object	  –	  resulting	  in	  largely	  
solitary	  object	  engagement	  even	  to	  the	  point	  of	  infants	  apparently	  “ignoring”	  people.	  While	   in	   this	   period	   preferring	   solitary	   engagement	   in	   object-­‐centred	  activities,	   infants,	   however,	   also	   keenly	   participated	   in	   exaggerated,	   even	  boisterous,	   social	   (often	   object-­‐mediated)	   play,	   responding	   flexibly,	  appropriately,	   and	   with	   laughter	   not	   only	   to	   playfully	   varying	   the	   space-­‐
time-­‐intensity	   contours	   of	   actions,	   but	   also	   to	   combinatorial	   variations,	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making	   their	   intentions	  clearly	  visible	  and	  contributing	   to	  and	  modulating	   the	  jointly	  created	  variations	  through	  their	  responses.	  In	   these	   interactions,	   led	   by	   the	   caregivers	   but	   with	   infants’	   contributions	  steering	  the	  direction,	  they	  together	  further	  parsed	  and	  delineated	  separate	  
and	   now	   exchangeable	   sub-­‐parts	   of	   the	   jointly	   established	   routines	   and	  highlighted	  transition	  or	  decision	  points	  as	  places	  for	  co-­‐ordinated	  negotiation,	  thus	  jointly	  creating	  a	  unique	  play	  sequence	  from	  partly	  known	  and	  partly	  new	  components.	  	  This	  transcending	  of	  contexts	  and	  transferring	  of	  actions	  between	  contexts	  can	   thus	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  basis	   for	  e.g.	   the	  development	  of	   symbol	  use.	  
6.6 9-­‐12	  months:	  co-­‐composing	  complex	  social	  action	  structures	  including	  
manual	  object-­‐relative	  object	  acts.	  As	   the	  emphasis	   for	  data	  analysis	  has	  primarily	  been	  on	   the	   first	  8	  months	  until	  now,	  we	  only	  analysed	  in	  detail	  a	  limited	  number	  of	  interactions	  from	  the	  age	  period	  between	  9	  and	  12	  months.	  Below	  we	  present	  a	  tentative	  first	  sketch	  and	  brief	  outlook	  based	  on	  our	  observations	  so	  far.	  	  In	   the	   period	   between	   9	   and	   12	   months	   infants	   smoothly	   integrated	  
attentive-­‐communicative	  and	  whole-­‐body	  as	  well	  as	  manual	  object	  actions	  in	   service	   of	   persistently	   pursuing	   one	   or	   another	   action	   sequence	   directed	  towards	   and	   involving	   objects	   and/or	   people.	   They	   were	   able	   to	   relate	   and	  
deal	   with	   multiple	   engagements	   in	   the	   form	   of	   complex	   (inter-­‐)action	  
sequences	   at	   once,	   splitting	   up	   and	   distributing	   different	   modalities	   and	  strands	   of	   actions	   between	   them,	   and	   then	   integrating	   them	   across,	   and	   thus	  bridging,	   different	   contexts,	   and	  now	  making	   some	   singled	  out	   aspects	   of	   one	  relevant	  for	  the	  other.	  	  Homing	  device:	  For	  the	  whole	  course	  of	  the	  research	  visit	  at	  nine	  months,	  the	  girl	  in	  figure	  6.1.c4.b,	  no	  matter	  in	  which	  activity	  she	  was	  otherwise	  engaged	  in,	  tended	   to	   end	  up	   commando-­‐crawling	   towards	   the	   objects	   in	   front	   of	   the	   fire	  place	   where	   she	   was	   not	   supposed	   to	   go.	   Approaching	   the	   fireplace	   she	  intermittently	  stopped,	  turned	  around,	  grinned,	  and	  looked	  at	  her	  mother’s	  face,	  who	  was	  kneeling	  on	  the	  floor	  at	  some	  distance	  behind	  her,	  and	  only	  proceeded	  after	   the	   mother	   responded.	   During	   one	   particular	   approach	   the	   mother’s	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response	   at	   the	   first	   stop	   was	   a	   low-­‐voiced	   twice-­‐repeated	   “where	   are	   you	  going?”,	  the	  second	  an	  “I	  know	  where	  you’re	  going!”	  with	  a	  slightly	  threatening	  undertone,	   	  met	  by	   the	   infant	  with	  a	  bout	  of	  exuberant	  arm	  and	   leg	   thrashing	  and	  laughter,	  and	  finally	  “I’m	  gonna	  get	  you”,	  accompanied	  by	  a	  ritualized	  mock	  attack	  landing	  next	  to	  the	  infant,	  before	  actually	  picking	  her	  up	  with	  a	  “NO”	  and	  placing	  her	  at	  some	  distance	  and	  facing	  away	  from	  the	  fire	  place	  upon	  which	  the	  girl	   unerringly	   aimed	   for	   the	   fireplace	   again	   (so	   that	   the	   merry	   game	   could	  begin	  again).	  In	  this	   interaction	  the	  girl	   integrates	  and	  utilizes	  and	  co-­‐ordinates,	  how	  one	  (inter-­‐)action	   sequence	   directed	   towards	   –	   and	   constituting	   her	   engagement	  with	   –	   the	   objects	   in	   front	   of	   the	   fireplace,	   employing	   a	   specific	   set	   of	  perception-­‐action	  resources,	  is	  related	  to	  and	  impacts	  on	  another	  (inter-­‐)action	  sequence	   directed	   towards	   –	   and	   constituting	   her	   engagement	   with	   –	   the	  mother,	  employing	  a	  somewhat	  different	  set	  of	  perception-­‐action	  resources,	  and	  vice	  versa	  –	  giving	  rise	  to	  a	  game.	  The	  participants	  are	  both	  oriented	  in	  a	  shared	  space	   of	  meaning	   and	   action:	   they	   are	   both	   aware	   of	   the	   point	   in	   space	   (and	  time),	  where	   the	   infant’s	   actions	   tend	   towards,	   of	   the	   action	   trajectories	   both	  participants	  follow,	  the	  specific	  roles	  both	  contribute	  to	  the	  interaction,	  they	  are	  aware	  that	  they	  follow	  opposing	  forces	  and	  action	  tendencies,	  and	  the	  form	  of	  “negotiation”	   which	   is	   going	   to	   take	   place.	   The	   girl’s	   stopping	   in	   front	   of	   the	  fireplace	   and	   turning	   to	   the	  mother	   and	  her	   response	   to	   the	  mother’s	   answer	  with	  exuberant	  thrashing	  and	  laughter	  shows,	  that	  the	  goal	  or	  topic	  or	  goal	  the	  interaction	  is	  not	  the	  action	  to	  get	  to	  the	  fireplace,	  which	  then	  is	  negotiated,	  but	  that	  negotiation	  of	  or	  about	  something	  has	  itself	  become	  the	  topic.	  	  
Symbol use: When the mother in Figure 6.1.c4.c, after the infant has 
handed her the book, is pointing to, vocalizing and signing “bird” referring to 
a picture in the book, the 12 month old infant is turning around and looking 
out of the window. Not realizing this, the mother first finishes her signing, and 
then – recounting how they had seen a seagull outside the window on the 
previous day – herself turns to the window – only then realizing that the infant 
was already looking there.  
In this interaction the 12 month-old boy singles out specific aspects of his 
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book-sharing engagement with his mother (a specific cluster of actions, 
meanings, invariances spanning the mother’s vocalizations, signing, and acts 
on the book) as links to another, memorized action context which had 
occurred at a different time and space. Both partners’ actions impact on each 
other’s orientation within a shared space of meaning and action. They allowed 
re-orienting and directing of oneself and the partner towards specific points of 
reference within this shared sense- and action(land)scape, spanning space and 
time, partly “virtual” and partly rooted in the presently shared situation. 
Aspects of this shared situation, presently available for perception and action 
and thus for affecting each other, are used as landmarks and tools for the 
alignment of orientation and pointers to the virtual shared space.  
6.6.1 Summary:	  participation	  at	  9-­‐12:	  negotiation	  of	  negotiation	  Infants	   were	   now	   able	   to	   flexibly	   co-­‐ordinate	   affective-­‐communicative	  
engagement	  with	  whole-­‐body	  as	  well	  as	  physically-­‐effective	  manual	  object	  
actions	   (including	   complex	   person/object-­‐relative	   object	   acts),	   either	   in	  convergence	   or	   split	   up	   and	   distributed	   between	  multiple	   action	   strands	   and	  objects	   of	   engagement,	   and	   integrated	   into	   one	   complex	   action	   sequence.	  Infants	  were	  now	  robustly	  oriented,	  and	  flexibly	  moving	  in,	  a	  number	  of	  highly	  structured	   shared	   meaning-­‐and-­‐action	   spaces,	   parts	   of	   which	   (e.g.	   certain	  actions,	   objects,	   “goals”	   etc.)	   could	   be	   singled	   out	   to	   direct	   the	   partner’s	  attention,	   or	   could	   be	   transferred	   between	   to	   link	   different	   contexts/action-­‐spaces.	   The	   partners	   were	   now	   both	   navigating	   a	   network	   of	   intricately	  structured,	  partially	  overlapping	  and	  connected	  shared	  spaces	  of	  meaning	  and	  action	  constituting	  a	  basic	  shared	  sense-­‐and-­‐action(land)scape,	  providing	  joint	  affordances	  and	  constraints	  to	  act	  within,	  as	  well	  as	  “building	  blocks”	  to	  jointly	  orient	  towards,	  act	  on	  and	  transform.	  	  Moving	  one	  step	   further	  still,	   continuing	  the	  development	  which	  went	   from	  playful	   variations	   of	   the	   space-­‐time-­‐intensity	   contours	   of	   joint	   actions	   to	  combinatorial	  variations	  of	  these	  joint	  structures	  to	  the	  point	  where	  the	  infant	  is	  not	  only	  actively	  directing	  the	  mother’s	  attention	  and	  actions,	  but	  also	  where	  
the	  shared	  topic	  of	   the	   interaction	   itself	   is	  not	  simply	  a	  specific	  “part	  of	  the	  action”,	  or	  an	  “object”	  anymore	  but	  is	  now	  the	  “negotiation	  of	   the	  action”.	   In	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this	   triadic	  participation	   infants	  were	  thus	  moving	  one	   step	   further	   towards	  
full-­‐fledged	  participation	  in	  training	  to	  negotiate	  negotiation.	  	  
Conclusions	  and	  Outlook	  
6.7 From	   engaging	   in	   simple	   (dyadic)	   interchanges	   to	   participating	   in,	  
negotiating	  and	  co-­‐creating	  complex	  (triadic)	   interactions:	  the	  role	  of	  
jointly	  enacting	  affect-­‐imbued	  action	  arcs.	  	  How	  do	   infants	   arrive	   there?	  How	  do	   young	   infants	  manage	   to	   understand	  and	  master	  these	  complex	  action	  structures	  and	  to	  share,	  jointly	  negotiate,	  and	  modify	   them,	   let	   alone	   learn	   to	   relate	   another	   complex	   structure	   (such	   as	  language)	  to	  these	  complex	  structures	  to	  communicate	  about	  them?	  Our	   exploratory	   investigation	   of	   everyday	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  interactions	  and	  social	  object	  practices	  over	  the	  first	  year	  suggests	  that	  in	  order	  to	  answer	  these	  questions	  we	  need	  to	  take	  a	  closer	  and	  more	  systematic	  look	  at	  the	  development	  of	  the	  infant’s	  action	  co-­‐ordination	  skills.	  	  These	  meet	  various	  complex	   co-­‐ordination	   challenges,	   consisting	   not	   simply	   in	   co-­‐ordinating	  “engagement	  with	   people	   and	   objects”,	   but	   rather	   in	   co-­‐ordinating	   one’s	   own	  multiple	  action	  sequences	  directed	  towards	  different	  targets	  of	  engagement	  by	  orchestrating	  multiple	  modalities	  and	  strands	  of	  action,	  as	  well	  as	  co-­‐ordinating	  them	  with	   someone	   else’s.	   This	   in	   turn	   requires	   some	  basic	   understanding	   of	  (often	   complex)	   situations,	   as	   well	   as	   of	   the	   interaction	   partners	   and	   their	  actions.	  
6.7.1 The	  development	  of	  action	  control	  and	  co-­‐ordination	  
6.7.1.1 Affective-­‐communicative	  engagement	  The	   action	   systems	   involved	   in	   attentive-­‐communicative	   engagement	  were	  the	   first	   ones	   to	  work	   in	   a	   functionally	   effective	  way:	   Infants	   effectively	   used	  gaze,	  facial	  expression,	  vocalization,	  and	  whole	  body	  movements	  from	  early	  on	  in	   social	   engagement	   in	   proto-­‐conversation	   and	   beyond.	   However	   affective	  communicative-­‐engagement	  went	  through	  a	  process	  of	  development,	  where	  the	  control	  of	  the	  process	  shifted	  several	  times	  between	  being	  primarily	  externally	  versus	  internally	  driven,	  before	  a	  balance	  between	  inner	  and	  outer	  control	  was	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reached	  (moreover,	   these	  actions	  also	  needed	   to	  be	  co-­‐ordinated	  with	   infant’s	  physically-­‐effective	  actions):	  
In	   the	   beginning,	   infants	   were	   highly	   responsive,	   e.g.	   have	   their	   gaze	  drawn	   to	   outside	   events,	   their	   attentive-­‐communicative	   engagement	   was	  
under	   strong	   outside	   influence	   and	   control.	   While	   generally	   functionally	  beneficial,	   resulting	   in	   infants	   looking	  at	   key	  events	   (“where	   the	  action	  was”),	  that	   is,	   key	   points	   for	   picking	   up	   information,	   this	   also	   led	   to	   distraction,	   in	  particular	   during	   infants’	   first	   limited	   efforts	   to	   pursue	   their	   autonomous	  actions,	   and	   often	   resulting	   in	   a	   divergence	   between	   their	   attentive-­‐communicative	   engagement	   and	   their	   physically-­‐effective	   object	   engagement.	  
Later	  on	  affective-­‐communicative	  engagement	  was	  increasingly	  controlled	  
from	   within,	   reducing	   distractions,	   and	   was	   drawn	   to	   and	   converging	   with	  infant’s	   own	   physically-­‐effective	   actions	   with	   which	   it	   needed	   to	   be	   co-­‐ordinated	  (see	  below).	  
6.7.1.2 Physically-­‐effective	  engagement	  
Physically-­‐effective	   engagement,	   in	   particular	   manual	   object	   actions,	  took	   longer	   to	   become	   functionally	   operating	   in	   the	   real	   world.	  While	   aimed	  (pre-­‐)reaching	  movements	  were	   observed	   in	   controlled	   laboratory	   conditions	  with	  postural	  support	  from	  early	  on	  (von	  Hofsten,	  1984),	  manual	  object	  actions	  in	   real	   life	   situations,	   even	   when	   scaffolded,	   were	   much	   more	   difficult,	   as	  simultaneous	   control	   of	   posture	   was	   needed,	   as	   well	   as	   coordination	   with	  outside	   events	   and	   influences,	   e.g.	   distracting	   sights,	   noises,	   or	   cheering	  mothers.	   These	   challenges	   of	   co-­‐ordination	   have	   to	   be	   taken	   into	   account,	   in	  particular	   when	   considering	   young	   infants’	   participation	   and	   cooperation	   in	  joint	   activities.	   These	   are	   usually	   defined	   as	   requiring	   physically	   effective	  engagement	  “bringing	  about	  a	  change	  in	  the	  world”	  (Sebanz	  et	  al.,	  2006),	  which	  in	  typical	  test	  situations	  for	  co-­‐operation	  take	  the	  form	  of	  e.g.	  inserting	  a	  small	  object	  into	  a	  toy	  truck	  (Hubley	  &	  Trevarthen,	  1979),	  which	  actually	  constitutes	  a	  rather	  complex	  and	  late-­‐occurring	  object-­‐relative	  object	  act.	  When	  considering	  infants’	   participation,	  we	   thus	   need	   to	   further	   differentiate	   infant	   actions	   and	  take	  into	  account	  which	  kind	  of	  actions	  the	  infant	  is	  already	  able	  to	  perform	  and,	  conversely,	   how	   difficult	   a	   specific	   action	   might	   be	   in	   terms	   of	   infant	   motor	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control,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  actions	  are	  coordinated	  with	  objects	  and	  other	  people’s	  activities.	  	  
6.7.1.3 The	  Development	  of	  co-­‐ordination	  between	  affective-­‐communicative	  and	  
physically-­‐effective	  engagement.	  Performing	   complex	   actions	   in	   the	   real	   world	   often	   requires	   intricate	   co-­‐ordination	   between	   attentive-­‐communicative	   engagement	   and	   physically-­‐effective	  engagement,	  and	  the	  action	  systems	  involved	  therein.	  While	  infant’s	  body	  and	  limb	  actions	  and	  the	  working	  of	  sensory	  modalities	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  work	  in	  a	  coordinated	  way	  from	  the	  beginning	  –	  even	  in	  the	  womb	  (Castiello	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  van	  der	  Meer,	  1997;	  van	  der	  Meer,	  van	  der	  Weel,	  &	  Lee,	   1995),	   however,	   this	   was	   not	   always	   straightforward	   in	   complex,	   real	  world	  environments.	  When	  3	  months	  old	   infants	   e.g.	   attempted	   to	  hit	   objects,	  we	   often	   observed	   a	   divergence	   between	   physically-­‐effective	   and	   attentive-­‐communicative	   engagement,	   likely	   due	   to	   difficult	   postural	   control,	   as	  well	   as	  due	   to	   distraction	   through	   outside	   events	   while	   pursuing	   their	   own	   object	  actions.	   In	   the	   course	   of	   the	   next	   months	   (around	   4-­‐7	   months),	   we	   see	   an	  increasing	  convergence	  between	  those	  two	  ways	  of	  engagement.	  By	  6-­‐7	  months,	  infants’	   attention	   was	   bound	   to	   monitoring	   their	   own	   object	   manipulation	  under	  focal	  visual	  control	  in	  sustained	  solitary	  object	  play,	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  largely	  ignoring	  external	   influences	   including	  other	  people	  and	  their	  efforts	  to	  engage	  them.	  Only	  later	  (around	  8-­‐9)	  infants	  were	  able	  to	  decouple	  different	  modalities	  and	   strands	   of	   action,	   splitting	   up	   and	   flexibly	   distributing	   them	   to	   different	  targets	  of	  engagement,	  and	  integrating	  them	  to	  into	  complex,	  multi-­‐step,	  multi-­‐target	  action	  sequences	  (compare	  de	  Barbaro,	  Johnson,	  &	  Deák,	  2013).	  
6.7.1.4 The	  development	  of	   infant’s	   functional	   contributions	   to	  a	   shared	  object	  
activity	  Taking	   into	  account	   the	   challenges	  and	  developments	  of	  motor	   control	   and	  co-­‐ordination	   described	   above,	  we	   can	   take	   a	  more	   differentiated	   look	   at	   the	  motor	   side	   of	   infant	   participation	   and	   their	   functional	   contributions	   to	   the	  activity.	   Looking	   at	   the	   data,	   we	   can	   differentiate	   different	   types	   of	   infant	  actions	  and	  describe	  their	  gradual	  sequential	  occurrence	  in	  participation:	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Infants	   from	   the	   beginning	   (3	  months)	   functionally	   contributed	   through	  
anticipatory	   whole-­‐body	   movements	   like	   the	   bottom	   lift	   in	   nappy	   change	  performed	   in	   adaptation	   to	   and	   anticipation	   of	   the	   mother’s	   object	   actions.	  
From	  4	  months	  on,	  they	  contributed	  to	  the	  task	  using	  body-­‐relative	  object	  
acts,	  where	   the	   object	   is	   translated	  by	   the	   infants	   relative	   to	   their	   own	  body,	  which	   can	   be	   at	   least	   partially	   controlled	   by	   relying	   on	   proprioception	   rather	  than	   having	   to	   rely	   strongly	   on	   precise	   focal	   visual	   control:	   e.g.	   grasping	   to	  mouth	  an	  object,	  pulling	  a	  blanket	  over	  one’s	  head	  to	  play	  a	  round	  of	  peekaboo,	  or	   to	   go	   to	   sleep.	  Only	   later,	   from	   around	   5-­‐6	  months	   on	   they	   engaged	   in	  
counter-­‐resistance-­‐related	  object	   acts,	  e.g.	  banging	  objects	   together	  or	  onto	  surfaces	   (though	  mostly	   done	   in	   solitary	   play),	   and	   only	   around	  8-­‐9	   months	  
they	   started	   contributing	   by	   engaging	   in	   precise	   person-­‐	   and	   object-­‐
relative	   object	   acts,	  where	   objects	   are	   translated	   or	  manipulated	   in	   relation	  with	  or	  regard	  to	  another	  person	  or	  object,	  e.g.	  placing	  or	  giving	  an	  object.	  	  
6.7.2 Understanding	  and	  orienting	  within	  a	   complex	   task	   in	  accordance	  with	  a	  
partner	  and	  his/her	  actions	  However,	   to	   successfully	   participate	   and	   functionally	   contribute	   to	   an	  activity,	   infants	   –	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   ability	   and	   skill	   of	   controlling	   and	   co-­‐ordinating	   their	   own	   actions	   –	   also	   need	   to	   be	   oriented	   within,	   that	   is,	   need	  some	  basic	   understanding	   of	   the	   complex	   task,	   its	   sub-­‐parts,	   their	   interaction	  partners	  and	  their	  actions,	   in	  order	  to	  contribute	  the	  appropriate	  action	  at	  the	  appropriate	   time	  and	  co-­‐ordinate	   their	  own	  actions	  with	   those	  of	   the	  partner.	  How	  are	  infants	  able	  to	  develop	  such	  an	  understanding?	  Our	  micro-­‐analyses	  of	  early	  infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	  routines	  suggest	  that	  one	  key	   factor	   enabling	   understanding	   and	   participation	   may	   be	   jointly	   moving	  
through	   affect-­‐imbued	   action	   arcs	   intricately	   shaped	   and	   patterned	   by	  caregivers	  (see	  figure	  6.1).	  	  
6.7.3 Action	  arcs	  as	  a	  key	  organizational	  principle	  in	  action	  co-­‐ordination	  We	  first	  noticed	  action	  arcs	  –	  with	  their	  distinct	  structure	  of	  beginning,	  build-­‐up,	  climax,	  and	  resolution	  –	  in	  the	  pitch	  and	  intensity	  contours	  of	  the	  caregivers’	  verbal	  utterances	  where	  they	  are	  most	  easily	  recognizable.	  Taking	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  transcripts	  of	  the	  various	  parallel	  action	  strands	  the	  action	  arc	  stood	  out	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as	  a	  general	  organizing	  principle	  running	  through	  the	  entire	  action;	  they	  can	  be	  found	  across	  and	  co-­‐ordinate	  various	  strands	  of	  action.	  Relevant	  events,	  such	  as	  important	   words,	   can	   be	   found	   at	   the	   peak	   of	   the	   interactions,	   infants’	  contributions	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  found	  at	  the	  peak	  or	  in-­‐between	  the	  arcs	  (compare	  Brazelton	   et	   al.,	   1974;	   narrative	   or	   shared	   project:	   Delafield-­‐Butt	   &	  Gangopadhyay,	   2013;	   vitality	   contours:	   Stern,	   2010;	   Trevarthen	   &	   Delafield-­‐Butt,	  2013).	  We	   suggest,	   that	   in	   these	   early	   highly	   structured	   affect-­‐imbued	   forms	   of	  interactions	   –	   rather	   than	   being	  merely	   exchanges	   and	   attunements	   of	   affect	  and	   behaviour	   having	   nothing	   as	   yet	   to	   do	   with	   cognition	   or	   knowledge	  (Tomasello	  et	  al.,	  2005)	  –	  a	  lot	  can	  be	  learned	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  complex	  action	  structures	  of	  self	  and	  other	  as	  well	  as	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  social	  co-­‐ordination	  and	  negotiation	  of	  these,	  which,	  we	  argue,	  go	  hand	  in	  hand.	  	  Jointly	  moving	  through	  shared	  action	  arcs	  allows	  the	  infant	  to:	  1) Experience	  the	  sharedness	  of	  acting	  together,	  by	  simultaneously	  moving	  through	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  specific	  action	  along	  with	  its	  specific	  contour	  of	  arousal	  and	  affect	  together	  2) Experience	  qualitative	  aspects	  of	  sharing	  the	  action,	  such	  as	  the	  degree	  of	  smoothness	  or	  friction,	  of	  alignment	  or	  opposition	  of	  forces	  	  3) Learn,	  (understand,	  and	  predict)	  a	  simple	  general	  action	  structure	  with	  a	  start,	  climax,	  and	  ending.	  	  4) Learn	  to	  participate,	  that	  is,	  to	  take	  over	  a	  specific	  action	  part	  at	  a	  specific	  time,	  fulfilling	  a	  specific	  role,	  scaffolded	  by	  caregivers	  utilizing	  the	  natural	  arc	  dynamics:	  delaying	  the	  climax	  and	  thus	  creating	  a	  tension	  and	  an	  opening,	  instigating	  a	  tendency	  to	  move	  in	  and	  complete	  the	  arc.	  5) Learn	  to	  distinguish,	  recognize,	  and	  to	  participate	  in	  different	  simple	  actions	  by	  their	  different	  specific	  action	  contours.	  	  6) Learn	  to	  jointly	  relate	  to,	  reflect	  on,	  communicate	  about,	  and	  modify,	  that	  is,	  reflectively	  engage	  with	  jointly	  established	  action	  arcs.	  7) Learn,	  understand,	  and	  (jointly)	  perform	  new	  complex	  object-­‐	  and/or	  conventional	  actions	  by	  mapping	  their	  complex	  structure	  onto	  familiar	  shared,	  predictable	  and	  hence	  meaningful	  action	  arcs,	  which	  can	  be	  nested	  into	  each	  other,	  thus	  over	  time	  creating	  an	  intricately	  structured	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continuously	  refined	  sense-­‐and-­‐action(land)scape,	  weaving	  the	  substrate	  of	  culture.	  	  1)	  Moving	  through	  action	  arcs	  together	  may	  contribute	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  the	   “sharedness”	   of	   an	   action	   in	   two	  ways:	   a)	   by	   creating	   a	   -­‐	   at	   least	   to	   some	  extent	   -­‐	   similar	   experience	   of	   performing	   the	   action	   itself,	   along	  with	   similar	  trajectories	   of	   arousal	   and	   affect	   in	   both	   partners	   in	   parallel	   through	   the	  dynamics	   of	   the	   action	   itself:	   i.e.	   changes	   in	   velocity	   (action,	   sound),	   intensity	  (action	  impact	  and	  volume),	  and	  elevation	  (motion	  height	  and	  pitch);	  and	  b)	  by	  further	  mutually	   reflecting	   and	   reinforcing	   these	   action,	   arousal,	   and	   emotion	  processes	  which	  the	  participants	  go	  through,	  by	  addressing,	  responding	  to	  and	  co-­‐regulating	  each	  other	  (also	  see	  section	  4.3:	  Nappy	  Change).	  	  2)	  Moving	   through	   action	   arcs	   together	   the	   partners	   not	   only	   experience	   a	  “sharedness”	  but	  also	  its	  specific	  quality:	  is	  the	  process	  unfolding	  smoothly	  or	  is	  there	   some	   friction,	   are	   they	  moving	   in	   straight	   alignment	   or	   is	   there	   a	   lot	   of	  negotiating	  going	  on	  pulling	  in	  different	  directions,	  and	  is	  the	  negotiating	  going	  softly	  or	  can	  opposing	   forces	  be	   felt?	  Thus	  a	   lot	  can	  be	   learned	  about	  self	  and	  other	  (see	  chapter	  5),	  about	  will,	   interest,	  purpose,	  goals,	  and	  skills,	  as	  well	  as	  about	  the	  relationship,	  mutual	  understanding,	  and	  co-­‐ordination	  of	  the	  partners	  (also	   compare	  Bühler,	   1927:	   “Only	   through	  resistance	  of	   the	  partner	   […]	  do	  we	  
learn	  something	  important	  about	  his/her	  soul/mind”).	  3)	   Action	   arcs	   are	   already	   and	   intuitively	   familiar	   to	   infants	   as	   they	   are	  inherent	  in	  action	  quite	  generally,	  both	  cyclic	  and	  transitive,	  such	  as	  breathing,	  thrashing	  one’s	  arms	  and	  legs,	  experiencing	  a	  surprise,	  or	  reaching	  and	  grasping	  an	   object	   (Churchland	   et	   al.,	   2012).	   Whether	   one	   is	   performing	   the	   action	  oneself	   or	   engaging	   in	   it	   by	   observing	   (Flanagan	   &	   Johansson,	   2003),	   such	  actions	   share	   to	   some	   extent	   common	   time-­‐space-­‐intensity	   dynamics	   with	   a	  start,	   climax,	   and	   end,	   which	   each	   of	   these	   actions	   is	   tending	   towards.	   Thus	  these	  actions	  in	  a	  sense	  already	  have	  an	  inherent	  goal,	  a	  certain	  form	  of	  “in-­‐tent-­‐ionality”	  already	  built	  into	  them.	  	  Although	  young	  infants	  do	  not	  necessarily	  as	  yet	  understand	  “goals”	  as	  rationally	  set	  ahead	  of	  time,	  and	  persistently	  pursued	  via	  strategies	  planned	  in	  advance,	  and	  then	  flexibly	  implemented	  in	  accordance	  with	   the	   unfolding	   situation	   and	  dealing	  with	  potential	   obstacles,	   nonetheless	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infants	  are	  familiar	  with	  the	  experience	  of	  action	  arcs,	  the	  focused	  and	  directed	  energy	   necessary	   to	   get	   them	   started	   and	   keep	   them	  moving	   along	   a	   specific	  trajectory,	  and	  finally	  “tending	  towards”	  a	  certain	  end	  point.	  Thus	  every	  process	  shaped	   into	   that	   action-­‐arc	   structure	   can	   be	   experienced	   and	   understood	   in	  these	  simple	  structural	  terms:	  a	  motivation-­‐fuelled	  start,	  climax,	  and	  the	  finding	  of	  a	  resolution	  in	  an	  endpoint.	  	  
	  
Figure	  .6.2:	  Shaping	  a	  peek-­‐a-­‐boo	  activity	  into	  a	  series	  of	  affect-­‐imbued	  shared	  action	  arcs	  	   4)	  Whether	  it	  was	  in	  nappy	  change	  (see	  chapter	  4),	  peekaboo	  (see	  figure	  6.2),	  or	   book	   sharing	   (see	   chapter	   3),	  mothers	   utilized	   and	   enhanced	   the	   inherent	  dynamics	   of	   action	   arcs	   to	   draw	   infants	   into	   participation:	   using	   the	   specific	  actions	   of	   the	   respective	   task	   they	   opened	   and	   built	   up	   an	   action	   arc,	   then	  delayed	   the	   climax,	   creating	   tension	   and	   a	   specific	   opening	   (see	   also	   Mehus,	  2011:	   “anticipatory	   contextualisation"),	   instigating	   a	   tendency	   for	   infants	   to	  move	  in	  and	  thus	  resolve	  the	  tension	  through	  contributing	  to	  completing	  the	  arc	  and	   leading	   it	   towards	   resolution.	   Repeatedly	   using	   this	   general	   arc-­‐on-­‐hold	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pattern	  across	  the	  different	  task	  contexts	  and	  manifesting	  it	  with	  their	  specific	  action	  “material”,	  mothers	  not	  only	  train	  infants	  to	  participate	  appropriately	  in	  the	  respective	  task	  but	  also	  draw	  infants	  into	  participation	  and	  ”readiness	  to	  co-­‐operate”	  in	  general	  (compare	  Fantasia	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Mehus,	  2011;	  Reddy,	  Liebal,	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  Moreover,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  patterning	  and	  shaping	  the	  activity	  into	  action	   arcs,	   caregivers	   also	   used	   conventional	   invitations	   such	   as	   questions:	  “Are	  you	  ready?”,	  “Do	  you	  wanna	  play?”,	  “Can	  you	  turn	  the	  page?”	  as	  markers	  or	  signals	  at	  the	  participation-­‐take-­‐off-­‐point,	  as	  well	  as	  conventional	  phrases	  such	  as	   “Thank	   you”,	   “There	   you	   go”,	   or	   “All	   done”	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   infant’s	  contribution	   and	   (formally)	   close	   the	   activity.	   Thus,	   in	   addition	   to	   training	  infants	   to	   appropriately	   participate	   in	   the	   specific	   task	   and	   drawing	   them	  towards	   a	   general	   “participatory”	   or	   “co-­‐operative”	   stance,	   the	   caregivers	  trained	   them	   to	   enact	   the	   conventional	   script,	   interaction	   format	   (Bruner,	  1985),	  or	  pragmatic	  frame	  (Rohlfing	  et	  al.,	  2016)	  of	  “co-­‐operative	  interchange”.	  And	  we	  suggest	   that	  mapping	  this	  conventional	   format	  onto	  the	  shared	  affect-­‐imbued	   action	   arc	   may	   contribute	   to	   learning	   the	   conventional	   format	   (see	  point	  7	  below).	  In	   the	   nappy	   change	   example	   the	   training	   of	   this	   conventional	   interaction	  format	   became	   particularly	   evident.	   By	   6	   months	   it	   had	   become	   ritualised,	  generalised	  and	   to	   some	  point	   conventionalised:	   the	  mother	  employed	   “Ta”,	   a	  conventional	   short	   form	  of	   “Thank	   you!”,	  which	   she	  previously	   had	  only	   used	  towards	  the	  end	  of	   the	  nappy	  change	  to	  acknowledge	  and	  thank	  the	   infant	   for	  her	  contribution,	  now	  at	  the	  lift-­‐off	  point	  as	  a(n	  arbitrary)	  signal	  for	  the	  infant	  to	  act	  (in	  particular	  when	  the	  infant	  was	  not	  paying	  attention).	  Is	  was	  used	  as	  an	  arbitrary	   signal	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   apparently	   neither	   functioned	   exclusively	  qua	   a	   rising	   and	   hence	   inviting	   intonation	   contour	   (which	   was	   much	   less	  pronounced	  than	  before),	  nor	  qua	  being	  a	  context	  specific	  index	  inherent	  in	  the	  necessary	  steps	  of	   the	  activity	   (such	  as	   the	  noise	  and	  sight	  of	   the	  nappy	  strap	  being	  opened),	   rather	   it	  was	  condensed	   from	  the	   “thank	  you!”	  common	  to	   the	  acknowledgment	  phase	  of	  “co-­‐operative	  interchanges”,	   transposed	  to	  the	  front	  and	  used	  as	  a	  signal	  of	  request,	  invitation,	  or	  imperative	  in	  a	  generalised	  way	  for	  “co-­‐operative	  interchanges”	  across	  different	  activity	  contexts.	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5)	   While	   actions	   in	   general	   can	   be	   considered	   to	   share	   an	   over-­‐arching	  structure	   at	   the	   most	   global	   level,	   see	   above,	   clearly	   specific	   actions	   vary	  extensively	   in	   their	   structure	   and	   arc-­‐shaped	   contour,	   and	   can	   thus	   be	  distinguished	   from	   a	   different	   action	   having	   qualitatively	   different	   dynamics	  and	   accordingly	   play	   a	   different	   role	   in	   a	   larger	   context,	   which	   can	   be	  distinguished	   as	   a	   different	   “meaning”.	   This	   point	   seems	   obvious	   for	   the	  contours	   and	   trajectories	   of	   manual	   actions:	   throwing	   an	   object	   has	   a	  distinctively	   different	   action-­‐	   and	   control	   contour,	   and	   hence	   a	   different	  function	  or	   “meaning”	  within	  a	   larger	  context,	   than	  carefully	  putting	  an	  object	  into	  a	  confined	  space;	  showing	  differs	  from	  giving;	  setting	  a	  baby	  gym	  in	  motion	  with	   specific	   whole-­‐body	   movements	   has	   a	   different	   contour	   than	   lifting	   the	  bottom	  in	  nappy	  change;	  pulling	  the	  blanket	  over	  one’s	  head	  and	  back	  down	  to	  cover	  and	  uncover	  the	  face	  in	  peekaboo	  has	  a	  different	  contour	  than	  pulling	  the	  blanket	  over	  one’s	  head	  to	  go	  to	  sleep;	  a	  command	  or	  threat	  uttered	  in	  a	  playful	  voice	  has	  a	  different	  dynamic	  and	  meaning	  than	  one	  shouted	  in	  the	  fearful	  tone	  of	  emergency,	  etc.	  (compare	  with,	  and	  note	  the	  difference	  to,	  Stern,	  2010).	  6)	   The	   intuitive	   form	   of	   action	   arcs	   allows	   specific	   actions	   to	   be	   enacted	  together,	   repeatedly,	   in	   a	   consistent	   and	   understandable	   way,	   and	   hence	   to	  become	  established	  as	  a	  common	  shared	  routine.	  Once	  established	  as	  a	  routine,	  the	  actions	  become	  reified	  as	  a	  shared	  familiar	  structure	  providing	  the	  material	  to	  jointly	  relate	  to,	   in	  other	  words	  reflectively	  engage	  with,	  either	  commenting	  on	  and	  communicating	  about,	  or	  modifying	   the	  action.	  The	  arc	  shape	  suggests	  and	   helps	   to	   localize	   and	   co-­‐ordinate	   around	   specific	   points	   for	   joint	  engagement,	   typically	   located	   either	   at	   the	   (often	  delayed	   and	  hence	  marked)	  climax,	  or	  between	  the	  component	  arcs	  of	  an	  activity.	  	  Thus,	  establishing	  (a	  sequence	  of)	  action	  arcs	  as	  a	  shared	  routine	  facilitates	  the	  development	  of	   joint	  reflective	  engagement,	  crucial	   for	  establishing	  a	   joint	  focus	   of	   concern,	   and	   hence	   triadic	   engagement,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   resulting	   joint	  negotiation	  of	  activities.	  	  7)	   There	   have	   been	  many	   efforts,	   in	   particular	   in	   the	   20th	   century	  with	   its	  major	  interest	  in	  formal	  structures,	  to	  characterize	  the	  organizational	  structure	  of	   activities,	   which	   form	   the	   larger	   context	   of	   -­‐	   and	   hence	   give	   meaning	   to	   -­‐	  particular	  actions	  or	  utterances.	  How	  do	  participants	  come	  to	  know	  (often	  put	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in	   terms	   of	   “representation”)	   and	   master	   such	   complex	   structures,	   that	   is,	  participate	  in,	  co-­‐create,	  transform,	  and	  further	  develop	  them,	  e.g.,	  by	  newly	  re-­‐combining	  or	   transferring	  components	  between	  contexts.	  These	  efforts	  mostly	  emerged	  from	  struggles	  with	  the	  (logic-­‐based)	  analysis	  of	  (primarily	  linguistic)	  meaning,	  where	  meaning	  could	  not	  be	  accounted	  for	  in	  terms	  of	  (the	  meanings	  of)	   its	   constituents,	   and	  with	   the	   directly	   related	   problem	   of	   how	   (language)	  “meaning”	  is	  learned	  (by	  infants	  or	  by	  computers)	  and	  taught.	  Reviewing	  these	  accounts	  (from	  Wittgenstein	  to	  Bateson,	  Goffman,	  Minsky…)	  goes	   unfortunately	   well	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   present	   work.	   For	   our	  purposes,	   we	   note	   that	   these	   accounts	   have	   in	   common	   is	   that	   they	   are	  relatively	  abstract,	  be	  it	  an	  arbitrary,	  albeit	  structured,	  list	  of	  events	  of	  actions	  in	  the	   case	   of	   Schank	   &	   Abelson’s	   scripts	   (Schank	   &	   Abelson,	   1977),	   be	   it	   a	  hierarchically	  branching	  structure-­‐tree,	  as	  Bruner’s	  famous	  depiction	  of	  peek-­‐a-­‐boo	   adapting	   Chomsky’s	   syntax	   tree	   (Bruner	   and	   Watson,	   1983).	   While	  capturing	  the	  analytic	  insight	  of	  the	  researcher,	  such	  framing	  of	  activities	  does	  not	  give	  us	  any	  clue	  to	  how	  infants	  may	  learn	  such	  complex	  multi-­‐step	  actions,	  whose	  goals	  may	  not	  even	  be	  apparent	  to	  them.	  We	  suggest	  that	  jointly	  moving	  through	  action	  arcs	  may	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  to	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  apparently	  “simple”	  dyadic	  interactions,	  and	  “complex”	  “cognitive”	  triadic	  interactions:	  we	  propose	  that	  infants	  can	  learn	  new	  complex	  object-­‐	   and/or	   conventional	   actions,	   including	   sequences	   of	   sub-­‐actions	   and	  distributed	   roles,	   even	   without	   knowing	   the	   goal	   and	   instrumental	   steps	  towards	   it,	   if	   those	   complex	   actions	   are	   mapped	   onto	   familiar	   shared	   action	  arcs,	  anchoring	  and	  locating	  object-­‐related	  and	  role-­‐specific	  sub-­‐actions	  in	  their	  affect-­‐imbued,	   dynamically	   predictable	   arc	   structure,	   thus	   creating	   a	   complex	  shared	   and	  embodied	  –	   and	  hence	  meaningful	   –	   action(land)scape	   (see	   figure	  6.3).	  	  Thus	  the	  concept	  of	   jointly	  moving	  through	  action	  arcs	  provides	  a	  potential	  (set	   of)	   learning	  mechanism(s)	   at	   a	  meso-­‐level,	   a	   key	  missing	  bridge	  between	  local	  learning	  mechanisms	  based	  on	  association	  (as	  e.g.	  described	  by	  Rączaszek-­‐Leonardi	  	  et	  al.	  2013;	  and	  captured	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  adjacency	  pairs	  by	  Heller	  &	  Rohlfing,	   2017),	   and	   how	   infants	   navigate,	   parse,	   and	   learn	   the	   complex	  structures	   of	   larger	   activities	   at	   multiple	   levels	   in	   a	   meaningful	   way	   –	   and	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through	  this	  may	  even	  come	  to	  know	  goals	  of	  activities	  and	  intentions	  of	  other	  people.	  	  
	  
Figure	   6.3:	   Understanding	   complex	   actions	   through	   mapping	   them	   on	   affect-­‐imbued	   shared	  action	  arcs	  	  
6.8 Shifting	   the	  perspective	   from	  triadic	   interaction	   to	   jointly	   structuring	  
shared	  multi-­‐modal	  sense-­‐and-­‐action(land)scapes.	  Linking	  these	  results	  and	  interpretations	  back	  to	  the	  development	  of	  triadic	  interactions,	  we	  thus	  suggest	  that	  the	  third	  pole	  in	  triadic	  interaction,	  which	  we	  assume	   emerges,	   crystallizes,	   and	   differentiates	   gradually	   over	   time,	   is	   not	  simply	  a	  single	  object	  –	  indeed,	  successful	  object	  labelling	  marks	  only	  the	  easily	  visible	  tip	  of	  an	  much	  larger	  iceberg.	  Rather,	  the	  third	  pole	  is	  constituted	  by	  the	  jointly	   established	   interaction	   structures	   (including	   action	   arcs)	   themselves,	  forming	  a	  shared	  orientation	  framework,	  a	  sense-­‐and-­‐action-­‐(land)scape,	  (parts	  of)	  which	  in	  the	  course	  of	  being	  enacted	  may	  be	  manifested	  in	  and	  hence	  tied	  to	  material	  objects,	  body	  parts,	  etc.	  However,	  objects	  (self,	  other,	  as	  well	  as	  specific	  activity	   sub-­‐parts	   and	   the	   specific	   roles	   they	  may	  be	   assigned	   to)	   all	   get	   their	  jointly	   established	   meanings	   (including	   at	   some	   point	   the	   symbolic	   and	  conventional	  aspects	  thereof)	  through	  their	  place	  in	  such	  a	  dynamic,	  constantly	  jointly	  refined	  shared	  orientation	  framework.	  Jointly	  enacted	  action	  arcs	  are	  the	  first	   basic	   version	   of	   these	   jointly	   created	   orientation	   frameworks,	   affect-­‐imbued,	  shared,	  predictable	  and	  hence	  meaningful	  –	  and	  over	  time	  differentiate	  into	   rich	   jointly	   created	   and	   systemically	   structured	   sense-­‐and-­‐action(land)scapes	  co-­‐weaving	  the	  substrate	  of	  culture.	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7 General	  Discussion	  The	   results	   from	   conceptual	   and	   empirical	   analysis	   accumulating	   over	   the	  course	  of	  the	  thesis	  culminated	  in	  a	  change	  of	  framework:	  Typically	  participation,	  joint	  action,	  co-­‐ordination,	  and	  triadic	  interaction	  are	  all	  conceived	  of	  in	  a	  cognitive	  and	  rational	  way.	  Put	  in	  a	  slightly	  oversimplified	  nutshell:	  co-­‐ordination	   is	  considered	  trivial	  with	  respect	   to	  motor	  control	  (e.g.	  gaze-­‐alternation),	   but	   requires	   a	   lot	   of	   knowledge:	   1)	   to	   be	   motivated	   to	  perform	  action	  co-­‐ordination	  at	  all	  (one	  needs	  to	  know	  that	  other	  people	  have	  goals,	   intentions,	   beliefs	   in	   order	   to	   be	  motivated	   to	   engage	   in	   joint	   attention	  and	  perform	  gaze	  alternations	  to	  see	  where	  they	  are	   looking),	  and	  2)	  to	  select	  the	  right	  “building	  block”	  in	  a	  serial	  sequence	  of	  actions	  (one	  needs	  to	  know	  the	  complex	  hierarchical	  structure	  and	  role	  distribution	  to	  appropriately	  contribute	  to	   the	  action	   sequence)	   (e.g.	  Tomasello	   et	   al.	   2005,	  Knoblich	  et	   al.	   2011,	   etc.).	  What	  –	  taking	  a	  closer	  look	  –	  all	  these	  activities	  seem	  to	  have	  in	  common	  is	  that	  they	  require	   the	  ability	   to	   “take	   into	  account	   the	  relations	  between	  “things”,	  a	  characteristic	   neatly	   and	  minimally	   captured	   in	   the	   image	   of	   the	   “triad”:	   one	  node	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  other	  two	  nodes.	  But	  if	  triadic	  interaction	   is	   the	   door	   to	   participation	   and	   is	   supposed	   to	   rest	   on	   joint	  attention,	   itself	   considered	   to	   depend	   on	   complex,	   relational	   knowledge	   (e.g.	  understanding	  people	  as	  intentional	  agents	  with	  distinct	  goals),	  then	  it	  becomes	  hard	   to	   account	   for	   the	   development	   of	   these	   abilities	   (except	   claiming	   their	  sudden	  emergence).	  To	  briefly	  summarize	   cognitive	  approaches:	   the	   infant	  
has	  to	  know	  in	  order	  to	  participate.	  	  Here,	   however,	   following	   theoretical	   and	   empirical	   analysis,	   we	   shift	   the	  framework	  to	  a	  more	  embodied	  and	  situated	  perspective	  (in	  line	  with,	  building	  on	   and	   further	   developing	   approaches	   such	   as:	   Alač,	   2005;	   Bühler	   1927;	   De	  Barbaro	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  De	   Jaegher	  &	  Di	  Paolo,	  2007;	  Goodwin,	  2013;	  Fantasia	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Rączaszek-­‐Leonardi	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Reddy,	  2008;	  Rogoff,	  1990;	  Rohlfing	  et	   al.,	   2016;	  Yu	  &	  Smith,	   2013;	   Zukow-­‐Goldring,	   2012):	   From	   this	  perspective	  the	   challenges	   the	   infant	   has	   to	   master	   to	   fully	   participate	   as	   a	   competent	  member	  in	  complex	  cultural	  activities	  are	  1)	  action	  control	  and	  co-­‐ordination,	  on	   many	   levels,	   intra	   and	   interpersonally,	   as	   well	   as	   2)	   being	   oriented	   in	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complex	   shared	   action	   structures	   and	   sense-­‐and-­‐action-­‐scapes.	   However	  from	  this	  perspective,	  we	  can	  also	  suggest	  a	  pathway,	  how	  the	  infant	  might	  be	  able	   to	   get	   there:	   generally,	   via	   participation.	   The	   infant	   participates	   in	  
order	  to	  know.	  	  From	   this	   perspective	   and	   based	   on	   our	   video	   data	   analysis	   we	   can	  tentatively	  outline	  participation	  as:	  appropriately	  contributing	  a	  specific	  action	  
to	   a	   shared,	   larger,	   structured,	   meaningful	   whole,	   as	   a	   socially	   legitimate	  
participant	   (also	   compare	   Rogoff,	   1990;	   Lave	  &	  Wenger,	   1991).	   This	  working	  definition	   can	   serve	   as	   a	   common	   framework	   capturing	   both:	   1)	   the	   complex	  interactions	  emerging	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  first	  year,	  typically	  set	  apart	  from	  earlier	  ones	  as	  “triadic”:	  e.g.	  giving	  and	  taking,	   following	   instructions,	  pointing	  to	  and	  labelling	  objects	  etc.	  However,	  instead	  of	  accounting	  for	  them	  in	  terms	  of	  “a	   third	   pole	   entering”,	   or	   “co-­‐ordinating	   engagement	   with	   and	   taking	   into	  account	   the	   relation	   between	   two	   things”,	   we	   rather	   put	   these	   forms	   of	  interaction	   into	   a	   larger	   context	   and	   suggest	   to	   conceive	   of	   them	   as	   “being	  orientated	  within	  a	   complex	  activity	   structure”	   and	   “actively	   contributing	   in	   a	  co-­‐ordinated	  way”	   (compare	   section	  6.8.).	  And	   this	  also	  allows	  us	   to	   take	   into	  account	   2)	   earlier	   forms	   of	   participation	   at	   different	   levels	   of	   complexity:	  differentiating	   how	   both	   the	   infants’	   contributions	   as	  well	   as	   the	   “structured,	  meaningful	  whole”	   start	   out	   simple	   and	   grow	   increasingly	   complex	   over	   time	  allows	  us	  to	  better	  account	  for	  development.	  Moreover	  3)	  the	  framework	  points	  out	  the	  meaningful	  activity	  structure	  as	  a	  scaffold	  or	  container	  supporting	  this	  increasing	  differentiation.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	   in	  chapter	  4,	  caregivers	  –	   from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  study	  –	  invited	  and	  drew	  infants	  into	  participation	  in	  nearly	  all	  ecological	   activity	   contexts	   (except	   delicate	   ones	   such	   as	   bathing	   or	   when	  putting	  the	  baby	  to	  bed).	  They	  performed	  verbal	  utterances	  and	  gestures,	  which	  we	   as	   competent	   members	   of	   the	   culture	   recognize	   as	   markers	   organizing	  particular	   cultural	   scripts	   and	   interaction	   formats,	  but	  which	   to	  young	   infants	  do	   not	   mean	   anything	   yet.	   We	   suggest,	   however,	   that	   orientation	   within	   a	  “meaningful	  whole”	  is	  provided	  and	  enabled	  by	  affect	  imbued	  action	  arcs,	  which	  caregivers	  shape	  their	  actions	  into,	  helping	  infants	  to	  orient	  and	  drawing	  them	  into	   participation	   from	   the	   beginning.	  We	   further	   suggest	   that	   by	  mapping	   of	  novel	  complex	  actions	  (with	  their	  conventional	  markers)	  onto	  the	  familiar	  affect	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imbued	   action	   arcs	   caregivers	  make	   these	   complex	   actions	   understandable	   to	  the	   infants.	   Over	   time	   they	   create	   shared	   sense-­‐and-­‐action-­‐scapes,	   which	   are	  embodied	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   systemically	   structured,	   allowing	   the	  participants	  to	  orient	  each	  other	  towards	  distinct	  locations	  within	  these	  shared	  networks	  of	  meaning,	  which	  may	  serve	  as	  a	  basis	  for	   joint	  action,	  cooperation,	  and	  symbol	  use.	  	  This	   is	   only	   a	   rough	   sketch,	   which	   invites	   further	   exploration,	   thorough	  testing,	   and	  which	  we	   need	   to	   understand	   in	  more	   detail.	   Also	   our	   empirical	  study	  was	  limited	  in	  many	  respects:	  while	  naturalistic	  longitudinal	  studies	  bring	  us	  close	  to	  real	  life,	  helping	  us	  to	  come	  up	  with	  a	  better	  estimation	  of	  the	  range	  of	  activities	  infants	  participate	  in,	  and	  while	  qualitative	  micro-­‐analysis	  allows	  us	  to	   capture	   the	   co-­‐ordination	  of	   interaction	   as	   is	   unfolds	  over	   time	   in	   intricate	  detail,	   their	   results	   are	   hard	   to	   generalize.	   Engaging	   in	   a	   time	   and	   labour	  intensive	   research	   method	   we	   can	   work	   with	   only	   a	   small	   sample	   size	   of	  participants	  who	  also	  may	  not	  be	  representative	   for	  the	  wider	  population:	   the	  16	  families	  of	  our	  study	  (6	  pilot,	  10	  main	  study)	  were	  not	  only	  all	  coming	  from	  UK	  and	  Austria	  reflecting	  Western	  and	  Middle	  European	  culture,	  they	  also	  were	  all	   middle	   class	   families,	   which	   e.g.	   might	   make	   them	   overly	   biased	   towards	  nudging	   their	   infants	   into	   specific	  ways	  of	   co-­‐ordination	  considered	  beneficial	  to	  their	  education,	  promising	  social	  advance	  (Bourdieu,	  2013).	  Thus	  –	  in	  order	  to	  get	  a	  better	  understanding	  of	  the	  varieties	  of	  infant	  participation	  in	  complex	  cultural	  activities	  and	  their	  co-­‐ordination	  –	  the	  study	  will	  have	  to	  be	  considered	  in	  a	  larger	  context	  together	  with	  studies	  including	  different	  groups,	  who	  might	  engage	   in	   different	   ecological	   activity	   contexts	   using	   different	   forms	   of	   co-­‐ordination	  (as	  indicated	  e.g.	  by	  Keller,	  Völker,	  &	  Yovsi,	  2005,	  indicating	  that	  Nso	  mothers’	   interactions	  did	  not	   get	  more	  object	   oriented	  between	   three	   and	   six	  months).	  And	  even	  within	  our	  small	  sample,	  with	  a	  sampling	  rate	  of	  half	  a	  day	  visits	  once	  a	  month,	  while	  providing	  many	  hours	  of	  rich	  video	  data,	  we	  only	  get	  a	   few	   glimpses	   into	   highly	   complex	   non-­‐linear	   processes	   of	   development	  (Thelen	   &	   Smith,	   1994).	   Not	   imposing	   control	   on	   the	   interactions,	   the	   study	  provides	   a	  more	   realistic	   but	   also	   highly	   variable	   sample	   of	   infant-­‐caregiver-­‐object	   interactions,	   making	   it	   hard	   to	   (in	   particular	   quantitatively)	   compare	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interactions	   between	   different	   families,	   or	   even	   within	   the	   same	   family	   at	  different	  points	  in	  time.	  However,	  observing	  co-­‐ordination	  in	  detail,	  analysing,	  and	  describing	  which	  actions	   and	   forms	   of	   co-­‐ordination	   occur	   (or	   do	   not	   occur),	   comparing	   them	  across	  different	   contexts	   and	   tracing	   their	   change	  over	  multiple	   time	  points	   –	  this	  method	  allows	  us	  to	  come	  up	  with	  new	  questions,	  a	  tentative	  trajectory	  for	  the	   development	   of	   joint	   object	   actions,	   and	   concrete	   hypotheses	   which	   lend	  themselves	  to	  testing	  and	  further	  investigation:	  	   -­‐ How	  are	  the	  respective	  modalities	  utilized	  and	  playing	  together	  during	  action-­‐co-­‐ordination	  depending	  on	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  respective	  contexts	  and	  the	  characteristics	  of	  the	  respective	  modality?	  -­‐ Can	  we	  show	  the	  infant’s	  gaze	  becoming	  anticipatory	  as	  routines	  get	  established?	  -­‐ How	  do	  eye-­‐hand	  co-­‐ordination,	  co-­‐ordination	  between	  multiple	  action	  strands	  and	  social	  co-­‐ordination	  between	  participants	  play	  together?	  	  -­‐ Is	  it	  possible	  to	  make	  the	  bodily	  action	  aspects	  of	  action	  arcs	  measurable	  with	  the	  help	  of	  e.g.	  a	  motion	  capture	  system?	  	  -­‐ Can	  we	  test	  and	  manipulate	  the	  functional	  role	  and	  effect	  of	  action-­‐arcs	  for	  infants’	  understanding,	  participation	  and	  learning?	  -­‐ …	  To	  address	  these	  questions,	  among	  the	  next	  steps	  is	  taking	  selected	  activities	  from	   some	   of	   the	   ecological	   activity	   contexts	   infants	   are	   typically	   involved	   in	  into	   the	   laboratory	   to	   investigate	   them	   in	  more	   detail	   under	  more	   controlled	  conditions.	   We	   are	   piloting	   data	   collection	   technologies	   such	   as	   lightweight	  mobile	   gaze	   and	   motion	   tracking	   to	   allow	   1)	   staging	   semi-­‐naturalistic	  interactions	  in	  more	  lab-­‐setting	  and	  2)	  conversely,	  taking	  these	  tools	  out	  of	  the	  lab,	   to	  enrich	   the	  possibilities	  of	   flexible	  home	  visits	  and	   to	  combine	  engaging	  with	  rich	  real	  life	  situations	  with	  measurement.	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